Control Authority (SFT). This contingency is put into effect in case of acute pollution where the source of the pollution is unknown or the polluter himself is not capable of responding. The governmental preparedness system is in the latter case responding on behalf of the polluter who afterwards will face the bill. This means in fact the discharge of oil from ships sailing along the coast and for whatever reason runs aground or is involved in a collision. This preparedness system holds more than 40,000 m of booms and approximately 100 oil recovery devices. 6 Norwegian Coast Guard vessels, 4 purpose-built response vessels and one twin turboprop Fairchild Merlin 111B special equipped surveillance aircraft. In addition a databank of ships that can be mobilised is available.
After receiving the message of the grounding of the “ARISAN” the local authorities were alarmed and asked to establish a command post in the area. The municipalities were asked to use all available equipment, including government equipment from the nearby depot, in order to protect special vulnerable areas. SFT was in the beginning established at its headquarter in Horten, but at first daylight the necessary staff was moved to the West Coast and established its command post there. Necessary government equipment was mobilised and five hours after first notification 3 recovery systems were in operation. The main task for the recovery systems was to pick up as much oil from the sea as possible and try to prevent the oil from reaching vulnerable areas. This strategy was based on available data of the area, wind and current situation and available resources. The weather condition made it impossible to protect the important island of Runde. Therefore it was decided that 2 other fjords equally important should be prioritised.
National strategy for oil spill combat operations
Oil recovery by the use of mechanical methods is the basic principle of Norwegian preparedness. Chemical methods are regarded as supplementary. Response shall take place as close to the source of the pollution as possible. Since the main goal of any oil combat operation is to limit environmental impacts, biological assessment is the key input to strategic decisions in Norwegian preparedness.
The nations oil pollution preparedness is heavily dependent on vessels of opportunity and personnel not working full-time with environmental issues. The Coast Guard vessels, tugboats, ferries, fishing vessels, supply vessels and coastal tankers are key resources in the National Contingency Plan.
The Norwegian coastline has been pre-mapped with respect to biological sensitivity. Hence, in case of an oil spill is approaching the coastline and the available oil combat resources are insufficient for total protection, priority of different coastline areas is possible on short notice.
One refinery has received pre-approval from SFT to conduct chemical dispersion of oil if certain conditions are fulfilled. Hence, immediate chemical response is possible- a key factor for effective chemical combat. SFT has made special regulations for the use of chemicals in environmental emergency operations.
Emergency offloading:
SFT had been informed that the “ARISAN” was carrying 400 t of fuel oil and 30 t of diesels. It was anticipated that about 100-150 t were released when the ship grounded. This information came from the captain who was taken off the ship with his crew at an early stage. This information proved to be wrong. After inspection of the ships tanks, and other information brought forward it was calculated that the ship was carrying close to 700 t of fuel oil. It was therefore vital at this stage to arrange for an emergency offloading of the ship before it started to break up.
Emergency offloading is the responsibility of The Norwegian Maritime Directorate. In circumstances like the above-mentioned incident, representative of the Maritime Directorate will join the SET operation Head Quarter. Equipment for emergency offloading is stored on 3 sites along the coast and can be brought to the effected area by helicopter if necessary.
In the case of the “ARISAN” the emergency offloading was a very complicated operation. The ship was aground in an area where other ships could not go alongside. The weather was so rough that you could not get any closer than 100 m. The only solution then was to bring pumps and hoses over by helicopter. The next problem was to get to the bunker tanks. Some tanks could only be reached through the engine room. That was quite a dangerous operation since we were afraid that the ship could start breaking up any time. However, the
