The Alliance also became heavily involved in regional security issues on the Balkans and conducted its first serious military operation in 1999 against Serbia. In spite of these developments, it was exactly this air campaign against Serbia that demonstrated some imbalances and weaknesses of the Alliance:
・The heavy American superiority in the air campaign and the very limited success of the campaign, especially in the first weeks, led to some unilateral decisions on targeting questions on the US side, which were criticized by Europeans.
・Regardless of the fact that all major decisions were taken on the basis of consensus, that operation was run―politically and militarily―by a coalition of the able and the willing. This "club" took important decisions that ultimately pushed the other members aside.
・The air campaign was launched without an explicit mandate by the UN. On the one hand, this was a reaction to the inability of the UN to come to grips with the serious violation of human rights on the Balkans which had already been dramatically demonstrated during the bloodshed in Bosnia. On the other hand, this was done in the consciousness, that this operation was not clearly legitimized by international law.
All this compelled the EU member states to accelerate their plan to build up a security and defense policy of their own. As a consequence of the Kosovo war, the EU now intends to develop independent decision-making capacity in security matters and the indispensable military means to launch armed operations on a self-reliant basis. In addition, civilian crisis management becomes a second pillar of EU's security policy.
A broadening of scope, however, always requires more effective decision-making rules. With regard to CFSP, the EU has more or less failed to do exactly that up to now, as can be seen in the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty: the possibility for qualified majority voting is very remote, the hierarchical system of decision-making (strategic guidelines by the heads of state, strategic concepts formulated by the foreign ministers and agreed by the heads of state, and finally, common actions and common positions) indicates a bureaucratic and immobile structure rather than a flexible institutional tool.
The creation of the position of a High Representative for the EU's CFSP3 is often regarded as a "step in the fight direction" and a means to overcome this difficulty. It is argued that Europe now has a phone number. This is, however, a one-sided description. A more adequate analysis should also take into account that the High Representative represents just one more actor in the EU's decision-making structure. Whether he will be able to play a strong role is debatable.
