The arrival of an American backed guarantor of the Dayton peace in Bosnia, under the name of IFOR/SFOR (International/Stabilisation Force), was greeted by a sigh of relief in the NATO Southern-European wing (Greece, Italy and Turkey), and raised dramatically the prospect of the countries in the region who were aspiring for the NATO membership (Hungary, Slovenia, Rumania) to show their credentials and good will.
The Bosnian operation was followed by an even higher profile intervention in Kosovo, although with substantially more risk, both politically and militarily. What's in it for Bosnia and Kosovo?~is an obvious question. The more so because from the internal Bosnian, as well as Kosovan perspective, there is a general understanding that the presence of SFOR/KFOR troops is vital for peace building, and beneficial for the regional stability. For the time being, there is no alternative for peacekeeping mechanism. Local political structures are still too weak, and to buy more time for breaking the war mentality and to help ordinary people to start enjoying the benefits of peace―this mechanism is crucial, morally justified and could be politically productive. The downside of the NATO presence is an over emphasis on the military component of the peace and reconstruction process. There should be much more room and understanding for all civilian aspects of the peace settlement. It is fair to say that soldiers may make "long war and swift peace," but the process of reconciliation and civilian reconstruction goes far beyond military brief. NATO's mighty force may often look, to young locals in particular, as a fascinating display of modern technology and sheer power, which in turn might overshadow and marginalize other values of peacekeeping effort and reduce the entire mission of the international community to a military showdown.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a tiny country. Kosovo is even a smaller province within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, both cases helped the United States to show to Europeans that American involvement is crucial in bringing peace to the region and that Europe cannot deliver it alone. Bosnia was a vehicle that exposed the American vitality in re-affirming itself as a super power. Kosovo helped the US to assume the leading role, first in the Rambouillet talks and later on by intervening militarily. In this interplay, it may be said that Bosnia as a state cannot function without NATO for the time being, but NATO would have not been able to redefine itself if it were not for its role in that country. In fact, Bosnia since 1995 has been the first test for NATO in the new circumstances of a changing world. Kosovo gave it an opportunity to reaffirm its role in the region. On the other hand, Bosnia and Kosovo, due to the NATO presence, are given a chance to show its will to rebuild and reintegrate themselves respectively, and by doing so to set the terrain for democratic reconstruction of the region.
Finally, a point should be made about the risks of "incomplete" intervention. Namely, five years after Dayton, and following quite recent democratic change of government in the FR Yugoslavia, it is time to revise the role of NATO in the peace process in the region. It should be stressed time and time again that the process of reconstruction goes far beyond military matters and should contain a substantial package of economic assistance and civilian policy guidance. Both military and civilian component of the Alliance have to relate to internal political developments within the country as much as to relationships between states in the region, because peace and security in this area as well as in the larger ex-communist world depend first and foremost on a successful transition to democracy and rule of law.
