The intelligence-gathering U.S.- Australia 'joint facilities' in central Australia have lost none of their importance after the end of the Cold War, and have been upgraded. Indeed, these facilities could have new roles in regional security if Japan and South Korea go ahead with Theatre Missile Defenses.
Australia contributed forces to the Korean, Vietnam and Gulf conflicts. In the February 1998 flare-up with Iraq, Australia was prepared to send SAS forces, and it endorsed the December 1998 US/UK punitive strikes against Saddam Hussein's regime. Australia was the only regional country willing openly to criticize China in early 1996, when China launched missiles across the Taiwan strait in an effort to intimidate Taiwan during its first presidential elections. At that time, Australia's defense minister warned China that its minatory behaviour might incur consequences.
In 1995, Australia entered into a remarkable new strategic alignment with Indonesia, prompted by both countries' determination to resist China's growing strategic pressure in the South China Sea. Australia welcomed the upgrading of the US-Japan alliance in 1996, recognizing the centrality of that alliance for regional security. Its own alliance with the United States was upgraded in the same year, with Australia expressing greater willingness to use the alliance to help shape the regional security environment. The US alliance continues to enjoy strong electoral and bipartisan support.
But Australia has yet to develop a maritime strategy appropriate to its strategic needs. Tied to continental defense, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) is prevented from projecting its forces beyond the continent, thus benefiting any potential aggressor, and undermining Australia's credibility as a contributor to alliance burden-sharing. Australia is also seeking defense on the cheap, spending having fallen to 2% of GNP. These force structure deficiencies stem from muddled strategic thinking which has its roots in isolationist instincts.
The strategic debate in Australia is muddled because it continues to confuse 'defence' with 'security'. 'Defence' focuses on the risk of invasion, while 'security' is a broader concept encompassing freedom from constraint by threats, intimidation or other pressures, from whatever source, that would unacceptably limit policy choices. For Australia, such constraints may be as geographically distant as, for example, Germany's pursuit of hegemony over Europe, or the Soviet Union's over Eurasia.
Muddled strategic thinking and isolationist instincts
Isolationist thinking resurfaced in Australia in the late 1960s, because of disillusionment with 'entangling' alliances consequent upon the Vietnam war. The concept of defense 'self-reliance' was nothing new. It had been around since the 1920s, when it emerged as a reaction against the appalling casualties of the First World War, and the belief that they had been sacrifices to remote Imperial interests.4
