2-1. The ecosystems of the seas surrounding China are divided into three distinct ecosystems the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Research exists on the boundaries among these ecosystems, though the data on the East China Sea is seriously out of date. We would like to conduct a survey with the support of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The Yellow Sea is a semi-enclosed sea and its ecosystem is closely related to that of the East China Sea. The South China Sea and the East China Sea are connected via the Taiwan Straits. However the East China Sea is under the influence of an ocean current in east area of the Pacific Ocean, and we can say that the East China Sea is divided from the South China Sea. Although reliable information about pollution in the South China Sea is not easy to come by, the situation is especially grave around Shanghai.

2-2. A legal framework already exists for cooperation in regional seas, including the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan. This framework is called the Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP), a program of UNEP. Although the list of participants includes China, South Korea, North Korea, Russia and Japan, unfortunately it has so far proven largely ineffective. With the significant changes unfolding in North Korea these days, with a little extra effort a stronger cooperative relationship might soon be possible. At this point, however, it is most important to maintain dialog.

　

2-3. A more active consultative body is the Partnership in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA). This plan is a joint initiative of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and IMO. PEMSEA operates in a scenes of five-year plans, the first of which started in 1994 and the second of which started in 1999. Key members of the partnership are the government agencies of each country, particularly those associated with the oceans and the environment.

2-4. In accordance wlth the spirit of Article 43 of UNCLOS, each country that uses or profits from the Straits of Malacca is obliged to cooperate with the coastal states to improve the safety of passage and the quality of the marine environment. Unfortunately only Japan has made actual financial contributions to coastal states. Other than a few conferences in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur organized by IMG, few specific actions have taken place. We believe that concerned nations need to pay closer attention to the implementation of Article 43 in the Straits of Malacca.

　

2-5. To learn more about how to proceed in implementing Article 43, particularly with respect to the Straits of Malacca, the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) is carrying out research in partnership with a university in Singapore. It is believed that obtaining the necessary cooperation with the countries that use the Straits will take considerable time. Although there is a desire for joint management of the Straits of Malacca, it is difficult to say who should do what or how responsibilities should be divided. The organization has yet to answer satisfactorily as to its expectations of countries and areas other than Japan, such as China, Taiwan and South Korea, or what burdens each should carry. The answer to the issues of the Straits of Malacca looks set to be a protracted one.

　

2-6. To fulfill the conditions of Article 43, user nations must participate in a joint-management framework for the Straits of Malacca. To date only Japan has responded favorably on this point. In addition to financial support, indirect collaboration through other forms of international cooperation must be initiated.

　

2-7. In terms of the safety of the Straits of Malacca, coastal states have offered significant support for navigational safety by installing navigation aids for shipping channels. Article 43 stipulates that states that use international channels must provide sufficient cooperation on the safety and environment of these bodies of water. Further dialog on this point would be valuable. Discussions have been held, most notably the conferences sponsored by Malaysia and Singapore and most recently the 1999 Straits of Malacca conference, but the tangible results of these talks were meager.

2-8. It has been proposed that environmental degradation be considered a threat to peace, calling for military measures to halt an act of aggression as provided in Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. The aerial bombardment in Kosovo, citing human-rights violation as a reason, was thought to justify military intervention by foreign powers-the largest such concerted action since the end of the cold war. There are doubts about the validity of human-rights violations as a reason for use of military force, as the implications are enormous. If military action were carried out elsewhere in the world in response to violations of human rights, in the same proportion as the action in Kosovo, the armed reprisals unleashed would be enormous. Similarly, environmental degradation is itself a crime against humanity. It is an international problem that no single country can tackle on its own. When acid rain falls, it falls everywhere in the world. In this sense environmental degradation is a crime against all humanity, and it is a crime that can lead to military confrontation if nothing is done about it.

2-9 Of course, the use of military force in response to environmental degradation must be considered a measure of last resort, to be deployed only after all other options have been exhausted. It is an interesting avenue to pursue, but it must be considered with great care. Certainly, environmental security is a vital component of national and international security, but calling for an armed response is a hard choice and one that we must only resort to if no other options are available.