II. Strategic Choices of Japan
1. Some 'do not's';
・do not rigidly define strategic objectives on the Korean question except respecting some basic principles, i.e. be supportive of the peaceful unification by the will of the Korean people, etc.;
・do not anticipate clear-cut solution of N.Korea's security threat, because a certain level of military threat is the only reliable guarantor of N.Korea's survival;
・do not assume possible playing between two Koreas because S.Korea is too important to play over her shoulder;
・do not lose credit and prestige in the humanitarian aid to N.Korea, because a certain amount of contribution is widely expected by the international community;
・do not get obsessed to the clear-cut burden-sharing formula among the U.S., Japan and S.Korea because each country has her own national interest priority.
2. Some 'do's';
・do maximize domestic support by keeping flexible position on the Korea-related issues; politicizing the issue might narrow the room to play outside;
・do develop future footing on the Korean peninsula by cultivating China connection and South Korean public support as well;
・do demonstrate her willingness with strong commitment to play in case of the regional contingency under the U.S.-Japan defense guideline;
・do find framework of compensations for Japan's contribution to the Korean question and utilize it for expanding Japan's diplomatic horizon by focusing on long-term investment in N.Korea's infrastructure.
(November 21, 2000)
