OECD REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION
The Working Party of the Trade Committee of OECD prepared this report which is available on the internet at "http://www.oecd.org/ech/tradedoc.html". The reader is encouraged to read the entire report. The following paragraphs are a few highlights:
・The leading players in the field of international standards share the perception that trade liberalisation has moved on from its earlier focus on tariffs, quotas, and related issues, and into the area of NTBs (non-tariff barriers); that standardisation forms a legitimate area of study in that context; and specifically that increasing attention needs to be devoted to making standards more relevant to the needs of trade and of the market. In the words of the president-elect of ISO: standards should be economic instruments with technical content. The attempt by OECD to contribute to that goal is broadly welcomed.
・The scope of this report covers not only voluntary texts (standards stricto sensu) but also standards that have been incorporated in texts with regulatory force (technical regulations). It considers only those with an identifiable link to products traded, where the goal of one product, one test, accepted everywhere, could be postulated.
・At government level, regulators adopt a range of approaches. In any given area, their work may 1) concern product standards, or conformity assessment, or both; 2) deal only with issues of the protection of the consumer or the worker or aim wider; 3) use any of a number of models for linking standards to regulations and 4) develop agreements either at multilateral level (in the WTO or other bodies), or bilaterally (e.g. USA/EU).
・The efficiency of the standardisation process in the established standards bodies is perceived as a particular area for attention. Today, that attention focuses on 1) the nature of the product line; 2) the depth and scope of the standards, and notably the distinction between criteria for end-performance and related testing and other descriptive specifications developed for the convenience of industry; 3) the inherent speed and complexity of the standards development process; 4) the implementation of adopted standards, since standards only have value if they are used; and 5) the ability to weed out obsolete or irrelevant texts.
・Past analysis from the trade policy perspective in the context of the OECD regulatory reform project has revealed that use of internationally harmonised standards is an important way to overcome national regulatory barriers. It has also been pointed out that the issue of the quality of international standards and the standardisation process is increasingly attracting the attention of policy-makers, and in some cases there is a recognised need for improvement. Such recognition led to one of the policy recommendations produced at the time of the 1997 Ministerial meeting:
Develop and use wherever possible internationally harmonised standards as a basis for domestic regulations, while collaborating with other countries to review and improve international standards to assure that they continue to achieve intended policy goals efficiently and effectively.
・The paramount importance of ISO and IEC is illustrated by the central document in the Uruguay Round of the WTO which deals with this field: the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, or TBT Agreement, which at the global level represents the most wide-ranging operational system yet developed for attacking technical barriers to trade. In this document, and notably in its Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards, it appears to accept that ISO and IEC are the dominant bodies in this field. It centralises with them the notification of acceptance of the code. Most of its definitions are taken from IS0/IEC documents. And where it deviates from IS0/IEC definitions - as it does on the question of whether standards can be regulatory instruments - it invents its own, rather than preferring those of another standards body. The same bodies dominate in the actual operation of the WTO TBT Agreement. The Agreement is overseen by a TBT Committee, with representatives from every WTO member, and which may grant observer status to international standards bodies.
・A history of linkage at national level: the traditional model
-At national level, structural linkage between standardisation and regulation is not new. In many countries, national standards bodies have close, formal links with government authorities. In most cases, the national standards bodies are formally independent of government, although there are still some exceptions, where the national standards bodies are run as departments of government ministries. This model - in which strong linkage at national level is crucial, between standardisers and governments - can be called the traditional, or "ISO/IEC" model, Relevant features include:
-At the national level
--National standards bodies (NSBs) are generally formally independent of government, with heavy involvement of industry.
--National regulatory authorities and national standards bodies link their activities. Typical linkages oblige national governments to participate in standards development through their local NSBs, and inform those NSBS of regulatory needs. They also oblige the NSBs to take account of those regulatory needs in their standardisation work. These linkages are frequently underpinned by formal Memoranda of Understanding.
-At the international level:
--Regulatory authorities are automatically represented in international standardisation only through their participation in national standards activity. Beyond that, intergovernmental groups of regulatory authorities do not participate automatically in the development of international standards, although ISO has an optional "liaison" system which permits such groups to ask or to be invited to participate, and which is quite heavily used.
--Standardisers and industry have no direct right of representation in international groups of regulators developing technical regulations, and at their best their representation is limited to that of observers, or similar, as happens in the WTO TBT Committee.
In this model, the theory is that if, in every country, standardisation activity is linked smoothly to regulatory development, national standards bodies will reflect that linkage in their work at international level, in the international standards bodies.
