The "Pacific Ares" sustained destructive damage at the bow section and was engulfed in flames, which developed into a great fire immediately after the collision, as a result of her exposure at the forecastle and all over the upper deck to the flames erupted from the "Yuyo Maru No. 10",. Of all the crew members, the only survivor was the Second Engineer. the Master and 27 other crew members were either burned or drowned to death.
This collision was caused when the "Pacific Ares" sailing westward in the vicinity of Kisarazu Port Entrance No. 2 light buoy, heading to go outside Tokyo Bay from the Kisarazu Passage, encountered a vessel sailing northward along the Naka-no Se Traffic Route. In such a case she should have taken evasive action, either by altering her course to starboard to make a detour sufficiently away from the north boundary of the same traffic route or stopping the engine to wait until the vessel passed clear of her. Without taking such action, she continued sailing on the same course, which would bring her excessively close to the north extremity of the same traffic route and advanced ahead of the other vessel. This inappropriate operation is found to have contributed to the occurrence of the accident. When the Master of the "Yuyo Maru No.10", examinee, navigated the "Yuyo Maru No. 10", a huge vessel which carried dangerous goods, northward along the Naka-no Se Traffic Route, he should have kept a strict radar watch to ascertain the presence of other vessels as the visibility was slightly restricted by haze, and have reduced her speed as appropriate to position the course guard boat ahead of her, thereby to fully utilize it, with the possibility in mind of an encounter around the north boundary of the same route with a vessel coming out from the Kisarazu Passage. He failed to take such measures, resulting in a delay in taking notice of the approach of the other vessel; and furthermore, he was also slow in taking such an action as the circumstances dictated after the development of a close quarters situation to avoid collision. His professional negligence in the vessel operation is also considered to have partly contributed to the occurrence of the accident.
No improper acts are found in the measures taken after the occurrence of the collision.
The act of the Master of the "Orion", examinee, is not found negligent while his radar watch deems to be rather insufficient.
The acts of the Third Officer of the "Yuyo Maru No. 10" and the Junior Third Officer of the "Yuyo Maru No.10", both examinees, and the Yuyo Steamship Co., Ltd. and the Eastern Shipping Co., Ltd., both designated parties in the marine accident, are found to have made no contribution to the occurrence of the accident.
After the occurrence of this accident, Kisarazu Port Offing light buoy was established 21°1,500 m from Naka-no Se Traffic Route No. 8 light buoy and vessels leaving Kisarazu Port are given specific administrative guidance to leave a distance of 1,500 m or more from the north end of the Naka-no Se route. However, there is still room for improvement regarding safety for vessels in the vicinity of the north extremity of this route.
Against the Master of the "Yuyo Maru No.10", examinee, his service under the license of First Grade Master shall be suspended for one month by the application of the Marine Accidents Inquiry Law, Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 in accordance with Article 4, Subparagraph 2 of the same law.
