The Labor government's authoritative policy statement, the' 1987 Defence white paper, modified the Dibb review by affirming that national policy was one of 'self-reliance within a framework of alliances'. The white paper allowed for possible Australian commitment of forces to contingencies distant from its area of immediate strategic interest. This policy flexibility permitted, for example, Australia's modest contribution to the 1991 Gulf War. Unlike their New Zealand counterparts, Australian Labor leaders also proved able to insulate the US alliance from anti- nuclear lobbies at home. But they made some important concessions to these constituencies, with unpredictable long term strategic consequences.
Nuclear allergies
Opposition to French nuclear testing in the South Pacific fed anti-nuclear sentiment in Australia and New Zealand. 'Peace activists' sought to convince the public that American nuclear weapons, rather than Soviet hegemonial designs, represented the real threat to their security.
Living in a remote comer of a vast ocean, 'peace' activists in the South Pacific could not comprehend the basic facts of the global balance-that the United States, as a maritime power, needed both nuclear weapons and maritime flexibility in order to contain the Soviet Union, and to protect its allies at both ends of Eurasia. Moscow obviously did not think the South Pacific irrelevant, as evidenced by its support for 'peace campaigns' which targeted nuclear weapons and US maritime mobility.
New Zealand, which had no US facilities on its soil, ran only minute risks by being a US ally. By contrast, there is no doubt that Australia's hosting of the joint defense facilities made it potentially vulnerable to nuclear attack. But few in Australia seemed to understand that the United States was also running risks by hosting in Australia facilities on which its nuclear security critically depended. What if a hostile government one day pulled the plug, possibly at a critical moment?
New Zealand defected from the ANZUS alliance in 1986, when it refused to accept nuclear-capable ships in its ports. The Australian Labor government proved to have better political skills in alliance management. It neutralized anti-nuclear sentiment by greater openness about the joint facilities and assertions of Australian sovereignty Frank acknowledgment of the deterrence functions of the 'bases' was combined with emphasis on their utility in monitoring arms control agreements. But there were some important concessions made in order to appease anti-nuclear constituencies, including the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SPNFZ).
SPNFZ was a symbol intended to neutralize anti-nuclear sentiment in the powerful left wing of the Australian Labor Party. Even though the Treaty accommodated US interests by allowing individual members to decide whether they would allow issue visits by nuclear-capable warships, SPNFZ caused concern in Washington because of the precedents it might create. Given the geostrategic asymmetries which defined the Cold War, Moscow stood to benefit from any constricting of US maritime mobility.
