TS-121
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA): A Modern Foundation for Marine Safety
Per Marius Berrefjord*, Bjφrn Haugland*, Ioannis Kourmatzis*, John Spouge* and Rune Torhaug*
ABSTRACT
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is a structured and systematic methodology, aimed at enhancing maritime safety by using risk and cost-benefit assessments in the rule development process. An interim guideline for the application of FSA to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) rule-making process was agreed in 1997 [1].
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) believes that risk technology may drive us to a deeper understanding of marine safety. In this paper we describe how DNV utilises the FSA methodology to enhance the quality of our rule making. We discuss how we take advantage of the FSA process to ensure that our rules and survey schemes are transparent and focused on the essential aspects with respect to safety, environment without unnecessary business interruptions for the ship owner. We focus on overall safety philosophy as well as on practical examples on how we link the safety philosophy to concrete prescriptive regulations.
Key Words: Formal Safety Assessment, Rule Development, Classification Societies
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Current Marine Safety Regime
Safety in ships is to a large extent achieved by following rules, regulations or guidelines governing their design and operation. The rules most directly concerned with human safety and protection of the environment are in general agreed internationally through the IMO. Rules for the structural strength, systems and equipment required to make the ship "fit for purpose" are mainly established by independent Classification Societies. On safety-critical structural issues, the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) provides common international standards. These rules have been developed incrementally over many decades, responding to accident experience, and represent a massive accumulation of expertise in how to allow designers as much freedom as possible while still achieving a good common level of safety.
While safety levels at sea have in general improved in recent years, accidents still occur, and some problems have become apparent with the current marine safety regime. The system of international rule making is to a large extent reactive, responding to accidents rather than proactively preventing them. It is vulnerable to rapid changes in ship designs, which may introduce hazards not anticipated in the rules. The rules, even when comprehensive, are not sufficiently transparent, and the purpose and relevance of individual rules is often unclear. The process of developing the rules was insufficiently systematic, with no method of prioritising on the areas where the greatest benefit could be achieved.
1.2 The Origins of FSA
Several major shipping accidents (notably the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 and the Exxon Valdez in 1989) prompted a re-evaluation of the marine safety regime. It was contrasted unfavourably with that used in other industries, based on more scientific safety management approaches such as risk analysis and safety cases [2].
"Safety Cases" identify the hazards faced by an individual ship and explain the safety management measures adopted, in order to convince regulators, the workforce or the public that the individual ship is safe. This approach is suitable for some types of vessels, particularly those with unusual hazards, operating within specific regions [3]. However, the varying ability to follow modern safety management principles among shipping companies and maritime administrations is widely believed to make Safety Cases inappropriate for internationally trading ships.
Instead of a safety case for each individual ship, the UK proposed that "formal safety assessment" (FSA) should be used to provide a more systematic and proactive basis for the IMO rule-making process. FSA included techniques of safety assessment, such as hazard identification, risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis, which were already being adopted by organisations in the marine field, and this helped the approach gain international acceptance. In 1997, IMO adopted guidelines for applying FSA [1] and has since been evaluating trial applications of the technique.
1.3 DNV's Adoption of FSA
Det Norske Veritas has been at the forefront of applying scientific approaches to developing its classification rules, and was an early supporter of the FSA initiative [4]. DNV recognises that FSA has the potential to improve the transparency of its rules, and to help focus on the essential factors protecting safety, property and the environment.
In 1998, building on previous initiatives, DNV initiated a dedicated research project to develop a transparent and sound scientific basis for its Ship Classification Rules and Procedures, and decided to use the FSA approach, consistent as far as possible with the approach adopted by IMO.
1.4 Objectives of This Paper
This paper gives an overview of DNV's FSA-based ship rule development project. Section 2 explains the philosophy underlying the work and the general approach adopted. Section 3 gives an example to illustrate how it will work in practice. Section 4 discusses some of the lessons learned to date and the road ahead. Section 5 makes conclusions about the impact of FSA on the rule-making process.
