Whatever the crisis, there were no major failures in Japanese foreign policy. Compared with the confusion immediately following the launch of Taepondong missile by North Korea in the summer of 1998, the handling of the ship crisis represented a marked improvement. In the Kyrgyzstan crisis too, the hostages were safely released. Japan's response to the Kosovo crisis was not positive, but considering the geographical and historical background, neither was it to be particularly criticized. In comparison, Japan's response to East Timor left a negative impression. Nevertheless, in the end, peacekeeping troops from Southeast Asia were sent to East Timor with Japanese aid, and together with troops from Australia and Korea they succeeded in restoring order.
However, Japan's response to these crises, revealed serious problems in foreign policy. The ship crisis clearly showed the inadequacy of how Japan patrols its territorial waters. Practical improvements have since been made in the Self-Defense Force and Maritime Safety Agency systems, but appropriate legislation has yet to be looked into. The fact that the hostages were released in the Kyrgyzstan crisis is cause for rejoicing, but in addition to investigating the background against which this crisis occurred, it is important to find out whether there were not perhaps any problems in the negotiating process. From the character of the crisis, there is no way of learning about the negotiating process from the outside, but it will be a source of future trouble if, as a result, the impression is allowed to spread that political compensation can be gained by taking Japanese nationals hostage.
On the subject of response to crises in the international community, Japan's passivity in East Timor was a major problem. Despite criticism of the framework of the PKO cooperation law for some time past, attempts to reform the law have constantly been put off.
