With regard to freight traffic however, there is no programme at all, nor for road traffic, railways, nor for the waterways. The only negotiations which are relevant at the moment are those between the EU and the nation-states: Austrich (member of the EU) and Switserland (no member of the EU), both bottlenecks in the European traffic with their mountains, and more and more selective with regard to road traffic by trucks, passing their territore.
The situation with regard to seatransport and ports is not different. Also here, and in contrast with airtraffic and airports, the EU has no particular jurisdiction at all, outside that of guaranteeing a not disturbed and open competion in the EU inner market. While in the sector of roads, railways and inner waterways the combined Ministers of Transport and Infrastructure take responsibility for an European transport policy, how open and in general terms this is, the sector of ports is not a particular responsibility of the EU. The powerful European Seaport Organisation (ESPO) prevented in the recent past that the EU Directorate General of Transport got such an overall responsibility at the level of the EU. In the meantime this implies that the ports in the Hamburg-Le Havre Range can not become coordinated fromout one overarching strategy. Instead of this,the ports-even if member of the same European Seaport Organisation, and as such bringing in their common interest in the EU-they are first of all competing ports, sharing wiht each other the same European Hinterland. For this the often hidden and indirect support (even if limited by the rules for an open competion within the EU market) by each of the nation states is as yet decisive (Suykens, 1998, p.121-p.132).
4. CONCLUSIONS: 'INTERNATIONAL REGIME THEORY'AS A FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTAND THE POSITIONING OF PORTS BETWEEN SEATRANSPORT AND HINTERLAND TRANSPORT
The example of Felixstowe as a port led by a private company, illustrates that it is possible to unite the target of optimal commercial functioning (Felixstowe was very successful in commerical terms) and the targets of martime safety, the environmental quality of the port region, the necessary capacity of connections (the latter with lesser success) and so on, even fromout a position as private actor. Hutchison Whampoa could only invest in Felixstowe and operate this port over a longer period by adapting to the requirements, posed in the broader setting of the port, both at the seaside and the landside, and with a landlord (Trinity College of Cambridge University), which only leased the land to the private actor (Baird, 1998, p.95-p.120).
Felixstowe shows us that a “trade off” strategy between different interests in a port complex is first of all a question of open negotiations, in which the competing reality of ports is a given. The time of ports as social capital is defnititvely over and the transition to an approach of economic capital is imperative. In a closer inspection of Felixstowe, one can also conlcude that the form this strategic investment and the operation in a complex environment is given, can vary. The port can be a public sector or a private port, or even a combined public-private port. The most important is that the port organization can take the risks and with this the chanches,and at the same time can be hold responsible for this. All this is part of a dynamic economy and technology, in which competition at the one hand is tough, but other interests at the other hand have to be brought in and weighted adequately,at least if one wants to function over a longer period.
This refers to a theory, in which the rules of the game are derived first of all from the strategic players and stakeholders themselves in their interplay, more than dictated first of all by the public sector, be it at a local, a regional, a national, or even an international scale. This is what one sees in the sector of telecommunication, transport (especially airtransport and seatransport) and in the sector of energy (electricity and gas). These sectors are all characterized by a turbulent technological dynamism and a strong competitiveness of economy, both not any more regulated within the borders of nation states, but in international turbulent markets. In such a situation it is not anymore possible that the nation states function as the decisive regulators, even if their overall role and function remains important. Instead of this, there appear new regimes and rules, originating directly from the strategic actors and stakeholders in the sector concerned and which offer the necessary framing for initiatives,investments and action of the main actors (or alliances of actors) together with the representatives of other interests, be it safety,environmental quality, or cultural or human values. In the meantime thisinternational regime is subject of study and analysis within the specializations of international trade and international relations. It has been worked out already in an elementary analysis of the sector of seatransport, additional to that of airtransport and telecommunications (Zacher, with Sutton, 1996).
For the future the evolution of ports-be it in Europe, in Asia, or in Northern America-within a broader whole of infrastructure, transport, distribution and logistics at the seaside as well at the landside-it is necessary to have more insight in this international seatransport regime and to bring this subsequently in relation to the geopoliticis and other policies of continents, nation states, often united in trade agreements, and finally of regions. The ports individually and in formations as those of the Hamburg-Le Havre Range will evolve further in the future, in seeking and finding a balance between the opportunities, the threats, the challenges, the pressures, as these demonstrate themselves at a global, a national and a regional/local scale. In this way ports are ‘entrepreneurial' in the economy of today.
