now in the media. These Anglo-Saxon commentators become instant experts on Asia.
｡?KAWAKATSU
Prof. Yamazaki mentioned three sets of dichotomy, and I'd like to add one more set, that is globalization and Americanization. Prof. Reid explained that Europe has its own nationality different from that of America and this is surely applicable to Asia. Globalization seems to be equal to what Prof. Yamazaki called modernization. Neither globalization nor modernization is the same as Americanization. Refusing to be Americanized doesn't necessarily result in returning back to Asian traditions, nation states, or a Japanese style of manufacturing. It seems to contribute to our own global standards.
As the fourth set of dichotomy, I'd like to suggest a set of Americanization and globalization. This idea probably denies Pax-Britannica, Pax-Americana, and Pax- Japonica, because such a way of thinking is, in a sense, similar to Sino-centrism or a mono-centric idea. We are possibly heading for a multi-polar and decentralized way of thinking from now on. This is probably related to the reason behind why Prof. Shiraishi expressed a strong reservation of Pax Japonica. I think this suggests one of the ways to formulate so-called a global society. That's why I'd like to add one more set of dichotomy.
｡?Ashis NANDY
Senior Fellow and Former Director, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi
I have a question, which I ask in ignorance, because I am neither an economist, nor do I live in South-East Asia, which is presently having an economic crisis. I come from the country which is taking the first step toward getting integrated in the global political economy. The question is: do you think, looking at the past from the point of view of the future, that South-East Asia would have protected itself better if its democratic institution had been stronger? If people had the direct capacity to intervene in the policy process, which we think mainly in terms of impersonal actors like the World Bank and the IMF on one side, economic planners and financial institutions on the other? Would the South-East Asians have been able to control their fate more if they were living in more open societies.
｡?MOHAMAD
Given the fact that there is no real center anymore in this current situation even there is no longer a Pax-Americana; given the fact that the nation states have withered away somehow, even if not totally, what kind of regional order are we speaking of, what is the base of this regional order you want to create? On the question whether Southeast Asian countries survive better if we had more democratic institutions, the answer is yes and no. Maybe Singaporeans would say no. Maybe they would prefer an authoritarian government that is very clean--- so clean in everything that Singapore has become like an intensive care unit. But in the case of Indonesia the problem of crony capitalism has generated a moral hazard which was born out of close relationships between big companies and government officials. The President's family business is so large that we cannot really tell whether it is national interest or Suharto's interest to protect them. In this kind of situation democracy, or whatever you call it, it is necessary to check the unscrupulous and the greedy who remain on the top. Now we are more and more dependent on one person. We are suffering from institutional diseases. It has to be stopped.
And we need democracy for that.
｡?LEE
I think that the issue presented by Prof. Ashis Nandy just now is very important. The theory of despotic development used to be popular in political science for quite a long time.
Despotic authoritarianism was then regarded to be helpful for economic development, especially in East Asia, and now it has ended in failure. I think it is very difficult to say that political authoritarianism or dictatorship is alternatively conducive to economic development. We need to pay attention to more details.
On the other hand, it is not always true that democracy protects each political community, and ensures welfare as well as economic development. Let me briefly refer to Korean Situation. It is strange to say that as far as I know most of conditions and challenges for reforms in Korea required now by the IMF were already included in the reform plans submitted by the government affiliated or Kim Yong sam's personal think tanks when Kim took office five years ago.
Sound economists can easily find out that the plutocracy might have been very effective for a certain period, but that it entails enormous inefficiency and wastes. It's also problematic in competitiveness. Therefore, financial groups that are often called "professional leading companies" should be split into individual competitive fields. On the other hand, medium and small businesses should be strengthened quality-wise. Financial surveillance functions should be more neural and independent. Those agendas were on the table of the
