China may in fact be willing to risk much in order to get back Taiwan before it slips from its grasp. That could happen within a few years, if Taiwan is covered by Theatre Missile Defenses, either from Taiwan itself, or by being sheltered by Japan's development of TMD. Once Japan's new defense guidelines become law, prospects for Japanese support of US actions in defense of Taiwan will also increase.
China's best hope of achieving a 'Sudetenland solution' for the Taiwan problem might be to provoke a crisis, then use missile barrages close to Taiwan's ports, simulated amphibious landings, attacks on the currency, electronic warfare, assassinations and so on in order to create panic and confusion in Taiwan. Then a pro-Beijing figure might pop up, preferable a native Taiwanese, to announce that Beijing was willing to treat Taiwan generously provided it acknowledged the sovereignty of China. 'One country, two systems', just like Hong Kong.
If America dithered long enough for China to present it with a fait accompli, would the US then risk casualties in order to intervene in China's 'civil war'? China's weapons purchases strongly suggest an intention to target US aircraft carriers if they intervene again. Could China hope to raise the cost of intervention high enough to deter the US?
The risk of miscalculation certainly exists. China may not be 'rational' according to US interpretations, and may resort to preemptive action if it thinks that time is not on its side. The logic of preemption, after all, informed Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941.
Senkakus/Diaoyu Islands
During the missile crisis in the Taiwan Straits in August 1995, Chinese warplanes entered the disputed airspace over the disputed Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, northeast of Taiwan. That prompted Japanese fighters to scramble from Okinawa for the first time.12
The end of the Cold War had consequences for the long-standing dispute between Japan and China over the ownership of these uninhabited islands. In the late 1970s, China and Japan became allies of convenience when the US and China came into strategic alignment in order to oppose the growing Soviet threat in the Far East. At that time, Chinese supreme leader Deng Xiaoping said that the Senkakus issue would be left to another generation to solve. But the end of the Cold War dissolved the de facto alliance between China on one side and the US and Japan on the other. UNCLOS (United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea), which entered into force in 1994, has also increased the strategic and economic value of such islands,
