Matake Kamiya

Associate Professor,

National Defense Academy of Japan

　

On May 2, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush announced a new missile defense program. The Junichiro Koizumi administration thus far has gone little beyond showing "understanding" of the program, while at the same time continuing with joint Japan U.S. technological research on theater missile defense. In the notso-distant future, however. Japan will be pressed to commit itself to a clearer position regarding the missile defense program.

　What stance should Japan take? Any serious discussion of this question must involve evaluation of the new defense program from the viewpoint of Japan's national interest. How will the program be useful? Will it be technologically feasible? How much will it cost? What impact will it have on international politics and security? Japan must judge the program comprehensively, bearing these questions in mind.

Why does the Bush administration give such high priority to missile defense?We may suggest five main reasons. First, an effective missile defense system will defend the United States and its allies from attacks by "rogue" countries using weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

　Second, President Bush and his advisors seem to feel a moral obligation to unilaterally reduce its nuclear arms to the minimum necessary level for assuring the security of the United States and its allies. This is the eminent reason the Bush administration has cited for its promotion of the missile defense program. After all, since the Cold War came to an end, Russia's nuclear weapons no longer pose a serious threat to the security of the Untied States and its allies, while real danger lurks in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that carry them as warheads of such "rogue"countries as Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

　Third, since the end of the Cold War-until the recent terrorist attacks - the United States enjoyed a singularly fortunate security environment in which virtually no direct threat to its homeland was thought to exist. The U.S. assertion of the need for a missile defense system, which often seemed excessively adamant from the viewpoint of other countries, was surely derived from its fervent desire to make that historically rare situation as permanent as possible. Given its geographic situation, bound on east and west by oceans and on north and south by states that are not militarily strong, the only kind of attack on the United States that might inflict large-scale damage within its borders would be that launched by weapons of mass destruction or by missiles. It can be assumed that the emphasis being placed by the Bush administration on the missile defense program stems from the intent to either eliminate or considerably reduce such exterior threats.

　Fourth is the overwhelming superiority of the United States in high-tech conventional weaponry. American political scientist Kenneth Waltz has asserted that, in a world of nuclear weaponry, it is possible for a country with less than half the economic power of the strongest country to be a great power, but in a world of conventional arms, without nuclear weaponry, only countries with economic power on a par with the strongest country can become great powers. An effective missile defense program would theoretically be able to negate the destructive power of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In other words, a world that is virtually free of nuclear threats could be realized. China and Russia would be unable to resist the United States using military power and American hegemony around the world would become solidly established for the long term. This is probably the kind of situation that the Bush administration aspires to achieve.

　The profit-seeking motives of the U.S. arms industry, furthermore, should not be overlooked. Defense-related industries are a traditionally strong support base of the Republican Party. The prospect of the new missile defense program, which is expected to require tens of billions of dollars to develop, is appealing indeed to corporations that have faced increased cutbacks in military budgets since the end of the Cold War.

In what way, then, will the Bush administration's new missile defense program be beneficial to Japan?

　Missile defense, which is by nature a defensive system, would suit the basic principle of Japan's "exclusively defense-oriented" security policy. If this defensive weaponry really had the capacity to render the weapons of mass destruction and missiles of other countries powerless, it would have great appeal for Japan. Such protection could eventually eliminate the need for the U.S. nuclear umbrella, an arrangement that would resolve the awkward dilemma Japan has long struggled with as an advocate of nuclear disarmament also in need of protection from nuclear threats. In addition. Japan would acquire all kinds of new technology and enjoy great economic advantages spinning off from development of the system. Tokyo's active cooperation in the program would deepen Japan-U.S. ties and have favorable effect on the bilateral alliance, If Japan were reluctant to support the program, on the other hand, it would have to prepare itself for friction in its relations with the United States.

The new missile defense program also poses some serious problems for Japan, preeminent among which is the enormous financial investment it would have to shoulder. Currently the outlines of the program are not concrete and an accurate calculation of the development costs is impossible, but some observers estimate that trillions of yen would be required of Japan alone. Having been forced to reduce its defense budget in recent years, Japan needs to consider carefully whether the financial burden of missile defense might actually work to promote the nation's defense capability as a whole. Japanese should not forget, moreover, that the technological wherewithal for the new program has still not been clearly defined and that even in the United States, quite a few specialists doubt its feasibility.

　Second, China and Russia are strongly opposed to the program. The danger that the two countries would react to the program by strengthening their nuclear arms and offensive missile systems, exacerbating Japan's security environment, cannot be dismissed. Japan's active participation in such a program could seriously undermine relations between Japan and China.

　Third, the deployment of a missile defense system might make Japan even more dependent upon the United States for its security. Japanese Defense Agency Director-General Gen Nakatani has stated that Japan would operate the theater missile defense system on its own. In reality, however, Japan must depend on the United States for intelligence about immediate missile attack threats, at least for the time being.

　Fourth, the new missile defense program would blur the distinction between theater missile defense and the national missile defense programs. The new program features interception of missiles immediately after their launching. Although not a problem as long as the program is in the development stage, once such a system were actually deployed, Japan would be forced to reconsider its policy concerning the ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.

　Taking the above points into full consideration Japan should formulate its position on the new missile defense program autonomously and in accordance with its national interests. The idea of missile defense per se suits Japan's needs well, but it needs to consider carefully the feasibility of realizing such a program and assess both its merits and its drawbacks. The motivations of the United States, the ramifications for the Japan-U.S. alliance, and the implications for regional and global security must all be kept in mind. It is not appropriate to discuss either support of or opposition to the program for passive reasons, such as opposition by China or reluctance to incur the displeasure in Washington.