The aggressive vernacular press of Taiwan can certainly hold its own and excel on the field. But for the part of the world that cannot read or listen to Mandarin Chinese with understanding, more emphasis should be placed on getting the news and analysis from this important story to foreign audiences. (2)
Vice-Premier Qian Qichen gave an interview to the Asian Wall Street Journal in October 1996, in which he spelled out what forms of expression would not be tolerated by the new order. There could be no criticism of the Chinese leadership, no "interference" in Chinese mainland affairs, such as rallies to commemorate the Tiananmen Square massacre, and the media would have to confine itself to 'facts', rather than opinions.
No "off-the-wall" commentaries.
If this was not eerie enough, consider what China has already done about laws which it dislikes, primarily the Bill of Rights. This Bill essentially incorporates the two international covenants on human, social and economics rights into Hong Kong's statute. These two covenants are, as stated above, actually apart of the Basic Law, constituting Article 39. However, China has made it clear that the Bill would have to be cut down to size. This meant taking away its overriding powers in relation to laws which contravene human rights and watering down elements of the law which made for more vigorous enforcement of these rights. Now ultimate jurisdiction on the Bill of Rights is out of the hands of Hong Kong courts and delivered to the NPC, which has the power of interpretation over the Basic Law.
Some apologists for the new order have argued that the pledge to maintain all of Hong Kong's existing laws only relates to those which were in force in 1984, when the Joint Declaration was signed. This implied that the British administration should create a virtual freeze on new statutes for a period of thirteen years until 1997. Of course this notion was absurd, Vines and others had noted. But when arguments of this kind are trotted out some clear indication is being given of the ways in which China could wriggle out of the pledges it has taken the trouble to enshrine in statute.
Even more blatant than the junking of the laws which China disliked was the arbitrary decision to establish a provisional legislature to replace the Legislative Council elected in 1995. The rival legislature came into being before China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong and its very existence had no constitutional basis, neither in the Basic Law nor in the Joint Declaration. The new government argued that it was a necessary expedient because without the creation of a provisional body there would be a vacuum of power. China had previously agreed with Britain that both legislators and civil servants would ride on the "through train", meaning that those in office on June 30 1997 would remain there on and after July 1.
