日本財団 図書館


Toward Closer Ties Between Europe and Japan
Noriko Hama
Economist and Research Director,
Mitsubishi Re'search Institute
 
If"so far yet so near" is the way to characterize the close ties between the United States and Japan in spite of geographical distance, "so near yet so far" would still regrettably have to be the label on Japan's relationship with the other Asian countries in its immediate vicinity. As for Japan's relations with Europe, "so far, and just as far," again regrettably, is apt to remain the reality, if not the aspiration.
 In the trilateral relationship between Japan, Europe, and the United States, the Euro-Japanese axis was always apt to be regarded as being the weaker link. The relationship has tended ever to give the impression, for better or worse, of a diluted version of U.S.-Japan ties. Any progress in market liberalization issues between Tokyo and Washington was followed by a similar progress between Europe and Japan. When trade frictions arose between Tokyo and Washington, relations between Japan and Europe would grow strained in more or less the same vein. Efforts have been made on both sides to break away from this second hand image, one of which has been the attempt to create a framework for political dialogue. Nonetheless the relationship is yet to emerge fully from the shadows of that other axis in the trilateral formation.
Failure to identify an issue of common urgency and the one-versus-many configuration are weak points in the Europe-Japan relationship
One of the major weak points in the Europe-Japan relationship is that the two sides have not thus far really been able to identify any issues upon which they share a genuine sense of urgency Even as both sides wished keenly to deepen existing ties, neither side has ever been quite able to eliminate a certain sense of contrived dialogue. It would seem to this writer that the problem has been not so much one of the lack of a common set of issues but more a matter of perspective. The search for dialogue material seems invariably to have taken the U.S.-Japan mode of discussion as the role model. An odd way to go about things, when it was precisely those U.S.-Japan relations out of whose shadow the two sides have struggled to emerge.
 Another problem has been the inevitably one-versus-many aspect of the Europe-Japan relationship. It goes without saying that the European Union is hot a monolith. However much European Commission representatives and the political leaders of the countries that take turns to hold the rotating EU presidency loyally speak with a EU voice, they still have diverse minds of their own. Tribute is amply paid to the efforts to create common policies and institutions. Yet people's attitudes and sentiments will forever remain uniquely their own. Long may it be so. On the other hand, this internal diversity of Europe, as irreplaceable as it is, does however make it difficult to create a platform on which in depth dialogue can take place within a Euro-Japanese dimension.
A common compelling concern for Japan and Europe is what to do about an increasingly inward-looking United States
Nonetheless, this writer would like to think that Europe and Japan actually share two compelling concerns. One is what I have taken to calling WTDA, otherwise to be known as the "What To Do about America" problem. Europe and Japan have spent too long fretting over what to do about their relationship with each other. A change of perspective that allows the two sides to look at common issues of interest outside the immediate sphere of their own bilateral ties, should bring a new dimension to the discussions. And there is certainly much that calls for a pooling of ideas in the context of WTDA.
 For America's econo-political perspective seems to be growing steadily inward. This is perhaps only to be expected. With the era of what came to be known with a great deal of legitimacy as the "Pax Americana" now behind us, it should come as no surprise if American eyes seem increasingly to turn away from the grand design of global affairs toward its more immediate domestic concerns. Of its own accord, the United States chose to severe the dollar's link to gold in 1971, thereby abandoning its position as the single international key currency nation of the world. In this strict sense, the United States is no longer the world's superstar, notwithstanding the overwhelming preference shown by the world for the dollar as a method of transaction and as a store of value. It has become one among a number of local heroes, albeit standing a great deal taller than the rest. Yet the habits of superstars do not die easily. One hopes that a combination of superstar habits and an inward-looking mindset does not become the hallmark of the Bush administration.
 None of this is to say that Europe and Japan should jointly round on the Americans. Yet an introverted United States is surely an issue worthy of serious enough common concern between Europe and Japan. The changing landscape of a post-postwar world requires new ideas, both broadly as well as in the more focussed context of the US-Europe-Japan trilateral relationship. The hope is that in discussing such matters of broad-brush yet nonetheless urgent significance, Europe and Japan will become able to go beyond the somewhat stilted dialogue of past years towards a deeper partnership.
The U.S. economy is long on competition and short on distribution. The Japanese and European economies, by contrast, are distribution-biased
A second thing that Europe and Japan have in common is quite simply the shape of their respective economies.
 Economic activity can be likened to a triangle composed on the three sides by the elements of growth, competition, and distribution. Growth stands for employment creation. Competition by the same token is survival of the fittest, while distribution works in aid of the survival of the weakest. An economy is surely at its best, stable and at once dynamic, when these three components of growth, competition and distribution co-exist with equal force, forming a well-balanced equilateral triangle. Such a golden triangle of economic activity is, however, obviously hard to come by in the real world. Even the much-hailed American new economy does not actually have strictly the right shape for a perfect equilateral triangle. The American economic triangle tends towards a long and well-developed competitive vector, while the distributive side of the triangle remains the weaker element. Meanwhile, it can be said of the Japanese and European economies, at least thus far, that they have been long on the distributive side of the triangle, and short by comparison on the competition front.
 It has become something of a standard practice to pit the "Rhein model" of capitalism against its Anglo-Saxon counterpart, it being the feature of the Rhein model that it tempers outright market forces with more equality conscious values. Germany's "social market economy" arrangements are the most commonly cited case in point.
 The post-World War II Japanese economy is also regarded as having operated in like fashion. Some would even go so far as to say that the Japanese version is a genuine socialist system rather than a modified version of the market economy, In any event, the existing mode of operation has reached a point where it is turning into a liability and making the Japanese economy dysfunctional. The excess emphasis on equal distribution and lack of space provided for competition to function healthily have culminated in a situation in which it is becoming virtually impossible for the economy to form itself into a triangle of recognizable shape.
 While matters had not come to such an extreme pass in Europe, it has, over the years had its share of difficulties due to a lack of momentum in the competitive component of its economic triangle. Hopes are high that the introduction of the euro and the globalization of European companies will reshape that triangle. Only time will tell whether the reality will match those expectations.
 Yet for all the need for a greater competitive thrust in both the European and Japanese economies, a simple "Anglo-Saxonization" of their systems cannot be the ultimate solution. Not least because the Anglo-Saxon model itself is a product of the latter twentieth century, and as such, harbours elements of outdatedness as we stand on the threshold of a totally new century, There can be no better opportunity for Europe and Japan to enter into creative debate, both at policy and inter-corporate levels in pursuit of new paths whereby to reach the golden triangle of economic activity.
 There is little doubt that Europe and Japan share much room for fruitful dialogue. WTDA and the quest for the ideal shape of economic activity should provide fertile enough ground to keep both sides engaged in serious debate. Hopefully, that debate will lead to a vision of twenty-first-century global harmony that will fittingly takeover from those concepts of international world order that prevailed in the latter half of the twentieth.








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