Frances F. Lai
How can one induce compliance with a framework agreement? At one extreme, compliance can only be brought about by force, when those who are required to comply do not share the goals or interests, or find compliance brings more hardship or difficulties than benefits; and, at the other extreme, when goals and interests are shared, so that compliance is not an issue. But, in the real world, we more than often find ourselves between the extremes. Goals and interests need to be commonly defined, a working relationship needs to be in place or developed, and specific difficulties or special circumstances need to be duly addressed.
In international treaty-making, formal diplomacy often sets the framework for action but cannot get into all the details, especially when participating/delegations come from diverse backgrounds, political cultures or domestic conditions. The Law of the Sea Convention is a case in point. It took ten years to complete, taking into account the varied interests and circumstances of more than one hundred countries in a give-and-take package deal. It is one of the most meticulously worked out international agreements. And yet there are still many details of fights and obligations to be worked out regionally and sub-regionally. In many sensitive areas, consensus-building is necessary and, to that end, it may be necessary to resort to non-official channels known as Track Two Diplomacy.
Track Two Diplomacy is contrasted with Track One Diplomacy, the traditional, government-to-government mode of official diplomacy. Track Two Diplomacy usually involves officials, politicians, academics and opinion leaders in non-official policy dialogues. It facilitates freer exchange of ideas and opinions relatively unbound by a government's policy positions.
After the Second World War, under the bipolar system, the United States was the dominant leader of the non-communist countries in Asia. Yet, given the political, economic and cultural diversities in the region and the different historical experiences of the countries, it was necessary to develop consensus. For example, according to Tadashi Yamamoto, a long-time veteran in international exchange, "by the late 1960s, the Japan - U.S. relationship had outgrown interaction at the government level alone, and national policies required broader public understanding and support. Private dialogue uninhibited by the policy positions of the two governments allowed conference participants to explore new long-term policy directions for both countries." A similar rationale of the need for non-official policy dialogue in the international relations and security field gave rise to the national centres or institutes of strategic and international studies in Southeast Asia and their related forums.
