(Acts)
When running southward carrying a large number of passengers on board the "Fuji Maru No.1", the Skipper of "Fuji Maru No.1", examinee noticed the presence of the westbound "Nadashio" and the northbound yacht "Eve 1". Recognizing that the submarine was drawing closer to his boat so as to cross ahead of the yacht, he reduce his speed to half ahead engine to let the submarine pass ahead of his pleasure fishing craft, in which case he had the obligation to take due care to continue watching the movement of the "Nadashio" to assess the risk of collision, but he failed to do so under the false impression that the submarine would pass ahead of his craft, which act is considered to constitute professional negligence and, against this act, his service as the Third Grade Maritime Officer (navigation) shall be suspended for one month by the application of the Marine Accidents Inquiry Law. Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 in accordance with Article 4, Subparagraph 2 of the same law.
When he was handling the submarine "Nadashio", the Commanding officer of Nadashio, a designated person in the marine accident, recognized the presence of the "Fuji Maru No.1" and the yacht "Eve I" after having left the Uraga Suido Traffic Route. When he found himself in a situation where his submarine would safely pass the yacht "Eve I", he did not pay sufficient attention to the movement of the "Fuji Maru No.1", and was not aware of the risk of collision. As a result, he did not take action to avoid collision, which is considered to have contributed to the occurrence of the collision. Considering that he was subjected to a disciplinary measure by the Maritime Self-Defense Force and abandoned sea service by failing to renew his qualification required for boarding ships, we do not make any further recommendation.
The fact that the Maritime Self-Defense Force Submarine Flotilla 2, a designated party in the marine accident, did not provide sufficient instruction and guidance for crew members in the basics of safe navigation, such as lookout, assessment of the movement of other ships and avoidance of collision, is considered to have contributed to the occurrence of the collision. After this accident, the said submarine flotilla has been providing in continuation, instruction and training in navigational safety on top of the reinforcement of refresher courses on marine traffic laws and regulations for senior officers, and basic training for other crew members in procedures for surface navigation and lookout, and in measures taken in response to emergency situations; and, furthermore, it has extended the application of the "navigational safety station" (state of high alert) to the whole area of Uraga Suido and improved the equipment of the submarines in relation to the communication of shiphandling orders, in addition to other measures for improvement. In consideration of the above fact, we do not make any recommendation.
When operating the "Fuji Maru No.1", which accommodated a large number of passengers, Fuji Shoji, a designated party in the marine accident, failed to manage her operation sufficiently by booking passengers in excess of her full carrying capacity, failing to prepare operational regulations or something like that, and entrusting the operational management to crew members unfamiliar with this type of boat in relation to the safety of passengers. Its failure is considered to have contributed to the occurrence of the accident. The only owned ship, the "Fuji Maru No.1", was scrapped as a result of this accident and it has become a company under liquidation, in consideration of which we do not make any recommendation.
