Part of the problem with realism is in its approach to reality as "value free" methodology. In other words, such an approach was supposed to guarantee "neutrality and impartiality" in interpreting the reality. After the categories of the cold war bipolar world were abandoned or broadened with more diversified elements, the value-free explanation of international politics could not offer answer to the complexities in international affairs. As a result, purely normative approach is risking betraying a distinct set of values on how nations should behave in international society.
The distinction between maintaining a strict positivist, "by the book," approach of the realists on the one hand, and arguing for the protection of "universal values of mankind" on the other, is the result of the post-Cold War world and its new political architecture. As such, it is reflected in many interpretations of the internationalisation of the Kosovo conflict. Discussing the complexity of the joint action by NATO in Kosovo, Pierre-Marie Dopey, briefly summarised that the action "was valid from the substantive viewpoint, but invalid from the formal viewpoint."2
Indeed, from the debate between Cassese and Simma3 it is possible to identify the dichotomy of the contemporary approach to understanding the problem of international intervention. It appears that we accept that the objectives assigned to the military intervention were clearly in accordance with the defence of some of the most fundamental principles of humanitarian international and human rights. At the same time, we can say that the formal validity of the action was equally manifestly non-existent, since it was carried out outside of the organic framework laid down in the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The intervention in Kosovo drew heavily from the experience of the international community during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995). Impotence and inaction in Bosnia resulted in a determination and resolution that the UNPROFOR saga should not be repeated. However, the hesitance to act against the regime in Belgrade and intervene in Kosovo and the rest of the FR Yugoslavia persisted in the form of endlessly tightening sanctions, re-inventing and re-applying them, shifting the blame for atrocities from one side to the other and so on. After the Rachak massacre, the guilty conscience for having allowed the Bosnian tragedy to happen, in the same region only a few years ago, prevailed and the international community finally had had enough. It already had the Rambouillet Agreement, which gave it the crucial elements that were missing during the United Nation Force deployment in Bosnia. The timetable was set in the Rambouillet Agreement; obligations were clearly defined for both parties (KLA and the Serbian regime), major provisions were backed by use of force. All that was missing was an international legal ground to use force according to the UN Charter.
The Lesson from Bosnia
The Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO led SFOR deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and quasi-international protectorate over the country―are current labels of that state. However, the inaction and failure of the international community to intervene and stop the war and humanitarian catastrophe at an early stage left its mark on the region and should not be forgotten. By the policy of international non-intervention and the absence of peacemaking agenda, masses of "ethnically cleansed" people in the region were betrayed; democratic and non-nationalist forces were disillusioned; "blue helmets" were humiliated; and UN officials were embarrassed and confused.
