1-1. The unidentified ship that sank in the East China Sea was clearly a spy vessel, and had thus infringed on Japan's sovereign rights by entering the nation's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In cases such as this, it is believed that Japan has an internationally recognized right to pursue, board and inspect such vessels, yet some suggest that Japan's reaction may have been excessive. The use of weapons must be avoided if at all possible, and if they must be used, they should be used as little as possible and in a humane manner. This incident spurred new debate as to whether the use of weapons in such cases was becoming all too common.

　

1-2. The unidentified ship in the East China Sea had been operating in Japan's EEZ, in accordance with laws regarding fishing operations. The Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) had ordered the vessel to stop so that it could board and search the ship, as provided under the Fisheries Law. When the vessel failed to respond, JCG opened fire. Naturally weapons should be used with the utmost prudence, but JCG recognized that the ship in question was armed and extremely dangerous.

1-3. In the pursuit of the unidentified ship in the East China Sea, we believe that a maritime security operation should have been announced. Northeast Asia is a region where various countries' EEZs overlap at many points. Japan needs to indicate clearly how it would respond to a clear and present threat from a neighboring country, with due consideration of the international implications.

　

1-4. According to the judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the use of force in an EEZ should be avoided as far as possible, and if such action is unavoidable then certain lines of appropriate conduct must not be crossed. Nonetheless these provisions do not completely prohibit the use of force. The intrusion of spy vessels is an extremely grave threat to national security.

　

1-5. When assessing whether to use force against an unidentified ship or spy vessel, it is important to establish whether the vessel has a purpose other than cruising through the waters in question. To warrant action, the vessel must be clearly recognized to be violating the coastal state's sovereignty. In the East China Sea incident, the unidentified ship was clearly not simply passing through, nor is it thought to have been engaged in extraction of marine resources-and it fired on a patrol vessel.

　

1-6. One problem in general principle is whether military action in a broad sense, including espionage, is permissible in EEZs under the law of the sea. The United States conducts reconnaissance missions in China's EEZ over 400 times a year. Japan and South Korea argue that North Korea's spying activities are a grave problem, justifying a solution through military action, but they need to argue their case in terms of international law. One problem is that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is vague on many points until those points are clarified, however, a prudent stance is best.

　

1-7. Japan is extremely discreet in its use of force. The government convened a cabinet meeting to decide to mobilize the maritime security operation. A great deal of time is taken in analysis before the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF)'s P3C can determine the sighting of an unidentified ship.

1-8. The United States explicitly recognizes international law in the case of military action in EEZs. Strictly adhering to its rights and responsibilities with respect to resources in its EEZ, the United States accepts the principle of freedom of navigation. Like China, the United States conducts military activities within other countries' EEZ. The clear difference in the case of North Korea is that North Korea disguises its military vessels as fishing ships and even flies the flags of other countries. In effect, these are pirate vessels. Some provision has to be made for dealing with countries that behave in this manner.

　

1-9. For maritime powers, one major threat is that many coastal states are tending toward a broader interpretation of UNCLOS. Steadily expanding their jurisdiction, many states are staking unlimited rights within their 200-nautical-mile territorial limits. If all Asian countries insist on a 200-mile limit, overlapping among these territories from north to south will be considerable, creating numerous conflicts of national interest. Nations must cooperate to abide strictly by the terms of UNCLOS, rather than interpreting the treaty unilaterally to extend their territorial claims.

　

1-10. India and the United States have recently conducted joint patrols in the Straits of Malacca. Coastal states cooperate in this venture to prevent any conflicts of interest from arising.

　

1-11. In the 1988 Rome Convention, the right to control piracy as well as terrorism at sea was recognized. Japan, China, South Korea, India and the United States have already ratified the Convention. Given a more sensitive approach, it is thought that the number of ratifying countries could increase. Singapore and Malaysia have now ratified and Indonesia is expected to follow suit. In our opinion, this is an excellent Convention that fills in a lot of important spaces that had been left blank for too long, and the reluctance of some states to ratify it is frankly puzzling.

　

1-12. Some 85% of the container traffic bound for the United States passes through at one of 20 of the world's major ports. If inspection of these 85% of containers could be speeded up, the inspection of the remaining 15% would be greatly accelerated as well.

1-13. Four to five years ago, a container inspection system was developed, called the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS). The system uses X-rays to obtain high-resolution photographs of the cargo inside containers. The system is not harmful to the cargo. A wide range of VACIS systems exist. In one system, the containers are inspected by X-ray photography while traveling on freight trains at 10km/h. The motivation for such "non-invasive" inspection procedures are clear: Just opening the doors of a container costs half an hour of the port' s time. If all 6 million of the containers that enter American ports each year had to be opened up, the country's trade would grind to a halt.

　

1-14. If drugs are held in a container, sensors should be able to detect them. Chemical sensors can be used to detect harmful chemicals. In practice, however, inspection for and detection of lethal biological weapons such as the anthrax bacillus is exceedingly difficult.