Conclusion
A typhoon, as well as an ice berg and a hurricane, is a threat directly affecting vessel navigation and masters who have encountered a typhoon are required by the relevant conventions and the Ship Safety Law to notify vessels in the vicinity and coast stations to that effect. This means that, even if a vessel is provided with the standard structures and equipment as prescribed by the relevant conventions and regulations, the master is required to take special precautions in the safety of the ship and human lives since an encounter with a typhoon, etc. will most likely to pose danger to the ship's navigation.
The "Toya Maru" was equipped with a large opening in her stern for the transport of trains and this opening had no facility to prevent entry ofwaves. Furthermore, the train deck had a large number of openings leading to the machinery space, boiler room, etc. All in all, the vessel had a special structure which prevented closing devices from having water tight integrity because of her operational features. When standing by after postponing her departure since the ship's operation was threatened by the approach of Typhoon No. 15 and when the Meteorological Agency issued a warning and related information that a typhoon with a considerable intensity would hit the Hakodate Region, the Master should have paid special attention to the safety of the vessel and to human life. In the vicinity of the port of Hakodate, the wind veered clockwise, gradually increasing its intensity, reaching SSW 22 to 25 m/sec and accompanying gusts of 32 m/sec, and the barometer stayed constant after having hit bottom, indicating that the typhoon had not passed. In such weather, the Master of "Toya Maru" left Hakodate for Aomori with a large number of passengers and trains on board. The casualty is found mainly attributable to his professional negligence in seamanship.
The direct cause of the capsizing of the "Toya Maru" is as follows: The "Toya Maru" sailed out of the breakwater and fell in a difficult situation in terms of maneuverability because of gales and high waves. She dropped her anchors and, while making efforts to maintain her position through the use of her engines and rudder, waves made their way into the train deck through the large opening in the stern, causing violent motions and yaws of the hull. As a result of her inability to prevent the ingress of a large amount of sea water from various openings situated in the train deck into the machinery space and boiler room, etc. located below the same deck, one by one various machines fell inoperative depriving the vessel of maneuverability and drastically lowering her draining ability. While she was dragging anchors with her stability being lessened, she touched bottom in the aft portion. As a result, the "Toya Maru" came to receive sea waves at a more broadside angle and still larger amounts of water came in through the bulwarks, at last making it impossible for the vessel to restore her stability.
The "Toya Maru" was a third grade ship whose navigation area was coastal waters under the Ship Safety Law, had passed regulatory inspections, and presenting no evidence of contravention of the law. However, the law has no standards as to the structures and materials of third grade ships and only specifies that the standards be as a competent authority deems proper. This means that the law guarantees the minimum safety of a third grade ship on the precondition that she is properly operated in the sailing area, but that it does not guarantee the safety of ship operation in all weather and/or sea conditions.
