On the occasion of the parliamentary debate, Mr. Komura, the Japanese Foreign Minister explained his views on April 13, 2000. The summary of his remarks are as follows: "I understand that NATO was obliged to take action in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster since a diplomatic solution has definitely failed… It is said that there are various views among academics on humanitarian intervention. Japan considers International Law as not yet having clearly determined in what situation, under what conditions and to what extent is humanitarian intervention permissible; International Law is still being developed. Japan is not a party of NATO action and we do not have detailed information on NATO's military operation. Because of this, the Japanese government is unable to make any judgement."
During the NATO air strikes, it was quite unusual for the NATO Secretary General to contribute his explanation to the major Japanese newspapers, not once but twice,9 and the UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook also contributed his opinion to a major Japanese paper.10 The Western leaders wanted to convince the Japanese people.
During the air campaigns, Japan tried to play the role of mediator since it is not part of NATO. In April 1999, the late Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi asked Yasushi Akashi, a former high-ranking UN official in charge of Bosnia, to meet Milosevic and to find a political role for Japan in the peace process.11 Milosevic did not seem to understand Japan's sensitive position, which the Japanese statesmen defined as almost "neutral." It did not work. Milosevic asked Akashi, as well as the other Japanese statesmen, to help in the reconstruction of Yugoslavia. In this regard, Japan cannot help other than in humanitarian assistance because of its solidarity with the West.
In addition to the invitation to the Stability Pact, there was a new Japanese responsibility. During the air strikes, Germany asked Japan to represent its diplomatic interests. For this reason, the Japanese Embassy in Belgrade were in negotiation with the Yugoslav government for the release a German journalist and a student had been arrested by the Yugoslav authorities―they were released on May 11, 1999.12
In the course of the peace negotiations, Japan suddenly became involved since Russia suggested using the G8 framework and the West agreed. If the UN Security Council had been the only venue, Japan could not have been included.
For Japan, the Cologne G8 summit meeting was a "windfall" since it enabled Japan to raise the long-standing issue of UN reform, as the UN could not resolve the Kosovo crisis. On June 18, two hours before the opening of the G8 summit meeting, Japan had a bilateral summit meeting with Germany. The two prime ministers made it clear that Japan and Germany should be members of the UN Security Council, and agreed to cooperate on broader UN reform.13 In its opening statement of the G8, Obuchi reiterated that "UN reform for the purpose of conflict settlement and prevention is urgent. It is necessary to deal with it in view of the UN millennium summit."14 Gerhard Shroeder supported his view and other participants showed interest.15 The G8 summit declaration reflected this, namely the enhancement of the UN conflict prevention and settlement capabilities.
In terms of the impact on the Asia Pacific region of the Kosovo crisis and the NATO air campaign, Japanese experts are concerned about the negative attitude of Russia toward the West which might make sensitive territorial negotiations more difficult. In reality, NATO's action and subsequent Russian discontent did not have any impact on these bilateral Japan-Russian negotiations.
