Subparagraph (b) is introduced to enhance compatibility between Part XI and VI. The wording is taken over from Article 77.4 of the Convention.

　Subparagraph (c) is to keep the Convention in line with the latest development in deep sea-bed research and exploration.

　

　By simplifying this Article, an attempt has been made to de-emphasize the territorial aspect of the Authority's mandate and emphasize the functional aspect.

　

　In these Articles, Articles 137, 140, 141 and 145 of the Convention have been regrouped as these Articles, somewhat dispersed in the Convention, define the principle of the Common Heritage: Non-appropriability; management for the benefit of humankind as a whole; reservation for peaceful purposes, and conservation of resources and environment for future generations.

　

　Also, a reference to the more recent Conventions on Climate and Biodiversity as well as the evolving Regional Seas Conventions, has been introduced, since the sea-bed mining regime created by this Part will have to interact with the regimes created by these other Conventions.

　

　A few minor changes are suggested what in the Convention was Article 143, on Marine Scientific Research.

　

　Part XI does not provide for any institutional mechanism through which the Authority could conduct marine scientific research in the Area. The idea evidently was that research should be contracted for. But given the fundamental importance of scientific research, applied research, and research and development, for the Authority and for the Enterprise, in whatever form it shall survive, it is suggested that the Authority should make “the appropriate institutional arrangements to enable it to do so.” This phrasing is broad enough to cover institutional arrangements both with other institutions or within the Authority itself.

　

　Cooperation with the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO in marine scientific research in the deep ocean appears natural. This would include the role of the deep sea-bed and its volcanic activities in the carbon dioxide cycle and its impact on the climate.

　

　There is no UN forum that has paid any attention to the implementation of Articles 276 and 277 of the Convention, mandating the establishment of these Centres. obviously they would be extremely useful, particularly in regional seas bordered by developing countries, for human resource development and technology cooperation and development. If, in the next century, such a Centre were to be established in the Caribbean, its close cooperation with the Jamaica Authority would be mutually beneficial. The Authority should have organic links with all Regional Centres that should be established next century for the development of environmentally and socially sustainable development.

　

　It is not so much the “dissemination” of research results that needs to be coordinated: It is the conduct of scientific research that needs to be coordinated. The sentence has been recast in that sense.

　

　In the present situation and the foreseeable future, the Authority should give priority to the enhancement and the internationalisation of marine scientific research and technology development for deep-sea research and exploration as these are the activities carried out today by he most technologically advanced countries. international cooperation in the development of the high technologies required will have a confidence-building effect and facilitate industrial cooperation at a later stage.

　

　Article 142 is a simplified version of Article 144 in the Convention which is somewhat redundant, the essence being that, through international co-operation, technology should be “transferred” to the Authority, and, through the Authority, to developing countries.

　

　The new feature in this Article is the encouragement to establish joint management zones or joint development zones in an area between 300 and 400 miles off the coast of a coastal State where the exact limit of the continental shelf may be very difficult, costly and time consuming to determine. If, instead, broad-shelf States were ready to “freeze” their claims (without renouncing them) and to establish such joint zones, the Convention could dispense with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which would constitute a considerable financial saving.

　

　Article 146 is new, inspired by the desire to make the Authority as useful, especially to developing countries, as soon as possible.

　

　In accordance with more recent developments, in particular the Barbados Conference (1994) on Small Island Developing States, these States have been added to the other disadvantaged States needing special consideration.

　

　Section 3 of Part XI, entitled “Development of Resources of the Area,” and comprising Articles 150-155, has been radically reconceptualized. In the Convention, the Articles covering policies relating to activities in the Area (Article 150), including Production policies (Article 151), are narrowly geared to the exploration and exploitation of manganese nodules in a precisely limited geographical Area. This concept is obsolete. An International Sea-Bed Authority for the 21st Century must have a vastly broadened scope. Policies must cover international cooperation in scientific research in the deep sea, research and development of the necessary technologies; exploration and production, not restricted to manganese nodules but including all deep-sea resources. The policy framework must be such as to make the Authority relevant, in step with the most advanced scientific and technological developments, and immediately useful to the international community, and especially to poor countries. The policy framework must be in accordance with the new concepts generated by UNCED and post-UNCED developments (sustainable development, biodiversity, climate, eradication of poverty which are in fact fully compatible with the principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind. The Common Heritage of Mankind principle, furthermore, must not remain restricted to a few preambulary articles, but it must permeate the policy framework.

　

　Article 153 departs from the Parallel system, which was an unfortunate political compromise: the least practical and cost-effective system that could have been devised. Now that the parallel system has, for all practical purposes been abolished by the Implementation Agreement -- leaving for the foreseeable future, States and their companies as the only operators in the Area -- the time has come to think of a better system for the next century. There is now a general agreement, included also in the Implementation Agreement (Section 2, paragraph 2), that the Enterprise, if and when it becomes operational, should operate through joint ventures. UNCLOS III, as well as the Prepcom., has produced quite a literature on joint ventures between companies as well as between States, and there are precedents where intergovernmental organisations have quite successfully built the private sector into a joint-venture relationship with the intergovernmental structure. In the following section, the INMARSAT statute has been used as a model. This model was brought to the attention of UNCLOS III by the Delegation of Austria back in 1977, during an intercessional meeting in Geneva under the chairmanship of Ambassador Jens Evensen of Norway, who included it in his report to the First Committee. Many Delegations expressed interest in this approach -- but the decision had already been taken in favour of the Parallel System, and there was a resistance against change.

　

　The concept of review conferences, abolished by the Implementation Agreement, has been re-instated (Article 154). Most modern Conventions contain provisions for review conferences at regular intervals, to keep the Convention relevant and in step with ongoing changes. Actually, there should be such a provision for the Law of the Sea Convention as a whole, among the Final Provisions in Part XVII. An “Amendment Conference” -- dealing with specific amendments, not a review of the Convention as a whole -- may be called ten years after the entry into force of the Convention (in 2004) ; but this is not the same as a systematic review at regular intervals.

　

　The nature and principles of the Authority have been modified. The principle of the Common Heritage, underlying that of sustainable development, is as basic to the Authority as the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members.

　

　The composition, powers and functions of the Assembly remain basically unchanged. Reference to “interests” to be represented in subsidiary organs [(d)] has been omitted. The Authority is a political, intergovernmental institution with broad responsibilities which it must meet in an independent and objective fashion. Of course it will be aware of “interests,” but these must not be built into its organs. Reference to the “competence” of members of subsidiary bodies has also been omitted. It is self-understood that the members of subsidiary bodies must be competent in the area with which they are to deal. This special requirement seems somewhat demeaning and patronising towards developing countries.

　

　The two budgetary specifications in (f)(i) and (ii) in the Convention have been omitted. They are subsumed in the new (g) which is comprehensive. This was done in response to the general need to streamline the text and unburden it from excessive detail.

　

　The new subparagraph (j) has been made more comprehensive and comprises, in a more general form, the functions described under (k) and (l) in the Convention.

　

　Article 161 of the Convention, establishing the composition, procedure and voting in the Council, has been greatly streamlined. Recalling the ordeal of the election of the first Council in 1995-6, and based on the desire not to repeat this demeaning experience, the “chamber system,” as well as the representation of interest groups has been abandoned. Financial interest groups are represented, in proportion to their investment, on the joint-venture boards of the Enterprise system. The Authority -- let it be repeated -- is an intergovernmental, political, institution with broad responsibilities of a scientific, technological, economic, environmental nature. Interest groups have no place in its organs. One should add to this that a Convention should retain its basic validity for as long as possible whereas interest groups may change very quickly. E.g., extending the functions of the Authority from nodule mining to a broader range of activities, which is essential if the Authority is to remain relevant, will necessarily change the “interest groups.”

　

　The Enterprise System will make a lot of detailed investment and related financial decisions. The decision-making of the Council will be of a broader and more political nature. The decision-making process has been stream-lined accordingly.

　

　The powers and functions of the Council have been stream-lined as much as possible. Most of the provisions of the Convention remain relevant. Subparagraph (u) includes among the responsibilities of the Inspectorate verification of compliance with the reservation for peaceful purposes of the Area. Since this is a fundamental principle of the Convention, whose implementation is to be reviewed by the periodic review conferences, compliance must be monitored.

　

　Considering the fundamental importance of science and technology for the activities of the Authority, the establishment of a Scientific and Technological Commission has been suggested here. This is in line with more recent Conventions, such as the Climate and Biodiversity Conventions.

　

　In accordance with the Implementation Agreement, a Finance Committee is already being established. It is here called a “Commission” rather than a “Committee,” just as a matter of editorial consistency.

　

　This article has been adapted from the Biodiversity Convention.

　

　In accordance with Section 1, paragraph 4, of the Annex to the Implementation Agreement, the functions of the Economic Planning Commission and the Legal and Technical Commission have been merged. And adapted to the broader scope of the Convention.

　

　This article is taken over and adapted from the Implementation Agreement.

　

　The structure of the Enterprise System is adapted from the Statutes of the International Maritime Satellite Organization, INMARSAT. which has successfully integrated the private sector into the structure of a public international organisation. The difference is that INMARSAT is a single-purpose organisation, so that the Signatories are structured into the Council of the Organization. The whole organization functions as an Enterprise.

　

　The Sea-Bed Authority is a multi-purpose system, with an operational subsystem. The Council has many responsibilities which are beyond the scope of the operational subsystem. It is therefore at the level of the subsystem that the Signatories must be integrated into the structure. It is this level that is the commercial level, at which financial and other commercial interests must be safeguard. and reflected in the decision-making system.

　

　This system, which transcends the illusory “parallel system,” already abolished, for all practical purposes, by the Implementation agreement, should be acceptable both to the friends of the Enterprise, since there is now a consensus that a joint-venture approach is the only solution to the problems of the Enterprise; it should be equally acceptable to the friends of the private sector; for, if the private sector functions well within the two-tier (States Parties/ - Signatories) joint venture system of INMARSAT, there is no reason why it should not function equally well in an analogous system applied to the Enterprise.

　

　The Enterprise system is decentralized and flexible, reflecting the multi-purpose nature of the International Sea-Bed Authority. Each joint-venture agreement will be tailored to the specific needs of each Enterprise, the mode of its financing and its activities.

　

　This article is adapted from the Statutes of INMARSAT.

　

　In the remaining articles only minor editorial adaptations have been made.