NATO also supported the decisions made at the Contact Group. Furthermore, being seriously concerned by the escalation of violence in Kosovo (which had the potential of destabilizing the whole region of the Balkans and ruining the fragile peace established in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement), NATO organized―as a preliminary political signal―some joint military activities with Albania and Macedonia. In June 1998, the Atlantic Council tasked the Alliance's military bodies to study a complete set of military options aimed at putting an end to violence in Kosovo and creating favorable conditions for a political settlement. Given the escalation of armed violence in Kosovo as well as Belgrade's political procrastination, NATO went so far as launching, on 13 of October, an Actord (activation order) for limited air strikes against the FRY. The Actord was cancelled following the announcement of the "Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement." Under the deal, the OSCE and NATO were each authorized to establish a Verification Mission―one operating on the ground and the other from the air; in addition an "extraction force" was stationed in Macedonia for the purpose of protecting (and in case of emergency) rescuing the unarmed OSCE verifiers. These arrangements call for two interesting remarks. First, NATO unilaterally decided to assume the role of a peace enforcer (or "Sheriff') in the Balkans. Second, in doing so, the US also decided to circumvent the UN and, instead, to ask the OSCE to act somewhat as its "Deputy Sheriff." In this period (1999), the only meaningful manifestation of the UN Security Council was the adoption of three Chapter VII resolutions (1160, 1199 and 1203) endorsing and actually legitimizing the Contact Group's activities and proposals.
As the political deadlock and escalation of violence remained unabated, the Contact Group decided to switch from simple mediation to mandatory conciliation, that is to say, to summon both parties to open direct negotiations in France in order to arrive at a final political settlement within three weeks. Co-sponsored by the European Union, the negotiations took place in Rambouillet (6-23 February 1999) and Paris (15-18 March 1999). While the Albanians wisely accepted, under American pressure, the proposed Rambouillet deal, the Serbs simply rejected it.
Military coercion
As a consequence of the failure of the Rambouillet talks, which confirmed that the Serbs were unwilling to compromise on the subject of autonomy, NATO decided to launch air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Operation "Allied Force," which lasted from 24 March to 10 June 1999, provoked strong criticism from many quarters. Three major arguments have been raised in this context:
The premature use of force
Some people have argued that all diplomatic options had not been exhausted and that a political compromise was still possible. All those who have followed the progress of the Rambouillet talks and the successive Rambouillet draft agreements can bear witness, in good faith, that the Serbian delegation was not prepared to strike a deal. The Serbs adamantly refused to envisage for Kosovo any autonomous status within the FRY. They were only prepared to accept some kind of autonomy exclusively within the Republic of Serbia. This meant that they envisaged for Kosovo a lower status than the one which Milosevic unlawfully abolished in 1989. This also meant that they denied to the 90 percent of ethnic Albanians populating Kosovo the right to form a federate Republic within the framework of the FRY. Furthermore, in a formal counter-proposal to the Rambouillet draft agreement they suggested the granting to all ethnic groups living in Kosovo, whatever their size, an equal share in local administration including a right of veto.
