・Consistency is better than Inconsistency. Legitimacy is clearly served if the rules are upheld on a consistent basis and are applied, moreover, to all. It is clearly unrealistic to expect this, however, even if it remains the ultimate goal.
・Early is better than late. Determining when is the appropriate time to use force for humanitarian reasons will always be a difficult decision but it cannot be subject to hard and fast rules that preclude early use.
Notes
1. This paper draws heavily from Paul B. Stares and Ivo Daalder, Force, Order, and Global Governance: Perspectives of the United States, Germany, and Japan, Brookings (forthcoming). Given the focus of this conference on the Kosovo conflict, only humanitarian intervention involving the use of force will be discussed recognizing that other kinds exist.
2. See Paul B. Stares, The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey (Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, 1998). See also John D. Steinbruner, Principles of Global Security, Brookings (2000), especially Chapter 4.
3. See Remarks of President George Bush at the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, (January 5, 1993).
4. Speech by PM Tony Blair to the Economic Club of Chicago, 22 April, 1999 see: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechetext.asp/2316>.
5. See Ann Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, (JCIE: Tokyo and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington D.C., 2000).
6. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "The Premature Burial of Global Law and Order: Looking beyond the Three Cases from Hell," Washington Quarterly, vol.17, (1994), p.150 and Barry Blechman, "The Intervention Dilemma" Washington Quarterly, vol.18, (Summer 1995), pp.63-4
7. One obvious measure of this is the increased capacity for agreement within the Security Council. Between 1945 and 1988, an average of 15 resolutions were passed each year. Subsequently the amount has rapidly accelerated. See Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War Adelphi Paper No.305, International Institute of Strategic Studies, (1996).
8. Not all concur with this assessment, however. Some have argued that the advent of "precision guided weapons" or smart bombs has actually exacerbated the risk that force will be used indiscriminately. As David Scheffer points out "smart bombs encourage military strategists to target a larger number of facilities that are essential to civilian needs, even if they may also facilitate military operations of the enemy. If a smart bomb misses its target, or is so powerful in its explosive capacity that even a direct hit inflicts brutally unnecessary damage, the risk of unintended but enormous civilian injury and damage arises in circumstances that might not have been entertained in earlier times." See David J. Scheffer, "The Use of Force after the Cold War: Panama, Iraq, and the New World Order" in Right v. Might, p.140.
9. All contained in Article 2(1) of the Charter. Additional supporting declarations include UN General Assembly Resolution 2131, 2625 ("Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States) as well as the Charters of regional international organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS). See Amstutz, International Ethics, pp.120-1.
10. Chapter VII was never invoked for the UN collective security operation during the Korean war. It should also be pointed out that in invoking Chapter VII, the UN is not confined to using forceful measures. Indeed Article 41 and 42 lists a variety of measures short of using force. For a brief history of UN mandated uses of force see Adam Roberts "From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force" Survival vol.37, (Winter 1995-6), pp.7-28.
