Japan needs to be proactive and responsive to the concerns and sensitivities of the Straits States. For Japan, the choices are not attractive. But the results of malign neglect may well be worse. Therefore, Japan should consider supporting one or more of the following arrangements.

One proposal being discussed is the establishment of a fund for the management of the Straits. The fund would solicit voluntary contributions from the maritime powers and international organizations and would be managed by the Straits States to enhance safety of navigation. Contributors to this fund would be all those who benefit from the oil cycle, including producing countries and companies, refiners, tanker owners and consuming countries and companies.

　

　　One approach to establishing this fund would be to persuade users to fund specific projects related to navigational safety and pollution prevention measures.⁶⁵ The precedent is the Japan-supported Malacca Straits Council which funds hydrographic surveys, stockpiling of equipment for combating pollution and the installation and maintenance of navigational aids. Potential contributors might be attracted because the contributions are voluntary, they will be able to generate political good will, and future costs may be defrayed. The operating principles could be designed with more sympathy for ecological damage not covered by conventional funds and conflict could be avoided by sorting out the allocation of contributions beforehand and one time only.

　

　　Another possibility is to propose and promote an international convention on an International Straits Fund. This would require a concerted diplomatic initiative to mobilize support from all Straits States, e.g.. Turkey, Italy and the Baltic States, as well as maritime powers for an international convention on straits funding. There is already a proposal before IMO to examine funding mechanisms in the Straits as a work program.⁶⁶

　

　　A third possibility is to accept the introduction of maritime dues. At the moment only light dues and port dues are collected. Clearly the present arrangement has not kept up with changing technology. Besides restructuring the Light Dues Board, maritime dues could be introduced to raise revenue from transiting vessels in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to defray the cost of providing the services. The proposed maritime dues should be introduced only after consultation with the relevant parties, including IMO. Collecting dues from ships which do not call at Straits ports would be difficult. However with the assistance of the IMO and a systematic port State control mechanism, it may be possible. Nevertheless, this proposal should be studied to ensure that the introduction of such a policy would not undermine the competitiveness of Straits ports.

A special regime for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, agreed to between the coastal and user States and with the cooperation of the IMO, is not only feasible but probably inevitable. However, it may be best to develop such a "Malacca Straits Management Commission" step by step. The next step might be a series of technical and scientific meetings. Further steps might lead to a more formal organization which could then address the issue of shared responsibilities, including the critical cost factors involved. A good regional analogy may be the "Mekong Commission", composed of the Mekong River Delta littoral States and assisted by outside interested parties, and which is charged with the overall management and protection of the Mekong River Delta.

While Malaysia continues to be concerned about navigational safety and pollution in the Straits, Indonesia remains concerned with the security aspects of its archipelagic claim, and Singapore with security and its economy. Geography and stage of development influence their respective positions. Clearly, the disparate perspectives of the Straits States constrain joint action for the sole purpose of environmental protection. Other sectoral uses of the Straits, however, also require management, including fishing, hydrocarbon exploration/exploitation, security, and transport.⁶⁷

　

　　Perhaps a package arrangement, involving intersectoral trade-offs between the three States would provide an opportunity for enhanced order in the multinational, multipurpose use of this constricted and crowded waterway. A first step might be the formation of a tripartite, multiministerial level task force to review the conflicts in and between all use sectors in the Straits and to make recommendations to the three governments for further action.

　

　　Eventually, the three Straits States and the major user States might form an organization to manage the activities and uses of the Straits - - a Malacca and Singapore Straits Management Authority. Indeed, the Nippon Foundation has proposed an Organization for Co-operative Management of Safety in the Straits. This organization would be an international mechanism for sharing the financial burden between littoral states and user states and would ensure navigational safety and the prevention of pollution.⁶⁸ The organization might take various forms: existing organizations, a regional organ, a joint commission or a joint authority. Or this range of organizational types could be considered as an evolutionary sequence. Existing organizations which might serve as a core for building a broad-based management regime include the Council on Safety of Navigation and Control of Marine Pollution in the Straits of Malacca/Singapore, formed in 1971, the Tripartite Committee, and the Straits of Malacca Revolving Fund. These organizations already exist and focus specifically on the Straits. However, they deal solely with tanker shipping and were initially formed with a political objective in mind, not specifically to manage all activities in the Straits. Their use would require the establishment of a permanent office to collect funds, arrange for their replenishment after disbursement, and to seek new donors.

　

　　A regional organ could be structured similar to the United Nations, i.e., it could have a governing council of policy-makers and a secretariat for technical support. The secretariat might be divided sectorally into shipping, fisheries, non-living resources, pollution/environment and security. Management of the environment of the Straits could be the integrating theme. The organization would centralize policy and provide some stability and predictability to management of use of the Straits. It also could have links with other international organizations. Its recommendations, however, similar to those of the United Nations, would not be binding on its members. Individual governments would approve policies affecting them. Additionally, there would also be issues of budget, cost and its allocation.

　

　　A joint commission could be given a legal mandate by the littoral and user States to research and recommend options for action. A commission would be more independent than a regional organ, having its own arbitration machinery to settle differences. The commission could include representatives of the general citizenry and industry as well as government. Technical support would be ad hoc. The individual governments could set the agenda for the body.

　

　　Another option would be a joint authority perhaps modeled after the existing Thai-Malaysia Joint Development Authority.⁶⁹ It could be a ministerial level, intergovernmental, policy-making assembly, overseeing an executive branch with five organs: environment, shipping, fisheries, non-living resources and security. The decisions or findings of the assembly could be binding upon the member governments. Indeed, Formation of such a Ministerial Council was once discussed at Tripartite meetings, but did not materialize.

　

　　How would a joint authority work in practice? For example, development of hydrocarbon resources in the Straits could interfere with other activities such as fisheries and shipping. Such development might eventually either be constrained by protests of neighbors, or engender use and user conflict, thus reducing the total benefits of the Straits available to all three States as well as the users. Therefore, the country with jurisdiction over the hydrocarbon resources would allow the authority to manage their development while ensuring conflict avoidance. Of course, for this system to work, governments must yield some management control over activities in the Straits.

　

　　Certainly the establishment of such an authority would require enormous political will and advance subsidies. The need would have to be obvious and urgent. Because it is not so perceived, and political and economic priorities of the Straits States are disparate and focused on domestic issues, further concrete steps toward joint management await a more compelling and cooperative climate. The most likely scenario is for international cooperation in management of the Straits to proceed ad hoc--issue by issue--as they arise and sufficient common concern is generated. Eventually this plethora of issues and ad hoc responses could form the framework upon which can be constructed a broader, multisectoral management institution.

Although the ASEAN and China draft codes of conduct have been consolidated, ASEAN-China talks in Hanoi on 11 October 2000 again failed to reach an agreement on a code and no date was set for new talks. Potentially problematic for maritime powers, the consolidated draft does not include freedom of navigation and overflight among its principles although it is recognized in the preamble. An agreed code of conduct embracing some mutual expectations and guaranteeing freedom and safety of navigation would be in the strong interest of Japan and the United States. Japan could and should bring whatever diplomatic pressure it has to bear on China, Vietnam and Malaysia - - the main holdouts - - to agree on such a code. Similarly Japan should and could initiate discussions on a similar bilateral code with China for the East China Sea.

A co-operative anti-piracy initiative - - a regional coast guard - - was proposed in November 1999 to Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi at the summit meeting in Manila of ASEAN heads of government.⁷⁰ But bitter memories in the region of Japan's brutal wartime occupation, and domestic resistance in Japan to a foreign military role are major obstacles to carrying out the proposal. Indeed, some analysts view the proposal as an attempt by Japan to reassert its waning influence in the region as a counterbalance to China. Moreover, some think Tokyo sees the move as a way of delicately distinguishing itself and its approach from that of the United States. The initiative may actually be a part of a broader strategy developed at Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies. Such a strategy envisages a Japan-led international Ocean Peacekeeping Force, which would be primarily concerned with activities that are necessary to fulfill obligations under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea so as to maintain maritime order and prevent armed conflict at sea.

　

　　The Force would conduct joint monitoring activities to protect the environment and resources in waters beyond state control, as well as to combat illegal activities that span international maritime boundaries, including illegal fishing, illegal entry and piracy. It would have both “benign” military duties, such as search and rescue, and constabulary functions. There have been many examples of bilateral cooperation of this type-the United States and Russia in the Bering Sea, for instance, and Indonesia and Malaysia, and Indonesia and Singapore, in the Strait of Malacca-but none on a multilateral basis. The long-term vision has the peacekeeping force providing a framework for security cooperation between Japan, the United States, China and Russia.

　

　　To avoid a dominant and objectionable presence, Japan has proposed that its ships which would be participating in the multilateral anti-piracy force be drawn from its civilian-controlled coast guard, rather than from its navy. And Tokyo has suggested that other participants in the force include China, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The response from some Southeast Asian countries to the proposed anti-piracy initiative was initially favorable.

　

　　But China opposed it from the beginning, perhaps because it sees the Japanese proposal as an attempt to preempt China's emergence as the dominant power in Asia. And now Malaysia and Indonesia have clarified that they are unwilling to allow foreign armed vessels into their territorial waters.⁷¹ Exercises and training are acceptable but not actual joint patrols. Another significant problem is that under the current interpretation of Article 9 of Japan's constitution, its coast guard can only use force if the vessel being attacked is Japanese. That obviously would not make Japan a very effective partner in an international coast guard.⁷²

　

　　The April 2000 Tokyo meeting addressed the problem on two levels: information exchange and cooperation among national coast guard agencies; and a policy conference of senior maritime officials. The meeting adopted a declaration on measures to be taken against piracy in Asia. To apply these measures, Japan offered to help countries with weak maritime surveillance capabilities by providing experts and training staff. It is the latter that interests the ASEAN nations the most.

　

　　Thus, there are several possible responses to the piracy problem: government to government joint patrols and joint training; and private sector initiatives like emplacing concealed transponders on ships, reporting fully and promptly all piracy incidents to the International Maritime Bureau, capacity building, and employing armed guards. However, there are serious problems for government to government joint patrols. First of all, the governments concerned cannot agree on the definition of piracy. And the Southeast Asian states oppose a definition that would allow foreign coast guard or naval vessels into their waters. Second, some Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia cannot agree internally on who has jurisdiction over this issue - the navy or the coast guard. Third, the coastal states and the maritime powers cannot agree on whose problem piracy is, and for all these reasons they cannot agree on which country or countries should take the lead in enforcement in the region.

　

　　Regarding Japan's role, there are several important questions. Is a leadership role for Japan acceptable to the region, and domestically, given the fears of the region and domestic sensitivity to a foreign Japanese “military” presence? If it is to be a leader, where will it focus its effort and what exactly can and will it do? Clearly controversy will increase as Japan extends its defense perimeter further away from its territorial waters.

　

　　A second set of questions concerns China's role. Will it accept Japanese or United States leadership in this endeavor? Since this is unlikely, would China be willing to lead, and if not, will it participate at all in any multilateral effort?

　

　　Finally, for the United States, is its proposal for multilateral naval exercises acceptable to the region? Or will it stimulate controversy and even tension between U.S. allies - - Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand - - and other Asian states more concerned with China's negative reaction to this bold initiative?

Japan should broaden and deepen its participation in regional security fora. The major forum for naval dialogue and cooperation in the region is the Western Pacific Naval Symposium(WPNS). The WPNS brings together leaders from the navies of the Western Pacific in their “unofficial” capacities to discuss issues of common concern, including law of the sea and the security of sea lines of communication(SLOCs). Its membership includes China, Japan, and South Korea from Northeast Asia, together with the navies of the ASEAN countries, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, France, and the United States.

　

　　The main thrust of the WPNS has not been multilateral naval operations, which were considered too sensitive, but rather the harmonization of existing procedures. A tangible outcome from the WPNS meetings has been a series of subordinate workshops which have led to the development of a Maritime Information Exchange Directory, a WPNS Tactical Signals Handbook, a WPNS Replenishment at Sea Handbook and planning for the conduct of a Command Post Exercise(CPX)to help the development of common doctrine and publications. Recent meetings of the WPNS have concentrated largely on civil responsibilities(maritime safety, search and rescue, disaster relief, and protection of the marine environment) because these were “safer” issues for the forum to consider. This is despite the fact that in most Asia Pacific countries, agencies other than navies usually have responsibility for these matters.

　

　　The ARF has begun to discuss these issues. For example, an ARF Maritime Senior Officials Meeting was convened in Honolulu in November, 1999 to consider and discuss ways and means for the ARF to add value to existing activities in the areas of maritime safety, law and order at sea, and protection and preservation of the marine environment. The recommendations arising from the meeting included information sharing about sub-standard vessels, oil spill response arrangements, measures to minimize the generation of shipboard waste, maritime law enforcement(particularly the control of piracy), marine information data exchange and the ratification of maritime conventions. These recommendations were subsequently considered at a further meeting of the ISG on CBMs in Bangkok in March 1999 that agreed to continue considering maritime cooperation, especially in the CBM context. The meeting also agreed that the Tokyo Memorandum on Port State Control(PSC), anti-piracy efforts and the ratification of various maritime conventions warranted specific monitoring by the ARF.

　

　　Regarding "second track" activities, The Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific(CSCAP)has established a working group to look specifically at maritime security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region. This group has adopted a broad view of security and is considering a range of small "s" security issues, such as marine safety, resources conservation, oceans governance(particularly in areas where maritime boundaries are not agreed)and unlawful activities at sea, e.g. drug smuggling, illegal population movements and piracy, as well as more conventional maritime security issues. A major achievement of the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group has been the development and promulgation of proposed Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation.⁷⁴ These are a set of fundamental, non-binding principles to guide regional maritime cooperation and to ensure a common understanding and approach to maritime issues in the region. In addition to recognizing the general "confidence-building benefits of naval cooperation," the Guidelines support regional maritime cooperation in maritime safety(Articles 13-15), search and rescue(Articles 22, 23), marine resources(Articles 24, 25), marine scientific research(Articles 26, 27), technical cooperation and capacity-building(Article 28), and training and education(Article 29).

　

　　There is thus quite a bit of maritime cooperation involving Asian countries, but what is less certain is the extent to which that cooperation has real economic or political benefit for the future of the region. Some of the cooperative activities have the appearance of "talk shops" that lead to little action or implementation of the ideas that are discussed. There is a particular problem also with translating issues to an operational or practical level. Issues are often discussed at the "head office" level by senior officials with no migration of ideas to a working level. Nevertheless, "second track" fora have a particular role to play in spreading awareness of the problems and potentially identifying solutions that may be too sensitive or embryonic for consideration at a "first track" level. And they do help build an epistemic community supporting cooperation in the marine sphere. Japan should continue to participate in, support, and, where appropriate, lead these efforts.

Ultimately sealanes would have to be protected by co-operating navies. But it would be a mistake to conceive of naval co-operation in the region in tactical terms, as if the problem were simply one of assembling the right blend of co-operative measures, and as if the larger strategic context of the security dilemma did not exist. Confidence and security building measures(CSBMs)are stepping stones or building blocks, not ends in themselves. As such, they should have realistic, pragmatic, clearly defined objectives. Taken together, the array of positive and negative factors argues strongly for an ad hoc, issue-specific evolutionary process for multilateral regime building for protecting SLOCs. To move the process forward, the concerned countries might agree to begin discussing objectives and principles for protecting SLOCs. Gradual, methodical, incremental approaches work best. The best approach is to start small; use a gradual, incremental, building block process; avoid overformalizing the process; and use unilateral and bilateral measures as steps towards multilateral confidence building.

　

　　One proposal for a multilateral SLOC security regime, would have the United States at its core and the Asian countries sharing responsibilities for areas and functions commensurate with their capabilities and locations. Under this scheme, the United States would be responsible for sealane control throughout the Pacific Ocean. In the different Asian sectors, this responsibility would fall to the concerned regional states. And surveillance of coastal waters and local shipping would be the responsibility of littoral states.⁷⁶

　

　　Co-operation in SLOC management could set the stage and have a spillover effect for true navy to navy CSBMs. When the time is right to move in this direction, the focus should first be on low-level matters such as transparency and Incidents at Sea(INCSEA) agreements. Already in Northeast Asia, a gossamer web of bilateral arrangements is being spun. INCSEA agreements exist between the United States and Russia, the United States and China, Japan and Russia, Japan and South Korea, and South Korea and Russia. Further, Russian and Japanese naval forces staged a first-ever joint marine rescue drill in the Sea of Japan in 1998. And, Japanese and South Korean naval vessels staged a path-breaking joint search and rescue operation in the extreme northern East China Sea in early August 1999. South Korea has proposed joint maritime search and rescue to China as well as exchange of visits by naval ships; it has also proposed a joint naval exercise with Russia. Recently Russia has proposed that it, Japan, and the United States stage joint search and rescue drills. Meanwhile, the United States has proposed that the U.S.-Malaysia joint military search and rescue training mission be expanded to include China and Japan. And even Japan and China have resumed their security dialogue and will exchange visits by warships,⁷⁷ while Russia and North Korea have signed a new treaty on friendship and co-operation. In what could presage an emerging security relationship, Russia and China had joint naval maneuvers in October, 1999.

　

　　More important however is the convergence of proposals by China, South Korea and Russia for a multilateral security forum for Northeast Asia. Initially, a subregional approach would be best, at least for specific maritime CSBMs, albeit under the overall umbrella of a regional security forum. Given the existence of a network of INCSEA agreements applicable in Northeast Asia, a multilateral agreement should be based on these standards.

　

　　But there are still formidable obstacles to a multilateral arrangement - - at least in Northeast Asia. How can China, Taiwan and North Korea be persuaded to join? North Korea has heretofore shown little desire to participate in multilateral discussions on security issues that would be necessary for a subregional INCSEA agreement. And to attempt to include both China and Taiwan, in an official agreement would be folly. Perhaps any subregional arrangement should not be called an "agreement," and a respected neutral party, e.g. Canada, should be the depository through which communications are transmitted. In this way, the issue of formal recognition would be avoided. For Southeast Asia, it is difficult at present to envision an arrangement that would involve both China and the United States. It would seem more likely that a multilateral arrangement would be led by one or the other of these competitors.⁷⁸

　

　　To be effective, a core agreement for Northeast Asia would have to include the United States, Russia, Japan, and most importantly, China. The inclusion of South Korea would be a political signal that the agreement is not exclusive or aimed at facilitating 'a new concert of powers'. However, Russia is not likely to be a steady partner in any co-operative system for some years to come. It should definitely be included but its role is likely to remain limited. Indeed, there were significant protests by war veterans in the run-up to recent Russian-U.S. joint military exercises near Vladivostok.

　

　　And the attitude of the United States towards a multilateral INCSEA agreement to which it would be a critical party is not entirely clear. Though U.S. diplomacy has made considerable strides towards recognizing the importance of multilateralism in its overall foreign policy, and in its approach to the Asia-Pacific region in particular, the U.S. Navy has yet to express its views. Indeed, the U.S. Navy may not perceive a need for a multilateral subregional agreement, and perhaps views the idea as too politically complex. But, without overhead and undersea intelligence support, which can only be supplied by the U.S. Navy, neither Japanese nor South Korean fleets can ever be considered blue-water. This may be why both Japan and South Korea would be reluctant to join a multilateral process that in any way undermines their alliance with the United States.

　

　　For these reasons, the arrangement should not be strictly hard-core military but multifaceted and comprehensive. A pure multilateral INCSEA agreement would be more appropriate when all regional navies have become blue-water fleets. The strategy should be to slowly increase the density of navy to navy contacts until a critical mass is reached. Eventually, one can envision piracy problems being effectively addressed in region-wide or, much more likely, subregional "Safety at Sea" agreements which would also address other common civil maritime problems like search-and-rescue, environmental protection, drug trafficking, and illegal refugees.

　

　　Further out to sea, -- in space and time -- an international naval or "self-defense" force might be created to ensure ocean peacekeeping including safety of navigation. This joint force could focus initially on the area beyond national jurisdiction and emphasize protection of high seas fisheries, air-sea rescue and an open ocean environmental monitoring. However, when all is said and done, navy-to-navy arrangements will depend on the quality of political relations.