The institutional framework, then, is the second basic component of ocean governance. Some of it is pre-designed by the Law of the Sea Convention itself, and, to a large extent, has been realized. Most of it is indicated, though not fully spelled out, in the Brundtland Report⁵ and further developed in the documents emanating from the Earth Summit, 1992, especially in Agenda 21, which deals with institution building in every one of its 34 Chapters. FAO has created a number of regional fisheries commissions; IMO has not given rise to new institutions.

　The Convention established four institutions:

　

　

　The Convention also mandated the establishment of regional centers for the advancement of marine science and technology, but these have not yet been implemented.

　

　

　The International Sea-bed Authority has seen very difficult times. Some of the difficulties it had to face were of a political nature, but the root cause of all the difficulties was over-concentration on, and limitation to, manganese nodule mining, which, in reality was not going to take place for the foreseeable future, while, at the same time, exciting new discoveries were made, of resources other than the nodules, such as Massive Seafloor Sulphides, Genetic Resources, or methane hydrates, but they all remained completely outside the scope of the Authority's activities.

　

　The Authority spent its first few years on the elaboration of a code of rules and regulations for the prospecting and exploration of manganese nodules, which may not find much immediate practical application.

　

　Over the last twenty years, the International Ocean Institute has done quite a bit of work trying to find ways for the Authority to keep up with the changing scientific, economic, and technological situation and to adjust the scope of its activities in an evolutionary manner. In cooperation with the Delegation of Austria, a proposal was elaborated and presented to the Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“the Prepcom”) in 1984 and 1985, for the establishment of a Joint Enterprise for Exploration, Research And Development, JEFERAD, for the exploration of a first mine site for the Authority's Enterprise (“reserved area”). This proposal is part of the Official Record of the Prepcom.⁶ A similar proposal was developed by the IOI in cooperation with the Delegation of Colombia, in a series of papers entitled The International Enterprise, 1987-1988.⁷ The purpose of this JEFERAD or International Enterprise would have been cost sharing and reduction, and spreading of risk; creating new and additional funding through generating synergies between public and private investments; enhancing the participation of developing countries. This kind of Enterprise would be a sort of global EUREKA for the advancement of deep-sea exploration, technology development and development of human resources. The body responsible for the selection of projects would be the Council of the Authority. Our studies at that time concluded that joint exploration of the mine site would cost about 30 percent less than it would if each Pioneer Investor carried it out independently, in accordance with the obligations as defined by the Convention and Resolution II. The costs for R&D would triple if carried out by each Pioneer Investor independently (duplication of efforts), and the training of personnel in independent and separate programmes could increase training costs by 50 to 100 percent compared to the cost of training in a unified programme.

　

　Today one should add to the purposes of JEFERAD the harmonisation and integration of various Convention regimes. The results of this R&D should not be restricted to the International Sea-bed Authority, it would serve the needs of the Biodiversity and Climate Convention regimes as well. The scope of research therefore would be fairly wide.

　

　In 1998, the IOI ^thus revised the proposal⁸ to include the Biodiversity Convention regime which now shares the responsibility for the conservation of deep sea-bed biota with the Authority, as well as the Climate Convention regime for which research on the deep-sea hydrates is of fundamental importance, since their destabilisation has important effects on climate change. These regimes now should be co-involved with the study and long-term monitoring of the living resources, including also the micro-fauna (“genetic resources”) and the hydrates in the Area. This revised proposal was discussed informally both with the Authority and with the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The project would certainly quality for co-funding by the GEF under its responsibility for biodiversity in international waters and climate change..

　

　In August, 1999, the International Sea-bed Authority organized a Workshop on Proposed Technologies for Deep-Seabed Mining of Polymetallic Nodules, and this work was resumed in a second workshop on Mineral Resources of the International Seabed Area in June 2000. A beautifully illustrated summary Report of the results of both workshops was released by the Authority in September 2000. It was gratifying to read in this Report the following:

　

　

　The Report also presents a useful list of recommended cooperative research and concludes with the information that:

　

　

　The Secretariat has also initiated work on rules and regulations for the exploration of the Seafloor Massive Sulphides. The drafting of such rules and regulations was requested by the Delegation of the Russian Federation in 1998 and, in accordance with the Convention, the Authority has to adopt them three years after such a request.⁹

　

　Thus, with the completion of the mining code which may turn out quite useful as a basis for the rules and regulations for the SMS, the “nodule barrier” seems to have been broken, and a new productive period, in line with contemporary science and technology, may be opening. The deep sea-bed today is much more important, scientifically, ecologically, environmentally, and for national and international security, then we thought in the ⟩Seventies, when Part XI of the Convention was drafted. It should be obvious that, if the sea-bed is more important, so must be the Authority. If the Authority is to live up to this challenge, more evolutionary changes will be necessary in its mandate as well as in its structure.

　

　It will turn out, for instance, that the “parallel system” designed for the mining of manganese nodules, is simply not applicable to the exploration and production of other resources. This should not cause a great problem, as practice may simply ignore the provisions establishing that system. The Convention, such as it is, provides alternatives, in particular, for a joint venture system, which, instead could be developed, without any amendments to the Convention.

　

　It may turn out, however, that the whole implementation agreement of 1994 is inapplicable, because it is strictly limited to the function of nodule mining, which, in the broader context of the widening scope of the Authority's activities, would make the composition and voting in the Council quite meaningless. It will be up to the Meeting of States Parties, in due time, to review and revise this Agreement, bring it up to date and in line with changing circumstances.

　

　In Annex I we have developed an illustrative “model” of what an International Sea-bed Authority for the Twenty-first Century might look like.

　

　The Authority was, is, and will remain, the first custodian of the principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind and responsible for its implementation. It constitutes a major component of ocean governance.