


# Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security



October 13, 2006

Ocean Policy Research Foundation



本書は、競艇交付金による日本財団の助成金を受けて作成しました。

Publication of this book is funded by a grant from The Nippon Foundation, which is issued from motorboat-racing proceeds.

# 目 次

日印関係と海洋安全保障ダイアローグ .....	1
日印海洋安全保障ダイアローグ フェーズ - 2 会議の概要 .....	10
日本とインド間の海洋安全保障協力に関する共同声明 .....	19
Opening Session .....	43
開会挨拶      Opening Address .....	45
Speech 1      インド洋の海洋安全保障環境 .....	57
Speech 2      安倍新政権における日印関係 .....	63
Session 1 海上暴力・不法行為 - そのシナリオと抑止 .....	83
Session 1-      海上暴力・不法行為に係る議論の総括 .....	85
Session 1-      インド洋における海上暴力行為 - 課題と対応 .....	108
Session 1-      海上テロの脅威 .....	122
Session 1-      海上航行と大陸棚上の固定式プラットフォームの 安全に対する不法行為の抑止 .....	145
Session 2 海洋安全保障情報の日印共有 .....	151
Session 2-      ReCAAPとISCの概要 .....	153
Session 2-      インド洋のチョークポイントにおける海事活動 .....	155
Session 2-      日印海洋安全保障情報の共有 .....	166
Session 2-      異文化間の情報共有 - 必然と障害 .....	170
Session 3 日印海洋・海事関連経済協力の促進 .....	193
Session 3-      Globalizationの進展と新しい日印経済関係 .....	195
Session 3-      インドの港湾近代化計画 .....	211
Session 3-      インドの造船 - 現在と将来 .....	224
Session 3-      海事産業基盤の構築に向けた日印経済協力 .....	230
Session 3-      インドの港湾・海事セクターに対する日本のODA .....	236
参考文献 .....	239
日印協力の展望	

# Table of Contents

<b>Indo-Japan Relations and the Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security</b> .....	5
<b>The Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security Phase -2</b>	
<b>Record of Proceedings</b> .....	23
<b>Joint Statement on India-Japan Ocean Security Cooperation</b> .....	38
<b>Opening Session</b> .....	43
Opening Address .....	50
Speech 1      Security Environment in the Indian Ocean .....	57
Speech 2      Indo-Japan Relationship under the Abe Administration .....	74
<b>Session 1 “ Maritime Terrorism and its Prevention ”</b> .....	83
Session 1-      Violence on the Sea and Unlawful Acts	
- Scenario and Roundup of the Discussion for Deterrence - .....	97
Session 1-      Maritime Violence in the Indian Ocean–Challenges and Response .....	108
Session 1-      The Threat of Maritime Terrorism .....	133
Session 1-      Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime	
Navigation and Fixed Platforms on The Continental Shelf .....	145
<b>Session 2 “ Indo-Japan Information Sharing ”</b> .....	151
Session 2-      Outline of ReCAAP and ISC .....	153
Session 2-      Maritime Activities in The Choke Points of the Indian Ocean .....	155
Session 2-      Information Sharing on Maritime Security between India and Japan .....	166
Session 2-      Inter-Cultural Information Sharing: Imperatives and Impediments .....	170
<b>Session 3 “ Indo-Japan Cooperation on Ocean-based Industries ”</b> .....	193
Session 3-      Globalization and new Japan-India economic relationship .....	199
Session 3-      India's Programme for Modernising Ports .....	211
Session 3-      Indian Shipbuilding Present and Future .....	224
Session 3-      Indo-Japan Economic Cooperation for Development of	
Maritime Industries and Infrastructures .....	232
Session 3-      Japan's ODA to Indian Ports Sector and Maritime Sector .....	236
<b>Paper for Reference</b> .....	239
The Prospect of Japan-India Cooperation	



## 日印関係と海洋安全保障ダイアログ

(海上交通路と日印関係)

インドは、広大なインド洋に楔を打ち込む形で存在する南アジアの大国である。インドが強大な影響力を及ぼすインド洋には、日本にとって死活的に重要な中東原油の運ばれる海上交通路が通っている。日本の安全保障上最大の関心事である海上交通路の安全確保は、インドとの協調なくしてはあり得ない。インドもまた、そのエネルギー供給を中東原油に依存しており、インド洋における海上交通路の安全は、まさしく日印の戦略的協力関係における最重要課題であると言える。

(インドの安全保障)

今日、インドにとって安全保障面の関心事は、米国及び中国との関係強化であろうが、それぞれに障害も存在する。中国とは歴史的な国境紛争に加え、パキスタンとの関係において外交的軋轢がある。米国との関係促進については与党内の左派連合がブレーキになっている。他方、日印関係にはそうした障害はなく、国内各政党ともこれを支持している。元より、インドは親日的である。他方で、日本側はインドとの関係にあまり関心を示していなかった。当財団が日印海洋安全保障ダイアログを一連の二カ国間の海洋安全保障対話の皮切りに実施した理由の一端もここにある。

相互依存の進む国際社会の中で、総合安全保障、あるいは協調的安全保障といった概念が次第に理解されると共に醸成され、そのような構想に基づいて安全保障協力が促進されてきた。それと歩を合わせるように拡大していった経済活動のグローバル化は、今日の総合安全保障における国際経済協力の重要性を殊にクローズアップさせている。インドは、急速な経済発展を遂げつつある。日本とインドとの包括的な安全保障協力態勢の構築において、経済関係の密接化は必須であり、海洋安全保障を考察する上においても、産業分野、特に海事産業等に係わる協力の促進が極めて重要である。

(インドの重要性)

アジアを巨視的に俯瞰した場合、日本と密接な関係を持って発展する中国や東南アジア諸国は、日本とインドの間に広がる陸域と海域に存在している。経済発展を目指すインドは東アジアに西方から大きな影響力を及ぼしつつある。東アジア情勢のダイナミズムの考察は、インドを除いては成り立ち得ないともいえよう。

(労働力——諸刃の剣)

近年、インド経済の成長は目覚しく、アジアにおいては、韓国を抜いて日本、中国に次ぐ第3位の規模となっている。インド経済の強みとして特筆すべきは、インドの若年労働力の存在である。日本や中国が少子高齢化問題に直面しているのと好対象と言える。インドの労働人口構成は、若年労働者層の比率が高い。2020年までに15歳から59歳までの人口が、総人口に占める割合は、現在の35%から47%まで増えるものと予測されているが、この予測に拠れば、インドは世界で最大の労働人口を持ち、最も多くの消費者を抱えることになる。

しかし、現在インドでは、毎年1,000万人以上の新規労働力が市場に参入しており、

労働力の増加は、一方で、労働力をいかに吸収するかという重い課題を突きつけることになるだろう。IT産業だけにこの膨大な労働力の吸収を期待することはできない。製造業の発展が必要とされる所以である。そして製造業の発展のためには、インフラ整備と外部投資が欠かせない。その意味でインドの日本に対する期待は大きいのである。

#### （対印投資の停滞）

インドの期待に反して、現在、日本の対印投資は進んでいない。原因は、高い関税、法規制、ビジネス慣行、文化の違い等、さまざまに挙げられようが、主たる要因はインドのインフラが整備されていないことにある。インフラは経済成長のバックボーンであり、日本の投資家の多くは、インドでは全般にインフラが未整備であると認識している。投資を誘致するためには、特に運輸インフラの向上が必要である。

#### （迫られる投資環境の改善）

対中貿易と比較して、インドが日本の貿易全体に占める割合は低い。日本の対中貿易額約1,900億ドルに対して、対印貿易額は65億ドルに留まっている。直接投資についても同様のことが言える。日本はインドにとって4番目に大きい投資国であるが、日本の対中直接投資200億ドルに対して、対印直接投資はその10分の1に過ぎない。

現在日本からの投資が行われている分野は、運輸、通信、燃料、化学工業などであるが、インドは迅速な経済改革と規制緩和を行って投資環境を更に向上させる必要がある。マーケットとしてのインドのポテンシャル、とりわけIT関連市場としてのポテンシャルは重要であり、ITや自動車産業に対する日本の投資は増えつつけている。日本の投資家はインドの経済改革に一定の評価を与えつつも、更なる経済改革と規制緩和を求めている。

#### （人的交流促進の必要性）

日印間の安全保障や経済面での交流も、広範な人的交流の裾野に支えられていない限り、持続性のあるものとはなりえない。しかし今日、日印間の人的交流は極めて低調である。2005年における日印間の人の往来は約15万人であり、これは日中間のそれ(395万人)に比べれば、26分の1である。2006年冬期における航空便数についても、日中間の週676便に比べ、日印間のそれはわずか11便に過ぎない。日印間の人的交流の現状はこうしたデータに端的に現れている。

過去、我が国では散発的にインドブームが起こっているが、いずれも長続きしたことはない。2007年は日印双方で、「インド年」、「日本年」として文化交流促進予定されており、査証発給要件の緩和措置、航空便増便等も検討されている。息の長い取り組みが望まれる。

#### （戦略的パートナーシップへ）

2005年4月、小泉総理がシン首相と日印グローバルパートナーシップに戦略的方向性を与える8項目の行動計画について合意したことは、記憶に新しい。これを踏まえ、現在、日印の協力関係を戦略的パートナーシップに発展させようとする努力が払われている。政治・安全保障面では、1999年以降、我が国海上保安庁とインド沿岸警備隊の連携、共同訓練が進展し、2006年5月のインド国防大臣来日を契機に海上自衛隊とインド海軍の協力が進みつつある。これらの実績の上にハイレベル交流、首脳相互訪問、



外相レベルでの戦略対話等が進められるべきだろう。経済面ではODAを活用した製造業・運輸インフラ整備への協力が重要課題である。インドは2003年以降、最大の円借款受取国（累計2兆6千億円）である。

（日印海洋安全保障ダイアログ）

海洋政策研究財団とインド洋研究学会（Society of Indian Ocean Studies）は、2003年11月、日印海洋安全保障ダイアログを立ち上げた。海洋力、地政学、政治関係等を考慮すれば、日本とインドはJIA（日本－インド－アラビア）シールートの安全確保に大きな役割を担っており、両国間の多角的な協力関係の推進が欠かせない。そこで、まず民間セクターの持つ政治的中立の立場で率直な意見交換を行い、JIAシールート上の海上交通路の安全を中心とした海洋安全保障問題について、両国民および政治的指導者の認識を向上させるとともに、具体的な提言を打ち出していくこととした。

（第一フェーズ）

本ダイアログの第一フェーズとして、東京とデリーで過去3回の会議が開催された（第1回2003年11月・東京、第2回2004年4月・デリー、第3回2004年11月・東京）。2004年11月に東京で開催した第3回会議では、第一フェーズの締めくくりとして、JIAシールート安全確保の重要性を明らかにし、そのために両国が推進すべき協力事項に関する具体的提案として、「日印海洋安全保障協力に関する共同声明」を発表し、海洋情報センター構想の具体化、日印間の防衛・海保相互交流の促進、日印海洋経済協力の必要性を訴えた。

（第二フェーズ）

第二フェーズでは、上記「共同声明」を踏まえて、日印関係機関間の海洋安全保障情報の交換体制の確立、海洋・海事経済協力推進のためのシステム構築、信頼醸成措置等につき対話を継続し、人的交流を深めながら、情報発信型の活動を展開していくこととした。今般、過去の会議での検討結果を踏まえ、議論の深度化を図るため、2005年12月の第二フェーズ第1回会議（デリー）に続き、第2回会議を都内において開催した。今次会議は、海上テロ問題の対応策、海洋安全保障情報共有のための情報交換体制、海事産業分野の日印協力の具体的方策等について議論を深め、3カ年にわたるダイアログを総括し、海洋安全保障分野における日印協力の促進に寄与することを目指した。

会議は、日本・インド両国の海洋安全保障あるいは海上安全の政策やオペレーションの分野における専門家を招へいして、10月12日と13日の2日間にわたって開催され、活発な討議が交わされた。1日目の晩餐会には麻生太郎外務大臣が参加し、日印関係の重要性についてスピーチを行った。2日目には、「日本とインド間の海洋安全保障協力に関する共同声明」が採択、発表された。

（「日本とインド間の海洋安全保障協力に関する共同声明」）

共同声明の眼目は、①海上暴力への対応、②海洋情報の交換と共有、③日印海洋安全保障担当組織の信頼関係の強化、④海事産業部門での日印経済関係の強化、である。海洋政策研究財団とSIOSは、「JIAシールート」の重要性に鑑み、共同声明に盛り込まれた提言を両国の国民に広く訴えかけていきたいと考えている。

共同声明における提言の概要は次のとおり。

1. 海上暴力への対応
  - ・ 共通の利害を持つ分野での協力
  - ・ 被害の局限化における協力
  - ・ 信頼醸成の促進及び協力分野の見極め
  - ・ JIA 沿岸国への援助協力の検討
2. 海洋情報の交換と共有
  - ・ 電子メールを用いた情報共有メカニズムの構築
  - ・ 国家レベルでの情報共有を補完
  - ・ ReCAAP と ISC の効果的運用確保のために協力
3. 日印海洋安全保障担当組織の信頼関係の強化
  - ・ 2006 年 5 月に開かれた日印防衛首脳での合意内容の推進
4. 海事産業部門での日印経済関係の強化
  - ・ インド海運産業・海上事業活動における協力の模索
  - ・ インドから日本に海事産業情報を提供するシステムの構築
  - ・ 政府開発援助の活用の研究及び民間専門家会議の設立
  - ・ 民間資金の呼び込み
  - ・ 第三国への主要品目輸出促進のための合弁事業
  - ・ インドの船員育成計画への援助

今次会議のアジェンダ及びプレゼンター等は、本書後出のとおりである。



## **Indo-Japan Relations and the Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security**

### **Sea routes and Indo-Japan relations**

India is a major power in South Asia. The great landmass of the Indian subcontinent projecting out into the Indian Ocean may be likened to a huge wedge driven into the world's third largest ocean where India exerts great influences. Sea routes in the Indian Ocean carry Middle Eastern oils, critically important to the prosperity of our nation, to the Far East. Without collaboration with India, the safety of the sea routes could not be maintained --- safety which constitutes the largest security concern of our nation. India itself also depends upon oil supply from the Middle East, and consequently, the safety of sea routes in the Indian Ocean is the common issue of paramount importance for the Indo-Japan strategic partnership.

### **Security issues of India**

The largest security concern of India is the promotion of bilateral relations each with the United States and China. Yet, India confronts some obstacles in the promotion of bilateral relations with them. India has historical border disputes with China as well as long-standing diplomatic frictions with Pakistan. As for the relations with the United States, the leftist alliance in the ruling party withholds all-out support to its promotion. On the other hand, there exists no such obstacle between India and Japan. Not only ruling parties but opposition support the strengthening of Indo-Japan relations. India is one of long-standing friendly nations of Japan, whereas Japan has failed to exhibit corresponding interests in the country. This ambivalence accounts in part for the reason why Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF) initiated serial bilateral maritime security dialogues with India.

As countries in the world are becoming increasingly interdependent, the concepts of comprehensive security and coordinated security are gradually understood and fostered, and international security cooperation is now pursued on the basis of such concepts. Globalization of economy that has kept pace with security cooperation highlights the importance of international economic cooperation in relation to comprehensive security of today. In structuring the framework of comprehensive security cooperation between India and Japan, closer economic relations are a must, and when we address maritime security issues as part of both countries' comprehensive security cooperation, it will be essential to expand bilateral cooperation into industrial spheres --- maritime industries in particular.

### **Importance of India**

In a macroscopic perspective of Asia, China and Southeast Asian nations that develop keeping close relations with Japan exist in the vast expanses of land and sea that stand between India and Japan. Economic growth-oriented India is wielding great influences upon East Asia from west. Analysis of dynamism of the current East Asian situation would be defective, if India were not taken into account as a crucial actor.

### **Labor resources --- double-edged blade**

India's economic growth over recent years is conspicuous. In terms of the size of economy, India is next only to Japan and China, surpassing South Korea. India's advantage lies in its asset of young labor force, which forms a clear contrast with Japan and China facing the problem of dwindling birth rates and rapid aging. The structure of labor force in India features a high percentage of young workers. It is estimated that the population of India between the ages of 15 and 59 will have increased by 2020 from 35% to as high as 47% in her total population. If the estimate is correct, India then will boast the largest working population as well as the largest consumer population in the world.

Another side to this story. In India, more than 10 million of new workers come in the labor market every year. Such an increase in labor force poses a grave problem of how to absorb labor force domestically. IT industry alone cannot absorb such an enormous labor power. Manufacturing industries must be so developed as to accommodate a large number of workers. On the other hand, development of manufacturing industries must be accompanied and supported by infrastructure development and foreign investment. In this context, India has high expectations for Japanese assistance for infrastructure development and direct investment.

### **Stagnation of investment toward India**

Notwithstanding India's expectations, Japanese investment toward India is slow in pace. Various reasons may be cited --- high tariffs; legal controls; business practices; differences in culture, etc. However, the principal reason is the inadequacy of infrastructures in India. Many Japanese investors point out the inadequacy across the country. Infrastructure forms the backbone of economic growth, and improvement of transport infrastructures is required more than anything else to attract foreign investments.

### **Pressure for improvement of the investment environment**

Japan-India trade accounts for much less than Japan-China trade does in the whole Japanese trade. Contrasted with 190 billion dollars of Japanese trade with China, that with India is as little as 6.5 billion dollars. The same is true with direct investment. Japanese direct investment toward China has amounted to some 20 billion dollars, whilst that toward India is no more than a tenth of the amount, irrespective of the fact that Japan is the fourth biggest investor for India.

At present, Japanese investments toward India go to such areas as transportation; communication; fuels, and chemical industry. Since India's potentials as markets --- as an IT market in particular --- are quite important, Japanese investments in IT and automotive industries continue to grow. Although Japanese investors appreciate India's efforts of economic reforms to a certain degree, yet they request for her further efforts to achieve additional reforms and more deregulations to improve the investment environment.



### **Necessity of human exchange**

Exchanges between India and Japan in security and economic spheres will not become sustainable, unless they are well founded on a wider exchange of our two peoples. However, the flow of people between the two nations today is extremely stagnant, and in 2005, it was some 150 thousand, figure which constitutes just a twenty-sixth part of that between China and Japan (3.95 million). As of the winter season of 2006, the number of weekly flights between India and Japan is 11, whilst that between China and Japan 676. These data are eloquent of the present status of human exchange between our two countries.

Japan had witnessed India booms repeatedly in the past. But none of them survived. The year of 2007 will be celebrated as “the India Year” and “the Japan Year” respectively at home in each of the two partners, with some cultural exchange programs being planned. Easing visa requirements and an increase in direct flights are also being considered. We hope enduring efforts to increase the flow of people be pursued.

### **Toward a strategic partnership**

It is still fresh in memory of many people in India and Japan that in April 2005 Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Indian Prime Minister Shri Manmohan Singh agreed upon an Eight-fold Initiative to provide the Japan-India Global Partnership with a strategic direction; in accordance with which strenuous efforts are being made to develop Indo-Japan relations into a strategic partnership. When it comes to political and security dimensions, various forms of collaboration and joint exercises have been undertaken since 1999 between the two countries’ coast guard agencies, while cooperation between the two navies, given a thrust by Indian Defense Minister’s visit to Japan in May 2006, is now making a progress. On top of these developments, high-level exchanges, mutual visits of government leaders, and strategic talks between foreign ministers should be implemented. Cooperation toward the development of India’s manufacturing industries and transport infrastructures utilizing ODA will be potentially a major economic cooperation that Japan should undertake. Since 2003, India has been the largest recipient of Japanese ODA that has totaled some 2.6 trillion yen.

### **The Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security**

Since November 2003, OPRF and the Society for Indian Ocean Studies have conducted five rounds of “Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security,” based on the common recognition that India and Japan should account more for the security of sea routes between the Middle East and the Far East, and that multifaceted cooperation between the two countries is of vital importance in this connection. The members of the dialogue concurred that it would be a second track initiative’s mission to exchange views in a neutral setting and to work out concrete proposals, thereby helping disseminate proper knowledge about maritime security issues. From these points of views, OPRF has, as part of its efforts to help develop non-governmental maritime security dialogues, promoted substantive talks among experts of India and Japan and aroused the public awareness about maritime security.

A broad array of experts including retired top brass of navy; coast guard officials; academics; journalists; diplomats and economists participated in the Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security.

### **Phase I**

In Phase I of the dialogue, three rounds of conference --- the first in Tokyo, November 2003; the second in New Delhi, April 2004, and the third in Tokyo, November 2004 --- were held. At the third round of the dialogue held in Tokyo in November 2004, we issued the “Joint Statement on Ocean Security Cooperation between India and Japan,” which summed up the Phase I discussions. The Joint Statement called for: further cooperation between Japanese and Indian navies and coast guards; the establishment of “Information Network of Indo-Japan Ocean Security;” and strengthening of bilateral economic cooperation to promote bilateral security relations.

### **Phase II**

In Phase II of the dialogue, in line with the spirit of the November 2004 Joint Statement, we held the fourth and fifth rounds of conference and exchanged views on the challenges and responses arising from violence at sea; the structure and the scope of information sharing, and bilateral cooperation for the development of India’s maritime industries, thereby aiming at contributing toward the promotion of Indo-Japan relations.

In succession to the fourth in New Delhi in December 2005, the dialogue members gathered together at the fifth round of conference once again in Tokyo, October 12-13, 2006, to deepen discussions. On the second day (October 13, 2006) of the two day conference, the dialogue members adopted and immediately publicized the “Joint Statement on India-Japan Ocean Security Cooperation.”

### **“Joint Statement on India-Japan Ocean Security Cooperation”**

Main points of the Joint Statement are: 1) Responses to Violence at Sea; 2) Exchange and Sharing of Maritime Information; 3) Confidence-Building Measures between India-Japan Maritime Security Organizations, and 4) Strengthening India-Japan Economic Cooperation in Maritime Industries. The dialogue members recommended the following measures to take itemwise:

#### **1. Responses to Violence at Sea**

- Cooperate in areas of common and mutual interests at sea. These should include the measures required for countering unlawful activities at sea as specified under international agreements.
- Cooperate in minimizing damages, for example, in responses to maritime pollution, salvage, natural disasters, in safety of life at sea and for safe navigation as specified in international agreements.
- Promote confidence-building measures to deepen cooperation in maritime security

affairs and identify precise areas of cooperation.

- Undertake study on cooperation with littoral states in the JIA to assist them in countering threats to safety of seaborne commerce.

## 2. Exchange and Sharing of Maritime Information

- Establish an information sharing mechanism.  
(\*) This bilateral mechanism will, using e-mail, exchange information on issues relating to maritime security and related economic activity.
- Complement information sharing at the national level with the measures above.
- Cooperate at track II level for effective functions of the ReCAAP and its ISC.

## 3. Confidence-Building Measures between India-Japan Maritime Security Organizations

- Further strengthen the cooperation between the two Navies as already agreed upon in May 2006 between the two Defense Ministers through joint exercises for goodwill, search and rescue and counter terrorism, and exchange program on maintenance and logistics.

## 4. Strengthening India-Japan Economic Cooperation in Maritime Industries

- Cooperate in advancing Indian shipbuilding capabilities, promoting ship recycling and modernizing port infrastructure and river navigation.
- Seek cooperation in Indian shipping industries and other maritime activities.
- Establish a system to transmit information on maritime industries from India to Japan.
- Plan use of ODA (mainly yen loans) as necessary and establish a non-governmental expert conference to promote economic cooperation.
- Invite private funds for maritime industries and take measures for it.
- Promote joint ventures for export to third countries in selected areas.
- Assist India to promote its seafaring training programs.

The conference agenda and a list of presenters at the fifth round of dialogue will appear in the subsequent section of this volume.



## 日印海洋安全保障ダイアログ フェーズⅡ－２ ～ 会議の概要 ～

### １．実施概要

開催日時：2006年10月12日（木）～13日（金）

開催場所：東京（虎ノ門パストラルホテル）

日本側メンバー（敬称略）：

夏川和也（日立製作所特別顧問）

青木 稔（日本海洋少年団連盟専務理事）

石津 緒（国土交通省大臣官房審議官）

小林 健（三菱商事執行役員）

笹島雅彦（読売新聞東京本社新聞監査委員会委員）

遠山純司（海上保安庁警備救難部国際刑事課課長補佐）

広瀬崇子（専修大学法学部教授）

眞野輝彦（聖学院大学大学院教授）

山崎 眞（日立製作所顧問）

秋山昌廣（海洋政策研究財団会長）

秋元一峰（海洋政策研究財団主任研究員）

インド側メンバー：

Mihir Kumar Roy (Society of Indian Ocean Studies)

Premvir Saran Das (Former C-in-C, Eastern Naval Command)

Malvinder S. Bedi (Society of Indian Ocean Studies)

Sanjay Chaturvedi (Indian Ocean Research, Punjab University)

Milan Mukherjee (Naval Architecture Association of India)

Prabhakaran Paleri (Former Director General, Indian Coast Guard)

Ranjit Bhavnani Rai (Indian Maritime Foundation)

### ２．会議の概要

#### 10月12日（木） 第1日目の概要

##### （１）オープニング・セッション

##### a. 開会挨拶：夏川元統合幕僚会議議長

夏川議長は、幾つかの理由から、マラッカ海峡以西の広大な海域において安全保障に関する能力と意志を持ち、共に協力できる国はインドだけであることを強調して、以下のよう述べた。①3年間にわたるダイアログは極めて広範囲に及び、内容も深く掘り下げられ、具体的なアイディアを出され、SIOSとOPRFの絆も強まり、日印間の安全保障協力の強固な基盤ができた。②この段階で重要なことは、議題の数を絞って集中審議し、成果を施策に反映し、実行し、軌道に乗せることである。③今回のダイアログの共同声明をもって、海洋の恩恵に浴しながらも、その存在が身近でないことから関心が低いという厚

い壁を崩す突破口にしたいものであり、活発かつ収斂する議論をお願いする。

b. スピーチ1:「インド洋の海洋安全保障環境」:ロイ退役中将

ロイ中将は、豊かな多様性を持つインド洋とその周辺地域の安全保障環境について、以下の点を指摘した。①インドは、戦略的にエネルギー供給地と消費地の中間に位置し、またペルシャ湾岸にも近い。インド洋海域は世界の海運の多くが利用する航路となっている。シン首相が言うように、この地域は「安定と真の経済統合に向けての優位の弧」(an arc of advantage for stability and cleaner economic integration)となるであろう。②中国は、インド洋地域における潜在的なステークホルダーとして登場しつつある。中国の海洋部門における発展ぶりはめざましいが、シーパワーでは未だ米国に及ばない。③日印関係は山あり谷ありであったが、2005年の小泉首相のインド訪問がパラダイムシフトとなった。日本は今や、インドを、アジアと世界の安定と繁栄のための「戦略的パートナーシップ」を強化することで、日中と並ぶ「アジアの3つの大国」の1つと見なしている。両国は、日印戦略的海洋パートナーシップを深化させ、拡充することで、安全保障と海洋問題により一層関心を向けるべきである。④インド海軍は航空戦力を持つインド洋地域で唯一の存在であり、海軍力の拡充は、ヒマラヤ国境地域の防衛から、海洋とシーレーンの安全保障に視点が変化してきていることを意味する。東アジアサミットへの参加はインドの外向き姿勢のもう1つの反映である。⑤インドの開かれた海洋政策は、アジアと世界の安全保障、安定、繁栄を促進するための民主主義国間の協力の優れた基盤を提供するものである。

c. スピーチ2:「安倍新政権における日印関係」:笹島読売新聞監査委員会委員

笹島氏は、このダイアログを含む最近の日印関係の変化を跡づけた後、安倍首相が就任前に日米豪印4カ国による戦略対話を提唱したことに触れ、日印両国が戦略的パートナーとしてどこまで関係を進展させることができるかについて、以下のように述べた。①関係強化の見通しについては、積極派と懐疑派がある。積極派は、日中両国が史上初めて東アジアにおいて対等なパワーとして対峙していることを背景に、インドとの関係強化によってバランスをとる、あるいはヘッジをかけておくべきだと主張する。米印関係の進展と日中間の緊張を背景に、日印関係は強化に向けた基礎的条件を整えつつあるが、両国間の協力は中国の脅威に対するカウンターバランス以上のものを目指すべきであろう。②懐疑派は、日本がインドとの関係強化を目指しても現実には何も進まないのではないかと見ている。例えば、日本側はインドにPSI(拡散阻止構想)への参加を働きかけてきたが、未だ進展がない。③日印関係は、両国間の経済的相互依存関係が確立されないままの状態では戦略的パートナーシップを求めるといふ、日本にとって野心的な試みといえる。両国は、共通認識を確認した上で、共通の課題に取り組んでいくことが、これから重要になることを自覚する必要がある。

(2) 第1セッション「海上暴力・不法行為—そのシナリオと抑止」議長:ロイ退役中将

a. 「海上暴力・不法行為に係る議論の総括」:青木元海上保安大学校長

青木校長(代理出席者)は、海上暴力・不法行為の代表的な例として、海賊、密輸、密航を挙げ、要旨以下のように述べた。①海賊は人の命や財産を奪う犯罪であり、人質を奪

う場合には生命の危険が大きくなる。(1999 年のアロンドラ・レイボー号のスライドを示し) 貨物を船体ごと奪うケースもある。②(日本で押収した拳銃、覚醒剤の写真を示しながら) 密輸は、その手口が巧妙化しており、水際対策の強化が求められている。③密航については、日本への密航者は就労が目的であるが、犯罪に手を染める可能性もあり、潜在的に危険な存在である。最近では、密航の手口も巧妙化しており、関係諸機関による監視の強化が求められている。④(北朝鮮の不審船の写真を示しながら) 国家が海賊行為を行い、密輸も密航も行うという現実があり、日本は、犯罪書や犯罪組織のみでなく、犯罪国家とも対峙しなければならない。⑤日本では JICA が世界各国で大規模な海外支援を行っており、海上保安庁は、海外の海上保安機関と直接連携協力する他、海上保安官を JICA の専門家として派遣し、数年間という機関で海外の海上保安機関の支援に当たっている。⑥海上犯罪は国を跨ぎ、海上を渡る犯罪であることから、法令執行は海上暴力・不法行為撲滅のための各国間の協力の共通のプラットフォームになり得る。従って、各国の海上保安機関の連携が不可欠である。インド沿岸警備隊との間では、合同訓練等を通じて、要項かつ緊密な関係が維持されている。

b. 「インド洋における海上暴力行為一課題と対応」：ダス退役中将

ダス中将は、インドが世界第3位の石油輸入国であり、貿易の95%が海運に依存していることから、海洋の安全が重要であるとして、要旨以下の諸点を指摘した。①インドは各種のテロ組織の取り囲まれており、武器の不法入手、密輸などの沿岸型の海洋犯罪には背後に組織が存在し、多様な国籍の人間が関係する組織犯罪である。スリランカのタミールイーラム等による海洋や船舶に対する海洋テロには、沿岸警備隊のみならず、海軍の関与も必要である。②アロンドラ・レイボー号事件のように、海洋犯罪対処には情報の共有による多国間協力が重要である。JIA シールートの両端の日印では協力関係があるが、インドネシアやフィリピン等の途中の国との情報共有関係が欠落している。情報の共有には信頼関係がなければならない。海上保安庁との協力に加えて海上自衛隊との協力を期待したい。③多国間の協力関係の構築には時間がかかる。多国間協力で最も困難なことは主権問題であり、例えば非武装では継続追跡(hot pursuit)の意味がない。日印両国は、主権問題に proactive に対処する必要がある。この問題を以下に克服するかが多国間協力の鍵である。④日印の海軍協力の強化には、正式な MOU が必要である。インドは中国と既に締結している(2006年5月)。協力には制度的な枠組みが必要である。

c. 「海上テロの脅威」：山崎元自衛艦隊司令官

山崎司令官はまず、海上テロの想定シナリオについて以下の4つを挙げた。①機雷によるマラッカ海峡の封鎖：ここでは、テロリストが機雷敷設を宣言して警報が発せられる場合と、実査に被害を与える場合の2つの態様がある。②リンペット・マイン(吸着機雷)による船舶攻撃：重要港湾に停泊する船舶に吸着機雷を仕掛けて爆発させ、船舶を行動不能にすると共に、港湾自体も機能も麻痺させる。③タンカーが浮かぶ爆弾となり、港湾を攻撃する：ここでは LNG タンカーのハイジャックなどが想定されている。④船舶から航空機に対するミサイル発射：海上の船舶からのミサイル発射は対処が困難である。次にこれらのテロ抑止対策として、山崎司令官は、米海軍と沿岸警備隊が進める、Maritime Domain



Awareness(MDA)に着目し、①MDA は、世界の重要なチョークポイントにおける安全に関わる情報を集約評価し、適切な対応策を見積もり、関係部署に提供することで海上犯罪を抑止しようとするものであり、②このためには適切な C4ISR を備えなければならない、③そして将来的にグローバルな情報網の構築を目指す必要がある、と強調した。

d. 「海上航行と大陸棚上の固定式プラットフォームの安全に対する不法行為の抑止」：パレリ前印沿岸警備隊長官

パレリ長官は、海上犯罪防止の法的側面に焦点を当て、要旨以下のように述べた。①1980年代初めに、船舶と乗員の安全に関する条約に関する論議が始まり、海上テロ防止条約、国連海洋法条約など、海洋の安全に関する6つのプラットフォームができている。②インドは、海洋テロ防止法を2003年4月に制定し、沿岸警備隊を海上法令執行機関とした。

e. 討議：「海上暴力・不法行為抑止のための日印協力のあり方と具体的方策」

討議における主な意見は以下の通り。パレリ：日印協力に当たっては、何がポイントで、何をを目指すのか、合同行動か、情報の共有か、共通認識を持つことが必要。

夏川：海上暴力への対応、情報の交換と共有、日印の沿岸警備隊と海軍間の信頼関係の強化、海事産業分野での協力などで具体化する必要がある。

秋山：協力関係が進んでいる沿岸警備隊間の関係は海軍同士の関係強化の参考になるのではないかと。2国間のみならず、多国間協力も必要である。いずれにしても、海軍間の協力関係の重要性について、認識が高まっている。日印間の海洋安全保障協力を深化させるためには、経済関係の協力が必要である。共同声明では、具体的に言及したい。

ロイ：PSIについては、米国との演習などではPSI演習をやっており、実態的にはインドもPSIに積極的に関与している。しかし、協定への調印は別話である。

パレリ：海洋の安全を目指して、海自とインドの沿岸警備隊、日本の沿岸警備隊とインド海軍といった、異なる機関同士の交流（クロス交流）も重要である。米海軍は、インドの沿岸警備隊との演習を提案している。

山崎、夏川：クロス交流は必要だが、障害が多い。人道的訓練などの信頼醸成を狙いとしたローレベルの訓練は可能になったが、空母などとの高度な訓練はできない。いずれにしても、クロス交流は現時点では時期尚早。日本国内でも、海自と海上保安庁との共同訓練は自由にやれない。現在両者の緊密化を図っている最中で、インドとはその後である。

(3) 第2セッション「海洋安全保障情報の日印共有」・議長：広瀬専修大学教授

a. 「ReCAAPとISCの概要」：遠山海上保安庁課長補佐

遠山補佐は、スライドを使用してReCAAPの概要と課題について、要旨以下のように説明した。①ReCAAPは、情報共有センター(ISC)の設置、各国海洋法令執行機関の能力強化に向けての協力、締約国間の協力強化を主たる目的とする。海賊と船舶に対する武装強盗が対象で、軍事は対象としていない。②ISCは2007年2月から運用を開始するが、その機能は、海賊・武装強盗に関する情報の流れの維持管理、情報の照合分析、統計資料の作成配布等であり、締約各国のFocal Point（日本は海保）を通じてネットワークを構成する。③情報に基づいて各国海洋法令執行機関が海賊・武装強盗対処を実施するに当たっては、

沿岸国の主権、領海を尊重することが重要となる。

更に遠山補佐は質問に答える形で、以下のように述べた。①ISC に対して日本は支援する立場、事務局長の人選も未定、情報の種類は確定していないが、通信手段は Web が中心で、電話、FAX も利用される。②インドネシア、マレーシアの未加盟については、1 番の問題で、参加への働きかけを強めている。ReCAAP は発効後、開放されることになっており、オーストラリアなどが参加する可能性がある。③アジア、西太平洋地域の未加盟国の海域で海賊事案があった場合には、近くの Focal Point を通じて情報を共有し、沿岸国を通して対処する。④ReCAAP が機能していくためには、各国の能力強化と信頼醸成が必要である。

b. 「インド洋のチョークポイントにおける海事活動」：パレリ前印沿岸警備隊長官

パレリ長官は、JIA シールートにおけるチョークポイントについて、要旨以下のように述べた。①ホルムズ海峡とマラッカ海峡が最も懸念されるチョークポイントである。マラッカ海峡には多くの密輸ルートもある。②チョークポイントは地勢的な重心ではなく、ここを抑えるだけでは周辺地域をコントロールできず、海賊、密輸などの問題解決にはならない。③マラッカ海峡の利用国として、インドは、要請されれば支援を提供する用意がある。マラッカ海峡の哨戒活動には要請がなければ参加しない。④しかし、インドは、JIA シールートの安全には大きな責任を有している。

c. 「日印海洋安全保障情報の共有」：秋元主任研究員（OPRF）

秋元主任研究員は、『海洋安全保障情報月報』の作成プロセスや内容を説明した後、インド側との情報交換について、①海洋政策研究財団とインド側関係機関との間で E メールによる情報交換ルートを設定し、②自由に利用可能な情報を交換し、共有することを提案し、インド側に対して、インド洋や中東などに関する情報や論文等の提供を期待すると述べた。

d. 「異文化間の情報共有－必然と障害」：チャトルヴェディ教授

チャトルヴェディ教授は、日印を両端とする JIA シールートには、広大な海洋があり、多様な国家と社会があるとして、2 国間、多国間で情報を共有するには、システムフレームワークを貫くコンセプトが重要である、と指摘した。また、情報の共有に当たっては、既存の組織を活用することも重要であるとも述べた。更に教授は、例えば、インド洋における中国の活動を地図に展開するなど、多種多様な地図を作成することが情報理解に不可欠であるとして、幾つかの地図をスライドで例示した。

e. 討議：「情報共有に向けて如何にすべきか」

討議における主な意見は以下の通り。秋山：我々にとって、東アフリカ周辺や中近東地域の情報、更にはパキスタン、ミャンマー周辺における石油と天然ガス開発の情報などは入手し難く、こうした情報が定期的に入手できれば有益である。

ロイ：情報要求リストがあれば、可能なものは提供できるが、定期的な提供は約束できない。

チャトルヴェディ：インド洋研究グループでは、3 カ月毎に情報交換が可能である。2007

年 1 月に最初の News Letter を出すが、E メールで交換が可能である。

秋元：組織と組織のネットワーク作りが肝要で、特別なメールアドレスを作ってネットワークを構築したい。

山崎：static な情報交換ばかりでなく、海上テロや船舶の動静把握などの動態情報の交換も必要。こうしたことは、海軍同士の交流によって可能になるが、現状では日印海軍間にはデータリンクなどはない。船舶の位置情報は非常に判断が困難で、例えば、北朝鮮の不審船を発見したとき、周辺に 300 隻もの漁船がいて、不審船の特定に苦慮した。情報の共有には、相互信頼が不可欠である。

笹島：チョークポイントについては、スンダ海峡も重要である。ここでの国際的な協力態勢ができるかどうか。また北朝鮮への制裁が発動された場合、インドは、パキスタンやイランへの核関連物資の移動をどう阻止するのか。

パレリ：インドは阻止する立場にはないし、政府の考えは承知していない。いずれにしてもそうした活動が実施に移されるまでには、時間がかかる。スンダ海峡については、インドネシアの領海内にあり、密輸ルートになっている。インド海軍は、インドネシア海軍との交流を活発化させてきている。

## 10月13日（金） 第2日目の概要

（1）第3セッション「日印海洋・海事関連経済協力の促進」、議長：ダス退役中將

a. 「Globalization の進展と新しい日印経済関係」：眞野聖学院大学大学院教授

眞野教授は、まず GDP、国内購買力平価、人口動態等のデータや BRICS の台頭と資源価格の高騰、世界の不均衡問題を取り上げて、日印を取り巻く世界経済の現状について説明した後、日印関係の現状と課題について、中国との比較において以下の諸点を指摘した。

①日印貿易は相対的に伸び悩み、輸出入の国別順位は共に 10 位に留まっている。また、ASEAN や中国貿易と比較して、垂直分業の接点が拡大しておらず、また補完関係の可能性の高いサービス分野においてもアウトソーシングのビジネスモデルができていない。②日本からの直接投資は種々の理由から変動があったが、最近では中国リスクの反動から状況の変化が見られる。③ODA については、インドが最大の供与先となっている。ODA は縮小される方向にあり、供与先やプロジェクトを絞り込み重点的配分が必要である。今後は金利の安い円を利用したインフラ整備に Public Private Partnership の活用の可能性が大きい。④今後の日印協力の舞台としては、日印 FTA 締結の促進、国連や IMF 等における発言権と義務のインバランス是正のための日印協力、JIA シールートの安全確保における協力等、ますます拡大しつつある。

b. 「インドの港湾近代化計画」：ランジット・ライ氏

ライ氏は、インドは独立以来の 40 年間にわたる自給自足時代を経て輸入を増大し始めており、世界の貿易の 90%以上が海運によることから、港湾を中心としたインフラ整備が課題になっているとして、以下のように述べた。①インドは 8%の経済成長を維持しており、貿易の伸びに伴ってコンテナ取扱量も増えている。インドにはハブ港はないが、コンテナ・ターミナルの整備が急がれている。②インドには、中央政府が管理する 12 カ所の主

要港と海岸線を持つ全ての州に州政府が管轄する 180 カ所の港がある。政府の推定によれば、今後 10 年以内に、主要港に対する民間部門の投資は 23 億 3,000 万米ドルを超えると見られ、民間の投資が増大してきている。③海軍の拡充も、増大する艦艇数に見合った海軍インフラの拡充を必要としており、海軍造船所を近代化しており、新たな施設の建設も検討している。ムカジー国防相も、港湾整備のための投資の拡大に意欲を示している。シン首相も、海軍拡張に必要な資金には糸目をつけないと確約している。④インドは新たな港湾施設を必要としており、中国と異なり、自由主義の国で、投資環境も整備されている。インドは、ムンバイとチェンナイのコンテナ・ターミナル建設計画への中国企業（注：香港の Hutchison Port Holdings で、世界最大の港湾運営会社といわれる）の応札を拒否した。

c. 「インドの造船業—現在と将来」：ミラン・ムカジー氏

ムカジー氏は、海運によるインドの貿易は急速に増大しているが、インドの造船業界は生産性の低さから船舶需要を満たすことができていないとして、インド造船業界の将来の方向として以下の諸点を指摘した。①国際的な船舶需要は増大しつつあり、バルク船の多くは Panamax 型と Suezmax 型である。この型の船舶需要は年率 80% で伸びている。②中国と韓国の造船業界は受注過多であり、日本の業界は LNG・LPG タンカーなどのハイテク船に特化している。これら 3 国の業界は、Panamax 型と Handimax 型のバルク船の受注に積極的でない。従って、インドはこの種の船舶に目を向け、最新の施設と高い生産性をもたらす最新技術を持った新たな造船所を開発できる。③IMO が原油タンカーと石油精製品タンカーの 2 重船体を義務づけたことで、船主は船齢 15 年以下の場合、新造より改装を選ぶかもしれない。Ship breaking、Ship conversion、Ship upgradation、Ship repair、Ship recycling などは、中韓両国の業界には魅力的でないかもしれないが、こうしたビジネスはインドの業界にとって大歓迎であろう。必要なのは、高性能機器の輸入である。④インドの造船業界は、生産性を高めるために近代化に大きな投資している。

d. 「海事産業基盤の構築に向けた日印経済協力」：小林三菱商事執行役員

小林氏は、3 つの分野の海事産業における日印協力の望まれる方向について、以下のよう述べた。①海事インフラの基礎である港湾分野においては、インドの港湾の水深が浅く大型船が入れず、陸上交通とのアクセスも悪く、近代化の必要性が高い。また日韓の自動車メーカーの進出でカー・ポートの重要性も高まっている。この面での協力は ODA によるところが大きい。②造船業、船舶修理業の育成に関しては、船用機械工業が進出し根付くことが鍵で、この分野の協力には税制措置等のインセンティブも必要で、また政府からのソフト面での支援も必要である。③海運については、政府間ベースより民間の活発な協力関係が発展している。④いずれにしても海事産業分野は政府間の経済協力に依存する部分が大きく、民間の活動と並行して、海洋、海事優先のインフラ構築に向けて ODA の傾斜配分が必要であろう。

e. 「インドの港湾・海事セクターに対する日本の ODA」：石津大臣官房審議官

石津審議官は、インドが ODA の最大の供与国であり、その優先目標が経済成長、貧困と環境問題、人材開発であるとした上で、インドにおける海事関係の ODA プロジェクト

の概要について、以下のように説明した(各プロジェクトの詳細はパワーポイントで説明)。  
①円借款(低金利、長期の返済猶予期間と返済期間)プロジェクトでは、Haldia 港の近代化、Hoogly Dock の近代化、Tuticorin 港の浚渫、Visakhapatnam 港の拡張が実施されている。  
②無償援助プロジェクトとしては、船員訓練資材の更新。日本船の船員の95%が外国人で、インド人が最も多く、高級船員の供給源となっている。  
③技術協力分野では、Mumbai 港の開発研究、港湾、造船技術等の日本人専門家の派遣がある。  
④海事関係の協力拡大の方向として、インドのゲートウェイ港の開発とそれらと内陸部を結ぶ連結網(DFC: Dedicated multimodal Freight Corridors with computerized train control)の開発に対する支援等がある。

f. 討議:「経済協力促進の契機のために」

討議における主な意見は以下の通り。小林:海事産業における投資先として、インドでは内陸部のインフラが不足しているので、小型の船用機械と小型港湾建設を組み合わせ、沿岸海運の開発に力を入れたらどうか。沿岸海運が発展すれば、インドでも建造可能な小型船舶の需要が高まる。

ムカジー、ロイ:内陸国のネパールの輸出入はインドが出口になっているが、Calcutta 港と Haldia 港は満杯で、ガンジス川が航行可能なら距離を短縮できるが、吃水が浅い。ビハール州では河川海賊も出るし、西ベンガル州は共産政権である。しかし、政府は、ナトゥラ峠経由で中国との国境を再開したことから、ガンジス川、シッキム、ネパールへのルート開発に熱心である。

秋山:日本の対印 ODA の 1.1%しか港湾・海事関係に投入されていない。インド側が港湾、海運の重要性を指摘しているにもかかわらず、何故この分野の優先度が低いのか。インドは ODA の時代は終わったと言っているが、中国は日本の ODA を上手く使った。日本の ODA は全体として減額方向にあるが、何故もっと上手く使えないのか。

石津:ODA は相手国の申請案件がベース。まずインドの国内手続きで海事関係 ODA プロジェクトに高い優先順位を付ける必要がある。

ダス:政府は、日本を含む外国からの援助をなくしようとし、民間から投資拡大を期待している。インドの人口 10 億人の内、貧困層が 7 億人で、貧困対策が必要である。しかし、政府も、経済の発展には港湾整備が不可欠であることがわかってきており、この分野の優先順位が高まりつつある。

(2) クロージングセッション、司会:今泉調査役(OPRF)

a. 共同声明発表:夏川元統合幕僚長議長(別添参照)

b. 閉会挨拶:ロイ退役中将

ロイ中将は、①これまでの対話を通じて、優れた参加者を得て内容的に非常にレベルが高くなった、②インドは現在、12カ所の港湾の近代化を進めており、これは8%の経済成長率を維持するために不可欠の事業である、③海事産業部門への日本からの投資を期待する、④インドは、インド洋における中国のフットプリントを求めず、ムンバイ、チェンナイの港湾事業への中国の参加を拒否した、などと語った。

c. 閉会挨拶:秋山会長(OPRF)



秋山会長は、3年間にわたる対話が成功裏に終了したことに感謝した上で、要旨以下のように述べた。①この対話のキーワードは、海洋、安全保障、トラック2の3つであり、トラック2については大臣、政治家、関係省庁担当者の参加も得て、1.5ともいうべき側面もあった。②しかしトラック2であることから、例えば、双方のネイビーと沿岸警備隊とのクロス交流の可能性を議論する等、政府レベルでは不可能な議論もできた。③海洋安全保障面での協力を深化させるためには、海事産業関係の協力が不可欠であり、安全保障と経済が繋がっていることを痛感した。この面での新たな議論が今後重要になってこよう。

## 日本とインド間の海洋安全保障協力に関する共同声明

日本とインドは、めざましい発展を続けるアジアの両翼を担う海洋国家である。第二次世界大戦後、日本は貿易立国として経済発展を成し遂げ、インドも 1991 年から経済の自由化を推進し、急速な経済成長を遂げつつある。両国はまた、成熟したアジアの民主国家であり、市場経済と法の支配という価値を共有し、文化的にもつながりが深い。ここ数年、日印政府・経済界指導者の往来が盛んとなり、2005 年 4 月にインドで開かれた日印首脳会談で、小泉首相とマンモハン・シン首相は「日印グローバル・パートナーシップ」に戦略的方向性を付与することで合意した。2006 年 5 月に東京で開かれた額賀福志郎防衛庁長官とプラナーブ・ムカジー国防大臣の会談では、安全保障・防衛分野における両国間の対話・交流をさらに発展させることが確認された。

海洋国家である日印両国は海から多大な恩恵を受けており、両国の安全と繁栄は、日本近海から東シナ海、南シナ海、マラッカ海峡を経て北インド洋、アラビア海を結ぶ海上輸送路（「JIA（Japan-India-Arabian Sea）シールート」）の秩序の維持に大きく依存している。近年、海上テロ活動や海賊行為をはじめ、大量破壊兵器の運搬や武器・麻薬密輸、密漁・乱獲等の不法行為が「JIA シールート」の秩序を脅かす要因として顕在化している。船舶の安全、海洋汚染、自然災害時の人命救助等も懸念材料である。日印両国は、信頼に足る海軍力及び沿岸警備能力を備えた組織を有しており、これらの脅威に対応する重要な役割を果たすことができる。また、日印だけでなく、その他の沿岸国及び利用国との協力も検討する必要がある。

2003 年 11 月以来、海洋政策研究財団とインド洋研究学会（SIOS: Society for Indian Ocean Studies）は、「トラック II」の特性である率直な意見交換を重ね、3 年にわたって 5 回の日印海洋安全保障ダイアログを実施してきた。2004 年 11 月には第 I フェーズの総括として、「日印海洋安全保障協力に関する共同声明」を東京で宣言し、日印の海軍・沿岸警備組織間の交流促進、「日印海洋安全情報ネットワーク」の構築、ならびに安全保障協力を促進する上で不可欠な日印経済協力強化の必要性を、両国民に広く訴えた。

2005 年からの第 II フェーズではさらに議論を具体化させ、海上暴力への対応策、海洋安全保障情報の共有体制のあり方、及び海事産業分野における二国間協力について検討してきた。

まず、日印を取りまく安全保障環境に関して、「J I Aシールート」にはテロの脅威が存在し、また、その沿岸部は海賊や不法行為の温床となっていることが確認された。中でも貨物船に対する襲撃とハイジャックは特に深刻で、貨物船が襲撃を受けると貨物は売り払われ、船舶はテロや武器の輸送に利用され得る。大型フェリーやタンカー、LNG 船、VLCC などを利用し、深刻な影響をもたらすテロの可能性もある。海洋安全保障に関しては各国が利害を共有しているが、日本は自らの法的・政策的制約及び沿岸国との関係により、個別の対応を取らざるを得ないことも多い。しかし、海上暴力への対応に関して日印両国が

協力できる余地は十分あり、協力を進めるために海洋安全保障にかかる各分野、各段階、各レベルにおける情報共有のあり方に関する協議及び情報共有を実践する必要性と、海洋安全保障問題に対する協力深化を目的とした信頼醸成の促進、及び各種協力協定の締結を検討する必要性が確認された。

海洋情報の共有に関しては、海洋の安定的かつ持続可能な利用が重要な課題となる中、海洋の安全保障政策や国防政策を立案していくためには、広範な情報の収集と適切な分析・評価及び配布が必須であることが確認された。海洋政策研究財団では、2005年夏より海洋を巡る紛争要因となる可能性のある軍事、治安、政治・外交、経済、資源、環境等に係わる事象を対象として広く公開情報を収集・分析し、『海洋安全保障月報』として公開している。この活動を基にインド側との海洋情報交換・共有のあり方が議論された。

日印の海洋安全保障担当組織の信頼関係の強化については、まず、1999年に発生した「アロンドラ・レインボー」号事件の対処に始まる海上保安庁とインド沿岸警備隊との関係が、その歴史の浅さに比べれば関係増進の速度は速く、内容も具体的であることが評価された。両機関は、両長官及び巡視船の相互訪問及び海賊、海上セキュリティ対策、搜索救助等での協力推進について合意し、搜索救助、火災消火、海賊逮捕、被襲撃船安全確認に関する共同訓練も実践的に行っている。

一方、海上自衛隊とインド海軍の関係は、1969年の遠航部隊の訪印及びインド海軍艦船の来日に端を発し、以来数年毎に往来しその度に基本的な訓練を実施してきたが、実質的なものではなかった。しかし、対テロ特措法に基づくインド洋派遣部隊の寄港時における共同訓練ではその内容が多少進歩し、本年2月に訪印した海上幕僚長とインド海軍参謀長との間でスタッフ・トークの実施が合意され、第一回目が本年末日本で実施される。またWPNS（西太平洋海軍シンポジウム）の枠組みの中で実施される掃海訓練にインド海軍も2001年から参加し、日本を含む数カ国の艦艇と共同訓練を実施している。本年5月の日印防衛首脳会談では、多岐にわたり、前向きな両国の防衛交流・信頼醸成の実施が合意された。

海事産業部門での日印経済関係の強化に関しては、日印海洋安全保障協力を促進するためには、両国の経済協力とりわけ海事産業における協力が不可欠であることが確認された。このためには、造船、港湾開発、海運、及び港湾・河川・海上における事業活動における経済的な協力を強化する必要がある。海事産業部門での日印協力はインドにおけるソフト・ハード両面の広い意味での海事インフラの整備につながり、両国間の経済関係における強化を意味するだけでなく、海洋における脅威に対する脆弱性を軽減し、結果として安全保障に大きく貢献するものである。

一連のダイアログの総括として、以下のような日印海洋安全保障協力の方策を提案する。

#### 1. 海上暴力への対応：

- ・ 共通の利害を持つ分野での協力、たとえば国際的取り決めに基づく不法行為対策
- ・ 被害の局限化における協力、たとえば海洋汚染、サルベージ、自然災害、人命救助、安全航行で国際的取り決めに基づいて協力
- ・ 海洋安全保障問題に対する協力深化を目的とした信頼醸成の促進、及び協力分野の見極め
- ・ 海上輸送への脅威に対抗できるようにするための JIA 沿岸国への援助協力の検討

#### 2. 海洋情報の交換と共有

- ・ 情報共有メカニズムの構築  
(電子メールを用いて、海洋安全保障情報とこれに関連する経済活動情報を交換)
- ・ 上記のメカニズムで国家レベルでの情報共有を補完
- ・ トラック II レベルで、ReCAAP と ISC の効果的運用確保のために協力

#### 3. 日印海洋安全保障担当組織の信頼関係の強化

- ・ 親善共同演習、搜索救難、対テロ対策、整備・補給の交流プログラムを通じて、本年 5 月の防衛首脳会談にて確認された海上自衛隊とインド海軍間の協力をさらに推進

#### 4. 海事産業部門での日印経済関係の強化

- ・ インドの造船技術の高度化、船舶リサイクルの推進、及び港湾や河川交通の近代化における協力
- ・ インド海運産業、さらには海上事業活動における協力の模索
- ・ インドから日本に海事産業情報を提供するシステムの構築
- ・ 必要となる政府開発援助（円借款が中心）の活用の研究と、日印経済協力促進を目的とした民間専門家会議の設立
- ・ 海事産業分野への民間資金の呼び込みとそのための活動
- ・ 第三国への主要品目輸出促進のための合弁事業
- ・ インドの船員育成計画への援助

#### 結語

以上は、われわれの 3 年にわたる討議の成果である。日印海洋安全保障ダイアログは、対話の焦点である地域の安全を絶え間なく保障するため、日印の戦略的海洋安全保障協力の促進と深化が必要であることを提言する。

2006 年 10 月 13 日

日印海洋安全保障ダイアログ フェーズ II

(日本側) ※敬称略  
夏川和也 元防衛庁統合幕僚会議議長  
青木 稔 元海上保安大学校長  
笹島雅彦 読売新聞東京本社新聞監査委員会委員  
広瀬崇子 専修大学法学部教授  
眞野輝彦 聖学院大学大学院教授  
山崎 眞 元海上自衛隊自衛艦隊司令官  
秋山昌廣 海洋政策研究財団会長  
秋元一峰 海洋政策研究財団主任研究員

(インド側)

Mihir Kumar Roy (Vice Admiral (Ret.), Society of Indian Ocean Studies)  
Sanjay Chaturvedi (Doctor, Indian Ocean Research, Punjab University)  
Premvir Saran Das (Vice Admiral (Ret.), Former C-in-C, Eastern Naval Command)  
Milan Mukherjee (Commodore (Ret.), Naval Architecture Association of India)  
Prabhakaran Paleri (Doctor, Former Director General, Indian Coast Guard)  
Ranjit Bhavnani Rai (Commodore (Ret.), Indian Maritime Foundation)  
Malvinder S. Bedi (Rear Admiral (Ret.), Society of Indian Ocean Studies)



**“Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security Phase II-2”**  
**— Record of Proceedings —**

**1. General Description**

**Dates:** October 12-13, 2006

**Venue:** Toranomom Pastoral Hotel, Tokyo

**Indian Delegates:**

VADM (Retd.) Mihir K. Roy, Council Member of Society for Indian Ocean Studies

Dr. Sanjay Chaturvedi, Indian Ocean Research Group, Panjab University

VADM (Retd.) Premvir S. Das, Former C-in-C, Eastern Naval Command

Commodore (Retd.) Milan K. Mukherjee, President, Naval Architecture Association of India

VADM (Dr.) Prabhakaran Paleri, Director General (Retd.), Indian Coast Guard

Commodore (Retd.) Ranjit B. Rai, Vice President, Indian Maritime Foundation

RADM (Retd.) Malvinder S. Bedi, Society for Indian Ocean Studies

**Japanese Delegates**

ADM (Retd.) Kazuya Natsukawa, Special Adviser, Hitachi Ltd.

Mr. Minoru Aoki, Executive Director of the Junior Sea Friend's Federation of Japan

Mr. Hajime Ishizu, Assistant Vice-Minister for International Affairs, Minister's

Secretariat, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport

Mr. Ken Kobayashi, Senior Vice President & Division Chief Operating Officer,  
Ship, Aerospace & Transportation System Division, Mitsubishi Corporation

Mr. Masahiko Sasajima, Senior Staff, Ombudsmen Committee, the Yomiuri  
Shimbun

CDR Atsushi Tohyama, Deputy Director, International Criminal Investigation  
Division, Guard and Rescuer Department, Japan Coast Guard

Dr. Takako Hirose, Professor, Faculty of Law, Senshu University

Dr. Teruhiko Mano, Professor, Seigakuin University, Visiting Senior Managing  
Staff, Tokyo Research International

VADM (Retd.) Makoto Yamazaki, Adviser, Hitachi Ltd.

Mr. Masahiro Akiyama, Chairman, Ocean Policy Research Foundation

RADM (Retd.) Kazumine Akimoto, Senior Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research  
Foundation

## **2. Presentations and Discussions**

### **Thursday, October 12**

#### **(1) Opening Session**

##### **a. Opening address: ADM (Retd.) Kazuya Natsukawa, Ex-Chairman of Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency**

ADM Natsukawa pointed that for some reasons, India is the only partner state, having capabilities and strong will, with which Japan can work on maritime security in this huge sea areas, the west side of the Malacca Straits. And then he said as follows;

- The Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security over the past three years covered various topics in broad areas. Profound discussions were held among the dialogue members, and concrete proposals were worked out. The partnership between OPRF and SIOS has been strengthened, and a firm foundation for maritime security cooperation between India and Japan has been formulated.
- What is important at this stage is to conduct intensive discussions on more focused topics and incorporate the results of discussions in concrete proposals that should be implemented on sustainable basis.
- We hope that the Joint Statement that we will come up with on the last day of the conference this time will help remedy the indifference of general public to the oceans that benefit humans a great deal but seemingly fail to receive due concerns from people. We hope active and convergent discussion be made.

##### **b. Speech 1 “Security Environment in the Indian Ocean”: VADM (Retd.) Mihir Roy, Council member of Society of Indian Ocean Studies**

VADM Roy mentioned the following points regarding the security environment in the Indian Ocean and neighboring areas featuring rich diversities:

- From a strategic point of view, India is located halfway between the energy supply areas and the energy consuming areas. India is relatively near the Persian Gulf. In the Indian Ocean, there are sea routes used by the world’s shipping fleets. As stated by Prime Minister Singh, this area will become an arc of advantage for stability and cleaner economic integration.
- China is emerging as a potential stake holder in the Indian Ocean. China’s activities in recent years in maritime areas are remarkable, but she is still far behind the United States in terms of sea power.
- The past Indo-Japan relations have witnessed ‘booms and Bust.’ Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to India in 2005 marked a paradigm shift. Today, Japan recognizes India as one of the three great powers in Asia together with herself and China, by strengthening a strategic partnership with India for the stability and

prosperity of Asia as well as for the world. India and Japan should deepen and enlarge the strategic maritime partnership between them, thereby taking more interest on security and maritime issues.

- The Indian Navy is the only regional seagoing force in the Indian Ocean with integral air power and its expansion indicates that India is shifting its strategic perspective from the present obsession of concentrating only on the territorial defense of Himalayan borders to the ocean's and security of sea lanes of communications. India's participation in the East Asia Summit is a further reflection of India's outward doctrinal mindset.
- India's open maritime policy will provide an excellent basis for cooperation among democratic nations to promote security, stability, and prosperity of Asia as also of the world.

**c. Speech 2 “Indo-Japan Relationship under the Abe Administration”: Mr. Masahiko Sasajima, Senior Staff, Ombudsmen Committee, the Yomiuri Shimbun**

Mr. Sasajima gave an overview of the recent changes in the India-Japan relations including this dialogue, and referred to Prime Minister Abe's proposal on a strategic dialogue among Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. Then he recounted his views on how India and Japan can develop the bilateral relations as the strategic partners, as follows:

- There are two kinds of views on the prospect of the strengthening of the bilateral relations: positive school and skeptical school. The positive school argues that against the background of the confrontation between Japan and China as the equal powers for the first time in the East Asian history, Japan should take care about balance of power or a kind of hedge strategy by strengthening the India-Japan relationship. Against the background of the promotion of the U.S.-India relations and the mounting tension between China and Japan, India and Japan are preparing basic conditions for strengthening their bilateral relations, but their cooperation should aim at something beyond just a counterbalance against China threats.
- The skeptical school doubts that even if Japan efforts to strengthen its relationship with India, nothing more will not be achieved in reality. For example, Japan urged India to join PSI, but no progress has occurred to date.
- India-Japan relationship is a kind of ambitious challenge for Japan in the sense that she is seeking a strategic partnership without economic interdependent. India and Japan should be aware that it is important to share common recognitions first and then to address common agendas.

**(2) Session 1 “Maritime Terrorism and its Prevention”**

**Chairman: VADM (Retd.) Mihir Roy**

**a. Presentation “Violence on the Sea and Unlawful Acts – Scenario and Roundup of the Discussion for Deterrence”:**

**VADM (Ret.) Minoru Aoki, Ex-Superintendent, Japan Coast Guard Academy**

Mr. Aoki’s paper enumerates piracy, smuggling, and stow away as examples of maritime violence and unlawful acts:

- Piracy is the maritime illegal acts infringing human life and properties. Hostages are exposed to the danger of death. In some cases pirates robbed ships herself and cargoes on board. (He showed the photo of “Alondra Rainbow” attacked and stolen by pirates in 1999.)
- Smuggling is becoming more and more sophisticated in methods employed. Beefing up the shoreline countermeasures are required to interdict smuggling at the border. (He showed the photo of the illegal items like guns and drugs.)
- On stow away, the main purpose of doing stow away to Japan is to get jobs here. But there are potential dangers that if they can’t find any job, some of them start to commit crimes. Recently the way of stow away have become sophisticated, and the authorities agencies concerned are requested to tighten surveillance.
- Some evil states actually commit piracy, smuggling and stow away. (He showed the photo of the North Korean Spy ship.) Japan has to confront with various maritime illegal acts committed by not only general criminals and criminal syndicates, but also the evil states.
- JICA is providing support to foreign countries in a large scale. Japan Coast Guard is directly working together with foreign maritime safety agencies and dispatch JCG officials overseas as JICA experts who give assistance to the maritime safety agency of the country where they are assigned to sojourn for several years.
- Maritime crimes have an international character and are committed at sea. Law enforcement can be a common platform of international cooperation to eradicate maritime violence and unlawful acts. Consequently, cooperation between maritime safety agencies of the states concerned are essential. Indian Coast Guard and Japan Coast Guard maintain a close, effective relationship through joint exercises and other forms of collaboration.

**b. Presentation “Maritime Violence in the Indian Ocean - Challenges and Responses”:**

**VADM (Retd.) P. Das, Former C-in-C, Eastern Naval Command**

VADM Das said that since India is the world’s third largest oil importer and depends

its trade upon maritime traffic up to 95% of its total trade volume, maritime security, therefore, is crucially important to the country. And then Das mentioned the following points;

- India is threatened by many terrorist organizations. Coastal types of maritime crime like illegal trafficking and smuggling of weapons are committed by criminal organizations behind the curtain, which are international crime organizations involving criminals of various nationalities. Maritime terrorism perpetrated by criminal organizations like Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka against ships should be addressed by not only coast guard agencies but also navies.
- International cooperation based on information sharing is necessary to address maritime crimes like the Alondra Rainbow incident. Although there is a cooperative relationship between India and Japan located at both ends of JIA sea route, the information sharing with countries along the JIA sea route like Indonesia and the Philippines is lacking. Information sharing should be built on a relationship of mutual trust. Cooperation with Maritime Self-Defense Force besides Japan Coast Guard is anticipated from the Indian point of view.
- It takes long time to establish a multinational relationship. The most difficult problem that accompanies a multinational relationship is sovereignty issue, and for example, hot pursuit will become meaningless if the chasing ship is unarmed for the reason of paying respect to the sovereignty of the state into whose territorial waters a suspicious ship flees. India and Japan should cope with sovereignty issue proactively. Multinational cooperation will hinge upon how to address the issue.
- The strengthening of Indo-Japan naval cooperation needs a formal MOU. India and China have already entered into such an MOU in May 2006. To realize the cooperation between India and Japan, an institutional framework is necessary.

**c. Presentation “The Threats of Maritime Terrorism”: VADM (Retd.) Makoto Yamazaki, Ex-Commander-in-Chief, Self Defense Fleet, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force**

VADM Yamazaki enumerated four possible scenarios of maritime terrorism as follows:

- Blockage of the Malacca Straits by sea mines
  - Case 1: Alarms are issued in response to terrorists’ declaration of laying mines.
  - Case 2: Actual damages are inflicted on ships.
- Attacks on ships by attaching Limpet mines: Terrorists attach Limpet mines to ships moored at principal ports. Mine explosion will put ships out of commission and paralyze port functions.
- Attacks against ports using a tanker as “a floating bomb”: There has been concern that terrorists could hijack LNG tankers.

- Missiles launched against aircraft from ships: It is quite difficult to cope with missile attacks from ships navigating at sea.

As deterrents against these terrors, VADM Yamazaki suggests the following measures, paying attention to Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) undertaken by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard:

- MDA aims to appraise information on safety at vital choke points around the world, to work out effective countermeasures and to deliver them to the sectors concerned, thus to deter maritime crimes.
- To this end, effective C4ISR systems should be established.
- It is necessary to aim at forming a global information network.

**d. Presentation “Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf”:**

**Dr. P. Paleri, Former Director General, Indian Coast Guard**

Dr. Paleri threw light on the legal aspect of maritime crime prevention, stating as follows:

- In early 1980s, discussion started on a convention on safety of ships and seafarers, and resulted in the creation of six platforms for maritime security including SUA Convention and UNCLOS.
- India enacted Maritime Terrorism Prevention Law in April 2003, and gave its coast guard the mission of law-enforcement agency.

**e. Discussions: “Modality of Indo-Japan Cooperation and Specific Measures for Combating Terrorism”**

- **Dr. Paleri:** For Indo-Japan cooperation, what are the points or what do we aim at --- joint actions or information sharing? We should share common recognitions.
- **ADM Natsukawa:** Concrete actions should be taken in the areas such as response to maritime violence; information exchange and sharing; the strengthening of trust between coast guards and navies, and cooperation in maritime industries.
- **Mr. Akiyama:** Could ongoing cooperation between the coast guards be a model for possible cooperation between the navies? Not only bilateral cooperation but also multilateral cooperation is necessary. Anyway, the public awareness of the importance of naval cooperation is rising in both countries. To advance maritime security cooperation between Indian and Japan, it is necessary to promote economic cooperation at the same time. Our Joint Statement should contain concrete references to this point.
- **VADM Roy:** As for PSI, India is undertaking PSI exercise with the U.S. as part of

the joint exercises with that country. In reality, India is positively involved with PSI. But the signing of the treaty is another story.

- **Dr. Paleri:** Cross-exchanges aiming at maritime safety --- between Maritime Self-defense Force and Indian Coast Guard, and between Japan Coast Guard and the Indian Navy --- are also important. The U.S. Navy proposes joint exercise with Indian Coast guard.
- **VADM Yamazaki and ADM Natsukawa:** Certainly, cross-exchanges are important, but there are many obstacles at present. Low-level exercises to advance confidence building such as training for humanitarian missions have been realized. Yet, high-level exercises, for example involving aircraft carriers, have yet to be realized. At any rate, cross-exchanges are premature at this moment. In Japan, Maritime Self-defense Force and Japan Coast guard cannot conduct joint exercises without restrictions. Efforts are being made to make their relations closer. Exercises with India will come after that.

### **(3) Session2 “Indo-Japan Information Sharing”**

**Chairman: Dr. Takako Hirose, Professor, Faculty of Law, Senshu University**

#### **a. Presentation “Outline of ReCAAP and ISC”:**

**CDR Atsushi Tohyama, Deputy Director, International Criminal Investigation Division, Guard and Rescuer Department, Japan Coast Guard**

CDR Tohyama’s presentation was focused on the outline of ReCAAP and challenges facing it:

- ReCAAP purposes to establish Information Sharing Center; to provide support for maritime law enforcement agencies to improve their capabilities, and to strengthen cooperation among contracting countries. Its specialty is to address piracy and armed robbery against ships, not military activities.
- ISC will start operation in February 2007. Its functions are to manage and maintain the flow of information on piracy and armed robbery; to collect, collate and analyze the information, and to prepare and disseminate statistic data, etc. An international network will be formed through linkage of each contracting state’s focal point.
- When a contracting state’s maritime law enforcement agency takes actions against piracy and armed robbery based on information provided by ISC, the contracting state should have to pay due respect to coastal states’ sovereignty and territorial waters.

Furthermore, CDR Tohyama stated as follows by answering questions from the members:



- Japan will provide support to ISC. Executive Director has yet to be selected. Categories of information to be handled are also yet to be decided. Communication among focal points will be done mainly by Web. Telephone and FAX will be also employed.
- That Indonesia and Malaysia has not yet signed the agreement is a big problem. Other member states are urging them to enter into the agreement. ReCAAP will be opened to the international community after it has taken effect. There is possibility that Australia will join the agreement in the future.
- If piracy takes place in the waters of non-contracting states in Asia and the West Pacific, necessary information will be shared through focal points in the neighboring areas and necessary actions taken through coastal states.
- To assure that ReCAAP performs assigned functions, individual contracting countries should improve their capabilities and make confidence building efforts.

**b. Presentation “Maritime Activities in the Choke Points of the Indian Ocean”:**

**Dr. P. Paleri, Former Director General, Indian Coast Guard**

Dr. Paleri talked about choke points along JIA sea route as follows:

- The Hormuz Straits and the Malacca Straits are the choke points apprehended to be most vulnerable. There exist many smuggling routes in the Malacca Straits.
- Since choke points are not of a geographical gravity center, it would not suffice to hold choke points alone to exert control over the neighboring areas or solve the problems of piracy and smuggling.
- As user state of the Malacca Straits, India is ready to provide assistance if requested. India will not join patrol activities at the Malacca Straits unless it is requested.
- But India has a great responsibility for the security of JIA sea route.

**c. “Information Sharing on Maritime security between India and Japan”:**

**RADM (Retd.) Kazumine Akimoto, Senior Research Fellow, OPRF**

RADM Akimoto gave a presentation on editorial processes and contents of “OPRF MARINT Monthly Report” and made a proposal on the possible information exchange with Indian partners in a hope of the India to provide information and papers on the Indian Ocean and the Middle East:

- Build information exchange routes between OPRF and Indian partners by using an e-mail.
- Exchange and share available information.

**d. Presentation “Inter-Cultural Information Sharing: Imperatives and**

### **Impediments”:**

**Professor Sanjay Chaturvedi, Indian Ocean Research Group, Panjab University**

Professor Chaturvedi pointed out: along the JIA sea route, there are the vast ocean and various countries and communities; it is, therefore, important to share the concept of a system framework to realize information sharing on bilateral and multilateral bases; and in sharing information, it might be better to make full use of the existing related organizations. Furthermore, displaying to the audience several maps including one illustrating Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean, Professor Chaturvedi drew the members' attention to the importance of making various kinds of map to understand information.

### **e. Discussions “Implementation of Information Sharing Infrastructure”**

- **Mr. Akiyama:** Since it is difficult for us Japanese to obtain information on East Africa and the Middle East, or information on oil and natural gas exploitation around Pakistan and Myanmar, these pieces of information would be useful if we could get them periodically.
- **VADM Roy:** If you give us a list of information you need, we will provide whatever information which is accessible to us. However we can't promise to provide them periodically.
- **Professor Chaturvedi:** Panjab University's Indian Ocean Research Group is ready to exchange information with the Japanese side every three months. We are planning to publish the first issue of the group's newsletter in January 2007, which we can provide to the Japanese side in the form of email attachment.
- **RADM Akimoto:** What is of primary importance is the formation of a network linking organizations concerned in India and Japan. We want to form such a network by using an email address for exclusive use.
- **VADM Yamazaki:** We need not only static information exchange but also operational information exchange on such as maritime terrorism and movements of ocean going ships. These would be possible through naval exchanges but at present there is no data links between the two navies. Information on ship positions is hard to handle --- for example, when we found a North Korean unidentified ship, there navigated some 300 fishing boats around the suspicious ship, which made it quite difficult to identify the ship in question. Mutual trust is indispensable to the implementation of information sharing.
- **Mr. Sasajima:** The Sunda Straits are also important as a choke point. Is it possible to establish an international cooperative system in the area? If sanctions are imposed against North Korea, how will India check transportation of

nuclear-related material to Pakistan and Iran?

- **Dr. Paleri:** India is not in a position to check the transportation. I am not aware of the Indian government's policy. It will take any government long time to implement some actions under similar circumstances. The Sunda Straits are located within the Indonesian territorial waters. Existence of smuggling routes is confirmed. The Indian Navy has recently been invigorating exchange with the Indonesian Navy.

### **Friday, October 13**

#### **(1) Session 3 “Indo-Japan Cooperation on Ocean-based Industries”**

**Chair: VADM(Retd.) P. Das**

##### **a. Presentation “Globalization and new Japan-India economic relationship”**

**Professor Teruhiko Mano of the Seigakuin University, the graduate school**

Professor Mano first mentioned the present state of world economy surrounding India and Japan, referring to data on GDP, purchasing power parity, and population dynamics, as well as such topics as the rise of BRICS and the rising prices of natural resources, and the imbalances among world nations. He pointed out the following facts regarding the current Indo-Japan relations and accompanying challenges, based on his analysis on a comparison between India and China:

- Growth of Indo-Japan trade is relatively sluggish and the Japan ranking of the import and export from India is the 10<sup>th</sup>. Compared with ASEAN countries and China, India has failed to expand interfaces of the vertical division of trade and to develop the out-sourcing business model in the service areas that have high possibility of complementary relations.
- For various reasons, Japanese direct investments fluctuated from time to time; recently changes have been noted due to possible risks of investments in China.
- India is the largest recipient of Japan's ODA. As ODA is now being reduced, it is necessary to conduct prioritized allocation by focusing on recipients and projects. It is likely that Public Private Partnership will be employed more than ever for infrastructure development by taking advantage of Japanese yen at low interest rates.
- The gamut of Indo-Japan relations will expand to include efforts to: expedite the conclusion of Indo-Japan FTA; rectify the imbalance between the right of speaking and obligations at United Nations and IMF, and ensure the security of JIA sea routes.

##### **b. Presentation “India's Programme for Modernising Ports”**

### **Commodore (Retd.) Ranjit B. Rai, Vice President, Indian Maritime Foundation**

According to Commodore Rai, after the elapse of 40 years period of self-supporting economy that followed her independence, India has recently begun to expand imports. Since as much as 90% of the world trade is conducted by shipping, the development of infrastructures including ports and harbors is a major challenge for India:

- India now keeps an 8% annual economic growth and the volume of containers handled at Indian ports is rising as its foreign trade flourishes. India has no hub port, but construction of container terminals is being expedited.
- Ports in India comprise:
  - 1) Twelve principal ports under the central government control.
  - 2) 180 ports in coastal states under the control of state government.According to the central government's estimate, private sector investments, which have been increasing recently, into the major ports will exceed US\$2.33 billion within 10 years' period.
- Expansion of the navy requires the development of infrastructures corresponding to the increasing number of military vessels. The Indian Navy is modernizing its shipyards, while considering the construction of new yards. Defense Minister Mukherjee is positive about the expansion of investments for construction of the ports and the related infrastructures. Prime Minister Singh promised that munificent funds would be allotted to the naval expansion.
- India is in dire need of new port facilities. Different from China, India is a democratic nation and the investor-friendly environment is available. India declined Chinese business firms' bidding for the container terminal construction projects in Mumbai and Chennai.

### **c. Presentation "Indian Shipbuilding Present and Future"**

#### **Commodore (Retd.) Milan K. Mukherjee, President, Naval Architecture Association of India**

Indian trade is rapidly growing thanks to its flourishing shipping industry, whereas its shipbuilding industry is not capable of meeting domestic demands for new ships due to its low productivity. Commodore Mukherjee spoke about the future direction of India's shipbuilding industry.

- International demand for new ships is on the increase. Most of bulk carriers belong to Panamax type and Suezmax type. Demands for these types of ship are rising at 80% per annum.
- Chinese and Korean shipbuilders are today over booked. Japanese shipbuilders are selective in accepting orders for high-tech ships like LNG/LPG tankers. Shipbuilders in these three countries are reluctant to accept orders for bulk carriers

of Panamax type and Handimax type. Therefore, India should develop high-tech shipyards with newest facilities and employ advanced technology to achieve a high productivity, thereby receiving orders for those particular types of ship.

- By IMO rules, double-hull structure has been made mandatory for takers of crude oil and petroleum products. It is likely that many shipowners may prefer remodeling to new construction in case his ship is less than 15 years old. Ship breaking, ship conversion, ship upgradation, ship repair, and ship recycling may not seem attractive to Chinese and Korean shipbuilders, but people of related industries in India will welcome orders for these services. What is lacking for them is high-performance equipment that is to be imported from overseas.
- India's shipbuilding industry is making large investments in modernization programs to raise productivity.

**d. Presentation “Indo-Japan Economic Cooperation for Development of Maritime Industries and Infrastructure”: Mr. Kobayashi, Senior Vice President, Mitsubishi Corporation**

Mr. Kobayashi mentioned the desirable direction of Indo-Japan cooperation in three principal areas of maritime industries.

- Ports and harbors constitute a major part of maritime infrastructure. Depth of Indian ports is too shallow to anchorage in large-sized ships. Access between ports and land traffic is inferior and should be modernized. As Japanese and Korean automotive manufacturers establish themselves in India, more car ports are demanded. Japanese ODA is utilized for their construction.
- Further development of shipbuilding industry and ship repairing industry will hinge upon whether or not ship machinery manufacturers come to start operations in India and establish their presence there. An incentive like tax privilege may be necessary to promote cooperation in this field, and soft-ware support on government basis is also desired.
- As for the shipping industry, cooperation on private sector basis is underway, more vigorously than that on governmental basis.
- Maritime industries depend a great deal on intergovernmental economic cooperation. Prioritized allotment of ODA will be necessary for maritime-prioritized infrastructure development, in parallel with private sector activities.

**e. Presentation “Japan’s ODA to Indian Ports Sector and Maritime Sector”:  
Mr. Hajime Ishizu, Assistant Vice Minister, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure  
and Transport**

India is the top recipient of Japanese ODA. Priority targets of the assistance are economic growth; poverty and environment issues, and human resources development. According to Assistant vice minister Ishizu, the outline of the Japanese ODA-funded maritime development projects in India are as follows:

- Among the yen-loan-financed projects are modernization projects of Haldia Port and Hoogly Dock; Tuticorin Port dredging project, and Visakhapatnam Port expansion project.
- Projects undertaken by grant aid include renewal of seafarers training equipment. As much as 95% of seafarers boarding Japanese flag ships are foreigners. Indians form the greatest majority. India is a provider of ship' officers.
- In the area of bilateral technical cooperation are research into Mumbai Port development and the dispatch of Japanese experts specialized in port/harbor and shipbuilding technologies.
- For advancement of cooperation in maritime areas: projects of India's gateway ports development and railway network development to link gateway ports and hinterlands. (DFC: Dedicated multimodal Freight Corridors with computerized train control)

**f. "Discussions: "Motivation to Promote Economic Cooperation"**

- **Mr. Kobayashi:** Since there is shortage of infrastructures in inland areas of India, a combination of small-sized ship machinery manufacture and small ports construction may be an idea to develop inland waterway shipping. I think inland waterway shipping is a promising maritime-related investment destination. If the inland waterway shipping prospers, demand will be created for small-sized ships that Indian shipbuilders can build.
- **Mr. Mukherjee and VADM Roy:** Trade of land-locked country Nepal is conducted through Indian territories. Today, Calcutta Port and Haldia Port are congested full capacity. If the Ganges River were navigable, the distance might be shortened. In reality, however, the river is too shallow for large ships to navigate. In the Bihar State, piracy on the rivers is reported. West Bengal State is under the communist administration. The central government has reopened the borders with China via Nathu La Pass, working earnestly on development of routes to Ganges River, Sikkim and Nepal.
- **Mr. Akiyama:** Just 1.1% of Japanese ODA for India is allotted to port/harbor development and maritime projects. Despite that India emphasizes the importance of port/harbor development and shipping, why is the priority of ODA for these areas low? Indian people say that the age of ODA has finished, but Chinese people capitalized on Japanese ODA. To be sure, Japanese ODA tends

to be reduced lately, but why does India not utilize Japanese ODA more effectively?

- **Mr. Ishizu:** Donation must follow applications (from developing countries) --- this order is important for the principle of ODA implementation. Indian side should make efforts to put higher priority to maritime-related ODA projects in her ODA application procedures.
- **VADM Das:** The Indian government is endeavoring to minimize aids from foreign governments including Japan, and is instead looking to more investments from private sectors. The population of India is one billion, of which 70% are the poor. Measures to fight poverty are given a top priority. Yet, the government is becoming aware that port/harbor development is essential for economic growth. Priority of this area is rising.

## **(2) Valedictory Session**

**Moderator: Mr. Takehisa Imaizumi, OPRF**

**a. Joint Statement: VADM (Retd.) Kazuya Natsukawa (See Attachment)**

**b. Closing remarks: VADM (Retd.) Mihir Roy**

VADM (Retd.) Mihir Roy said as follows;

We have been conducting the dialogue of which level has become higher and higher with participation of excellent experts. India is currently proceeding with modernization of twelve ports/harbors across the country. This project is indispensable to maintain an 8% annual economic growth. India looks forward to Japanese investments in its maritime industries. India does not like Chinese footprints in the Indian Ocean, declining China's participation in the projects of port development in Mumbai and Chennai.

**c. Closing Remarks: Mr. Masahiro Akiyama, OPRF Chairman**

Mr. Akiyama expressed his gratitude to the successful end of the three-year dialogue, and mentioned to the following effect:

- The keywords of our dialogue are ocean; security, and track 2. Yet, as we had the participation of ministers, statesmen, government officials, the character of the dialogue may be called "1.5" rather than "2."
- Thanks to the track 2 nature of the dialogue, we took up topics that it is impossible to discuss on intergovernmental basis, such as cross exchanges between the two countries' navies and coast guard agencies.
- To deepen bilateral cooperation of maritime security, collaboration in the area of



maritime industries is indispensable. We came to share the recognition that security and economy is closely related with each other. More discussion thereon will be needed in the future.

## **Joint Statement on India-Japan Ocean Security Cooperation**

Japan and India are two maritime nations lying on either flank of rapidly growing Asia. While Japan already has a well developed economy as a trading nation since the end of WWII, India, having deregulated its own economy since 1991, is also experiencing rapid economic growth. Both nations are mature democracies in Asia and share values such as market economy and rule of law. In these years, mutual visits of leaders have become frequent. During their April 2005 summit meeting in India, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to strengthen the “strategic orientation of India-Japan global partnership.” In May 2006, Defense Minister Fukushima Nukaga and Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee reiterated their commitment to deepen security related dialogues.

The two maritime nations enjoy the blessings of the sea, and their security and prosperity depend on the maintenance of order in the “JIA (Japan-India-Arabian Sea) Sea Route”—a sea lane connecting the area surrounding Japan and the Arabian Sea through the East and South China Seas, the Straits of Malacca and the northern Indian Ocean. In recent years, maritime terrorism and piracy, along with other crimes at sea such as poaching and illegal fishing, smuggling of drugs, arms and illicit migration, and transportation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have begun to emerge as major concerns to the safety of shipping. There are also concerns regarding environmental pollution, safe navigation and safety of life particularly in times of natural disasters. Both Japan and India possess credible maritime capabilities in their respective regions in the form of their Navies and Coast Guards and can play significant roles in countering these threats. Cooperation with each other as also with other forces belonging to user nations as well as littoral countries merits consideration.

Since November 2003, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation and the Society for Indian Ocean Studies have conducted five rounds of “India-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security,” taking advantage of free discussions in “Track II” meetings. In November 2004, to sum up the Phase I discussion, we issued the “Joint Statement on Ocean Security Cooperation between India and Japan” in Tokyo. The Joint Statement called for: further cooperation between Japanese and Indian navies and coast guards; the establishment of “Information Network of India-Japan Ocean Security;” and strengthening of bilateral economic cooperation to promote bilateral security relations.

In Phase II of the dialogue, we exchanged ideas on the challenges and responses arising from violence at sea, the structure and the scope of information sharing and

bilateral cooperation in maritime industries in India.

With regard to the security environment, we acknowledged that there are security concerns in the “JIA Sea Route” such as terrorism, piracy and other unlawful acts in the littoral areas. Attack against cargo ships and hijacking are the most serious concerns: cargos are sold and ships can be used for terrorism or smuggling of weapons. Large ferry boats, tankers, LNG ships, and VLCCs can be also used for terrorism at sea which might cause severe damage. Every nation concerned shares an interest in maritime security, but, due to its legal/policy restrictions and relations with littoral nations, Japan has to take its own measures in some areas. However, there is much scope left for Japan and India to cooperate in maritime security, and we acknowledged the necessity of consultation for maritime security information sharing at each area, step and level and its implementation, the promotion of confidence-building measures for profound maritime security cooperation, and the necessity of conducting study on various agreements of cooperation.

Regarding maritime information sharing, we acknowledged that since the stable and sustainable use of the sea is becoming more and more important, it is desirable to collect, analyze, evaluate and distribute a wide range of information in order to develop policies on maritime security. Since the summer of 2005, the OPRF has been issuing “OPRF MARINT Monthly Report,” collecting and analyzing open information on military affairs, law and order, foreign and political affairs, economy, natural resources, and environment. Based on this activity, we discussed ways of exchanging and sharing maritime information between Japan and India.

With regard to the confidence-building measures between Japanese and Indian maritime security organizations, first of all, we acknowledged that the relationship between the Japanese and Indian Coast Guards—a relationship which has its origin in the cooperation in the 1999 *Alondra Rainbow* incident—is growing rapidly and practically despite its short history. The two organizations agreed on mutual visits of directors and ships and on promotion of cooperation in anti-piracy, maritime security and search and rescue missions. They are also conducting practical joint training on search and rescue, fire-fighting, arresting pirates, and confirmation of safety of assaulted ships.

On the other hand, the relationship between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and Indian Navy began in 1969, when JMSDF training squadron visited India and Indian warships visited Japan. But these exchanges were not substantive. Given the dispatch of Japanese vessels to the Indian Ocean under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the joint training showed some progress. Both

Naval Chiefs of Staff agreed in February 2006 to start staff talks and the first such talk is to be conducted at the end of this year. Since 2001, India has participated in minesweeping training under the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and conducted joint training with the Japanese and other navies. At the India-Japan Defense Ministers meeting in May 2006 in Japan, it was agreed to conduct a wide range of positive defense interactions and confidence-building.

Concerning India-Japan economic relations in maritime industries, we acknowledged that economic cooperation, especially in maritime industries, is indispensable for India-Japan maritime security cooperation. Measures should be taken to promote cooperation in shipbuilding, development of port infrastructure, shipping, and other activities in ports, rivers, and the sea. Cooperation in maritime industries will lead to the improvement of software/hardware maritime infrastructure in India, which not only strengthens bilateral economic relations but also contributes to mutual security by reducing vulnerability against threats at sea.

The India-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security, based on the series of discussions, now recommends the following measures:

1. Responses to Violence at Sea
  - Cooperate in areas of common and mutual interests at sea. These should include the measures required for countering unlawful activities at sea as specified under international agreements.
  - Cooperate in minimizing damages, for example, in responses to maritime pollution, salvage, natural disasters, in safety of life at sea and for safe navigation as specified in international agreements.
  - Promote confidence-building measures to deepen cooperation in maritime security affairs and identify precise areas of cooperation.
  - Undertake study on cooperation with littoral states in the JIA to assist them in countering threats to safety of seaborne commerce.
2. Exchange and Sharing of Maritime Information
  - Establish an information sharing mechanism.  
(\*) This bilateral mechanism will, using e-mail, exchange information on issues relating to maritime security and related economic activity.
  - Complement information sharing at the national level with the measures above.
  - Cooperate at track II level for effective functions of the ReCAAP and its ISC.
3. Confidence-Building Measures between India-Japan Maritime Security Organizations

- Further strengthen the cooperation between the two Navies as already agreed upon in May 2006 between the two Defense Ministers through joint exercises for goodwill, search and rescue and counter terrorism, and exchange program on maintenance and logistics.
4. Strengthening India-Japan Economic Cooperation in Maritime Industries
- Cooperate in advancing Indian shipbuilding capabilities, promoting ship recycling and modernizing port infrastructure and river navigation.
  - Seek cooperation in Indian shipping industries and other maritime activities.
  - Establish a system to transmit information on maritime industries from India to Japan.
  - Plan use of ODA (mainly yen loans) as necessary and establish a non-governmental expert conference to promote economic cooperation.
  - Invite private funds for maritime industries and take measures for it.
  - Promote joint ventures for export to third countries in selected areas.
  - Assist India to promote its seafaring training programs.

## Conclusion

The above is the result of our three-year long dialogue. The India-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security recommends the deepening and broadening of the India-Japan strategic maritime partnership without delay for ensuring regional security which is the focus of the dialogue.

October 13, 2006

The India-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security, Phase II

## Endorsed by:

### Indian side

Mihir K. Roy, Council Member of Society for Indian Ocean Studies

Sanjay Chaturvedi, Indian Ocean Research Group, Punjab University

Premvir S. Das, Former C-in-C, Eastern Naval Command

Milan K. Mukherjee, President, Naval Architecture Association of India

Prabhakaran Paleri, Former Director General, Indian Coast Guard

Ranjit B. Rai, Vice President, Indian Maritime Foundation

Malvinder S. Bedi, Society for Indian Ocean Studies

### Japanese side

Kazuya Natsukawa, Ex-Chairman of Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency  
Minoru Aoki, Ex-Superintendent, Japan Coast Guard Academy  
Masahiko Sasajima, Senior Staff, Ombudsmen Committee, the Yomiuri Shimbun  
Takako Hirose, Professor, Faculty of Law, Senshu University  
Teruhiko Mano, Professor, Seigakuin University  
Makoto Yamazaki, Ex-Commander-in-Chief, Self Defense Fleet, Japan Maritime  
Self-Defense Force  
Masahiro Akiyama, Chairman, Ocean Policy Research Foundation  
Kazumine Akimoto, Senior Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation

## Opening Session

---

開会挨拶 (Opening Address)

- |         |  |
|---------|--|
| Speech1 | インド洋の海洋安全保障環境<br>Security Environment in the Indian Ocean      |
| Speech2 | 安倍新政権における日印関係<br>Indo-Japan relations under the Abe government |





## 開 会 挨拶

夏川 和也

日立製作所特別顧問

我々が 2003 年にこのダイアログを始めて今回で 5 回目になるが、討議を開始するに当たって基本的な認識を揃えるという意味で、経緯を簡単に整理した後、今回の性格について述べる。このダイアログは、海からの恩恵を安定的に確保することに関する日印両国の協力を如何に推進するかという観点から立ち上がった。

海は地球表面の約 70%を占め、そこからの恩恵により我々は生存を維持し、繁栄を享受している。

恩恵の一つは世界の経済を支える海上交通である。世界の貿易量の 99%が海上輸送によるのであることから、海上交通が世界の経済を支えていることが分かる。十数年来世界経済の活況をもたらしているボーダレスな経済も大型コンテナ船の出現とそれを支える施設の発達が大きな要因である。安全保障上重要な艦船の行動を含めて「海上交通の自由」は人類が繁栄するために欠くこと出来ないものである。

もう 1 つの恩恵は、漁業・鉱物或いはエネルギー資源である。漁業は人類に蛋白質を提供する重要な分野の 1 つである。採取もしくは抽出技術が発達していないため活用は不十分であるが、海中・海底には膨大な鉱物資源がある。そして海底油田の開発は徐々に進み、その他に干満の差や温度差を利用した発電も実用化されつつある。また海洋を発生源とする雨水は生命の維持と食物の生産にとってなくてはならない資源である。

三つ目の恩恵は環境である。雨水の循環と膨大な海洋の保持能力は環境浄化に極めて大きな働きをしてきている。また海洋の循環は適正な気温の維持に欠かせないものでもある。

恩恵と同時にそれを阻害する要因がある。海賊、テロ、乱獲、事故や不法投棄等による海洋汚染、或いは利権をめぐる係争等々である。また恩恵を阻害する要因ではないが、大量破壊兵器の拡散、密輸、麻薬の運搬等の海を利用した不法行動も大きな問題である。そして阻害要因の特色は、生起した場合その影響が、生起した海域に留まらず広い海域に及ぶという事である。

四周を海に囲まれた日本は、その貿易量の 98%が海運であることが示すように、また日本人の魚による蛋白質の摂取が肉によるものを凌駕している事が示すように、まさに海からの恩恵を享受しているのである。海の安全確保は極めて重要な課題である。世界中の海を利用しているが、特に日本から中東に至る海域は生命線とすることができる。

どちらかと言えば大陸国家的傾向の強かったインドは、10 数年来着実に力をつけその経済活動は活発になって来ている。近年 ASEAN 諸国、中国及び日本との政治・経済関係が増大し、さらには極東ロシアにも強い関心を持ちはじめている。やはり海の安全確保は重要なものである。

両者にとって海の、特に極東から中東に至る海域の安全確保は極めて重要であると同時に、世界の中でこの海域は恩恵を阻害する行為の最も多く生起する海域なのでもある。阻害要因を排除するために力を合わせることは極めて自然なことなのであるが、その重要性・必然性の割には両国の関係は疎遠であったといえる。

以上のことを背景に、(財) シップ・アンド・オーシャン財団とインド洋研究学会 (Society of Indian Ocean Studies, SIOS) は、2003 年 11 月に「日印海洋安全保障ダイアログ」を立ち上げた。ダイアログの狙いは極東から中東に至る海域の安全確保に関する日印両国の協力関係の構築と増進にあった。そして、政治的に難しい問題が存在し日印関係が国家レベルで劇的に進展する可能性が少ない状況において、まず民間の中立的立場で率直な意見交換を行い、海洋安全保障問題について正しい認識を普及させ、同時に具体的な提言を纏めて世に問おうとするものであった。

本ダイアログは立ち上げから 2004 年 11 月の間、東京とデリーで合わせて 3 回開催しコアメンバーによる集中審議を重ね、3 回目の後半一日を日印海洋安全保障協力の重要性を広くアピールするための一般公開会議とするとともに、両国参加メンバーの総意により、「日印海洋安全保障協力に関する共同声明」を発表した。その中で、われわれは海洋安全保障に係わる情報ネットワークの構築、日印の防衛・海上保安相互交流の促進、日印海洋関連経済協力の推進を呼びかけたのである。

ここまでをフェーズ 1 とするなら、フェーズ 2 として 4 回目のラウンドを昨年 12 月デリーで行い、これまでの討議に基づいた具体策について討議を行った。そして今回を迎えることになったが、今回の位置付けを述べるならば、2003 年に始まった「日印海洋安全保障ダイアログ」の成果を世に問う具体策として纏める、すなわちダイアログの最終段階にあると思うのである。対象とすべき議題はこれまでの対話の中で幾つも出てきているが、今回はその中から成果の期待できるもの 3 つを選んで討議をすることにした。具体策を世に問う、或いは我々で実行するということを念頭に討議を深化させて頂きたい。

早速審議に入りたいところであるが、その前にこれまでの審議の内容を簡単に振り返り、日ごろ考えていることについて若干の私見を述べる。

内容に精粗はあるが大方次ぎの事項について討議をしてきた。

- ・ 海洋利用の歴史的変遷・実態及び地政学的特性、国連海洋法の認識と適用の実態、海洋安全保障と経済等々、海洋の意義について。
- ・ 海洋利用の不安定要因及び新しい脅威とその実態・関連事項、国際情勢、地域の情勢、問題点等々、海洋安全保障の環境について。
- ・ 政治、経済、社会、文化、歴史から見た、日本及びインドの現状、日印関係の現状について。
- ・ インド洋の重要性とインドの位置付けについて。
- ・ 日印関係の重要性・可能性、安全保障の枠組みと日印の役割について。

- ・ 2 国間、多国間、等の協力の形態について。
- ・ 協力の現状と方向について。

このような内容の審議を通じてわれわれは海洋に関する理解および相互の理解を深め、海洋の安全確保に関しての両国の協力の重要性について共通の認識を確たるものにした。そして協力の具体策について理解が進んだのである。

ここでこの対話の重要なテーマである「協力」ということについて私なりの考えを述べてみたい。

我々はいろいろなコミュニティーで協力をしながら日常生活を営んでいるが、国際社会においても基本的に各国は協調・協力することが必要であり、近年一国の困難を援助する事が責務とも考えられる時代になってきている。資源や環境のことを考慮すれば、将来この傾向は一層強まるであろう。特に海に関係する場合、海洋法精神である「海は人類共通の財産である」という認識に立つべきであり、理念を尊重し、その具現化に努力はしなければならない。

一方国際情勢は常に変動し、各国の事情はそれぞれに異なるのであり、現実的対応も必要である。その結果 2 国間の関係は流動的にならざるを得ないが、多少の動きでは変化しないという関係もある。その要因は歴史的、地政上、国の体制、民族、文化等であろうが、日印関係はその重要性が最も変化しない関係のひとつであるということがフェーズ 1 の検討で明確になった。日印は協力しなければならない国であり、協力できる国なのである。また、地域の特性や状況から考えても同様の結論になる。我が国の場合、主たる活動海域は日本から中東に至る海域であるが、この海域において日本が単独で安全を確保する事は不可能であり、またそのようなことを域内のどの国も望んではない。また後でもう少し詳しく述べるが、各国はこの海域で経済活動をしているのであり、各国が協力して応分の活動をするのが原則であろう。従って、全ての国と或いは地域が一体となって安全保障について協力することが望ましい。しかし、一挙にそのような体制を実現する事は不可能であり、できるところから協力をしていくのが現実的である。現在の情勢を背景にどこの国との協力にまず取り組むかと言えば、インドということになる。その理由を挙げると、

海域の特性：日本はこの地域に原油輸送の 75%を依存しており正に生命線であるが、世界の海上貿易の 33%もこの地域を往来しているのであり、日本、韓国のみならず、中国も東アジア諸国もインド洋を利用せざるを得ないのである。一方目覚しく経済成長をしているインドにとっても、その経済成長の大きな要因が貿易の進展にあり、貿易の相手方も大きく変わり、アジア・西太平洋、アフリカ東岸が急激に増してきていることを考えれば、この海域の平和、安定、安全が不可欠なのである。このように見てくると、この地域の諸国はその経済力により差はあるものの、活発に海上を交通しているのであり、北東アジアから中東にいたる海上交通路は一大幹線と言える。そしてこの大幹線の約半分であるインド洋に注目した場合、日印協力の重要性が顕著に認識される。マラッカ海峡以西の広大な海域に於いて安全保障に関する能力と意志を持ち、共に協力できるのはインドだけなので

ある。

東アジア諸国との関係：日本は東アジア諸国と深い関係にあるが、インドもかつて深い関わりを持った東南アジアに新たな目を向け始め、海の利用に積極的になり、多数の国と貿易協定を結んでいる。そして地域の経済パートナーシップのプログラムに参加している。日印両国の結びつきは既述の如く地域の海洋安全に貢献し、地域全体の枠組みづくりの核となり、一体感の増進に寄与する。

この海域の東西に位置する：上記に加えて東西両端にある両国が協力することを想像してみると、中間にある国々を巻き込むモメンタム、躍動感はある素晴らしいものがあり、地域全体の取り組みを成功させる原動力となり得る。

共通する事項を有する：共生という仏教的センス、民主主義という価値観、国際テロ・海洋における不法行動への対応の必要性、外交的共通課題、中国の軍事的台頭への懸念（海洋進出への警戒心）等を共有する。太平洋戦争後、一度もクーデターの起きなかった安定した国とも言える。また 2 国間には歴史上種々の出来事があったが、一度も重大な競争関係がなく、友好関係を築いてきた。

戦略上の配慮：東アジアにおける、また日本の大きな問題は「台頭してきた中国と日本という地域 2 強の情勢にどう対処するか」ということである。1 つの地域に日中という 2 つの大国が存在することは、かなり難しい状況であり、その影響は日中 2 国だけでなく地域全体へも影響する事なのである。これは一義的には日中が検討していくことであろうが、地域を少し西方にずらせばそこには印中という大国が存在し、同様に関係は難しいものとなるのではなかろうか。2 本の柱は安定しないが、3 本になれば安定する。地域を広げてインドを含めれば 3 本の柱になる。中国がこのような席に参加するにはもう少し時間が必要かもしれないが、日印関係は中国を含めた 3 国関係から考えることも必要だろう。現状では少なくとも、中国に関する様々な事柄を考慮して議論すべきであろう。

次に、日印協力をめぐるその他の情勢について考えてみる。

従来日本は専守防衛という政策の下、安全保障に関する目が国内を向いていた。海上交通路の防護にしても 1000 マイルまでは自国で努力をするが、それ以遠は米国及び沿岸諸国に依存していた。日本は、インド洋に貿易を頼っているが、目は太平洋を向いていたとも言える。日米共に立脚しているので、アジアやインド洋への関心は独自にというより、米国との共同の範囲で考えていたとも言える。それが、湾岸戦争、数々の PKO 参加、アフガンでの行動等を経てインド洋方面を含むものになってきた。一方テロ・海賊といった新しい脅威に代表される最近の情勢は、脅威に対して各国が独自で且つ協力して対応する事を求めている。米国は依然として世界で生起する事象に対応する意志と力を保有しているが、全てを引き受ける事は困難であり各国に応分の負担を期待する。米国は何時でも、何処でも同盟国を支援する意思を持っているが、同時に地域の海軍の参加も期待している。

インドは、ARF のメンバーになったのが最近のことである事が示すように、かつてはこの地域の活動への参加には積極的でなかった。しかし既述の如く、経済発展等に伴い東に目が向いてきており、この海域での安全保障に前向きになっている。また米国との関係も、

この2、3年で、海軍の共同パトロールを実施する等関係が進んでいる。

日本とインドの関係はかつて低調であり、議論をする機会も余りなかったが、このような情勢の変化が両国の協力を要求し、且つ可能にしているのである。

協力ということに関して更に二つの事に触れておく必要がある、

一点は、この地域の国ではない米国との関係である。何時、何処で生起するか分からない新しい脅威に対応するために「米国は依然として世界で生起する事象に対応する意志と力を保有しているが、全てを引き受ける事は困難であり各国に応分の負担を期待している」ことを既に述べたが、この事は、米国の力を基盤に置かなければならないし、いろんな意味で影響力をもつ米国を視野にいれておくことが極めて大切であるが、地域の事は地域で対応するということも重要になってきたということであろう。

もう一点は地域全体との関係である。地域の事は域内諸国全ての国が参加して対処すべきであるが、現状で一気にそれを実現する事は不可能であり、可能なものから始めると言う事は妥当であろう。しかし常にアジア全域との関係に考慮しなければならない。そして、EUがベネルックス3国から始まったということは、この地域で同様のものを将来目指すのかどうかは別として、大変参考になることであろう。アセアンを中心に考えるということが現在の情勢であり、将来も余程の情勢の変化がない限りそうであろう。

すなわち、多国間協力とそのコアメンバーを常に念頭に、その中での日印関係を考えるという態度が必要なのである。

冒頭、今回のダイアログの位置付けについて述べた。3年間に亘るダイアログは極めて広範囲に及び、内容も深く掘り下げられ、具体策のアイデアはいくつも考えられた。SIOSとSOFとの間の絆も大変強くなった。総じて言うならば、日印海洋安全保障協力の強固な基盤ができたということであろう。この段階で重要なことは、具体策について満遍なく考え議論を重ねるより、議題の数を絞って集中的に審議し、成果を施策に反映しあるいは実行し、軌道に乗せることだと考える。成功例を提示することにより、各種の動きが誘発されるだろう。また、新たな協力の提案に対しても、このダイアログで培ったSIOSとSOFの関係を持ってすれば十分に対応できると考え、一応の区切りとしたものである。

折りしも、この一年間で政・財界の動きがあり、日印関係改善・増進の兆しが見えるが、その目が海洋を向いているかといえ、そうでもない。今回のダイアログの最後に行く共同宣言を持って、海洋の恩恵に浴しながらも、その存在が身近でないことから関心が低いという厚い壁を崩す突破口にしたいものである。活発且つ収斂する討議をお願いします。

— 以上 —

## Opening Address

Kazuya Natsukawa  
Special Adviser, Hitachi Ltd.

We established this dialogue in 2003. Although you all know well about the progress of the dialogue, I'm going to summarize it a little in order to make discussion effective. This dialogue was started dependent on the view of how to improve Indo-Japan cooperation in order to secure the benefits from the ocean stably.

From the sea, covering 70% of the surface of the earth, we receive benefits, and sustain our existence and enjoy prosperity

The first benefit is communications at sea. 99% of worldwide trade depends on sea traffic. So, we can easily understand that sea traffic has been sustaining the world economy. A borderless economy which has been providing a good economic condition has been sustaining by a large type of container carrier and its supporting facilities. Including naval vessels vital for security, the free passage of ships must be secured for the prosperity and stability of humankind.

Another benefit is fishery, mineral and energy resources. The fishery provides protein to humans, and there are huge mineral resources in the ocean and seabed, although under-used because of difficulties of extraction and excavation. Development of fossil fuel has been gradually progressing, and electricity generated by utilizing the differential of tide and temperature of the sea is going to be practical use. And also the rainfall is very vital for sustaining life and producing food.

The third benefit is related to the environment. The circulation of rainwater and the huge preservation capability of the ocean have contributed immensely to purifying the environment. And also, it would be difficult for the proper air temperature to be maintained without great sea currents.

Along with the benefits, however, there are factors which could prevent the enjoyment of benefits. They include piracy, terrorism, over-fishing, ocean pollution caused by accidents and illegal disposal, and conflict of interest issues. Proliferation of WMD and such illegal activities as drug and smuggling are big problems, although not direct threats to the enjoyment of ocean benefits. The common characteristic of these factors is that the effects are not limited to the area of occurrence but spread over a broad area.

Japan depends on shipping for 98% of its trade and really enjoys the benefit. Japanese protein nutrition dependence on fish exceeds that of meat. This means that

Japan, surrounded by sea, has been enjoying benefits from the sea. Japanese activities at sea are done around world and especially we can say that the sea area from Japan to the Middle-East (JIA sea route; Japan-India-Arabia sea rout) is literally a lifeline for Japan. So, ocean security is a very keen matter in Japan.

India, comparatively a land-power, has improved its economic power and activities in these ten and some odd years. And recently, its political and economic relationship with ASEAN countries, China and Japan has improved. Moreover, India is going to have a strong interest in Far-East Russia. This means India needs ocean security.

For both countries, the security of the ocean especially JIA sea rout is very vital, and at the same time more threats occur in this sea area than anywhere else in the world. It is natural for India and Japan to cooperate to secure the sea, but their relationship has not kept pace with the importance and necessity.

With these background, OPRF has been implementing “Indo-Japan dialogue on ocean security” together with society of Indian ocean studies (SIOS) since November 2003, based on the common recognition that India and Japan should account more for the security of the JIA sea route, and that cooperation between the two countries is of vital importance. In reality, it is unlikely that the Indo-Japan relation will progress dramatically on an intergovernmental basis, on account of some politically difficult problems. Yet, the members of the dialogue concur that it is the mission of track-2 initiative to exchange views in a neutral setting and to work out concrete proposals, thereby helping disseminate proper knowledge about ocean security issue.

Core members have held the dialogue three times in Tokyo and Delhi since the November ‘03 start, and discussed broad range of items. The second day of the third round was an open-to-the-public conference to emphasize the importance of bilateral talks on ocean security issues between India and Japan. The core members adopted and issued in the second day conference a “Joint Statement on Ocean Security Cooperation between India and Japan”, calling for the creation of a network for the exchange of intelligence on ocean security issues, the promotion of exchange between the two countries’ navies and coast guards, the advancement of maritime economic cooperation between the two countries, and so on.

If we call these rounds phase-1, we had the 4<sup>th</sup> round on Dec.’05 in Delhi as the first of phase-2. And we discussed concrete actions based on the previous discussions. Thus we are now on the 5<sup>th</sup> round. If I am allowed to touch on the characteristic of this round, this is the final stage of the dialogue in which we have to compile every result of the past 4 rounds of discussion as concrete proposals in order to ask the public for evaluation. Although there are a number of items that have to be considered, we are

going to select three from which we can expect fruitful result.

Please keep in mind that we will air the proposal to the public or do it by ourselves, and please deepen the discussion.

It may be better to start as soon as possible, but let me shortly reframe the contents of previous discussions very roughly and introduce my opinion.

Roughly, we have been discussing the following items:

- Significance of oceans: historical transition and actual condition of use of oceans and geographical characteristics, recognition of UNCLOS and actual condition of adoption, ocean security and economics.
- Ocean Security circumstance: instability factors & new threats and actual conditions, international & regional situations, problems.
- Present situation of India and Japan, present situation of Indo-Japan relationship: political, economical, social, cultural, historical.
- Importance of the Indian Ocean and India.
- Framework of Ocean Security and roles of India & Japan, importance & feasibility of Indo-Japan relationship.
- Form of cooperation: bilateral, multilateral.
- Status quo and way ahead of cooperation.

Through these discussions, we have improved understandings about oceans, and have shared recognition about the importance of mutual cooperation for securing ocean safety. And then, we have been cultivating concrete ideas for cooperation.

Let me touch on the cooperation that is such an important theme of the dialogue.

Although we are keeping our daily life by collaborating in many kinds of community, it is also needed basically that every nation cooperate/coordinate with one another in the international community, and recently it has been recognized as a responsibility that a nation assist other nations in difficulty. After considering resources and environment, this tendency will become essential in the future. Especially, the persons who have relations and concerns to the sea have to stand on the point of “the sea is common property of humankind” which is the spirit of UNCLOS. We have to respect and make efforts to materialize this spirit. On the other hand, the international situation is continuously changing and the circumstance in each nation is different. So, realistic action is required. As a result, two nations’ relations cannot help becoming unstable generally, but there is an underlying relation that is not changed even if rather big movements happen. The factors of creating this condition are history, geopolitics,



national systems, race, and culture. It has become clear through the discussion done in phase 1 that the importance of Indo-Japan relation is one of the most unchangeable. India and Japan are nations that have to cooperate/coordinate and can do so. We reach the same answer after considering regional characteristics and situation. In the case of Japan, the most necessary sea area is from Japan to the Middle-East. It is impossible for Japan to obtain safety by its efforts alone, and no country in this area welcomes Japan protecting its sea activities by herself independently. I will provide details later, but let me say now that each country is conducting her activities in this area also, so it may be a worthwhile principle that each country conducts appropriate effort independently or by cooperation. Accordingly, cooperation with all countries in this area must be desirable. It is difficult, however, to promote cooperation with many countries at once. So it is important to take balance effort for cooperation among bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral relationships. Under the present situation, if I am asked, "With what country do you want to cooperate?" the answer is "India". Now, I will list the reasons why cooperation between Japan and India is needed,

- Characteristics of the area

Although Japan relies on 75% of its oil needs being transported from this area making it a lifeline, 33% of world trade is also transiting this area. This fact indicates that not only Japan and Korea but also China and countries in East Asia have to employ sea traffic through the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, India with a remarkably improving economy must need peace, stability and security in the Indian Ocean considering how her trade counterparts have been changed to Asia & the western Pacific and east coast of African countries. In this sense, countries in this area are utilizing sea-lanes, although there are differences depending on economical power.

So, we can say that JIA sea route is a very main traffic rout. And once we note that almost half the route is in the Indian Ocean, the importance of Indo-Japan cooperation comes into relief. Only India has the capability and intention for security cooperation in this huge sea area, the west side of the Malacca strait.

- Relationship with Asia countries

Japan has close relationship with East Asia countries; India also has been looking to all the east ( countries ) with which she has ever enjoyed close relations, and become very active in utilizing the sea, and concluded trade agreements with many countries in East Asia. Moreover, India is participating in the regional economic partnership program. Accordingly, a close tie between India and Japan can contribute to the ocean security of the region, as I said before, and has become a core of creating regional frameworks, and contribute to creating a sense of regional identity.

- Located at East and West tip of this Area

Adding to what is mentioned above, once we imagine the cooperation of Japan and India, located at both tip of this area cooperate, the momentum of involving countries located inside and vibrant situations are glorious. And this becomes the engine to promote entire efforts of all countries in this area.

- Possessing common items

Buddhism sense - co-existence, value of democracy, common diplomatic theme, and necessity of taking action against international terrorism and illegal action at ocean, concerns about China's military expansion: both Japan and India can share these ideas. It may be said that Japan and India are stable countries that have not experienced any coup d'état after WW-II. Although there have been kinds of trouble between the two, it has never been serious and there has been the establishment of friendly relations.

- Strategic consideration

A Japanese big concern, and I believe the same thing is true in East Asia, is how to cope with the situation in which there are two strong powers, Japan and the rising China. There are two big nations in one region; this is a difficult situation, and it affects not only Japan and China but also the whole countries of the region. This is an issue which Japan and China primarily make efforts to resolve. If we slide the area of focus toward the west, however, there would be the same problem of two big powers, India and China, in one region. Two corded poles are not stable, but if three, it comes stable. If the area is once enlarged and include Japan, India and China, the number of poles becomes three. Although it will take some more time to have China included, it would be needed to discuss Japan-Indo relation from the view of trilateral relation including China.

In the present situation, at least, we have to discuss taking various aspects concerning China into consideration.

Now, let's look into another situation related to Indo-Japan cooperation.

In the past, in Japan, the security concern has been very domestic, because of its exclusively defensive policy. As to SLOC protection, Japan makes efforts within the area of 1000 miles and relies on the efforts of the US or countries along side the sea route for the area beyond 1000 miles. We can say that Japan has been looking at the Pacific in spite of the real situation of relying for its trade on the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Japan has been thinking about concerns to Asia and the Indian Ocean within criteria of cooperation with the US, instead of thinking independently, because Japan's defense stands on the Japan-US cooperation. The Japanese security concern has been changing to an international one after the experience in the Gulf War, many PKO activities and the Afghanistan case. On the other hand, new threats of terrorism and piracy require action independently and cooperating with other countries in the area.

The US still possesses power and the intent to cope with any incident in the world, but in light of the difficulty, expects to share this tough job with countries concerned. The US keeps the intention to assist allies wherever and whenever, but at the same time, expects regional forces to participate.

India has not been participating in activities in East-South-east Asia as indicated by the fact that India became a member of ARF only recently. As I mentioned above, however, her concern has been changing to the east in accordance with its economic progress, and now keeps active attitude toward security matters in this area. And also, relationship with the US has progressed in these two or three years to the point of conducting joint patrols with the USN.

The relationship between Japan and India has been inactive lacking the chance for discussion, but such situation changes as mentioned above cry out for the cooperation of both countries and also makes such partnership feasible.

I have to touch on two more items concerning security. The first is the relationship with the US that is not a country in this region. I have already pointed out that the US still possesses power and intention to cope with any incident in the world, but really, it is difficult to deal with all of them, and so the US expects to share this tough job with countries concerned. This means that US power should be fundamental and we have to always consider the US that has influence in many fields, but it comes to be important that regional countries should act on regional matters.

The other item is the relation with whole of Asia. The matters in the region should be treated by all local nations' participation, but it is impossible to realize this idea all at once. So, it is reasonable to start immediately on an idea that is feasible. We have to, however, take the whole region into account. It is valuable for reference that the EU started from Benelux 3, although it is quite another matter whether we will aim for the same thing. The present trend to think of any way of centering ASEAN will continue as long as big situational change does not occur.

The gist of the matter is that it is important to keep the attitude that we have to study Indo-Japan relations by always taking account multilateral cooperation and core members.

At the beginning of this speech, I touched on the characteristic of this round. The discussions, lasting three years, have had a very wide scope, deep contents and the proposal of many concrete ideas. The ties between SIOS and OPRF have been tightened. So, it is suggested that the firm basis of Indo-Japan Ocean Security Cooperation has been formulated.

What is important in this stage is to concentrate our discussion on several items, to reflect output on policy or to practice output, and then get cooperation on the track. By presenting examples of success, other actions will be triggered. And it is likely possible to cope with newly proposed items concerning cooperation by utilizing close ties between SIOS and OPRF. That is why I propose a provisional conclusion of this dialogue with this Tokyo round for the present.

Movements in the political and economic circle show a sign of an improving Indo-Japan relationship. If it is asked, however, whether they are watching the ocean enough, the answer may not be “yes”.

I wish the joint declaration which will be published at the end of this round be a breakthrough to the strong obstacle which is low interest about the ocean, in spite of enjoying its benefits, by the reason that benefits from ocean is not close to the public.

Active and convergent discussion will be very welcome everyone.  
Thank you.

## **Security Environment in the Indian Ocean**

**Mihir Kumar Roy**

**Council Member of Society for Indian Ocean Studies**

### **Significance of the Indian Ocean**

The Indian Ocean and its rim region has been an area of significant importance over centuries. The region encompasses the Eurasian, Afro-Asian, and Australasian land masses and provides a rich diversity in terms of culture, environment, trade and human resources.

The warm embayed Indian Ocean of 28 million sq.miles consisting of 30 littorals, 11 land locked states and 1286 islands contain 1/3 of world's population, 1/4 of its land mass, 3/4 of world's oil controlled by 5 feudal Gulf states, 2/3 of strategic material and 70% of world's disasters.

### **India's Overseas Trade**

India's overseas trade has become the driver of her economic growth. More than 55,000 ships traverse the Indian Ocean annually. India's export trade is currently 95% by volume and 70% by value with her GDP expected to touch \$ 1 trillion by 2010. By 2035, the world will become tripolar in an economic sense with China maintaining a growth rate of about ten percent.

### **Asian Regional Security**

Asian requirement of oil is expected to increase from the present 30 million barrels per day to 130 million barrels by 2020. Moreover, with the price of a barrel of oil skyrocketing, there is a move to create an Asian Strategic Petroleum Reserve (ASPR) as a safeguard against OPEC's propensity to raise oil prices.

The bulk of this increase will be accounted for by China and India who together are responsible for 35 per cent of the world's incremental consumption of energy. For the first time, Asian oil consumption has exceeded that of North America.

Hence the choke points of Hormuz and Malacca Straits, Gulf of Aden and the Mozambique Channel as also the Indonesian deep water straits of Lombok and Sunda are of strategic importance in terms of trade and security for ensuring economic prosperity of the Indian Ocean region.

India is strategically located between the regions of production and consumption and with proximity to the Gulf which provides 59% of oil exports. At present, the Indian Ocean Region is not just a waterway to be defended from intrusion. This region hosts

heavy international maritime traffic that includes half of the world's containerized cargo, one third of its bulk cargo and two thirds of its oil shipments. Moreover, approximately 600 freighters loaded with Japanese nuclear waste for reprocessing in Europe traverses the world's busiest choke point of Malacca Straits.

The competition between nations is underscored by information, knowledge and industrial capability. Industry and trade which play a major role in propelling the economy are considered vital areas affecting the economic prosperity of the region.

The safety and security of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) is the prime responsibility of regional navies particularly as non-state actors are making their presence felt in maritime terrorism, piracy, illicit migration and narco smuggling. It is evident that securing oil supplies from West Asia and "countering terrorism and violent extremism" is a significant aspect in the Indo-Japan strategic dialogue.

There is a view that fears of maritime terrorism are exaggerated because it is not profitable for terrorist groups, as it is neither visible and without a traumatic impact. This is perhaps true but the effects of terrorist acts at sea will be mainly economic and felt over a longer time frame. However, the costs will be much higher. For example, closure of one major Indian port for three months by terrorists blocking the entrance will result in a loss of \$ 5 billion in overseas trade apart from stoppage of work in the refinery and many other industries and associated hinterland activities. This should be compared to the losses of about \$ 4 billion in the 9/11 attack in New York. So it will be naïve to discount the threat that maritime terrorism poses.

It is also evident that pirates and Islamic terrorists conduct joint operations particularly in the Malacca Strait with precision and well laid out operational plans. In financial terms, it is estimated that the loss of ships, cargo and rising insurance costs amounts to \$ 16 billion per year according to Dr. Pinto in the Economic & Political Weekly of 24<sup>th</sup> June, 2006.

### **Socio-Economic Trends**

With economic integration and Asian countries holding two thirds of world's foreign exchange reserves, the interdependence of countries has been highlighted which Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh has stated would be 'an arc of advantage for stability and cleaner economic integration'.

Nevertheless, Sino-Japan differences and the Sino-American rivalry and greater liberalization of Asian economies with enlarging trade and commerce may lead to a period of mixed relations with Beijing. With the Olympics due in 2008, China appears to be promoting 'peaceful development' instead of her 'strategic rise' in order to reassure her neighbours by playing a waiting game of 'Chinese Chekers'.

## **The Security Environment**

Having explained the significance of the Indian Ocean region, we need to consider the global security environment which has shifted from Euro-Atlantic to Asia-Pacific; from geo-strategy to geo-economics; from conflict to commerce and from a confrontation to a cooperative mindset.

Three out of five of the large economies in the world will be in Asia. Five out of seven magnum ports will be in Asia. The immediate concern of the USA is to combat radical Islamic terrorism, secure the supply routes of energy and contain the proliferation of WMD which are all Asia-centric. The epicenter of terrorism also originates from Pakistan with Taliban making a come back in Afghanistan.

It is, therefore, not surprising that there is a spectrum of U.S. presence stretching from Turkey in the West to Japan in the East and including CAR with the U.S. Navy having formidable capabilities to act independently from International waters as seen from the invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq and earlier Bosnia. The northern part of the Indian Ocean has become one of the major theatre of conflict in Asia.

## **Indo-U.S. Relations**

India is increasingly drawn into more formal security arrangements such as the Indo-US Defence framework agreement of June 2005.

There are three broad components of this Defence agreement. The first is the expanded Defence Purchase and Co-production relationship with the U.S. The second is a broad approach to deal with a number of multilateral missions such as the security and safety of sea lanes of communications (SLOCs). The Third is the implied balance of power in Asia which will see a huge shift in India's doctrinal attitude for reaching out to the world.

The Indo-US civil nuclear deal of 2006 which is yet to be approved by the U.S. Senate has mixed reception in India. Some see the agreement as a closer relationship to Washington and, as a power in her own right, and not simply as a counterweight to Pakistan or China. Others see India shifting towards a U.S. – led unipolar world. The deal is being viewed as part of U.S efforts to promote India as the upcoming power to balance China. Moreover, regarding nuclear cooperation, some feel India might benefit from nuclear technology without signing the NPT. Other analysts, feel the danger of giving up an independent nuclear policy or even worse an independent foreign policy.

There was a time when Delhi was asking the Americans to get out of the Indian Ocean in order to structure a 'Zone of Peace'. Now we have a strategic partnership with the U.S.

### **Sino-Indian Relations**

China's relations with India has not been adversal since 2002 when Zhe Rongji suggested that economic relations between India and China should grow faster. It has already reached \$ 10 billion and may touch \$ 30 billion by 2020 and even skyrocket to a more spectacular \$ 45 billion if the new business models to replace the China-West trade pattern are successful.

China and India are important ingredients of the Asian chessboard. There has been a qualitatively enhanced relationship of strategies of strategic value between the two countries. Ships of the Indian and Chinese navies have been exercising as also there have been exchange of high level military visits.

After close to a year of intense debate, India had decided not to approve security clearance to the Hong Kong based Hutchinson Port Holdings (HPH) to bid for building container terminals at Mumbai and Chennai at Rs.1200 crore and Rs.494crore respectively. This decision also eliminates Chinese participation in modernising 13 Indian ports at a planned programme of Rs.61,000 crore.

Nonetheless, the illicit transfer of nuclear technology by China to Pakistan including the supply of reactor designs, weapon grade plutonium, transfer of 5000 ring magnets and the Khusba reactor which has helped to train hundreds of Pakistani engineers. In addition, an industrial furnace has been set up in Pakistan for casting the bomb core. Moreover, China has opposed India's membership to the Security Council and has also been hostile to the Indo-US nuclear agreement for enhancing India's civilian nuclear energy. Besides the long festering boundary issues between India and China has still to be resolved.

The attempt by Pakistan to develop missiles through their SUPARCO were again not successful. Hence China, using North Korea as an alibi transferred M9 and M11 missiles now called Shaheen-I and Shaheen-II as also entire factories to the Kala Chitta mountains in Pakistan which is 40 km west of Islamabad in the National Defence Complex.

### **Beijing's Indian Ocean Strategy**

China had already established an electronic listening post in Cocos Island in North Andamans on Myanmar territory where other marine facilities have come up with Chinese assistance which have been nicknamed Beijing's 'String of Pearls' in the Indian Ocean. China is emerging as a potential stakeholder in the Indian Ocean region, which merits careful analysis.

In addition, Beijing has acquired the former Soviet aircraft carrier 'Varyag' of 70,000 tons which has been painted in Chinese colour but whose completion has been kept on a



low key. China with her increased access to US technology has purloined sonars, radars and submarine launched missiles such as US W-88 Ultra Compact, missile guidance and submarine tracking technologies. In addition, China has come closer to a weakened Russia and has purchased defence technologies, guided missile warships and Kilo class submarines with Klub-S cruise missiles. Her inventory of 65 submarines including nuclear powered Type 093 submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles as compared to India's 16 conventional submarines.

Hence the latent ambition of China's Blue Water Navy cannot be brushed under the carpet to avoid rocking the boat of bilateral trade between US, China, and Japan. China has built 800 shipyards with the largest being under construction in the Chang Xing Island in the Shanghai sector. But notwithstanding China's progress in the maritime sector, the United States is well ahead in sea power and with a 'world reach' and presence in the Indian Ocean which requires Beijing to find other alternatives to reunite with Taiwan as also to further her territorial claims in the South China Seas.

### **Indo-Japan Relations**

India – Japan relations have witnessed 'booms and busts' in spite of their mutual respects for each other. The most significant achievement of Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to India in 2005 is the paradigm shift with regard to the positioning of India within Japan's Asian diplomacy. India had earlier been considered as a mere regional power which was hyphenated with Pakistan. Japan has now made it clear that Tokyo recognizes India as one of the "Three Major Powers in Asia" together with Japan and China by strengthening their 'strategic partnership' for the stability and prosperity of Asia as well as for the world.

Both countries should take more interest on security and maritime issues by deepening and broadening of India-Japan strategic maritime partnership. This will require more exchanges of ship visits to ports of both countries, deputation of personnel as also interaction between navies and Coast Guard.

Japan and India should consolidate and perpetuate Economic Cooperation between the two countries particularly in maritime industries such as shipbuilding and ship repair as also modernization of port infrastructure and promoting joint ventures for export to third countries in selected areas.

The emerging security environment in the JIA requires cooperation between countries with mutually compatible interests. India and Japan are two such countries with effective maritime capabilities for countering maritime threats as also to cope with disasters at sea. Moreover, the two democracies who along with Australia are natural partners and should help other countries which do not have similar capabilities. One

such contribution to celebrate the Japan-India Friendship year 2007 could be assisting India to structure approved the Maritime University at Chennai as India is a major supplier of 77,000 maritime personnel including 22,000 officers to the merchant marine and 'flags of convenience'.

## **Conclusion**

The cliché that when elephants make love or fight, the grass gets trampled needs to be applied to U.S.A, China, Japan, India and Asean jockeying for space in the crowded, competing and conflict ridden Asian space with trade and commerce being the cover for balancing containment strategies. It is a matter of interest to analyse the Asian conundrum as to how much and in which direction – economically, culturally, strategically and politically will the Asian grass be trampled by the big powers who are currently erecting a new economic and strategic architecture in the emerging Asian order.

With continuing economic growth becoming critical to India's aspirations, security concerns at sea are assuming an increasingly important dimension. Any disruption in this activity by nation states or by non-state actors will affect vital interests of the country. The Indian Navy is the only regional seagoing force in the Indian Ocean with integral air power.

The increasing Naval Budget is a pointer to the shift towards the ocean's and security of sea lanes of communications from the present obsession of concentrating only on the territorial defence of her Himalayan borders. The fact that India is sitting at the east-Asia summit is a further reflection of India's outward doctrinal mindset.

The openness of India's ocean policy provides an excellent basis for cooperation with like minded democratic nations for promoting the security, stability and prosperity of Asia as also of the world at large.

\*\*\*\*\*

## 安倍新政権における日印関係

笹島 雅彦

読売新聞東京本社新聞監査委員会委員

### 1 はじめに

議長、ご紹介ありがとうございます。ご列席の皆様、本日、日印海洋安全保障ダイアログのフェーズⅡの場において、冒頭に発言する機会を与えていただいたことは、私にとって、望外の喜びです。ここでは、さる9月26日に発足したばかりの安倍新政権下における日印関係について、まず現状と今後の方向性を述べたいと思います。そのうえで、アジア太平洋・インド洋海域における平和と安定、繁栄を維持していく上で、日印両国が責任ある大国として、また、戦略的パートナーとして、どのような協力関係を築いていけるのか、問題点と課題を提示したいと思います。特に、ここでは、積極的、懐疑的側面に分けて評価・分析し、概観してみたいと思います。

さて、はじめに、このダイアログを振り返ってみましょう。私たち日印の両グループは、2003年11月以来、4回にわたってトラックⅡベースの会議を開いてきました。最初の会議が東京・虎ノ門の海洋政策研究財団で開かれた時、インド側代表団を率いるミハイル・ロイ海軍退役中將は、「日本のレーダー・スクリーンにインドは映っていない」という強烈的な批判の言葉を日本側に投げかけました。私は、その言葉を鮮明に覚えております。インド側から見たとき、日印間には、文化的にも、歴史的にも友好関係の前提条件がそろっているのに、政治的交流は細々とした状態で、貿易・投資など経済的側面は全く関係が薄い状況にありました。逆に、日本側では、イラク戦争から半年後にこの会議が始まった当初、「なぜ今、インドなのか」「なぜ今、海洋安全保障協力なのか」という疑問の声がありました。しかも、それは、海洋安全保障における協力の道を探るという先駆的なテーマで話し合うという野心的な試みでしたから、懐疑的な見方が出てくるのも無理はありません。当時、日印の外交面だけでなく、貿易・投資といった経済面、インドに対する知識や国際交流といったコミュニケーション面においても細々としたネットワークしかありませんでした。

ところが、この3年間で、日印関係は大きく変化してきました。何よりも、日本側がインドの戦略的重要性に気づいたことが大きかったと思います。インドは「ポスト冷戦時代」に入った1990年代以降、経済自由化と経済改革を進め、高い経済成長を達成しており、現在では年率10%の高度経済成長を目指しています。特に、IT産業は飛躍的に発展しており、BRICSの一角として、その潜在性には誰もが注目するようになってきました。今では、日本の大手証券会社の店頭には、「インド株」の宣伝広告があふれ、個人投資家の目を奪って

います。

2001年の同時多発テロ、9・11事件から5周年が過ぎました。この時から世界は、「ポスト・ポスト冷戦時代」に突入しました。対テロ戦争の継続と共に、アフガニスタン、パキスタンに隣接するインドの重要性は戦略面からも高まってきました。インドは10億人の人口を有する世界最大の民主主義国家であり、日本とは民主主義、市場経済、法の支配といった共通の価値観を有しているからです。グローバリゼーションの進展とともに、その発展から取り残された国々（例えばアフガニスタンのように）がテロの温床とならないよう、専制と抑圧から抜け出し、民主的発展を遂げてもらうことは、国際安全保障のうえで、死活的に重要になってきています。

そうした中、このダイアログでは、ペルシャ湾からインド洋、マラッカ海峡を経て日本に至る海上交通路（SLOCs）の安全をいかに確保するかという海洋安全保障の側面から、日印協力の可能性を議論してきました。これまで会議の末席に座っていて、私が学んだことは次のような点です。まず、日本としては一日も早く海洋戦略を確立し、海洋国家としての国益＝海洋権益を追求する外交・安全保障上の体制を築くことが大切である、ということ。米軍再編を通じて、日米同盟の一層の強化を図るとともに、日本が近海のシーレーン防衛はもとより、海洋権益保護に向けた海上保安当局、防衛当局の密接な連携体制を構築することが重要です。また、アジア地域における海洋諸国家と連携を強化し、西太平洋からインド洋をまたぐ SLOCs における安全確保のため、チョーク・ポイントにおける海賊・テロ対策や共同パトロール、警戒監視活動などに多国間で協力する枠組みを構築する努力をすること。特に、日米同盟を基軸として、インド、オーストラリア、ニュージーランド、韓国、ASEAN 諸国の海上保安当局や海軍当局と連携を図ることが必要です。この文脈で、日印海洋安全保障協力の拡大について、関心が高まってきたわけです。こうした協力関係は新たな戦略的オプションを切り開くことでしょう。日印両国は、海上保安当局同士の協力関係を先駆けとして、海上自衛隊、インド海軍による救難・救助、災害支援、海洋安定のための共同演習などに徐々にステップアップしていくことが想定されます。さらに、日本側の課題としては、憲法上の制約を一日も早く乗り越え、インド側と実質的に協力できる法的枠組みを整えることがあります。

## 2 日印間の政治対話

日印関係全般をみると、2000年8月、当時の森喜朗首相がインドを訪問し、「日印グローバル・パートナーシップ」の構築で合意したことが、関係強化の第一歩となりました。続いて2001年12月、当時のバジパイ首相が来日し、IT交流や大量破壊兵器拡散、テロへの共同対処を内容とする「日印共同宣言」を発表しました。安倍首相は2005年3月、当時、自民党幹事長代理の立場で、訪印しました。そして、続く4月、小泉純一郎前首相がイン

ドを訪問し、「日印グローバル・パートナーシップ」に戦略的方向性を付加することに合意し、そのための行動計画である 8 項目の取り組みを開始しました。2006 年も活発な人の往来が続いています。日本からは今年 1 月、麻生外相がインドを訪問し、外相間戦略対話の開始や経済連携協定（EPA）の検討を行うことで合意しました。7 月 17 日には、G8 サミット出席のため、ロシアのサンクトペテルブルクを訪問中の小泉前首相とモンマハン・シン首相が首脳会談を行いました。この席では、経済問題を包括的に協議する産学官による「日印共同研究会」（JSG）の報告書が提出され、経済連携協定締結のための交渉を開始する方向性が打ち出されました。今年 12 月には、シン首相が日本を訪問する予定になっています。

政府レベルの会議開催も活発になり、私たちのグループによるダイアログが 2003 年 11 月に開かれた直後の 12 月、東京で外務省主催による「第 1 回日印シンポジウム」が開催されました。そのシンポジウムはニューデリーで第 2 回（2005 年 3 月）、東京で第 3 回（2006 年 3 月）が開かれ、日印米中の民間人を中心に活発な討論が繰り広げられました。この種の日印会議はこの 3 年間で急速に拡大してきている、といえます。2007 年は、「インドにおける日本年」で、さらに人的交流も進むものと期待されています。

安全保障分野では、2001 年より日印安保対話が実施されています。2005 年 4 月の小泉首相訪印や同年 12 月の東アジア首脳会議の場を利用した首脳会談では、安全保障分野の交流や協力をさらに進めていくことを再確認しました。防衛首脳クラスの高レベルの交流も最近、活発になってきました。2005 年 10 月、プラカシュ・インド海軍参謀総長が来日し、斎藤海幕長と意見交換。また、当時の先崎統幕議長が同年 9 月、斎藤幕僚長が 2006 年 2 月、森陸幕長が 3 月、吉田空幕長が 4 月に相次いでインドを訪問しました。さらに、5 月にはプラナーブ・ムカジー国防相が来日し、額賀防衛庁長官との間で、会談、防衛協力に関する共同発表を行いました。2004 年 10 月にインド海軍艦艇 3 隻が東京を親善訪問（14 回目）し、海上自衛隊も 2005 年 8 月、練習艦隊をムンバイに派遣、親善訓練を行いました<sup>1</sup>。今年 2 月の第 4 回日印安保対話では、両国の安全保障協力について、意見交換が行われました。双方の海上保安当局間でも、船舶の親善訪問や共同訓練が活発に行われています。

経済援助の面では、日本はインドに対する最大の二国間 ODA ドナーであり、インドは 2003 年度以降 3 年連続で日本の最大の円借款受け取り国となっています。2003 年度は約 1250 億円、2004 年度約 1345 億円、2005 年度約 1555 億円という具合で、コミットメントの累計総額は 2 兆 970 億円に達しています。

日本の対インド基本政策は、政府レベルでは、「政治・安全保障、経済、文化交流などの

---

<sup>1</sup> 防衛白書（2006 年版） p 256-257.

分野でインドとの関係強化を進めていく。経済連携協定（EPA）交渉を開始する。東アジア首脳会議（EAS）の発展や海上安全保障、エネルギー、環境などの地域的、国際的課題に対する協力を一掃深めていく」ということに集約されるでしょう。このうち、EPA に関しては、さる 8 月下旬、その柱となる自由貿易協定（FTA）交渉を再開することを決定しています。

### 3 日印の世論動向

日本とインドの両国民は、この二国間関係をどのように見ているのでしょうか。読売新聞社がギャラップ社などとともに、インドや東南アジア諸国において 7 か国世論調査を実施した結果<sup>2</sup>によると、東南アジア諸国やインドで、アジアにおける日本の役割を高く評価するとともに、今後も政治、経済両面で日本に強い期待を寄せていることが分かりました。その一方で、中国の急速な台頭に警戒感を持つ日本と、歓迎する東南アジアとの対中意識の違いも鮮明になりました。その世論調査結果を詳しく見てみましょう。

現在の日本との関係について、「良い」と応えた人はインドで 89%でした。日本に「良い印象」を持つ人はインドが東南アジアより高く、96%でした。日本を「信頼できる」と応えた人は、インドで 83.4%と高い数字。「日本がアジアの一員として、アジア発展のために積極的な役割を果たしている」と見る人は、「大いに」と「多少は」を合わせてインドで計 80%でした。「日本がアジアの発展のために積極的に取り組むべきこと」（複数回答）では、インドで、「経済・技術の支援や協力の拡充」（78%）がトップ。続いて、「貿易や経済交流を促進する」（71.3%）。「アジア各国の労働者を積極的に受け入れる」（47%）が、3 位に入りました。経済面での関係強化や協力・支援の拡充を求める人が多かったといえます。

日本とアジア諸国で認識の差が大きかったのは、日本の影響力についてです。例えば、「最近、アジアにおける日本の影響力は強まっているか」との質問で、落差が大きかったのです。「強まっている」がインドネシアで計 89%、タイ計 87%、インド計 79%などだったのに対し、日本では計 33%にとどまり、「弱まっている」が計 59%に上りました。これは、中国の存在感の増大や、「アジア軽視」との批判がある小泉外交が日本国民の意識に影響したものと見られます。

日本が今後も人道復興支援のため、イラク同様、自衛隊を海外派遣することについては、東南アジア 4 か国とインドでいずれも「賛成」が多数を占めました。特に、インドネシアで計 83%、タイでは計 80%、マレーシアでも計 79%が「賛成」と答えました。インドは 64.3%でした。一方、日本では「賛成」計 50%、「反対」計 46%でした。

---

<sup>2</sup> 読売新聞（2006 年 9 月 4 日、10 日付）。

中国に「良い印象」を持つ人は、マレーシア（計 89%）、タイ（計 83%）、インドネシア（計 81%）の 3 か国で 80%を超えました。同じ質問をした 95 年の調査と比べ、11～51 ポイント増えました。今回この質問を初めて行ったインドは計 78%。日本では、「良い」が計 27%（同 28 ポイント減）、「悪い」が計 67%（同 32 ポイント増）でした。日本における対中認識の悪化が突出しています。

インドの人々は自国経済への自信を強めているようです。「今後、最も経済力を持つ国や地域」（3 つまで選択）を挙げてもらうと、「米国」（44%）、「日本」（36%）を抑え、「インド」を挙げる人が 53%で 1 位となりました。96 年の調査では、「日本」、「米国」に次ぐ 3 位でした。また、「今後、経済力も含めて、アジア地域に最も影響力を持つ国や地域」（1 つ選択）でも、「インド」が 42%でトップでした。こうしたインドに、日本や韓国が熱い視線を向けるようになってきています。日本で、「今後、最も経済力を持つ国や地域」として「インド」を挙げた人は 19%で、96 年調査と比べ 18 ポイントの大幅増となりました。「中国」、「米国」に次いで、3 位に上昇しました。ちなみに、「日本」は 4 位です。「自国にとって、軍事的な脅威になると思う国や地域」をいくつでも挙げてもらうと、インドでは、「中国」53.1%、「米国」38.7%、「日本」21.9%の順。日本では、「北朝鮮」77.7%、「中国」47%、「米国」14%の順でした。

今回の調査では、東南アジア諸国やインドで、日本に対するイメージが非常に良かったことが大きな特徴です。白石隆・政策研究大学院大学副学長は、「(われわれと) 日本との関係は良好であり、日本は信頼できる国だ。日本には良い印象を持っているし、日本との関係は将来もっと良くなるだろう。日本は世界に良い影響を与えているし、日本は国連安全保障理事会の常任理事国になるべきだ」——こういう見方が、インドネシア、マレーシア、タイ、ベトナム、インドでは広く受け入れられている、ということが明らかになった。これらの国々の国家建設、経済発展に日本が協力してきたことが高く評価されているためだろう。その意味で、日本はこれからも、自信をもって、こうした協力を続けていけばよいのではないかとコメントしています。

日本では中国への懸念が強いようです。これは中国の台頭によってアジアの地域秩序が中国主導になり、米国が締め出され、日本が抑え込まれることを懸念したからだと思われます。「ASEAN プラス 3 の組み合わせは、中国の地域覇権主義」と見なす研究者もいます。日本はそうならないよう、東アジアの地域秩序形成において、安全保障、経済協力、その他の分野で、民主主義を共有する諸国、米国、韓国、オーストラリア、インドなどと、もっと戦略的に関与し、東南アジア諸国や南アジア諸国に好影響を与えていく必要があります。

#### 4 日米豪印の戦略対話

そして、今回の安倍政権の誕生です。安倍首相は就任前の7月6日、東京都内で開かれた講演会で、日本のアジア外交について「インドのように自由、民主主義、人権という価値を共有している国がある。日米豪とインドで戦略的に話し合う場をつくってもいい」と述べ、日米豪印4か国による協議構想を提唱しました。<sup>3</sup>この日米豪印による戦略対話構想は、9月29日の臨時国会における首相の所信表明演説に引き継がれています。その演説の中で、安倍首相は「自由な社会の輪をアジア、そして世界に広げていくため、オーストラリアやインドなど、基本的な価値を共有する国々との首脳レベルでの戦略的な対話を展開します」と述べました。安倍首相の取り組むアジア外交は、「主張する外交への転換」を進める上での大きな柱になるでしょう。それらは、①日米豪印の戦略対話②中国、韓国との関係改善③東南アジア諸国連合（ASEAN）との協力関係④拉致問題を中心とする北朝鮮問題への対応——などに分類されます。インドは、これからの日本外交の大きな柱として姿を現してきました。インドは、日本のレーダー・スクリーンに大きな姿を映し出されてきました。ロイ中將も、この3年間の日印関係の進展については認めてくださるでしょう。

アジア外交の中で、とくに重要なのは、日米豪印の戦略対話でしょう。国益を重視する伝統的な現実主義から一歩離れ、自由と民主主義の価値観の共有に重点を置く外交を展開することになるのではないのでしょうか。アジアにおいては、民主主義の進展している国々はまだまだ少数派であるだけに、日本、インド、オーストラリアなどが連携し、アジア地域における自由と民主主義の拡大を目指すことは、大きな意義があります。それは、第2期ブッシュ政権の外交戦略とも共鳴作用をもたらします。アジア外交というと、中国、韓国との関係改善が一番の課題だと、日本国内では受け取られています。現実には、安倍首相の中国、韓国訪問が大きくクローズアップされています。これは、前政権の負の遺産を解消する作業でしょう。それは、安倍政権が最初に取り組まなければならない課題である、という意味においてです。しかし、安倍政権はたぶん、目の前にある懸案を解決することに受け身の姿勢で追われるのではなく、自らに望ましい安全保障環境を創り出していく、ルール・セットに比重を置いているように観察することができます。安倍首相自身は、「日米印豪4か国（アジア大洋州デモクラティック G3 プラス アメリカ）の首脳または外相レベルの会合を開催し、とりわけアジアに置いて、こうした普遍的価値を他の国々と共有するためにいかに貢献し、協力しうるかについて、戦略的観点から協議を行うことができれば、それはすばらしいことだと思う。日本はそのためにリーダーシップを発揮する必要がある」と述べています。<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> 読売新聞（2006年7月7日付）

<sup>4</sup> 安倍晋三著「美しい国へ」（2006年、文春新書）



ただし、これは大きな挑戦です。日米同盟は日本外交の主軸であることに変わりありません。日米豪 3 か国の閣僚級戦略対話 (TSD) は、2006 年から開催されることになりました。さて、これを 4 か国に拡大するとなると、インドが賛同してくれるかどうか、オーストラリアはまだ懐疑的に見ているように見えます。また、インド自身はどう考えているのでしょうか。インド外務省高官は「全く新しい考え方。内容をしっかり検討する必要がある」と述べるにとどめています<sup>5</sup>。インドのアルジュン・アスラニ元駐日大使は、「インドは半世紀にわたり非同盟を掲げ、冷戦後も外交政策の自立を追求してきた。印日、印米など 2 国間で合同軍事演習などを行うのは構わないし、4 か国でも対テロなどテーマごとの協力関係を築くのはよいが、正式な同盟への参加は抵抗がある。インド国内の支持が得られない」という意見を述べています<sup>6</sup>。冷戦時代からの長年にわたる非同盟政策の伝統からすると、特定の 4 か国の枠組みに加入することが得策かどうか、二の足を踏むのでしょうか。インドは現在、日米中ロなど主要国から積極的なアプローチを受け、各国のヘッジ戦略の恩恵を享受している恵まれた立場のように見えます。インドの戦略家たちは、自国の国際政治における存在感の高まりを意識していることは、最近、米国の外交問題雑誌「フォーリン・アフェアーズ」のインド特集号<sup>7</sup>の諸論文にも表れています。例えば、C.ラジャ・モハン氏は「米印関係は反中同盟の布石なのか」と題する論文で、「いまやインドは、グローバルなパワー・バランスを変化させるほどの力を持つ国として台頭しつつある。今後、インドは、アジア秩序の安定化、大中東地域の政治的近代化、そしてグローバル化の管理という、21 世紀における重要な課題への取り組みの結末を左右するような大きな機会と影響力を手にしていくだろう」としたうえで、「インドはアジアやインド洋地域で、中国の 2 番手に甘んじることだけは避けたいと考えているし、むしろ遠く離れた超大国との協調に安定的な利益を見出している。ワシントンとの安全保障関係の強化を望むのは、こうした構造的な理由がある」と述べています。

それでも、インドは米国との同盟関係には慎重です。その文脈からみると、日米豪印との戦略的対話についても、慎重かもしれません。しかし、インドはすでに、国連安保理常任理事国入り問題で、日本、ドイツ、ブラジルを含めた 4 か国グループ (G4) で、挫折したものの、安保理拡大決議案を提出した経験があります。日本は、東アジア首脳会議において、ASEAN プラス 3 (日中韓) に、インド、オーストラリア、ニュージーランドの民主主義国家 3 か国を加えた 16 か国の参加を主導してきました。そのうえで、さる 8 月 24 日、東南アジア諸国連合 (ASEAN) との経済閣僚会議で、当時の二階経済産業相がこの 16 か国による「東アジア EPA 構想」を提唱しています。インドが積極的な自立外交を進めているのは理解できますが、同時に多国間外交にも力を入れていることが読み取れます。日印二国間外交では、今後も毎年、首脳交流を行うことで、小泉前首相とシン首相の間で、合

<sup>5</sup> 朝日新聞 (2006 年 9 月 21 日)

<sup>6</sup> 読売新聞 (2006 年 9 月 30 日)

<sup>7</sup> FOREIGN AFFAIRS (JULY/AUGUST 2006) “THE RISE OF INDIA”

意しています。さて、こうした新たな潮流を踏まえて考えますと、日米豪印 4 か国の戦略対話の行方にますます注目が集まってまいります。

## 5 積極派か、懐疑派か

さて、ここからが本題です。

日印両国は戦略的パートナーとして、どこまで関係を進展させることが出来るのでしょうか。それは、単に言論の自由を有する民主主義国家同士としての「対話」を続けるレベルなのでしょうか。両国は「行動」の面で、どこまで共同歩調を取れるのでしょうか。その先にあるのは、中国とのパワー・バランスを考慮した日印の「疑似同盟」関係なのでしょうか。それとも、中国も含めた東アジア 16 か国による巨大な自由市場圏を生み出す「経済連携協定」(EPA) 構想なのでしょうか。インドは安倍首相の唱える「日米豪印の戦略的連携」の是非について、どのように考えるのでしょうか。

## 6 積極派の見方

日本では、インドとの関係強化について、専門家は積極派と懐疑派に分かれているようです。積極派のグループは、歴史認識問題を中心に日中の対立関係が深まるにつれ、インドとの関係強化によって、バランスを取るべきだ、あるいはヘッジをかけておくべきだ、と考えています。それは、旧ソ連の崩壊後、新たな軍事的脅威の対象として、台頭する中国を想定するという「ポスト冷戦時代」の思考が働いているのではないのでしょうか。日中両国は世界史上、初めて東アジア地域における対等なパワーとして対峙しており、そのライバル関係を調整していく必要があると見られています。しかも、2005 年以降、日本の国連安保理常任理事国入り問題で、中国は国内で暴力的な官製反日デモを各主要都市で実施、さらに国際社会でも反日キャンペーンを展開しました。その結果、アジアで G4 の枠組み決議案の共同提案国になったのは、モルジブ、ブータン、アフガニスタンだけでした。中国は東シナ海のカス田開発で、露骨に海洋権益の擁護を主張しています。また、中国海軍の核搭載可能な潜水艦は、沖縄トラフ近海からグアム島まで進出し、日本の領海を侵犯したこともあります。日中関係は、首脳会談も途絶えている状況で、安倍首相は、早期訪中による事態打開を図ろうとしています。ただ、日中間で首脳会談が復活したとしても、構造的問題の解決は手を付けられていないままです。日中間の信頼関係を確立することは相当、長く困難な状況が続くことでしょう。

一方、米国においても国防総省を中心にそうした中国脅威論は根強くありました。しかし、9・11 事件以降、ブッシュ政権の中国観は大きく変化していきます。政権発足当初は「戦略的競争相手」と位置づけていたのに、対テロ戦争を優先し、中国をパートナーとして扱い、台湾との関係は冷却の一途をたどりしました。その一方、米国は、共通の価値観を有す

る民主国家同士として、インドを「戦略的パートナー」として位置づけ、時には「自然な同盟」（コンドリーザ・ライス米国务長官）とさえ、呼称しています。2005 年 7 月にはモンマハン・シン首相が訪米し、2006 年 3 月には、ブッシュ大統領が訪印しました。米国はインド最大の貿易相手国であり、今後 3 年間に貿易額を倍増させることを合意しています。グローバリゼーションの進展の中で、民主国家インドの存在は、米国の視点からも高まっているといえるでしょう。軍事面では、2005 年 9 月から 11 月にかけて、海、空軍間での共同訓練が実施されました。特に、2005 年 9 月にアラビア海で行われた第 8 回海軍共同演習「マラバール 2005」には、両国から空母が参加するなど 6000 人規模の大演習となり、対テロ作戦や対潜作戦、洋上給油など多彩な訓練が行われたと伝えられています。2006 年 2 月、米国防総省が議会提出した「4 年ごとの防衛見直し報告」（QDR）によると、中国もインドも「戦略的岐路に立つ国」に分類されています。インドの場合は民主国家ですし、核拡散防止努力をおこなっていることから、さほど問題はないのですが、中国の場合は、戦略的な危険を冒さないよう、思いとどまらせることが抑止以前の段階として、重要になってくると思われます。また、ブッシュ政権は民生原子力協力を積極的に進めており、民生用・軍事用の特定などについて、合意がなされています。この原子力協定は、米議会内だけでなく、国際社会でも核拡散防止条約（NPT）体制のあり方をめぐり、大きな論争を引き起こしています。この面では、客観的に見れば、米印関係は、日印関係よりもはるかに進んでいます。

こうした米印関係の進展と日中関係の緊張関係を背景に、日印関係は強化に向けた基礎的条件と弾みを整えつつある、といえるでしょう。ただ、同じ積極派の間でも、中国の将来における軍事的脅威をどの程度、見積もるかによって、勢力均衡論に基づく関係強化を目指すのかどうか、意見が分かれるところでしょう。台頭する中国の将来像と方向性がだれにもわからない以上、安易な楽観論、悲観論は禁物です。日印間の協力は、中国の脅威に対するカウンター・バランス以上のものを目指すべきだろうと思います。様々な中国の発展シナリオから崩壊シナリオに至るまで、よく吟味しながら、あらゆる事態に対応できるよう、そして望ましい安全保障環境を創り出せるよう、日本は外交努力と防衛努力を重ねる必要があるのではないのでしょうか。最近、中国上海市のトップが更迭され、中国地方幹部の腐敗構造の根深さが改めて浮き彫りになりました。中国共産党の一党独裁体制が継続する限り、いかに腐敗追放を唱えても、中国の抜本的な政治改革は不可能でしょう。日本を含め、民主主義諸国家は、中国が民主化を進め、言論の自由を実質的に保障するよう、強く働きかけていくことが望まれます。中国の民主化プロセスこそが中国と東アジアの安定化につながるでしょうし、真に国際社会の枠組みに組み込むことが可能となるでしょう。

対中脅威認識が低ければ、中国に対するカウンター・バランスとしてインドを見なす必要はなく、日印 2 国間関係や国際平和協力、とくに対テロ戦争や経済の連携の重要性を強調するだけでよいことになります。これは、一つの有力な選択肢の一つであります。過度

に中国脅威論にとらわれると、今後、日中関係が改善されていく段階で、インドの存在価値を相対的に低く見積もることにもなりかねません。「ポスト・ポスト冷戦時代」において、中国、インドのような大国を「友敵モデル」に単純化して、当てはめることは無理があります。中印両国の関係改善や信頼醸成の取り組みも、地域の平和と繁栄にとっては有益と判断されるでしょう。中国脅威論とは直接的にリンクしない形で、日印二国間の緩やかな関係強化を図ることも必要でしょう。逆に、中国の軍事的脅威が著しく高まる場合、日印が擬似同盟関係に近づくことも可能性としてはありうるでしょう。ただ、その戦略的選択肢は、オープンにしておき、柔軟性、機動性をもって行動できるよう、文書化しない知恵を働かせておけばよいのです。

また、経済面から、グローバリゼーションの進展による国際政治の構造変化にも着目しておく必要があります。先ほども述べました東アジア首脳会議を一つの弾みとする「東アジア EPA 構想」が実現に向けて進展しますと、中国も含めて自由貿易体制の中に組み込んでいくことができます。インド側の提唱する「繁栄の弧」を形成することも可能でしょう。インドの経済をこの東アジア EPA 構想に組み込んでいくことも大きな課題です。日本としてもインドのインフラ整備や民間投資の活性化に向けて協力する必要があります。ただし、地域的経済統合の機能的アプローチは、経済的、人的交流とコミュニケーションの増大につながっても、必ずしも地域の平和と安定を約束しません。そこには欧州共同体のように当初からの政治的意思が必要でしょうし、自由と民主主義の価値観の共有も前提条件となっています。欧州モデルを単純にアジアに適用できるわけではありません。こうした複雑なアジアの状況下、日印両国の将来の選択肢は、柔軟かつオープンであるべきでしょう。

## 7 懐疑派の見方

一方、日本国内の懐疑派グループは、日本側がインドとの関係強化を目指しても、何も現実には進まないのではないかと疑問を抱いています。インドには、冷戦時代から「非同盟」政策の伝統があり、一定のレベルを超えて、安全保障分野における協力には踏み込まないのではないだろうか。また、インドに対して、巨額の ODA を提供しても、インド側は当然のこととして受け取り、日本側の要望や説得を聞き入れてはくれないのではないかと。インドはいざという時、何とも頼りないパートナーなのではないか、という疑問です。たとえば、海洋安全保障の一つのテーマとして、大量破壊兵器拡散阻止構想 (PSI) について、このダイアログをはじめ、さまざまな会議の場を通じて、日本側はインドの参加を働きかけてきましたが、現在のところ、「検討する」以上の回答を得ていません。何も進展はないのです。日印間の安全保障上の協力が何か、具体的な共同行動に結実しないと、世論の納得を得られないでしょう。

もちろん、日本側にも問題があります。日本側には、集団的自衛権の行使を禁じている

という政府の憲法解釈のために、同盟関係や国際協力の面で、憲法上の制約を受けていることは決定的な弱点です。この問題は、安倍政権が積極的に取り組む課題になることでしょう。さらに、国連安保理常任理事国入り問題で、日本は G4 グループの枠組みを維持するかどうか、不透明になっています。日本は現在、G4 グループの連携と日米協調の両にらみ状態であり、方向性が定まっておりません。米印の民生用原子力協定に関する合意について、インド側は、原子力供給国グループ（NSG）における日本の理解と支持を求めています。しかし、日本側は明確な対応を示していません。日本の大方の世論は、この米印合意を受け入れることに反対しているのが現実で、日本政府もなかなか前に一步踏み出すことが難しいようです。インドを NPT 自身に参加させることはできなくても、不拡散チームに参加させることなどは、日本にとっても利益につながる面があります。核不拡散の面における日印協力は、新たなフロンティアでしょう。

最近においては、さる 7 月 4 日の北朝鮮によるノドン、テポドン 2 号などミサイル発射実験が行われた直後、国連で北朝鮮批判決議案を討議しているさなか、7 月 9 日、インドが核搭載可能な中距離弾道ミサイル「アグニ 3」（射程 3000～5000 キロ）の初の発射実験を行ったことも、日本にとっては理解に苦しむ行動でした<sup>8</sup>。この点は、7 月の日印首脳会談で、小泉前首相が指摘しましたが、国際社会の一員として責任ある行動は、どの国にも求められることだろうと思います。このダイアログにおいては、国際テロと海賊の結びつきが大量破壊兵器拡散につながる恐れもあり、日印両国が海洋安全保障のテーマとして取り組むよう、議論して参りました。こうしたテーマも、実現への道筋を真剣に模索する必要があります。

日印関係について、積極派、懐疑派双方の見方を紹介しました。日印協力が本当に進むかどうか、考え方は割れています。日印間の経済的相互依存関係が確立されていないままの状態、戦略的パートナーシップを求めるといふ、日本にとっては野心的な試みといっていいいでしょう。先に挙げたひとつひとつのテーマを考えて行くにあたって、相当の知恵が必要であり、困難が予想されるところです。要するに、日印協力の必要性について、両国は、共通認識を確認した上で、共通の課題に取り組んでいくことがこれから重要になってくることを自覚する必要があります。

（了）

---

<sup>8</sup> 読売新聞（2006 年 7 月 10 日付夕刊）

## Indo-Japan Relationship under the Abe Administration

Masahiko Sasajima

Senior Staff, Ombudsmen Committee, the Yomiuri Shimbun

### 1. Preface

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for inviting me to talk on this important subject at the second Indo-Japan Ocean Security Dialogue Phase 2 and to take this opportunity to assess the present and future of Indo-Japan relationship under Abe Administration which has just launched September 26<sup>th</sup>. In this context, I would like to present issues and agenda whether both India and Japan would be able to establish cooperative relationship as strategic partners and responsible powers. Special attention will be given to the survey of this bilateral relationship dividing positive and skeptical aspects.

Let me first address my retrospect of this dialogue. Both Indian and Japanese delegations have periodically held track II level sessions four times since November 2003. Then, Japanese members were peppered with harsh criticism by VADM Mehir Kumar Roy, who led Indian delegation, saying “Japan has failed to put India on its radar screen in a way.” I remember that phrase clearly. Although there is no negative history between Japan and India as there is between Japan and China, and we have only positive historic and cultural memories since WWII, their political transaction has kept lingering on and their trade and investment have remained miserable situation. On the contrary, some critics in Japan raised questions of “why do we discuss our cooperation with India now” or “why do we, now, discuss maritime security cooperation with India.” It might be understandable to see these skeptical questions, because it sounded like an ambitious approach that we would discuss maritime security cooperation as a pioneer. At that time, India and Japan have kept only a narrow network not only in diplomatic channel but also in trade and investment or transnational communication.

However, the bilateral relationship has drastically shifted in these three years. One of the watershed events, I think, was that Japan herself was awakened to the strategic importance of India. During the Post Cold War Era in 1990s, India achieved its high economic growth through economic liberalization and economic reform that led to 10percent increase of economic growth per year in these days. Japanese officials acknowledged the rapid growth of the Indian economy as a member of BRICS and its tremendous economic potentiality. It is easy to find out advertisements of “Indian bond” which attracts investors at the show window of major security companies in

Japan.

Five years has past since the 9/11 incident in 2001 when it entered into the “post-post Cold War Era.” India, the largest democracy in the world, attaches great importance to its geopolitical position which seams with Pakistan and Afghanistan under the era of war on terrorism. Both Japan and India share values such as market-oriented economy or rule of law as stable democracies in the chaotic Asian region. The development of globalization may leave less integrated nations, such as Afghanistan, to the hot-bed of terrorism with tyranny and oppression. It is crucial important for us to lead the failed nations to make shift to the democracy.

It is vitally important for Japan to keep open the sea lines of communications (SLOCS) from the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Malacca Straits to East Asia in order to secure its energy supply in the form of petroleum resources. We have discussed the possibility of Indo-Japan cooperation on ocean security. I have learned following things through the discussion.

First of all, it is important for Japan to establish its ocean strategy as soon as possible and to construct its security system pursuing national interest and ocean interest as Sea Power. Japan needs to enhance its alliance with the U.S. through military transformation.

Secondly, Japan needs to make a effort to establish a framework for multilateral cooperation in jointly patrolling the open sea in order to pursue maritime cooperation in keeping SLOCs open from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean. That deserves attention as we fight against transnational terrorism and pirates. It is essential for Japan to cooperate with the coast guards and navies of India, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and ASEAN based on the alliance with the U.S. In this context, India has maintained its potential capabilities to be the hub of prosecuting the war on terrorism and to cooperate with Japan. These cooperative relations would expand its new strategic option. Japan and India should enhance cooperation between their coast guards to tackle piracy and maritime terrorism. The dispatch of Japanese Self Defense Forces vessels to the Arabian Sea to provide logistical support for the peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan reminds us of the fact that India has cooperation with Japan in its logistical support.

Simultaneously, it is necessary to make clear the legal issues of maritime security for building relationships with Indian naval forces. That will give us an opportunity to gradually beef up mutual communication through courtesy visits as well as joint communications and search and rescue exercise.

## **2. Political dialogue between Japan and India**

When India conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, the government of Japan suspended new commitments of grant aid and yen loans for new projects, leading to a tentative freezing in their bilateral relations. Those were eventually melted only after Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's visit to India in August 2000, when both sides agreed to establish the Japan-India Global Partnership for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Prime Minister Vajpayee made a return visit to Japan in December 2001 just after 9/11, and the two countries released a joint declaration on consolidating the Japan-India global Partnership. New Prime Minister Abe, then deputy secretary-general of LDP, visited India in March 2005. Following that, in April 2005 Prime Minister Koizumi visited India and agreed with Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, to reinforce the strategic focus of the global partnership between two countries. They signed Joint Statement "Japan-India Partnership in the New Asian Era" and issued "Eight-fold Initiative for Strengthening Japan-India global Partnership."

Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Aso, visited India in January 2006 and agreed to launch Foreign Minister-level Talks with a strategic perspective and EPA negotiation. Both PM Koizumi and PM Manmohan met at the time of G8 Summit in St. Petersburg in Russia. They received an economic report by a Joint Study Group (JSG) which is composed of government officials and representatives of business and academia from the two countries, and they suggested to start negotiation of EPA. PM Manmohan will visit Tokyo in this December.

Both countries have been conducting security Dialogue since 2001 and military to military talks since 2004. High level exchange is continuing between the defense authorities. From Japan, General Massaki, Chief of Staff (September, 2005), Admiral Saito, Chief of Maritime SDF (February, 2006), General Mori, Chief of Ground SDF (March, 2006), and General Yoshida, Chief of Air SDF (April, 2006), and Joint statement was issued to promote defense exchanges. Between the coast guards, combined exercises on anti-piracy, search & rescue have been conducted every year since 2000. Heads of coast guards of both countries visit each other almost every year.

It is also noteworthy that numerous symposiums, discussions, workshops including our dialogue, have been held between two nations.

Both governments will hold "Japan-India Friendship & Exchange Year 2007" both in Japan and in India.

India became the top recipient of Japanese Official Development Aid in FY 2003 ahead of China and Indonesia, and it keeps its position last three years. Japan extended ODA loan assistance worth more than 1 billion U.S. dollars (equivalent to about 125 billion yen) to the Indian government in 2003. Japan also extended ODA 134.5 billion yen in 2004 and 155.5 billion yen in 2005.



This chain of events indicates that policy makers in both Japan and India share the idea of establishing strong ties in politics and security including maritime security cooperation, economic cooperation, and cultural transaction. Both nations agreed upon resuming FTA/EPA negotiation in late August in 2006. Last three years has witnessed momentous changes of the bilateral relations between India and Japan.

### **3. Public Opinion Survey**

We will look upon citizens' opinion in both nations. A survey conducted in seven Asian countries by the Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallop Poll found that more than 90percent of people in India and Southeast Asian countries felt their countries had a good relationship with Japan and between 70 percent and 90 percent said Japan was a trustworthy nation. In particular, 96 percent of respondents in Indonesia and Thailand said their countries had "very good" or "rather good" relations with Japan, followed by Vietnam with 92 percent and Malaysia with 91 percent. People in Southeast Asian countries also held a favorable view of China, whose economy is growing rapidly, indicating they feel their ties with China are warming, according to the survey.

The interview survey was conducted by The Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallup Group between late June and mid-July in Japan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam. This was the third such survey after ones conducted in 1995 and 1996.

More than 90 percent of respondents in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam in the 1995 survey said their countries enjoyed good relationship with Japan.

89 percent of Indian pollees, who were asked the question for the first time, said their countries and Japan got along "very well" or "rather well." 91 percent of Indonesians said Japan had a positive impact on the world, while more than 80 percent of pollees in Southeast Asian countries and India said so.

The Southeast Asian countries and India held high expectations Japan would play a key role in the international community. Regarding the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces personnel to foreign countries to provide humanitarian assistance, 83 percent of pollees from Indonesia, to which SDF members were dispatched to provide relief to victims of the 2004 tsunami, supported such SDF missions. With the exceptions of South Korea, more respondents backed overseas SDF dispatches than opposed them.

### **4. Strategic dialogue among India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S.**

Newly elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, appointed his inaugural Cabinet on September 27 in 2006. PM Abe once mentioned before his inauguration that he would

seek to enhance relations with India and Australia which share values with Japan such as liberty, democracy, and human rights. As he said the Japan-U.S. alliance is the cornerstone of the nation's security and diplomacy, he drew a picture of a strategic dialog among India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S. He delivered similar points in his first policy speech to a plenary session of the Diet as the Japanese PM on 29<sup>th</sup> of September.

In his speech, Prime Minister Abe remarked, "The vision I am aiming for is that of 'a beautiful country, Japan' – a country filled with vitality, opportunity, and compassion, which cherishes a spirit of self-discipline, and is open to the world." He further identified the "beautiful country" as possessing the following four attributes: (i) a country that values culture, tradition, history, and nature; (ii) a country underpinned by free society, respects discipline, and has dignity; (iii) a country that continues to possess the vitality to grow toward the future; and (iv) a country that is trusted, respected, and loved in the world, and which demonstrates leadership. In order to meet these attributes, he stressed that "With my conviction that a bright future is open before us, I am determined undauntedly to keep the torch of reform burning."

He also referred to India as follows: as a democratic nation in Asia, I will engage in strategic dialogues at the leader's level with countries that share fundamental values such as Australia and India, with a view to widening the circle of free societies in Asia as well as in the world.

His policy platform features "assertive diplomacy." It includes following ingredients in terms of Asian policy.

- 1 starting strategic dialog among India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S.
- 2 strengthening bonds of trust with both China and South Korea
- 3 promoting cooperation with the ASEAN
- 4 continuing to strongly demand the return of all abductees

Obviously, India has emerged as the first pillar of Japan's diplomacy. Japan now put India on its radar screen in a way. I expect that VADM Mehir Kumar Roy admits the developments of Indo-Japan relations in recent three years.

It will be important to have strategic dialog among India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S. It may also lead to a diplomacy which enhances sharing values such as liberty and democracy, apart from traditional realism. Because it has yet a minority camp of democratic nations in Asia, it must be greatly significant to cooperate among Japan, Australia, and India, with a view to widening the circle of free societies in Asia. That would bring to synchronize with the diplomacy of the second Bush Administration.

You may regard Japan's Asian policy as improving relations with China and South

Korea. PM Abe just used his first meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, on last Sunday, to improve their countries' relationship and invite Hu and Wen to visit Japan as soon as possible. PM Abe also visited Seoul on last Monday to meet with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun. We recognize PM Abe's visit to Beijing and Seoul as resolving a sort of negative legacy of former PM Koizumi who frequently visited Yasukuni shrine in his term. Accordingly, it is natural that PM Abe initially has to tackle with these bilateral relations. However, we can observe his position not to be filled every minute by passive way but to be filled with rule-set that creates desirable strategic circumstances in Asia. PM Abe once mentioned that Japan should lead to consult and to cooperate with Asia-Oceanic democratic Group 3 (Australia, India, and Japan) plus the U.S.

However, it must be a great challenge. There is no change of the vital role of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Also, TSD, trilateral strategic dialogue at ministerial level among Japan, Australia, and the U.S. has just started under Australian initiative in 2006. It seems that Australian governmental officials look dubious about the plan yet. In addition, we have to hear Indian opinion. One of the high-ranking officials in Indian foreign Ministry said, "It is a new idea. It is necessary to examine the contents of the proposal." Former Indian Ambassador to Japan, AG Asrani, answered questions by the Yomiuri's interview, "India has pursued its diplomatic autonomy through non-alliance policy for a half century and beyond cold war. Although it will be okay to conduct joint military exercises in bilateral bases and to build the cooperation for fight against terror with Japan, Australia, and the U.S., it is reluctant to develop the group to an alliance. It would be difficult to get support in India." India might be unwilling to join this specific framework because of its traditional non-alliance policy.

However, the end of the Cold War freed India to pursue engagement with all the great powers. New Delhi also began to proclaim that India was a natural ally of the United States. After the Cold War, India set about wooing the U.S. Simultaneously, other major powers also set about wooing India. So, it seems that India enjoys some benefits of hedge strategies of each powers. Indian strategists recognize that India is now on the verge of becoming a great power.

For instance, C. Raja Mohan, Strategic Affairs Editor at The Indian Express, stated in his article "India and the Balance of Power" in Foreign Affairs (JULY/AUGUST 2006) as follows:

"India is now emerging as the swing state in the global balance of power. In the coming years, it will have a opportunity to shape outcomes on the most critical issues of the twenty-first century: the construction of Asian stability, the political modernization of the greater Middle East, and the management of globalization." And also, he

concluded, “A rising India may be difficult at times, but it will act broadly to defend and promote the many interests it shares with Washington. Assisting India’s rise, then, is in the United States’ own long-term interest.”

He also referred to Japan:

“Since the start of the Bush administration, Japan has also shown increasing interest in expanding military cooperation with India, especially in the maritime domain. Neither India nor Japan wants to base their political relationship exclusively on a potential threat from China, but both know that deepening their own security cooperation will open up new strategic options and that greater coordination between Asian democracies could limit China’s impact.”

India is deliberate to establish an alliance with the U.S. In that context, India is also deliberate to start dialogue with Australia, Japan, and the U.S. However, India and Japan as members of G4 have experienced to submit a resolution of expanding permanent membership of Security Council at the U.N. Japan took a initiative to support India’s participation in the inaugural East Asian Summit, December 2005, despite China’s reluctance to include India. Further more, then Japan’s minister of economy and industry, Nikai proposed an East Asian EPA Initiative with all 16 East Asian Summit members. Despite of its autonomous diplomacy, India has expanded its multilateral diplomacy. India and Japan agreed their shuttle diplomacy between both prime ministers in every year. In this regard, it will be interesting to see the development of the strategic dialogue among 4 nations.

## **5. The Positive school, or the Skeptical school?**

How can we develop the relationship between India and Japan as the strategic partners? Will they remain in dialogue partners or develop their joint behavior and quasi-alliance against potential threat of rising China? On the other hand, will it be possible to create a new framework of EPA among 16 nations in Asia?

## **6. The positive school**

There are two schools among specialists and policy makers of Indian studies in Japan. One is the positive school and the other is the skeptical school. Members of the positive school are likely to care more about balance of power or hedge strategy than ordinary people prefers in accordance with Sino-Japanese confrontation. It reflects the idea of post-Cold War Era when they regards rising China as an object of new potential threat after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So, it is necessary for both Japan and China to facilitate the coordination of their rivalry as equal partners in the history. Chinese rivalry against Japan was procurement in the case of permanent seats of the

Security Council in the UN. AS the result of that, only three Asian nations such as Maldives, Bhutan, and Afghanistan joined the resolution by G4. In addition, a Chinese nuclear capable submarine once encroached upon Japanese territorial waters near Okinawa islands. PM Abe visited Beijing on October 8<sup>th</sup> to break the impasse of the relations beyond the Yasukuni issue. No easy solution of the structural problems will be expected. It will take a long time for establishing mutual trust between Japan and China.

## 7. The skeptical school

On the other hand, members of the skeptical group in Japan have some doubts about the developments of India-Japan relationship. These doubts include that the tradition of non-alliance policy will not bring security cooperation beyond to a certain level, and that providing a huge amount of ODA will not lead to India's acceptance of Japan's request. For instance, in spite of the endurable persuasions by Japanese side, Indian government has referred to its examination whether it attends on PSI as a way of maritime cooperation. Nothing has changed yet in its development. It would be very difficult to gain public support without any realizations of concrete joint activity in maritime cooperation.

It also raises a question of Japanese side. Because Japanese officials believe that it is prohibited to exercise the right to collective-defense in Japan, it leads to some legal constraints in its alliance and international cooperation. In addition, it is unclear whether or not Japan will maintain the framework of G4 (India, Japan, Germany, and Brazil) to seek their permanent seats at the Security Council in the UN. Japan hedges its coordination among G4 and its cooperation with the U.S. Although India requests Japan's support at Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) in relation with the nuclear agreement for civilian use with the U.S., Japan is reluctant to respond clearly. Because of harsh public opinion as for nuclear agreement between India and the U.S., Japanese government has taken deliberate position. In a sense, it may lead to a Japanese interest to involve India in non-proliferation framework, although it may be difficult to urge India to join the NPT regime. At least, it may be fair to say that India-Japan cooperation in terms of nuclear non-proliferation.

Recently, Indian intermediate-range missile test, a launch of Agni 3, bewildered Japanese people in July 9, while member nations of Security Council discussed the U.N. Resolution against North Korean missile test in July 4. Then PM Koizumi pointed out this matter at the summit meeting with Indian PM Dr. Manmohan Singh. It is necessary to seek a way of international cooperation in this regard.

I have reported different perspectives in terms of India-Japan relationship. What

we are seeking is a strategic partnership, which is an ambitious challenge for Japan without economic interdependence. It would be necessary for us to see wisdom in resolving these themes. We should recognize great importance of proceeding common agenda sharing common ideas in their cooperation.

Thank you very much for your attention.

## Session1 海上暴力・不法行為—そのシナリオと抑止

### “Maritime Terrorism and its Prevention”

---

#### Session1-① 海上暴力・不法行為に係る議論の総括

Violence on the Sea and Unlawful Acts

- Scenario and Roundup of the Discussion for Deterrence-

#### Session1-② インド洋における海上暴力行為—課題と対応

Maritime Violence in the Indian Ocean – Challenges and Responses

#### Session1-③ 海上テロの脅威

The Threat of Maritime Terrorism

#### Session1-④ 海上航行と大陸棚上の固定式プラットフォームの安全 に対する不法行為の抑止

Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation and  
Fixed Platforms on The Continental Shelf





## 海上暴力・不法行為－そのシナリオと抑止をめぐる議論の総括

青木 稔

日本海洋少年団連盟専務理事

(1)

議長、ありがとうございます。

ただ今紹介にあずかりました、青木です。

本日、私に与えられたテーマは「海上暴力・不法行為－そのシナリオと抑止をめぐる議論の総括」です。

(2)

本テーマを話すに際し、海上暴力・不法行為の

- ・ 代表的な例
- ・ 目的
- ・ 影響

についてまず整理し、その具体の対策について論じていきたいと思っています。

さて、私は、海上暴力・不法行為といわれる代表的な3つの例として、  
海賊、密輸、密航。

を挙げたいと思います。

なぜ、これらが、代表的な例であるか、もう少し詳しくご説明したいと思います。

海上暴力・不法行為、特に不法行為という場合には、その他、これ以外にも様々な海上犯罪があると思います。

例えば、密漁、海洋汚染、海上交通違反など。

しかしながら、海上犯罪とはいっても、最後の例のような犯罪は、他人を傷つけるとか、他人の財産を侵害するというような意図を有した犯罪ではありません。

例えば、日本では海洋レジャーの発達に伴い、ライフジャケットを着ていなかっただけで罪に問われることもあります。

海に落ちた際の自分の身を守るのに必要であるとの国民の声が、このような規則を作る原動力となったのです。

これなどは、同じ海上犯罪でも、他人の財産を侵害することを目的にした海賊などとはその趣が大きく異なります。

国によって犯罪の要件が異なることはありますが、法に犯罪要件が明文化され、法執行手順とともに公にされている、という点は世界共通でしょう。

本日、私が論ずる海上犯罪とは、生命、財産、治安に大きなダメージを与えるものです。  
そういった意味で、ここに示されている3つの犯罪が代表的な海上犯罪であると言って差し支えないでしょう。

### (3)

犯罪はなぜ行われるのでしょうか？

そして目的は、あるいは、その犯罪が行われることによって生じる影響は？

まず、原因は2つに大別されるでしょう。

1つは貧困によるもの、他方は抑圧からくるもの。

抑圧は人種的、宗教的、また貧富の差によるものまで、多種多様な原因があります。

そして犯罪を犯す目的は、これらの原因を取り除くためのものであり、貧困が原因であれば「生計を維持するため」、として抑圧が原因であれば「抑圧から解放されるため」ということになるでしょう。

しかしながら抑圧が原因である場合には「抑圧から解放されるため」という目的の他に、「相手に恐怖心を与える」、「相手に報復する」あるいは「開放組織の示威活動」という二次的な目的を含んでいることもあるでしょう。

そして、むしろそのような二次的な目的が主たる目的として犯罪が行われるのが、「9.11」以来全世界の脅威となっている「テロ」と呼ばれるものでしょう。

テロは大きな脅威であり、国連においても、連携してテロと戦っていくことが宣言されました。

しかしながら、その定義については国連の場においても定まっておられません。

なぜなら、立場、国、あるいは宗教・宗派によって、これらの判断が異なるため定義ができない、というのが現状だからです。

私はこのプレゼンテーションの中で、犯罪を国際法あるいは国内法で規定された犯罪、そしてその抑止についても国際法あるいは国内法に定められた方法で行う、という立場に立って論じたいと思います。

私は、テロに関しても、それが悪であり、同様の立場の下、対処すべきだとは思いますが、テロに関する議論は、他のプレゼンテーターにお譲りし、以後は論じないことと致します。

さて、3番目になりますが、犯罪が及ぼす影響です。

犯罪は生命、財産を奪い、治安を悪化させ、一般市民の平穏な生活を脅かすものである

と言えます。

その影響は直接的なものに留まらず、悪化した治安の下（もと）では安定して生計を立てることは不可能であり、貧困をもたらす。

そしてその貧困が犯罪を助長するという悪循環に陥ります。

犯罪対策と貧困対策は切っても切り離せない関係にあるのです。

それでは、先に述べた 3 つの海上犯罪について、それぞれのシナリオを見ていきましょう。

#### (4)

皆様は既にご承知の通り、海賊は人の命や財産を奪う犯罪であり、太古の昔から生業（なりわい）として存在する犯罪です。

海賊は 21 世紀においても、人の命に危害を及ぼす犯罪であるにもかかわらず、しかしながら多くの人々が海賊に関して良い印象を持っているのは、今人気の海賊を主人公とした映画のせいなのかもしれません。

国連海洋法条約では、海賊とは「公海における船舶内にある人、若しくは財産に対して行われる、不法な暴力行為、抑留、又は略奪行為」であると定義されています。

領海内で行われるこれらの行為は、国連海洋法条約における海賊には該当しません。

このため IMO で論じられる場合は、わざわざ「海賊及び海上武装強盗 (Piracy and Armed Robbery on the Sea)」という長たらしい名前と呼んでいます。

海賊が狙うものには次のものがあります。

まず金品。

この場合は金目当（かねめあて）ですから、抵抗しなければ生命への危険は低いかも知れません。

人質を奪う場合には、生命への危険が大きくなります。

人質がビジネスとして成り立っている場合には、相場の身代金を払えば助かるケースもあるようですが、それが満たされない場合には殺害され、あるいは生死が判明しないケースもあります。

大きな船会社のような後盾（うしろだて）がなかったり、地元の零細な漁民が人質にとられた場合には、犯人が要求する金額が払えない場合もあり、それは即、生命の危機となります。

もう一つは、貨物を船体ごと奪うケースです。

これには奪った船を操船したり、船を入港させて貨物を売り払ったり、さらには船名や塗色を変え、虚偽の船舶登録を行い転売するといった、大掛かりな組織が必要です。

船体ごと狙われる場合は、予め（あらかじめ）船の出港日時や積荷の種類、数量、それに行き先といった情報が海賊に漏れていることが多く、犯罪は組織立って計画的に行われます。



写真は、1999年に海賊に襲われた貨物船アロンドラ・レインボーを追跡中のインド海軍です。

乗組員は幸運にも救命艇に乘せられて海に放り出されたため、日本人の船長、機関長、フィリピン人の乗組員は、後日全員生存して救出されました。

しかし積荷であったアルミインゴットは売却され、船名は変えられていました。

海上犯罪は国を跨ぐ犯罪であり、アロンドラ・レインボー事件は、各国の海上保安機関間の連携が重要であることを再認識させられた事件でした。

この事件をきっかけとして、インド沿岸警備隊と海上保安庁の密接な連携協力がスタートし、毎年連携訓練が行われるとともに、長官同士の会談も毎年行われています。

最近においては、船ごと奪ってしまうといった大掛かりな事犯は発生していませんが、これは日本とインドのような関係国間の連携した対応が効を奏していると言えるでしょう。

今年の11月には、海上保安庁の大型巡視船がインドを訪問し、インド沿岸警備隊との連携訓練が行われる予定になっています。

## (5)

次は密輸です。



写真は日本で密輸犯を検挙した際に押収された密輸品です。

拳銃は主に日本のマフィア、「やくざ」の手に渡り、もっぱら、やくざ組織間の抗争に使われてきました。

しかしながら、最近では現金強奪などに使われるようになり、一般市民に対する危害が懸念されているところです。

右側の写真は覚醒剤、あるいは「シャブ」という名前の方が有名かも知れません。

シャブは一般民間人にも販売され、健康を損なうだけではなく、覚醒剤により精神を侵

された人による犯罪も問題となっています。

特に、「人を殺さなければ自分が殺される」といった脅迫観念に取り付かれてしまった中毒患者は危険であり、なんの因果関係もない人が襲われ、死亡に至るケースも少なくありません。

特に、若く好奇心が旺盛な若者が興味本位で使用し、中毒患者になっていくケースが多く、問題になっています。

シャブを含む違法薬物の販売利益は莫大であり、これらがやくざの大きな資金源になっています。

やくざはこの資金源で新たに覚醒剤を購入したり、銃火器を購入して組織の強大化を図ります。

そして治安の悪化を招くこととなります。

治安が悪化すれば、更なる犯罪が誘発されることは既に述べた通りです。

陸上における監視の目が厳しくなった結果、貨物船でこれらの密輸品を運び、海上で漁船やプレジャーボートに積み替えて監視の目を誤魔化す、あるいは海上コンテナにより一般貨物を装って密航するなど、その手口は巧妙化しており、水際対策の強化が求められているところではあります。

## (6)

日本にやって来る密航者の目的は、日本における就労であり、法益が侵害されるという弊害以外は危険はありません。

しかしながら、これら密航者は正規の入国者ではありませんから、職に就ける保障もなく、やがて強盗やスリなどの犯罪に手を染めることとなります。

時には犯行時に殺害に及ぶこともあり、潜在的に危険な存在であることは否定できません。

日本への密航者の多くは中国から来ます。

このため、彼らの例を紹介しましょう。

彼らが入国する際には、「蛇頭」と呼ばれる中国マフィアに多額の現金が払われ、日本に入国する際には日本のマフィアである前出の「やくざ」が引き受け先となっており、蛇頭からやくざに現金の一部が支払われます。

次の写真は密入国に使用された船（左）、そして船内に潜んでいた密入国者（中央）です。



彼らは貨物船内に作られた秘密のスペースに息を潜め、日本への侵入を企てることもあり、コンテナの中に隠れていることもあります。

また、密輸同様、海上で漁船やプレジャーボートに乗り移り、日本に上陸した後は魚を運ぶ保冷車に隠れて目的地に向かうこともあります。

最近では、写真のような外形的に判別しやすい小型船で大量の密航者を運ぶ手口や、密航者にとってリスクの大きいコンテナによるものに代わり、偽造した船員手帳を所持し、船員になりすまして密航を図るなど、益々手口が巧妙化しています。右の船員手帳は写真が巧妙に張り替えられており、海上保安試験研究センターに鑑定を依頼した結果、偽造された船員手帳であることが判明しました。

このように、彼らは入国当初から中国・日本のマフィアと繋がりがあり、犯罪に係わる蓋然性が高いと言えます。

また、正規に入国した者でも、滞在期限を越えて不法滞在する者が多数おり、結果的に不法滞在者となり、犯罪に手を染めることが多いのも事実です。

密航対策に関しても、関係機関による監視の強化が求められているのです。

日本周辺では本人の希望で密入国を企てるケースが大分分（だいぶぶん）ですが、世界を見渡せば、本人が希望しない、つまり奴隷として強制的に密航させられるケースも依然多いでしょう。

さて、海賊、密輸、密航、大きな3つの海上犯罪について述べてきました。

それらの犯罪は、当然のことながら犯罪者によって実行されます。

ところが、犯罪者ではなく国家が、しかもこの3つの犯罪を同時に起こす、ということが、このアジアにおいて起きているのです。

(7)

2001 年 12 月、九州南西沖の海上で、北朝鮮によるスパイシップ事件が発生しました。

最初、中国の漁船を装っていたスパイシップは、海上保安庁巡視船の停船命令を無視して逃走を継続、巡視船の威嚇射撃に続く停船のための射撃に対し、激しく応射してきました。



左の白黒の写真は、当庁巡視船が停船のための船体射撃を行っているところで、赤外線画像です。

これにより巡視船は多数の銃弾を受け、乗組員 3 名が負傷しています。

その後スパイシップは自船内で爆発物を爆発させ、それが原因で 90 メートルの海底に沈

みました。

スパイシップ乗組員の生存者はいませんでした。海上保安庁は該船を引き上げ、徹底的な捜査を行いました。

その結果、

- ・その船が北朝鮮のスパイシップであったこと
- ・船内には多数の銃火器があったこと
- ・4 台の強力なエンジンと 4 枚のスクリューを備え高速で航走できること
- ・沿岸接近用の高速小型舟艇や上陸用の水中スクーターを船内に格納していたこと
- ・それらを船尾の扉を開け発進させることができたこと

などが分かりました。

そして、この船が、覚醒剤などの密輸に使われ、北朝鮮の工作員を日本国内潜入させることに使用されたこと。

さらに、北朝鮮工作員による日本人拉致にも使用された可能性があるのです。

国家が海賊行為を行い、密輸も密航も行うという現実があり、日本は、犯罪者や犯罪組織だけではなく、犯罪国家とも対峙しなければならないのです。

本年 5 月、北朝鮮から我が国に大量の覚せい剤を密輸入した複数の日本のやくざが逮捕されましたが、海底から引き揚げられたスパイシップの船内から発見された携帯電話の発信履歴に、これら日本のやくざの関係先も記録されていたことが判明するなど、同船の捜索結果が、その後の同種犯罪の捜査に大きな影響を与えています。



このように、困難ではあっても、犯罪捜査は重要かつ必要なものです。

捜査によって明らかにされた証拠がなければ、北朝鮮による犯罪であったことも証明することはできなかったでしょう。

そして、覚醒剤密輸に係わった犯人の検挙も難しかったかもしれません。

犯罪を防止し、犯罪者を捕らえるだけではなく、捜査をし、証拠を保全し、犯罪を明らかにし、法的手続きによって犯罪者を裁くということが重要であることを、スパイシップ事件を例にとり、ここで改めて強調したいと思います。



写真は海底から引き揚げられたスパイシップです。

4つのスクリューと船尾には開閉扉も見えます。

この型の漁船は、通常船首部にカーゴホールド、船尾部にエンジンルームがありますが、このスパイシップは構造が逆になっています。

これは船尾部のスペースに、上陸用の小型艇や水中スクーターを格納し、船尾の扉から発進させることができるようにするためです。



左側の写真は水中スクーターと潜水機材。

これで作業員を日本に上陸させた可能性が高いです。



右側の写真はロケットランチャー。

この他、固定式の機関銃や手榴弾など、多数の銃火器が発見されております。



そして、左の赤枠の写真に写っているスイッチには「自爆」と書かれていました。


彼ら作業員は最後を悟って、このスイッチを押したのかもしれない。

(8)



犯罪撲滅の最終目的は、犯罪撲滅それ自体ではなく、飢えがなくなり、産業が発展することにより失業の心配がなくなり、国民が安心して日々の生活を送ることができるということです。

左図はその過程を示しており、下から上に進化します。



犯罪の撲滅に当たり、犯罪者の能力が法令執行能力を超えている場合、軍事力に頼らなければならない場合もあるでしょう。

そのような状態では緊急的な食料援助も行わなければなりません。

私は法執行と犯罪捜査の重要性を説いてきましたが、犯罪抑止のための軍事力使用を否定するものではありません。

この状態は図内で赤字で示しておりますが、可及的速やかにその過程を脱し、その上の過程に進むべきでしょう。

ある程度治安が回復したならば、いよいよ法令執行機関による治安の維持がメインとなってきます。

国によっては軍事機関が法令執行権限を有している場合もありますが、ここでポイントとなるのは、軍事機関か法令執行機関かではなく、法令執行権限を有した機関が法令執行によって犯罪の撲滅に当たる、という点です。

法令執行機関による治安の維持が保たれるようになれば、次に、国民が自立できるよう、産業や教育を支援していく必要があるでしょう。

過剰な食料や物資の援助は、国民の勤労意欲を減退させ、自立の遅延を招きますので注意が必要です。

また、良い国作りには、「グッド・ガバナンス」が必要なことは言うまでもありません。

日本には「ジャイカ」と呼ばれる国際協力機構が世界各国で大規模な海外支援を行っています。

ジャイカは、被支援国の自立を促すため、水道の普及、医療の発展、教育の普及などの援助を行っており、世界各地に拠点を設け、専門家を派遣するとともに、必要な資機材を供与しています。

また、専門家の他に、青年海外協力隊という若い世代の隊員を派遣し、現地の人達と生活を共にし、現地に密着した支援を行っています。

海上保安庁は、海外の海上保安機関と直接連携協力する他、海上保安官をジャイカの専門家として派遣し、数年間という長いスパンにわたる海外海上保安機関の支援に当たって



います。

左の写真は、海上保安官がフィリピン沿岸警備隊の支援を行っている一コマです。

さて、本日の私に与えられたテーマは「海上暴力・不法行為—そのシナリオと抑止をめぐる議論の総括」ですから、そろそろ総括をしなければなりません。

括をしなければなりません。

## (9)

総括です。

「海上犯罪は人の命、財産、治安に対する脅威である。」

「治安の悪化は更なる海上犯罪を誘発する。」

治安が悪い状態では、人は生活の糧を得るため犯罪に走る傾向があります。

「海上犯罪は法令執行により撲滅されなければならない。」

犯罪組織が法令執行機関の力より強大である場合、軍事力の力を借りる必要もあるでしょう。

しかし極力、犯罪は明文化された法律の規定と手順によって撲滅されなければなりません。

そうでなければ犯罪取締りは国内的にも国際的にも正当化されないからです。

「海上犯罪は国を跨ぎ、海上を渡る犯罪である。」

以上述べましたポイントを考慮しますと、私が、本日一番強調したい又は重要と考える点

「法令執行は、海上暴力・不法行為撲滅のための各国間の共通のプラットフォームとなり得る。」

そして、「各国の海上保安機関の連携が必要不可欠である。」ということが導き出されます。法令執行の特徴は、犯罪の要件と法執行の手順が法に明文化されており、イデオロギ

一に囚われることなく、各国間の共通なプラットフォームになるという特徴を持っているのです。国境を越える犯罪である海上暴力・不法行為の撲滅のためには、このような法令執行をプラットフォームとした法令執行機関の連携・協力が重要な課題となるのです。

以上、私のプレゼンテーションを、本年マレーシア・プトラジャヤで開催された、第 2 回・アジア海上保安機関・長官級会合の写真でめたいと思います。

インドと日本を含む、アジア 19 の国と地域が集った（つどった）この会合こそ、アジアにおける海上保安機関連携のシンボルと言えるでしょう。

(10)

最後に日本とインドの関係について少し述べたいと思います。



左の写真は、前回のダイアログでも紹介しましたが、インド沿岸警備隊シン長官と海上保安庁石川長官の会談の様態です。

下の写真は、九州を訪れたインド沿岸警備隊巡視船サマルと海上保安庁巡視船ちくぜんです。

サマルとちくぜんは、この時に合同訓練を行っています。

このダイアログの後にも日印のイベントは目白押しです。



まず、11 月には、海上保安庁最大の巡視船「しきしま」がインドを訪問。

インドの地において、合同訓練を行うこととなっております。

また、石川長官もインドを訪問し、インド沿岸警備隊長官とともに、訓練を視察、両海上保安機関のより強力な連携に関する話し合いが持たれることとなっております。

12 月には、インドのシン首相が来日するとの報道もあります。

また、日印文化協定を締結して 50 年目に当たる 2007 年は日印交流年として、多彩な催しが開催され、日印の交流が深まることでしょう。

来年の海上保安庁の観閲式にはインド沿岸警備隊から巡視船が参加するという情報もあります。

新しく日本の首相となった安倍氏も、その著書「美しい国へ」の中で、日本とインドの関係が非常に重要であることを指摘しています。

政治的にも経済的にも結びつきが強く、同じ民主主義国家として海上治安に強い関心を持つ日本とインドの関係は、今後益々その結びつきを強くしていくことでしょう。

私のプレゼンテーションは、海上保安機関の連携の重要性を指摘して総括としましたが、特にインドと日本の良好かつ緊密な関係を紹介して、終わりにしたいと思います。

ご静聴ありがとうございました。

ダンニャワード

**Violence on the Sea and Unlawful Acts**  
**Scenario and Roundup of the Discussion for Deterrence**

**Minoru Aoki**  
**Executive Director of the Junior Sea Friend's Federation of Japan**

(P.1)

Thank you Chair man.

Good afternoon distinguished delegates and guests.

I am Minoru AOKI former president of the Japan Coast Guard Academy.

Today, the theme that I have to focus on is that summarizing the presumed scenario and countermeasures against the maritime violence and illegal acts.

(P.2)

As I address on this issue, I will talk about;

- firstly, general three types of crime that I consider as maritime violence and illegal acts
- secondly, purpose of those crimes
- thirdly, influence of those crimes
- and lastly, concrete countermeasures against those crimes.

As general type of maritime violence and illegal acts, I would like to pick three types of crime, namely,

- piracy
- smuggling
- stow away

in my presentation. Let me explain more why I consider those crimes as the typical examples of maritime violence and illegal acts.

Well, I suppose that when you think about maritime violence and illegal acts, you can image various kinds of those crimes, especially as the maritime illegal acts, like illegal fishing, maritime pollution and violation of maritime trafficking rules. However, the last examples that I gave is not the crime intending to hurt someone or infringe someone's property even though they are categorized into the maritime illegal acts generally. Concretely, here in Japan, those people who do not wear a life jacket, while they are enjoying marine sports at sea, can be indicted under the Japanese law.

Demands from the public insisting the importance of the protection of their safety is the motive to make such laws. Such illegal acts are completely different with the other types of illegal acts like piracy that originally intends to infringe someone's property. One common point of both crimes are stipulated as crime in international or domestic law.

I assume that maritime illegal acts, that I am mentioning in my presentation today, is the crime harming people's life, property and public peace. From this point of view, three types of crime that I provided, piracy, smuggling and stow away can be said the general examples of the illegal acts at sea.

(P.3)

Well, in this part, I would like to discuss on the purpose and influence of the crimes. Firstly, I would like to focus on the cause of the crimes to think about the purpose of it. I suppose that the cause of the crimes can be categorized into two types basically. One comes from poverty and another one is suppression. Racial and religious differences, and a gap between the rich and the poor, such variety of causes will be related with the suppression. Then, the main purpose committing crimes is to remove those grass rooted causes. Namely, I assume that crimes are committed to get over the poverty or to be released from suppression. In the latter case secondary purpose like threatening the opponents, retaliating against the opponents or demonstrating the significance of the activists can be the part of criminal's intention.

Terrorism that is now huge threat to the world since 9 · 11 in the United States is committed to achieve secondary purpose mainly. Terrorism is enormous problem to solve for the world and the United Nations declares the firm will to fight against it. The definition of the terrorism, however, has not defined yet in the world society since its origin comes from a variety of roots depending on religion and region.

In my presentation, I am taking position on that maritime illegal acts should be considered as the crimes stipulated in the international or domestic laws and countermeasures against them should be taken within the scope of the international and domestic laws. I think that terrorism also should be handled under the international and internal rules basically, but I would like to count on other presenters on the discussion of it.

Well, next, let's think about the influence of the crimes. As I mentioned before, crimes threatens the people's life and property and disrupts the public peace. The influence of such crimes is not confined to direct effect, for example, the disorder of public peace will lead to the poverty of the society as whole since people can not make

their living stably under such circumstances. Such situation will lead vicious circle that poverty encourages the people to commit crimes. It can be said that when you think about countermeasures against crimes, it is inevitable to consider concrete measures against poverty as well.

Then, let's move on to see the presumed scenario and countermeasures against three types of maritime illegal acts.

(P.4)

Firstly, let's discuss on the piracy.

As you know, piracy is the maritime illegal acts infringing people's life and property and has existed as the way for living for a long time ago. They are actually dangerous criminals even in this 21<sup>st</sup> century, though some people may have better image on them, may be because of the popular pirates film showing them as cool.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy that any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed against persons or property on board ship or aircraft on the high seas. As UNCLOS stipulates, those acts committed within the territorial sea are not considered as piracy under the convention. Following this fact, the word, Armed Robbery, is used as the same meaning with piracy in the international society like IMO (International Maritime Organization). The objects that pirates aiming at are followed;

Firstly, their object is for money and valuable things in a ship. In this case, their main object is to get the money, so if crews do not resist, their lives will not be in jeopardy.

Secondly, some pirates intend to take hostages. In this case, risk of life is higher than the first case. In case taking hostages is done for getting ransom, they will be released and saved if ransom is paid as required. If it isn't paid, hostages will be killed or be missing even can not find out whether they are killed or not. If those person who are not provided enough financial support from employer or if poor person like local fishermen are being hostages, their lives will be in jeopardy since they can not afford to pay ransom.

Last case is to take cargos on board and ship herself. In this case, huge criminal syndicate must be involved since their ultimate purpose is to sell the stolen cargos and ship after they change the name and color of it. Details of ship like navigation plan, types and amount of cargos are leaked to the pirates carrying out their plan in a very organized manner.



This photo shows the Indian Coast Guard chasing a cargo vessel named, “Alondra Rainbow” that were attacked and stolen by pirates in 1999. Crews of the ship like Japanese captain and chief engineer and Pilipino sailors were saved after they were put on life boat of the ship from pirates and flung into the sea. Cargos on board, Aluminum, were already sold and the name of the ship was painted and changed.

This incident actually reminds us the significance of the facilitation and cooperation between Coast Guard agencies to react to such transnational crimes like piracy. It also encouraged Japan Coast Guard and Indian Coast Guard to strengthen the relations and then nowadays they conduct combined exercise and hold top meeting every year.

In these years, large scale crime like Alondra Rainbow incident has not happened. We believe that favorable and firm relations and cooperation between Coast Guard agencies like Japan and India, that has been developing rapidly, have some certain effect.

(P.5)

Next topic is on smuggling.

These photos show the seized illegal items when smugglers were arrested.



Traditionally, those illegal items like guns are transferred to the Japanese mafias, Yakuza, and they are used as the weapons for their strife. This traditional trend, however, has been changed.

Nowadays not only mafias but also public can obtain guns easier than used to be and it is used as the tool for robbing the money. This situational change brings up the concerns on perils to the public.

Photo on the right side is the drug, the name called “Syabu” will be famous among the Japanese. It is also serious concern that even general people can buy and get Syabu in these years. Syabu is not only the problem that it is actually harming the people’s health, it brings up the concerns on the crimes caused by a drug, Syabu, addict whose mental is completely broken down. Especially those drug addicts who are obsessed by



the menace are dangerous to the public since they can kill anybody without any casual relationship. There are many cases that young people who would like to try just curiosity become addicted user. This is also actually serious concern for the society.

Benefit provided from the drug business is huge for the Japanese mafia, indeed. This business is actually tremendous money resources for them. By making bad use of this benefit, they are buying new drugs and guns illegally in order to expand their syndicate. It will lead to the disorder of the society. As I mentioned, the disorder of the society will increase the number of crimes.

A modus operandi has been well organized and complicated as the countermeasures taken by the police and coast guard are also developing. Smugglers are trying to use the cargo and fishing or pleasure boats for smuggling. Beefing up the shoreline countermeasures are demanded and key to maintain the public peace.

(P.6)

Next topic is on stow away. The main purpose of doing stow away is to get a job in Japan. In this sense, apart from the fact that stowaways actually infringe the Japanese domestic law, generally they can not be potentially big threat to the Japanese society. If they can not find any job, however, some of them start to commit a crime like robbery for their living. They sometime even kill someone to accomplish their purpose, robbing something, from this point of view, we can not totally denied that they are potentially dangerous to the Japanese society.

Stowaways coming to Japan mainly come from China originally. Let me explain details on this.

As you may know, for accomplishing stowaway successfully, Chinese mafia, what they call “Snake Head”, “Jyatou” in Japanese, organizes and involves in. Snake head has something to do with Japanese mafia and the expensive charge for the stowaway paid by the Chinese people is shared between them. A photo on the next page shows a vessel used for transportation and stowaways hiding within the vessel. They sometime hided in a secret space that is specially remodeled or in a container. As is often the case with smuggling case, they transfer to a fishing or pleasure boat at sea and then get on a truck on the land. In these years, the way of stowaway has progressed, for example, they try to be a certificated seaman with counterfeited seaman’s passport. A photo on the next page is the example of well counterfeited seamen’s passport.



As I explained, stowaways are potentially to be involved in some crimes in the future since Japanese or Chinese mafia exist their background. Strengthening the investigation and crack down made by the concerned authorities are necessary and demanded.

Well, we see the presumed three types of maritime illegal acts.

In generally, those kinds of crimes are committed by a criminal or syndicate. In Asia, surprisingly, we can see that even States do commit such crimes. Let's see more on this case in the next part.

(P.7)



North Korean Spy ship incident happened in Dec 2001 in the offshore of southeast from Kyuusyu region. North Korean spy ship had kept running away from the Japan Coast Guard's hot pursuit, ignoring their warning to stop. The spy ship shot a fire against Coast Guard vessels in reacting to their shot to make the ship to stop. This black and white photo is an infrared photograph showing a Coast Guard vessel shot a fire to make the ship to stop. Three officers of the coast guard were injured and the vessel was damaged due to the bullets shot by the ship. Afterwards, the spy ship exploded a bomb by herself and then the ship was sunk into the 90 meter depth of sea. Although, there was no survivor from the spy ship, Japan Coast Guard salvaged the spy ship somehow from the bottom of sea to investigate and examine thoroughly.

As the result of investigation, followed facts are revealed;

- The spy ship comes from North Korea
- Many conventional weapons were on board

- The spy ship was modified to proceed at high speed with 4 engines and screws
- High speed small boat and water scoter were on board to reach the land
- The hatch of the stern side was able to open to launch the boat and scoter.

It is also revealed that the spy ship had been used for smuggling and sending the spies to our country. Moreover, the spy ship can be possibly used for kidnapping several Japanese.

Japan has to confront with various maritime illegal acts committed by not only general criminals and syndicates, but also the evil States.

Several Japanese mafias were arrested due to the huge amount of smuggling the drugs from North Korea in last May. The phone numbers of those mafias were recorded in a mobile phone that was detected from the spy ship, salvaged from the bottom of sea. The results of the investigation of the spy ship contribute to the investigation of similar cases.

Investigation of crimes is inevitable and so significant, though it has some difficulties to accomplish.

If were there no proves revealed by the investigation, it would not be able to claim that the crimes were committed by North Korea and arrest the concerned Japanese criminals, mafias, involving in drug smuggling.

I would like to strongly stress that investigating, correcting the evidence and indicting the criminals in accordance with judicial procedures are much important than just arresting the criminals.



The left photo show the spy ship salvaged from the bottom of the sea. You can see the four screws and opening hatch in the stern. This type of fishing boat has hold for cargos in bow side and engine room in stern side, but the structure of the spy ship is reversed. It is because to launch the small boats and water scoter from stern side.



Photo on the left hand side is the diving equipment and water scoter that are highly possible used by the spies to go on shore.




Photo on the right hand side is rocket launcher. Other conventional weapons like



machine guns and hand grenades were also detected from the spy ship.

The word, self explosion, was written above the switch showing in the left photo. The spy must be prepare himself to the death and then press this switch.



(P.8)

Ultimate goal of eliminating the crimes is that public can have safe and stable life without any fear, starvation and poverty. This diagram shows the process for achieving that goal and process is progressed from the bottom to the up.

If the ability of criminal exceeds the capacity of law enforcement authorities, we may rely on the military power. Although I stress the importance of the law enforcement and investigation of the crimes, I do not deny the involvement of the military power for eliminating the crimes. Such condition shows in red ink in this slide, however, it will be preferable to move to the next level as soon as possible.

Maintaining peace and security by law enforcement authorities will be the key and main task after the public peace is restored in some extent. I would like to stress out in here that concerned parties who are dully authorized to make law enforcement should be mainly involved in eradicating the crimes. Although in some States military forces are authorized to make law enforcement, it does not matter which organizations are provided such authorization.

Once public peace maintained by law enforcement organizations, business and educational support should be provided as next step assistance so that public can be independent. It is essential, however, excessive assistance will prevent the independence of the public by getting rid of their diligence. It goes without saying that so called good governance is necessary to establish the better States.

Here in Japan, Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA in short, has provided various assistances all over the world. In concrete, they support pervasion of water

supply, medical treatment and education to help some States independence. They establish the bases, sends experts and provides fundamental equipments to every place in the world to provide their assistance properly. Their motto is to provide assistance closely related to local region. They send Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers consisted of mainly young generation as well to understand and feel the actual life of local people following this motto.

Japan Coast Guard is actually working together with JICA closely in that providing



assistance in maritime matters. Many coast guard experts on maritime matters are sent and designated to work for helping the development of foreign coast guard agencies like Philippine Coast Guard and Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency in a long term. The left shows the actual assistance of such

activities.

(P.9)

Let me conclude my presentation.

Vice Admiral Das addressed as follows in the last dialog in India:

- First point; Strengthening and maintaining the security of sea lane, coast line and ports are significantly important for the National interests since the import of oil from the Gulf countries will keep increasing considered that the consumption of oil in India will be the third in the world till 2020.
- Concerns on smuggling of guns and drugs and illegal fishing are increased as well as the terrorism issue in India are increasing since India, the country surrounded by sea, are vulnerable to such illegal acts.
- Pirates are getting brutal as if they can be terrorists at sea.
- Hijack of a ship is organized crime. Vast network must be behind it.
- Multilateral relations like information sharing and joint operations between States are indispensable to react smoothly and properly not only to the what we call traditional types of crimes but also to the nontraditional crimes like terrorism.

Japanese presenters have mentioned followed issues;

- illegal dealings drugs and guns
- smuggling and stowaway
- spy ship from North Korea
- piracy and armed robbery against ships
- proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

As the countermeasures against those issues;

- Bilateral and multilateral cooperation
- New scheme like PSI
- Amendment of SUA and SOLAS convention

are explained and latest international movement on this issues are introduced.

Especially, Vice Admiral Das stressed out that relations between India and Japan should be firmed firstly for maintaining maritime security in responding to the question asking that how the relations among three nations, India, Japan and India should be.



The left Photo shows the meeting between Admiral Ishikawa of JCG and the Admiral Sin of Indian Coast Guard as I mentioned in the last meeting.

The lower photo is the Chikuzen of JCG and SAMAR of ICG berthing at Moji port, Kyusyu. JCG and ICG had combined exercise in this



time.

After this dialog, many events between India and Japan will be coming up. Firstly, one of the large patrol vessels will visit India to hold combined exercise. Admiral Ishikawa will visit India in this occasion to observe the exercise and to have top meeting.

There is news that in this December Indian prime minister will probably visit Japan. A variety kinds of events will be held for the friendship between India and Japan in the next year as the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary since two countries agreed upon agreement on



cultural exchange. Next year will be the memorable year and to firm the friendship between two States.

New Japanese prime minister, Abe, pointed out the significance the relation between two countries in his book titled “As a beautiful country”.

I strongly believe that relations between India and Japan, those are closely related in politically and economically, democratic countries and devoted to strengthen maritime security, are getting stronger and stronger.

Thank you for your attention.

Dha nyawad.

## **Maritime Violence in the Indian Ocean – Challenges and Responses**

**Premvir S. Das**

**Former C-in-C, Eastern Naval Command**

### **Preamble**

The global security environment is now focused on the Asia-Pacific generally, and in Asia, in particular. Three of the four largest economies of the world in the next twenty years will be Asian; China, Japan and India. The immediate concerns of the USA e.g. rogue or failed states, radical Islamic terrorism, oil and its supply routes and proliferation of WMD, are all Asia-centric. The emergence of the non state actor as a growing concern is endemic to this region. In the longer term, the only country which can emerge as a rival to US global interests, China, is an Asian entity. It is, therefore, not surprising that there is a swathe of American presence stretching from Turkey in the west to Japan in the east, and including the CAR, in addition to formidable capabilities which can be brought to bear from the sea. This situation is unlikely to change on the foreseeable future.

The Indian Ocean is one of the major theatres of Asia-Pacific. The strategic imperatives of America, to have a dominating presence in Asia, to exert influence over its energy assets, to ensure safe movement of commerce and to counter radical Islamic terrorism, are inextricably linked to this vast stretch of water. The countries of concern are littorals of this space, the major terrorist movements originate from here and safe movement of energy requires the sea-lanes to be made secure. It is in this overall context that we have to look at the maritime dimensions of security in this region.

### **The Indian Ocean**

Nearly half of the entire seaborne commerce of the world moves across the waters of the Indian Ocean. While 75 percent of all shipped cargoes in the other two great oceans are moved between and to countries littoral to them, in the Indian Ocean, this same percentage goes to countries external to the region; even more important, as much as 20 percent of this commerce is in the form of oil and gas of which, more than half is shipped eastwards through the sea lanes of south-east Asia. Consequently, countries outside these waters have a natural interest in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region. For example, 70 percent of Japan's needs of oil are met from the Gulf. The USA, the largest of the importers, obtains 20 percent of its energy needs from here and France, half of its total energy needs. Even China has become a major importer of Gulf oil, overtaking Japan. Thus, the entire Asia-Pacific is critically dependent on the energy resources of



the region and on the safety of their movement. As much as 65 percent of the world's discovered oil reserves and 35 percent of its gas are located in this region, which accounts for 40 percent of global oil production annually. These are very important and critical assets. There are also resources below the sea that are still to be discovered. These existing and potential resources and the competitive energy environment that they are likely to create, lend great strategic significance to the Indian Ocean region.

At the same time, the region suffers from serious vulnerabilities. The sea lanes entering and exiting from these waters pass through several narrow passages e.g. the Straits of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, Mozambique Channel, the Straits of Malacca etc, creating 'choke points', literally, making it possible for rogue states and non-state actors to interdict or disrupt shipping, thus, jeopardizing the safety of international cargoes moving across the important trade routes. The East-West shipping lanes running across the North Indian Ocean are particularly susceptible to such threats. Last year, more than half of all piracy at sea, worldwide, took place in the Malacca Straits and surrounding Indonesian waters. With some 60,000 ships transiting the Straits annually, effects of consequent disruption in the trade chain on the economic growth of most major economies are not difficult to visualize. Furthermore, most littorals have been nation states for less than fifty years, and religious, ethnic and societal discords plague many of them. The fact that several are ruled by authoritarian regimes and are dependent on 'single product' economies, especially in the Gulf region, adds to their domestic and political fragility.

On the one hand, therefore, the Indian Ocean region is of great strategic significance and one in which major countries external to it have a stake. On the other, most of its littorals have potentially unstable societies that can suffer destabilization, economically and politically. Non state actors and radical terrorism are already posing serious threats to the stability of littoral states and are potentially threatening to the safety of seaborne commerce. As the largest country in the region, and one with important economic and technological growth imperatives, India has, at the same time, to be able to safeguard its own interests and participate in the international effort to safety of seaborne commerce.

### **India's Concerns**

India has some specific concerns in the Indian Ocean. As many as 4.2 million Indian citizens work in the Gulf countries, contributing over \$ 12 billion to the Indian economy annually. Our interests require that their work environment remains stable and their contributions are not affected in any adverse manner. All Gulf littorals are Islamic countries with which India's own very large muslim population has many interfaces.

These include, in a positive sense, religious interaction as in the 'Haj' pilgrimage but also activities inimical to our interests such as the funding of 'madararas' and fundamentalist organizations in India, some of which fuel terrorism. Another vital concern is India's own dependence on oil imports from the Gulf. Over 70 percent of India's annual oil consumption is imported and the figure is likely to go up from 95 million tons last year to 300 million tons by 2020. Any stoppage or interdiction of this oil will have crippling impact on the country's economic growth. It is equally important that our offshore oil assets, spread over an area of over 48,000 square kilometers and likely to double in the next two decades, are protected from attacks or encroachments by hostile elements. The same holds true for the nearly 4,000 odd tankers that come to our ports every year. Their number is likely to grow to over 8,000 by 2020. Almost 95 percent of India's overseas trade moves through the medium of the sea. From \$ 210 billion last year, this figure is likely to cross \$ 400 billion in 2010 and exceed \$ 1 trillion by 2020, constituting over 40% of the country's GDP. Of this, about half, or \$ 500 billion would be moving through the waters of the South East Asia region, matching existing US seaborne trade through the area. Safety of these sea-lanes, the coastal offshore areas, and of our ports and harbours through which this trade moves is, therefore, critical to our national interests. In earlier times, the emphasis was on securing important assets against conventional military threats but the greater danger now posed is by non-state actors. For example, it would require just one ship scuttled at the entrance to put any of several major ports out of business for many months and determined terrorists cannot be unaware of this vulnerability.

India shares maritime boundaries, not just with three of its South Asian neighbours, but shares waters of the Andaman Sea in the Bay of Bengal with four countries of the Asean viz. Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. While boundaries have been delineated with most of them, there are, inevitably, irritants of poaching, smuggling and illegal movement of arms and of people. Arms have been taken across to the East coast of Sri Lanka for use of the LTTE terrorists from the Thai coast through the Andaman group of islands. Similarly, they have been known to be taken up the coast through Myanmar and on to our north eastern states. Another serious concern concerns the narcotics trade which is inextricably linked to the arms trade and, therefore, to terrorism. India is located in the middle of two major narcotics centres of the world, centering on Myanmar in the East and Afghanistan in the West. We hear a lot about seizures made at airports and on land but one seldom gets to hear of transportation by sea, which is infinitely easier and permits large quantities to be shipped. Two years ago, a Japanese vessel, masquerading under a false name and flag, was routinely investigated in an Indian port and found to have been engaged in the smuggling of

narcotics and arms. There must be many other vessel carriers which have not been caught.

Finally, India's interface with the Asia-Pacific region is crucial to its economic growth. Its overseas trade with these countries, passing through the waters of South East Asia, as stated earlier, is likely to exceed \$ 500 billion by 2020. Stability in the countries with which we trade, and their own prosperity, is, therefore, in India's interest. Linked to the security concerns highlighted earlier, this makes an Indo-Pacific relationship an important adjunct of the overall Indian Ocean security scenario. The medium which acts as the facilitator, as well as the cause for concern, is the sea.

### **Maritime Violence**

Violence at sea, commonly termed as piracy, can be categorized under four heads viz. attacks on ships in harbour or at anchorages, attacks on ships at sea, mainly in narrow channels, take over or hijack of ships physically and, finally, acts of terrorism. Each of these has ramifications of its own. The first is actually armed robbery, occurring as it does within the territorial waters of the state and sometimes carried out in connivance with the ships' crew. The criminals carry rudimentary weapons such as knives and machetes and decamp with what is immediately and readily available, cash or electronic equipment, in little country craft. They are not interested in confrontations. Many of the so called piracy incidents in Indonesian waters, or in ports of Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, the Gulf and East Africa fall in this category. They have little impact on safety of seaborne commerce, disturbing as they are. The second category is beyond the limits of territorial waters, almost always in narrow channels with small islands to and from which the miscreants can easily operate. The boats are more sophisticated, fitted with several outboard motors for speed, and, generally, automatic rifles, modern communication equipment and even rocket propelled grenades have been used. Once boarded through use of grapnels, the criminals might remain on board the attacked vessel for several hours and violence is quite possible. Fire might also be opened to force the ship to stop. Vessels with low freeboard can be attacked more easily. The value of items, thus, stolen will be more than in the first case but cargoes will still, generally, be left untouched. A dangerous dimension, in recent years, has been the taking of crew as hostage for ransom. In March 2005, an Indonesian chemical tanker was boarded by 35 armed gunmen who kidnapped the Master and the Chief Engineer. Only a fortnight later, a Japanese tugboat was attacked by pirates who opened fire on the vessel and kidnapped three members of the crew. Ransoms paid for such hostages have, reportedly, ranged from \$ 20,000 to \$ 30,000 though the initial demands of the pirates were higher. While many such incidents have taken place in the Malacca Straits and surrounding

waters, the coast off Somalia on the Horn of Africa is also becoming a major hub of such crimes. India, itself, has been affected with the hijack, some months ago, of an Indian vessel by Somali pirates, later released by the criminals after 'persuasion' by US naval forces.

But where we enter a more serious domain of maritime violence is when vessels are attacked to be seized, or hijacked. The operation is, obviously, much more organized and networked since subsequent actions require a degree of interfaces with several agencies. The original crews are set adrift, in some cases killed, and the ship, generally a freighter or product carrier of less than 20,000 tons DWT, taken over physically. The cargoes, especially fuel oils can easily be sold in the black market; the coastal areas of China were easy destinations until recently when harsh measures were adopted by the Chinese authorities to dismantle the associated underground structures. There have been occasions when such ships have been repainted, given false names and flags, and thereafter, operated 'normally'. Sometimes, genuine papers and fresh registration, mainly with 'flags of convenience' countries have been arranged. These are arranged with no great difficulty and the ships can then be used for transportation of narcotics and even arms, apart from normal cargoes. The LTTE movement in Sri Lanka has operated some genuine and some hijacked vessels for several years in the narcotics-arms trade. These vessels have carried drugs from the coast of Myanmar to Turkey, money transfers to Bangkok have then been arranged for purchase of arms, after which these have been lifted from the coast off Phuket. The arms have been transported to the East Coast of Sri Lanka through the waters of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, sometimes transferring these loads to smaller trawlers in some uninhabited islands to escape detection. This sea transportation of arms has been pivotal in sustaining the terrorism in Sri Lanka. More than one ship involved in this trade has been arrested by Indian maritime forces on the high seas and neutralized. Several movements must have gone undetected. A few years ago, the Indian Coast Guard inspected a vessel named the **Gloria Kopp** in one of our ports to find that it was the hijacked Japanese freighter **Kobe Queen I**. The vessel had been engaged in smuggling of narcotics. The Master of the ship committed suicide and the incident highlighted the exploitation of hijacked merchantmen in the drugs trade which, ultimately, fuels terrorism. Only a few months ago, a ship was arrested with \$ 700 million worth of narcotics in the port of **Cartagena** in South America. The case of the Japanese ship **Alondra Rainbow**, hijacked in Indonesian waters and arrested by Indian maritime forces in the Arabian Sea, is too well known and is yet another example of what 'might have been'. Ironically, while hijacking an aircraft is an accepted act of terrorism internationally, a crime punishable by death in several countries, hijack of a

ship is still viewed as just an act of piracy. Attacks leading to hijack of ships, must be viewed with great seriousness. These crimes require efficiently organized groups cutting across national boundaries, are executed by well armed criminals who will not hesitate to kill and have direct impact on the safety of sea lanes of communication through which much of international commerce, including energy, must move. In addition, these vessels also become potential platforms for maritime terrorism, the fourth form of attacks at sea.

Many people tend to mistake piracy at sea for maritime terrorism. As already explained, the former has existed for as long as men have sailed the seas and largely covers robbery, petty or big, often with the connivance of the crew. It can be disturbing but will not, unlike terrorism, affect the security of nation states. Piracy, which leads to hijacking of ships, falls under a different and much more serious category. It is organized crime, because these activities are not executable without a vast network. It is also transnational. Ships belong to one country, are registered in another, crewed by people from several others and carry cargoes of many countries bound for destinations around the world. So, the security of regional waters is important, not just for those littoral to it but also for those well beyond. Vessels pirated or hijacked in one area can pose a menace much farther away. As far as maritime terrorism goes, we have, so far, seen Al Qaeda attacks on the USS Cole in Aden, on a French oil tanker, the **MV Limburg** off Yemen, and on offshore oil terminals and tankers at Basra, and the sinking of super ferries by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines. Only a month ago criminals from this group were arrested as they attempted to blow up yet another ferry. The ultimate terrorism, on par with the 9/11 attack, can be the sinking of hijacked ships in busy channels or at the entrances of major ports to bring their activities to a standstill for several weeks, if not months. So, the threat is grave. It may appear far-fetched but who could have visualized that commercial airliners would be used as veritable bombs until this actually happened. Ships are easier to hijack and will cause damage beyond that inflicted on 9/11. They are also not difficult to sink. Countries cannot cope with maritime terrorism by themselves. It will also not help to be able to react when the damage has already been done. Proactive and preventive capabilities are essential. There is need for information sharing, for effective and stringent laws, for suitable organizations and capabilities and for coordination and cooperation at the national and regional levels. All this calls for close engagement at every level with countries around us, external to the region and littoral to it. Maritime power has to play the lead role in such interfaces.

In short, violence at sea, apart from crimes such as poaching, smuggling, illegal movement of people and transport of narcotics and arms, cuts across four distinct

areas. The first is petty armed robbery and has no significant impact on safety of seaborne commerce. This crime is widely prevalent through ports in the North Indian Ocean belt. The second stretches beyond territorial waters and is confined to narrow channels, mainly for larger though still petty gains and is becoming more disturbing. Such piracy is still visible in the Malacca Straits, though considerably reduced in the last two years, and rampant in the waters off Somalia and Indonesia. The next step is the kidnapping of crews. This will, generally, focus on vessels, not too large, which target important sea lanes and whose owners will be in a position to pay heavy ransoms and, therefore, constitutes a threat to safety of those routes. At the very top is the hijacking of ships which can, potentially, lead to crimes which are much more serious and, ultimately, to maritime terrorism. The entire North Indian Ocean littoral is infested with groups which are proficient in terrorism. These include the Al Qaeda in South West Asia, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Lashkar, Jaish and Hizbul groups in Pakistan, assorted groups in Bangladesh, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, though its fight is only with the government and it has no interest beyond that, the GAM and Jemaah Islamia groups in Indonesia, the former operating off Aceh, radical groups operating in Malaysia and the Abu Sayyaf group in Philippines. There are several others of varying strengths and different names. Most of these groups have entered the domain of maritime crime only recently. However, there is every possibility that the violence will assume more hardened dimensions as these groups begin to acquire the skills required for activities at sea and comprehend the global impact of the crime. Obviously, a background in piracy will be good recruiting ground for such people. Wisdom, therefore, lies in anticipating the development and being prepared to cope with it. Both regional states and external powers have a stake in this preparation.

### **The Stakeholders**

The main external stakeholders with important interests in the Indian Ocean littoral are the USA, France, Russia, UK, China and Japan. The USA, with \$ 600 billion in overseas trade traversing the Malacca Straits every year, is a major player. As a global power, it has vital strategic interests in this region. It also deploys considerable maritime power to support and safeguard them. India shares some of these interests, in particular, those pertaining to the fight against terrorism and the safety of seaborne commerce. The Indian Navy has been carrying out joint exercises with the US Navy for about a decade and their scope has been increasing to ensure that the desired level of interoperability is reached between both navies. Despite differences of opinion in some matters, it is very unlikely that these interfaces will diminish, as there is convergence of interests between the two countries at the strategic level. This positive relationship also

extends to India's maritime interfaces with countries such as the UK, France, Australia, South Africa etc. India and Russia also have a strong relationship in military cooperation flowing from shared interests. The Indian Navy has quite a large number of ships, submarines and weapon systems of Russian origin but it is only now that it has embarked on joint exercises with the Russian Navy. This is likely to become a regular feature of the relationship since Russia also depends heavily on the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean for its trade and is concerned about their safety. There is need for such engagements as they add to confidence and mutual trust which are essential in combating the danger posed by non state actors. The level of maritime interaction between India and Japan is increasing commensurate with the convergence of strategic concerns of both countries in the Indo-Pacific region but is still well below the threshold that the mutuality of interests of the two countries requires. The constitutional impediments that may inhibit Japan from more active interaction with other maritime forces are only one factor; India's own compulsions arising out of geopolitical considerations are another. This notwithstanding, there is no reason why the navies of the two countries should not be able to formalize and enhance their interfaces more meaningfully. A MOU for cooperation between the Coast Guards of the two countries is likely to be concluded before the end of this year and this is a good beginning. It is desirable that this should be followed by a formal Defence Cooperation agreement on the same lines as those concluded by India with several other countries, including China.

### **The Neighbourhood**

As far as the littoral countries are concerned, both in the Gulf and in the Asean region and in the immediate neighbourhood, India has important economic, political and security interests. Not only is the Gulf region critical for its oil and gas but also for other inputs to our economy, while the Malacca and Singapore Straits are among the world's most important shipping routes. As highlighted earlier, half of India's overseas trade, exceeding \$ 500 billion in 2020, will pass through them. Its interests in these sea lanes is, therefore, substantive and in synergy with those of several other countries. The Indian Navy hosts a gathering of littoral navies biennially; the last meeting held in Port Blair in 2005, had maritime forces from nine nations represented. Ships of the Indian Navy have assisted Sri Lanka in times of natural disaster and other difficult times. In Maldives, it was only the timely intervention of our naval and airborne forces that saved the legitimate government from being overthrown. Most recently, both countries have seen immediate and credible response from Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships during the Tsunami disaster even as India, itself, suffered great loss of life and

devastation. Indian naval ships have carried out patrols of the Exclusive Economic Zone of Mauritius at that country's request and ensured offshore and coastal security for the African summit conference in Mozambique last year. Coordinated patrols are being carried out with the Sri Lankan and Indonesian Navies and the same cooperative interaction has now been initiated with the Thai Navy. Similar interfaces with Malaysian maritime forces might be initiated in the not too distant future. Joint exercises with the Singapore Navy are an annual feature. So, a cooperative environment is being progressively built up in the region.

Pakistan has not been incorporated in this developing environment so far. The reasons are obvious. Relations between the two countries are insipid at best. The reasons why this is so need not be elaborated and it would be enough to say that it is quite unlikely that this scenario will change radically in the foreseeable future, given the contradictions and compulsions in Pakistan's society and ruling establishment. Induction of cruise missiles, frigates and aircraft from China is also underway and the Indian Navy has to be prepared to cope with any military eventualities. Broadly speaking, India enjoys the required superiority in maritime power which is sufficiently dissuasive and this superiority must be maintained. Probability of a conventional military conflict between the two countries is not high. Pakistan is developing the port of Gwadar on the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz through Chinese assistance. This, by itself, would not be an issue of great significance except that its President has stated that ships of the PLA Navy would be allowed to use the port facilities whenever Pakistan 'felt threatened.' This pronouncement has sinister overtones and needs to be factored into our security calculations, given that India's oil lifeline can easily be threatened by hostile elements, both state and non-state, operating out of Gwadar.

## **China**

As far as China is concerned, India's relations with that country have fluctuated, but in the emerging world order, things have begun to change. Bilateral trade between the two countries has jumped from a few hundred million dollars a decade ago to nearly \$ 19 billion last year. It is likely to exceed \$ 50 billion by 2010, which could make it our largest trading partner. During his visit to India in April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jia Bao has spoken of a qualitatively enhanced relationship of strategic value between the two countries. So, there has been a visible improvement in Sino-Indian relations. Cooperation between the two militaries has been initiated. A MOU for Defence Cooperation has been concluded by the two Defence Ministers and Indian and PLA Navy ships have exercised together at sea. There has also been exchange of high level military visits. This type of engagement is likely to be further enhanced. At the same



time, there are long festering boundary issues still to be resolved. In addition to the Gwadar programme mentioned earlier, China is also assisting Myanmar in developing its port facilities. Hitherto, the PLA Navy's profile was largely confined to the coast, but it now has more oceanic ambitions. Its naval modernization under which submarines and destroyers have been, and are being, acquired from Russia, as also its own indigenous shipbuilding warship building adds to this aspiration. Availability of port facilities in Myanmar and Pakistan will give it an Indian Ocean capability that it does not presently have. In short, while India does not view China as a threat, or even as a rival, the implications of its maritime postures have to be watched carefully.

### **The Responses**

Maritime violence, in today's times, is essentially related to threats from non state actors. Littoral operations become very important in the context of such threats. Piracy and other illegal acts at sea, hijacking of ships and maritime terrorism come under this category. These, as has been explained earlier, generally take place in coastal waters or narrow channels, are executed quite quickly, and cannot be countered, much less preempted, without a tightly integrated system of surveillance and response, networked for operations in real time. Even more important, given the transnational nature of such crimes and the differing approaches and capabilities of littoral nations, it will be very difficult to cope with the crimes unless there is very close cooperation and coordination, amongst several stakeholder countries. Much more trust and confidence in multilateral cooperation will be needed if such operations are to yield the desired results. With future threats arising more from non-traditional sources rather than from conventional military conflict between nations, these are the issues which merit more serious consideration.

In this context, responses must be multinational and foster multilateral cooperation. Considering that this is a wholly new security paradigm on which many nations have sensitivities, it is quite in order if, initially, the interfaces are bilateral where the imponderables are fewer. India's approach has been on these lines. As confidence and trust are consolidated, multilateral arrangements can be brought into play. Organizations like the ARF and the WPNS, at the official level, and the CSCAP at the Track II, serve this purpose. More recently, the Regional Cooperation Agreement (RECAAP) which brings 16 regional countries, including India, on a common platform to share information in coping with piracy in the region, has been activated. It is an important initiative towards regional security cooperation. Similar arrangements have to be put in place in the Gulf region and amongst the East Africa littorals. Apart from sharing of information, conduct of joint patrols and exercises is important as they result

in consolidation of standard operating procedures, communications and mutual trust and confidence.

A question that is often mooted by the littorals is of national sovereignty. It has been argued that maritime forces of countries not littoral to the waters must not interfere in security operations but may assist monetarily or with hardware. In this context, Japan is providing training and ships to Malaysia, and Australia is training personnel of the Philippines Coast Guard. Indonesia is also receiving some help from the USA. This desire to discharge the security responsibility themselves is commendable and has shown positive results in the tri-nation patrol and the four-nation 'Eye-in-the-Sky' aerial surveillance being carried out in the Malacca Straits. However, such operations are high on attrition, of resources as well as of will, and, can not be sustained for long with the desired intensity. Not all three partners have the same capabilities or the required will. Availability of additional hardware will help only up to a point; thereafter skills will assume importance and these can not be generated overnight. The measures that have been brought into force by the three littorals have come about only after intense pressure was brought to bear upon them by proposals such as the US Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). There is, therefore, no reason why participation of others in securing safety of important shipping routes should not be sought. There can be no compromise of sovereignty in a cooperative paradigm as long as there is confidence and trust in one another. India's approach is to provide help if asked to do so by the three main littoral countries in this region just as it has done elsewhere.

Sharing of information is essential to cooperation. The RECAAP, and the Information Sharing Center (ISC) set up under its aegis in Singapore, through which information regarding piracy in South East Asian waters will be shared between member nations, is a very welcome step but the difficulties it will experience can be assessed from the fact that one of the key littorals, Indonesia, has still to ratify the agreements pleading encroachment of national sovereignty. Exchange of relevant intelligence bilaterally is also important. Sharing will never be free and forthright unless there is adequate confidence and trust amongst the cooperating partners. There is, therefore, need for a spectrum of measures which will help build both. These may include exchange of personnel, frequent ship visits, regular conduct of seminars and discussions. Further, cooperation will be credible only if the participating countries adhere to international conventions, the Suppression of Unlawful Activities at Sea (SUA) in particular, have appropriate legal frameworks to ensure that crimes are dealt with adequately, and on a, more or less, common platform, work out standard operating procedures and streamline communications. These are complex activities and can not be resolved simply by producing documents, of whatever size or number. For example, few

of the regional countries have ratified the SUA. Cooperation can, therefore, only be made credible by fine-tuning it through regular exchanges and interaction of maritime forces at sea in joint exercises and patrols.

Japan and India have mutually supportive concerns and interests in the entire stretch of sea from the Gulf at one end to the approaches of Japan on the other, a route termed the JIA by some. The preponderance of concern in the North Indian Ocean, at present, is in the waters of South East Asia but very soon this could extend to the Gulf region where the Straits of Hormuz can act as a veritable choke point on the vital energy routes. Any interdiction here will have horrendous impact on the entire energy supply chain and of the country whose supplies are affected, in particular. It is, therefore, necessary, that suitable cooperative measures are put in place sooner rather than later by maritime forces of the two countries in cooperation with those of other like minded nations

### Capabilities

The India Navy is the only regional seagoing force in the Indian Ocean with integral air power. Along with vessels of the Coast Guard, ships of the Indian Navy can be deployed for ensuring safety of sea-lanes not only near the Indian coast but also at distances quite far away. India is also well positioned in the Northern Indian Ocean, sitting astride the East-West shipping routes, and able to mount surveillance over them at several points stretching from its Lakshwadeep Islands in the west to the Great Nicobar Island in the east. This beneficial position affords several advantages in easy deployment and sustenance of naval forces, from the Gulf coast in the west, up to and including the Malacca Straits, thereby providing a potential maritime capability that no other navy in the region can have. India's economic growth is heavily dependent on its overseas trade, half of which routes through the eastern sea routes of the North Indian Ocean and its maritime forces must be able to safeguard the security of these shipping routes.

At the other end of the JIA route is Japan with substantial maritime forces of its own, both in the MSDF and in the Coast Guard. Its interests in ensuring safety of seaborne commerce through the entire JIA and its ability to patrol the waters of concern in the West Pacific is no less that of India in the North Indian Ocean, probably more. These capabilities must be put to use. In the Malacca Strait, the two countries can cooperate with each other and with the three littoral nations concerned, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, to provide the desired degree of security to the great numbers of ships which transit through those waters carrying important cargoes. Appropriate structures need to be put in place to coordinate the cooperation, both in Track I and Track II

mechanisms. The need for them has been discussed in earlier discussions. The time has now come to put them in place.

In between, there are several littoral countries with maritime capabilities which vary from negligible at one end, to just about adequate at another. The actions should, therefore, be three pronged viz. enhance the capabilities of those that are weak, assist in further enhancing those of others and, until these objectives are achieved, fill the gap with participation of those that are better placed to help.

### **Recommendations**

In the light of these discussions, the following recommendations are made:

India and Japan should enhance the level of cooperation between the Indian Navy and the Japanese MSDF through greater exchange of ship visits, conferences and joint exercises.

A formal agreement for cooperation at sea should be concluded.

There should be regular and frequent exchange of personnel at various levels to generate mutual trust and confidence in each other.

Both countries should play proactive roles in promoting maritime security in areas of concern through assistance to littorals which do not have enough capabilities and by undertaking joint patrols with them.

A mechanism should be created which will review progress annually and project fresh measures of cooperation as required.

### **Conclusion**

In the emerging security environment, the North Indian Ocean region, an important part of the JIA, has acquired strategic and security dimensions which we just cannot ignore. India has important maritime interests which stretch from the Gulf region in the West to the coast of South-East Asia in the East. Non traditional threats are becoming increasingly potent and the sea lanes of communication, critical to India's energy security and economic growth, are beginning to get endangered, as never before. The littoral and the non state actors together comprise the new domain of maritime operations. All together, the environment requires capabilities and institutions at sea that can safeguard our interests through a maritime strategy- mix which encompasses

engagement and cooperation with countries similarly affected and interested. India and Japan should be at the very top of this list.

## 海上テロの脅威

山崎 眞  
日立製作所顧問

はじめに



海上テロ

海上交通路（シーレーン）の重要性は改めて論じるまでもないが、経済の発展とグローバル化に伴って、その果たす役割は益々重みを増し人類の死命を制する存在になってきている。世界の貿易の90%は海上交通によっており、シーレーンの安全の確保は世界経済の維持発展のために緊要の課題となっている。特に、インド洋から太平洋に至る海域は多くのシーレーンとチョークポイントが存在する重要な海域であるが、海賊、テロ、不法行為が多く発生する危険な海域でもある。軍事的に見ても、この海域には約 250 隻の潜水艦が存在しており、これらのシーレーンに及ぼす危険度は計り知れない。

2005 年における海賊発生件数は 276 件であり 1999 年以降最も少ない件数であったが、海域別に見ると東南アジア周辺海域の 122 件（インドネシア 79 件、マラッカ・シンガポール海峡 19 件等）、アフリカ周辺海域の 80 件（ソマリア 35 件等）の順で多く発生しており、依然としてインド洋から太平洋に至るシーレーンは多くの危険に晒されている。更に、マラッカ海峡における海賊発生件数が 2005 年 10 月から 2006 年 3 月末までゼロであったのが 4 月末から 7 月にかけて 6 件発生していること、及びソマリア沖いわゆる「アフリカの角」海域における海賊発生件数が 2004 年には僅か 2 件であったのが 2005 年には 35 件に激増し、しかもこの海域における海賊が重武装し軍艦に対しても攻撃をする程の凶悪な存在であることが注目される。

テロ集団の存在も大きな脅威である。マラッカ海峡は世界で最も戦略的な海峡の一つであり、世界貿易の 3 分に 1 を占める年間 60,000 隻の船舶が航行し、世界の原油の半分がここを通る。現在 1 日あたり 11M バレルの原油が通過しているが、これが 2025 年までの間に年 3% の割合で増加すると言われている。海峡の長さは 1,015 k m、最狭部（Phillips Channel）の幅は 2.4 k m、最も浅いところは水深 25m である。仮にこの航路が閉鎖されたら、通過船舶の 50% は 1,000 k m 遠回りをしなければならない。また、海峡に面するシンガポール港は世界第 2 位の重要な港湾である。経済を通して敵国に打撃を与えることを戦略目標とするアル・カイダ等のイスラム原理主義テロリストは、当然このマラッカ海峡

に関心を持っている。また、前述した海賊の中にはテロ集団と同一または関連を持つものがあり、海賊とテロリストの区別が付け難い状況にある。現状ではマラッカ海峡におけるテロ攻撃の可能性は高くはないが、万一テロが発生した時の世界に与えるインパクトは計り知れないものがある。

日本近海におけるテロ、不法行為のインパクトも重大である。過去頻繁に発生している北朝鮮による麻薬運搬・工作員潜入・拉致等を目的とする不審船（スパイ船）事案、2000年以降急激に増加した中国による日本 EEZ における海洋観測等わが国の国益に重大な影響を与える行為がある。不審船は国籍を隠してわが巡視船に対しロケット砲、機銃等による攻撃を加えており、これは明確なテロ行為と判断される。

これらの脅威に対し、世界各国特に東アジア各国は、連携することにより及び自国の努力により海賊・テロの抑止に努めている。例えば、日本のリーダーシップにより実現した「アジア海賊対策地域協力協定(Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia: ReCAAP)」及びこの一環としてシンガポールに設置される「情報共有センター(Information Sharing Center)」はアジアにおける国際協力の大きな成果である。また本年 4 月、マラッカ海峡沿岸 3 国による海空における海峡哨戒活動のための「合同調整委員会(Joint Coordinating Committee: JCC)」設置の協定がなされたことも大きな進歩である。

本稿では、主として海上におけるテロの脅威に焦点を当て、起こりそうなシナリオを想定し、その対策を検討することにした。

## 1 海上テロの実態

海上テロと海賊行為の区別は困難であるが、海上テロと明確に認識できるものとしては、政治目的を達成するために対象船舶、海峡、港湾等に対しダメージを与える事を目的とし、大量破壊兵器等の爆発物、武器等により攻撃を加える行為がある。これによりテロ対象国の経済に打撃を与え、国民に恐怖心を煽ろうとするものである。

2000 年以降、船舶、港湾等に対するテロリストによる攻撃が顕著になってきている。2000 年 10 月 12 日には、燃料補給のためイエメンのアデン港に停泊中であった米海軍ミサイル駆逐艦「コール」が小型ボートの突入による自爆攻撃にあった。「コール」は、当日 0930 に係留作業を完了し、1030 から燃料補給作業を実施中であったが、1118 に小型ボートが艦の左舷に接近し衝突・自爆した。艦は左舷に 12m 四方の穴が開き、重大な損傷を被った。自爆攻撃は 2 名のテロリストによって行われた。彼らはアル・カイダのメンバーであった。「コール」では、17 名の水兵が死亡し、39 名が負傷した。「コール」は、ノルウエーの海難救助船 MV「ブルー・マリーン」によってアデン港から米国ミシシッピ州パスガグーラ

へ搬送され、修理が施され、2003年に任務に復帰した。この事件は、米軍に重大な影響をもたらした。米軍は以後、「自軍防御」(Force Protection)のために多大な労力と投資を強いられることになった。また、将来艦の設計にも大きな影響をもたらし、新型駆逐艦(DDX)においては艦の外舷への攻撃から被害を極限できるような船体構造を新たに採用した。極めて安価な小型ボートの攻撃により、1隻\$1B以上もする高価な軍艦が1年以上も戦列を離れることになり、さらに軍はテロ攻撃から自軍を防護するための多大な投資をしなければならなくなった。

2002年10月6日朝、フランス国籍の160,000トンタンカー「リンバーク」は、イランで搭載した397,000バレルの原油をマレーシアへ輸送すべくアデン湾、イエメンのアル・ムカッラー沖を航行中であった。同船は、イエメンにおいて更に1.5Mバレルの原油を搭載する予定であった。同船は突然右舷に爆発が起こり火災が発生、大量のオイルが流出した。火災は夕方までに完全に消火したが、船体の被害は大きく90,000バレルのオイルが海中へ流出した。乗組員の死者は1名、負傷者は4名であった。4日後、同船はアル・ムカッラーへ曳航され政府関係者による船体被害の調査が実施された。政府調査員は、「リンバーク」がテロリストの自爆攻撃を受けたことを確認した。テロリストはアル・カイダのメンバーであった。テロの目的は、フランスの石油の最終出荷先をイエメンから他国に変更させることにあったと言われている。このテロ攻撃による「リンバーク」の船体被害、海洋汚染、サルベージ等の経費は甚大であり、イエメンの経済も大きな損害を被った。同船は、テロリストの小型ボートの自爆により被害を受けたと見られているが、破口の形状・位置からボートまたは潜水艦からの魚雷攻撃によるものとの分析もある。

2004年2月27日、899名の乗客・乗員を乗せてマニラからネグロス島バコロドに向けマニラ湾を航行中のフィリッピン国籍10,192トンのフェリー「スーパーフェリー14」の後部が爆発炎上し、多数の死傷者・行方不明者が出た。同船は、転覆座礁し廃船となった。事件から8ヶ月経った10月の時点で、確認された死者63名、行方不明者50人以上を数えた。当初、フィリッピン政府はこの事件を単なる火災と見なし、テロの可能性を否定していたが、同年10月11日、国際テロ組織アル・カイダとの関係が指摘されるイスラム過激派「アブ・サヤフ」による爆弾テロ事件と断定した旨発表した。事件当初から、同船の乗客名簿にアブ・サヤフのメンバーの名前があった事が確認されており、アブ・サヤフのスポークスマンによる自爆攻撃の犯行声明もあった。

2004年4月24日午後5時頃、イラク南部のバスラ沖の石油積み出し施設の近くで、アラブの伝統的な輸送船である木製のダウ船を使った海上自爆テロが2度にわたり試みられた。最初の攻撃は、ダウ船がコール・アル・アマヤの石油ターミナルに近づいたのを警備船が発見し、同船に乗船しようとしたところ突然爆発して米兵2名と米沿岸警備隊員1名が死亡した。最初の事件から約20分後、さらに2隻のダウ船がバスラ石油ターミナルの近



くで警備船により停船を命じられ、警備船が接近しようとしたところ爆発が発生した。但し、警備船に負傷者は発生しなかった。イラク南部の港湾都市ウンム・アル・カスルから南方約 15k mにあるバスラ石油ターミナルでは、4 隻の石油タンカーが船積みを待っているところであった。イラク戦争後、武装勢力や窃盗団による陸上の製油所や石油パイプラインを狙った攻撃等は度々発生しているが、海上の石油積み出し施設を狙った攻撃はこれが初めてであった。現在イラクの石油輸出の 90%が同国南部の油田で採掘され、バスラなど南部の積出港から輸出されている。今回の海上自爆テロにより、約 100 万バレルの輸出が停止し、2800 万ドルの損害が出た。しかも、1 個所では発電装置が停止し、さらに石油輸出に影響が出た。このような事件は、輸出の停止によりイラクの外貨獲得に大きな影響を与えるのみならず、船舶保険の引き上げなどによりイラク原油の輸出競争力を弱め、イラク復興のための資金の獲得に大きな影響を与えることになる。

このように、テロリストは明確な目的をもつて的確に対象国の弱点を狙い、最も安価な手段により最大の効果を上げようとしている。国際テロ組織アル・カイダは、これらの目的を達成するために次に挙げる各項目についての「アル・カイダ海軍マニュアル」を所有しているといわれる。

- ・ 船舶の最適攻撃場所
- ・ リンペット・マイン（吸着機雷）の使用法
- ・ 高速艇からのロケット砲発射法
- ・ LNG タンカーを浮ぶ爆弾に変える方法
- ・ 爆薬を搭載した高速艇の使用法
- ・ 燃料・ガス貯蔵施設または船舶の傍でトロール、船等を爆発させる方法
- ・ 自爆攻撃用の水中スクーターの使用法

このような高度の攻撃技術を備えたテロ集団の行動を抑止することは容易ではない。その行動態様を正確に把握し、あらゆる手段を使った警戒・監視態勢を備えることが必要であろう。このためには、予想されるテロ攻撃についての想定シナリオを準備し、これに対する対処法を検討し、訓練することが不可欠である。

## 2 想定される海上テロのシナリオ


ここでは、想定される海上テロのシナリオのうち、発生した場合に甚大な被害・損害を生じるものについて数項目採り上げてみたい。

### (1) 機雷によるマラッカ海峡の封鎖

マラッカ海峡の機雷による封鎖は、二つの態様が考えられる。一つは、テロリストが海峡に機雷を敷設し、テロリストの声明または船舶の機雷による被害により、警報が発せら

れる場合であり、二つ目はテロリストが機雷敷設の宣言を発し、その証拠のために船舶に実際に機雷による被害を与える場合である。このいずれの場合も、テロリストは機雷を敷設した場所は明確にしないであろう。これにより、マラッカ海峡全域が航行不能になり、船舶はロンボクまたはスダ海峡へ遠回りを経ざるを得なくなる。このように機雷は戦略的な目的で使用する兵器であり、仮にマラッカ海峡に機雷がただ一個敷設されても、海峡全域が使用不能になる。また、海峡内の航路総てを掃海し、航行の安全を実際にテストするまでは、船舶が海峡を航行することは出来ない。これには、掃海兵力にもよるが、数ヶ月の期間が必要になるであろう。船舶が長期にわたって遠回りを経ざるを得なくなることは、積荷の到着遅れ、船舶の使用燃料の増加、船舶の積荷増大のための大型化等多大の経費の増大を招く事になり世界経済に与える影響が大きい。

機雷はその敷設の態様から区分すると一般に、海底からのワイヤにより固定し一定の水深に漂わせる「係維機雷」、海底に沈める沈底機雷、海面に浮かべる浮遊機雷がある。敷設の深度は特殊なものを除き10mから200m位までである。



係維機雷（左図）の場合、船舶が触角・アンテナに接触すると爆発する触発式と船舶の磁気・水圧・音響に感応して爆発する感応式がある。沈底機雷には感応式と、船舶の通過を感知し海底から上昇して命中する上昇式がある。浮遊機雷は触発式である。テロリストが入手し敷設する機雷は、いずれの方式も可能性がある。浮遊機雷は敷設容易であるが、海流の流れを利用する必要があり、海峡では発見される可能性が大であるため効果が余り期待できないであろう。係維機雷および沈底機雷は、敷設に際しタグボート・バージ等からでも落とすことが可能であり、小型船の船底からロープにより水中に吊下して目的地へ運び、ロープを切って海底へ落下させることも可能である。

機雷は、安価な装置により甚大な被害・損害を与える事が可能であり、テロリストにとっては極めて利用価値が高い魅力的な兵器である。事態がエスカレーションした場合、マラッカ海峡の機雷による封鎖の危険性は高く、その世界経済に与える影響は致命的と言っても過言ではない。

## (2) リンペット・マイン（吸着機雷）による船舶への攻撃

シンガポール港等の重要港湾に停泊する船舶の船底にリンペット・マインを仕掛け、爆発させることにより行動不能にする。これにより、船舶の被害のみならず港湾が使用不能になる。



リンペット・マイン（左図）は、潜水員により船舶・岸壁等に仕掛け、船舶に行動不能に至る被害を与えることが目的の機雷である。通常、磁気により船体に吸着させ、時限式発火装置を内蔵しており、調定した時間が経過した後爆発する。リンペット・マインは容易に入手でき、操作も簡単であり、テロリストにとってはこれも魅力的な武器である。リンペット・マインは、ロシア、英国、イタリア、米国等で製造されている。写真は、イタリア製のリンペット・マインである。

### (3) タンカーが浮ぶ爆弾となり、港を攻撃する

2005 年 7 月 29 日、ARF(ASEAN Regional Forum)外相会議においてシンガポール外相ジョージ・ヤオ氏は「テロリストが LNG(Liquefied Natural Gas)タンカーをハイジャックし、シンガポール港で爆発させる恐れがある。これにより、シンガポールは勿論破壊されるが、世界貿易へのインパクトは甚大で計り知れない。」と述べた。この外相発言にあるように、LNG やオイルのような爆発性の載貨を搭載したタンカーがマラッカ海峡でテロリストによってハイジャックされる事に対するシンガポール政府の危惧は極めて大きい。

また、2005 年にマレーシアを訪問した米国コーストガードのテリー・クロス中將は、メディアに対し「マラッカ海峡で海賊による攻撃が発生している事は、テロリストがオイルタンカーを奪い取り、浮ぶ爆弾として使うことの動機付けになる。」と述べた。同じように、2005 年 3 月 15 日付”The Business Times Singapore”は、「1,289 トンのタンカー”Tri Samudra”がマラッカ海峡で海賊によりハイジャックされた時、IMB はこれは正しくテロリストがタンカーにより陸上を攻撃するのと同じタイプの出来事だと述べた。」

と報じている。”Tri Samudra”は、ハイジャックされた時、爆発性の液体化学物質を満載していた。

LNG タンカーはテロリストのターゲットとして、どのように危険なのであろうか？

LNG( Liquefied Natural Gas)は、華氏-260 度に冷却され液化された天然ガスである。天然ガスはこのような状態でなければタンカーにより運搬することはできない。現在、LNG の船舶による輸送は増加しつつあり、2002 年から 2025 年の間に 70%増加するといわれている。天然ガスは、90%以上が高度に可燃性のメタンガスからなっている。天然ガスは液状では爆発性がなく安全であるが、漏洩した天然ガスは速やかに蒸発し、高度に爆発性を有する蒸気雲となる。蒸気雲は急速に拡大し引火する。 (“Pool Fire”) タンカーに開いた穴からは、LNG が漏洩し急速に蒸発するであろう。これが引火した場合、その熱により 1,200 フィート離れたところで鉄が溶け、1 マイル離れた所で露出した皮膚が 2 度の火傷を負うといわれている。 (“Sandia National Laboratory”2004 年度研究) これは、今までに発生したどの工場火災よりも大きく、燃料が総て燃え尽きるまで消火することは不可能である。漏洩ガスが燃え尽きるのには 5 分から 8 分経過するであろうが、この次に起こる 2 次火災はさらに大きな被害を及ぼす。米国において唯一記録されている LNG 事故は、1944 年に

オハイオ州クリーブランドにおいて燃料タンクが爆発した事故である。LNG が漏れて急速に蒸発し爆発したことにより、128 名が死亡し 225 名が負傷した。2004 年には、アルジェリアのスキクダにおいて LNG 生産プラントのボイラーが爆発し、これによりガス漏れが発生し 2 次爆発と火災が起こった。この事故では 24 名が死亡した。

このような爆発の危険性を有する LNG は、テロリストにとって特に望ましい目標になる。ガス・パイプラインは、テロリストにとって余り良い目標ではない。パイプラインは、容易にガスを遮断できるし、火災も比較的容易に消す事が出来る。ガス・ターミナルは攻撃による被害が大きいため、より効果的な目標になりうる。テロリストにとって最も魅力的な目標はタンカーである。例えば、米国ロードアイランド州プロビデンスの LNG ターミナルをテロリストがタンカーによって攻撃すると仮定した場合、8,000 名が死亡し、20,000 名が負傷するという試算がある。

米エネルギー省 “Sandia National Laboratories”は、テロリストによる LNG タンカー攻撃には 4 つの方法が考えられると報告している。

1 つは、「衝突」である。テロリストは LNG タンカーに対し他の船舶による衝突を試みるであろう。また、タンカーを他の静止目標に衝突させることもありうる。タンカーに衝突する船舶が高速であるか、衝突する物体が鋭利な形をしていなければタンカーに亀裂が入ることはないが、亀裂が入れば LNG が漏洩し大火災が発生する。

次に、「爆発物の使用」である。機雷のような爆発物を LNG タンカーの航路に仕掛けるか、タンカー自体に仕掛ける方法がある。

次は、「外部からの攻撃」である。これには幾つかの方法がある。まずテロリストによるタンカーの攻撃である。2000 年の米ミサイル駆逐艦「コール」に対する小型舟艇による自爆攻撃がこの顕著な例である。次に、タンカーに対するロケットやミサイルによる攻撃がありうる。タンカーは、島の近くの航路を航行する時、極めて脆弱である。タンカー攻撃によるインパクトは、攻撃の規模と場所によって大きく変わる。

最後に、「ハイジャック」である。最も深刻なシナリオは、テロリストが LNG タンカーをハイジャックし船のコントロールを獲得して主要な人口密集地へ突入し、爆発させることである。

#### (4) 船舶から航空機に対するミサイル発射

余り議論されていないテロ攻撃に、船舶から携行 SAM (対空ミサイル) により旅客機を攻撃し撃墜するシナリオがある。シンガポール空港に発着する航空機は、船舶の交通が激しいシンガポール海峡の上空を必ず通過しなければならない。シンガポールにおいて、陸上から航空機にミサイルを発射することは防ぐ事が出来るが、海上の船舶からのミサイル発射は防ぐ事が困難である。携行ミサイルは、ブラックマーケットで\$10,000 出せば購入可能である。このミサイルは空港へ発着する航空機を攻撃する性能を有している。シンガポ

ール海峡を航行する多くの小型船の一つからミサイルを発射することは容易である。このような攻撃がシンガポールに与えるインパクトは、空港の閉鎖等極めて甚大である。また、航行船舶の総てを点検することも殆ど不可能である。

この他に、海峡の最狭部に船舶を沈めることによる海峡封鎖というシナリオもあり得るが、これは極めて成功率の悪い方法である。マラッカ海峡の最狭部に船舶を 1 隻沈めても海峡の封鎖にはならない。航行船舶は、これを避けて通過することができる。

### 3 海上テロ抑止対策

海上テロを抑止するためには、様々の対策の集積と相乗効果による以外にはなく、単一の対策で大きな効果をあげるのは困難である。また、海上テロと海賊の区分・識別が困難なため、海賊対策も海上テロの抑止に直接的・間接的に係わっている。また、海上テロがグローバルに拡散している現状においては、海賊と同様に多くのケースにおいては単一国家で対処することは不可能であり、複数の国家が緊密に連携することにより初めて効果をあげ得るものである。

現在、実施あるいは提案されている国際的な海上テロ対策としては次のようなものが挙げられる。

- ・ 海上人命安全条約(SOLAS)の改正(2004 年 7 月発効)及び ISPS コード(International Ship and Port Facility Security Code) (2002 年 12 月採択)  
船舶保安情報、入港規制等
- ・ ローマ条約(SUA)の改正 (2005 年 10 月)  
旗国の同意により公海上での大量破壊兵器等の捜査、拘束、処罰等
- ・ 拡散に対する安全保障構想(PSI) (2002 年 12 月提唱)  
大量破壊兵器等関連物質の拡散阻止のための共同措置
- ・ 地域海上保安構想(RMSI) (2004 年 11 月提唱)  
情報の共有、適時の対処方針決定、対処能力の向上、地域の共同
- ・ アジア海賊対策地域協力協定(ReCAAP)(2004 年調印)及び同情報ネットワークシステム(IFN)(2006 年 4 月調印)  
多国間海賊対策協力及び情報共有センターの設置
- ・ 日印防衛首脳会談共同発表 (2006 年 5 月)  
テロへの対抗、大量破壊兵器等の拡散防止、地域的海上交通の安定への貢献
- ・ 自動船舶識別装置(AIS)の設置義務 (前 SOLAS 条約の改定による)  
船舶の識別符号、船位、針路、速力等の自動発信、受信

また米国においては、LNG タンカーへのテロ抑止対策として、入港 96 時間前の通告を実施することを義務づけている。これにより、コーストガードがタンカーへの護衛をつけ

ることができる。また港内では、警戒船、潜水員、消火船およびヘリコプターを準備する。タンカーが通過する橋は閉鎖され、近隣の空港は発着を止める。いかなる私有の船もタンカーに近づくことは許されない。タンカーは陸地に近づく前に爆発物の所在が検査される。乗組員は乗船前に安全審査をパスしていなければならない。LNG ターミナルは厳重な警戒を実施し、アクセスが制限され、保安員はテロ対処訓練を実施する。このような徹底した対策をとることは安全の為に最小限必要である。しかしながら、これでもテロを完全に抑止することは困難であろう。

現在、インド洋、マラッカ海峡、南シナ海海域において情報の共有及び共同警戒の協議が活発化している。例えば、

- ・ 「タイ・マレーシア間における南部国境沿岸海域での安全保障協力の強化」  
(2006 年 7 月)
  - ・ 「フィリピン・マレーシア・インドネシア間における合同海洋警戒の討議」  
(2006 年 7 月)
  - ・ 「シンガポール・マレーシア・インドネシアのマラッカ海峡における空中と海上における警戒活動に関する合同調整委員会設置の協定」(2006 年 4 月)
  - ・ 「米国・オーストラリア、対テロ協定に調印」(2006 年 5 月)
  - ・ 「日・印両国、マラッカ海峡での安全確保で協力強化」(2006 年 5 月)
  - ・ 「フィリピン・中国・ベトナム、南沙諸島周辺海域の安全保障協力強化に合意」  
(2006 年 5 月)
  - ・ 「米太平洋軍司令官、マラッカ海峡の安全確保に協力を表明」(2006 年 2 月)
  - ・ 「ミャンマー・タイ両国、ASEAN 対テロ条約に調印」(2006 年 1 月)
- などのケースがある。

これらの中にはそれぞれ強弱があり、国家間の思惑も絡んでいるであろうが、これらが海洋の安全と安定のために各国が目指すべき方向である。このような努力により効果をあげるための前提として、各手段によって得られる総ての海洋の安全に係わる情報を集約し、分析・表示することにより、海洋における船舶等の安全についての正確な状況を把握することが求められる。米海軍・コーストガードは、“Maritime Domain Awareness(MDA)” と称して組織的・機能的にこれに重点を指向している。MDA は、対テロ対策遂行のための重要機能である。世界の人口の 75%、首都の 80%が沿岸地域に集中しているため、沿岸地域への海上からのアクセスの安全を保障することが極めて重要である。また、世界にはホルムズ海峡、マラッカ海峡、アフリカの角などの重要なチョークポイントが存在する。MDA は、これらの海域における安全に係わるあらゆる情報を集約し、相関をとり、分析し、把握することにより、対応手段を適切に見積り、各部へ提供することによりテロ、海賊を抑止し、世界経済の発展、世界の安全並びに自国の安全に寄与しようというものである。また、このためには適切な C4ISR(Command, Control, Communication, Computer,

Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance)の装備体系を備えなければならない。  
シンガポールに設置される「情報共有センター」は、マラッカ海峡の沿岸各国等の情報を集約し、海峡全域における状況把握を目指すという点において、狭義の MDA といえることができる。今後、偵察衛星、航空機、船舶の情報を衛星通信等を駆使して集積・相関・分析し、共通画像 (Common Operating Picture:COP) を作成しリアルタイムに全般に配布することを目指すべきである。このためには衛星画像の分析能力も必須である。これにより、船舶の積荷、船舶の行動等の詳細データが得られる。また、将来的には「情報共有センター」を含む、よりグローバルな情報網を構築することも必要である。

マラッカ海峡、南シナ海、アフリカの角等の海域を重点に、国家間の共同により強力な MDA を構築すれば、テロリストの活動に対し一定の封じ込めを行うことができる。

おわりに

アラビア海、インド洋、マラッカ海峡、南シナ海、東シナ海は、日印両国にとって極めて重要な海域である。両国の石油資源、貿易はその多くがこれらの海域における海上輸送によって賄われている。アジアにおける 2 大海洋国・民主主義国である日印両国は、持てる海上防衛・保安のアセットを提供し、共同してこれらの海域の安全と安定のために努力しなければならない。

当面、強力な MDA 機能を共同して構築することを提案する。このためには、重点海域における航空機・艦船等による常続的共同哨戒の実現と、データリンクを含む通信及び表示方法の相互運用性 (Interoperability) の確保が緊要である。これにより、重点海域における海上の安全に関する状況把握が可能になり、日印両国のみならず関係諸国がより適切な対応処置をとる事ができる。

従来から提案している日、印、米を核とする “Maritime Coalition in Asia” の構築は、効果的な MDA 態勢を築くためにも大きな力になるであろう。  
日印両国の海洋における強固な連携を強く提言したい。

(2006 年 9 月 29 日記)



マラッカ海峡（矢印：シンガポール）



## The Threat of Maritime Terrorism

Makoto Yamazaki

Adviser, Hitachi Ltd.

### Overview



It is needless to say that sea lane is so important. Sea lane could have control of world economy's fate in the current situation of world economy's development and globalism. Due to 90% of world trade is depending upon maritime transport, it is urgent issue to ensure safety of sea lane. Especially the area expanding from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean includes many sea lanes and chokepoints is vital for world economy, however many dangerous piracies, terrorism and illegal actions exist in this area. Also in the military point of view, approx. 250 submarines exist in this area; that would cause incalculable dangerous impact to the sea lane.

Piracies occurred in 2005 counted 276 in the world.; that is fewest number since 1999, due to the IMB report, however looking at the individual area, it counts 122 in the South East Asia includes 79 in Indonesia and 19 in Singapore/Malacca, and counts 80 in Africa includes 35 in Somalia. The sea lane through Indian Ocean to Pacific Ocean is still dangerous. It is worthwhile to notice that piracy in Malacca Straits increased to 6 between the end of April and July 2006 while it counted zero between October 2005 and March 2006. Also in the "Horn of Africa" off Somalia, it increased to 35 in 2005 from only 2 in 2004. Moreover piracies in the "Horn of Africa" are so atrocious; attacking by rockets and machineguns even against warships.

Terrorist groups are also serious threat. Malacca Straits is the one of most strategic straits where 60,000 ships pass a year that account 1/3 of world trade and about half of world oil import transit. Currently 11M barrels of oil are passing Malacca Straits and this will increase 3% per year until 2025. The length of Straits is 1,015 km, the width of the closest channel( Phillips Channel) is 2.4km with 25m depth at shallowest point. If this Straits would be blocked, 50% of passing ships would detour additional 1,000km. Also the Port of Singapore is now ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> largest port in the world. The al-Qaeda and

Islamic extremists; having strategic object to give damages to enemy nations through economy certainly interested in this Straits. Parts of piracy groups, previously described, have relation with terrorists or they are terrorists themselves and it is difficult to discriminate between piracy and terrorist. Currently there will be few possibility of terrorist attack occurs in Malacca Straits, however if it would occur, its impacts to the world would be incalculably heavy.

The impact of terror and illegal actions in the Sea of Japan is also serious. The frequent NK(North Korea) suspicious ships incidents, which purposes are transport drugs, send spies to Japanese homeland and capture citizens, etc. and the illegal sea observation in the Japanese EEZ by Chinese government ships, which have been rapidly increasing since 2000, have direct impacts to Japanese national interest. The NK suspicious ship is clearly recognized as terrorist due to their action that attacked Japanese CG ships by rockets and machine guns.

Each nations in the world, especially East Asian countries are taking efforts to restrict terrorism and piracy by own measure and coordination with other nations. For instance, the ReCAAP(Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia) and the Information Sharing Center which was established in Singapore as the part of ReCAAP activities are great outcome of international cooperation in Asia. Also it is great progress that the establishment of JCC(Joint Coordinating Committee) for joint sea/air patrol in the Malacca Straits by three coastal nations are discussed and agreed in April 2006.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the threat of maritime terrorism assuming potential scenarios and to propose possible measures;

#### 1 The existing threat of maritime terrorism

While it is difficult to discern between piracy and terrorism, there is clear recognition as maritime terrorism; that is the action to give physical damage against ships, straits and ports by the attack of WMD like explosive or weapons to obtain political goal. Terrorists intend to make damages on economy of enemy country and give fear to people.

Since 2000, terrorists attacks to ships and ports have been becoming serious problems.

On 12 October 2000, Guided missile destroyer, USS “Cole”, attacked by a high

speed/small suicide boat with explosives during she anchored in the Port of Aden, Yemen for replenishment. USS Cole completed anchoring at 0930 and started refuel at 1030, then a small boat approached her port side at 1118 and made suicide attack by explosives. USS Cole's damages were serious with 40 feet square hole from above the waterline to keel on her port side. Suicide explosion was conducted by two terrorists; members of al-Qaeda. 17 sailors killed and 39 sailors wounded. USS Cole was brought to Pascagoula, Mississippi by Norway MV "Blue Marine" for repairing and assumed new operation in 2003. This incident had grave consequences to US Military. The US Military has compelled to extend big effort and investment to "Force Protection" since this incident occurred. Also, this affected to ships design in US Navy. The US Navy decided to apply new design for future destroyer(DDX) hull to limit damages from the explosive attack like USS Cole incident. This attack by terrorists demonstrated that very cheap boat can bring big damages to very expensive ship like USS Cole that costs more than \$1B and cause more than one year period of non operational situation. Moreover, US Military must make big amount of investment for Force Protection.

On 6 October 2002, MV "Limburg"(built in 2000, 157,833 GRT) was sailing off Al-Mukalla, Yemen under the French flag. The Limburg had taken on 397,000 barrels of oil in Iran and was on its way to Malaysia. A further 1.5M barrels of oil were to be loaded onto the vessel in Yemen. In the morning, she was badly damaged on starboard side by an explosion. She had fire and big amount of oil spilled out. Fire was completely extinguished by the evening but 90,000 barrels of oil spilled out.. One crew member killed and 4 wounded. 4 days after explosion, Limburg was towed to Al-Mukalla and investigated damage by government inspectors. They confirmed that Limburg was attacked by suicide terrorists. Terrorists were members of al-Qaeda. The purpose of that terrorists attack was to force to France to change the final oil shipment port from Yemen to other country. The Limburg's damages, pollution, salvage costs were so heavy and Yemen's economy suffered a great loss. It was investigated that Limburg was attacked by a small suicide boat but there was another view that she was supposed to be attacked by torpedo shot from boat or submarine; looking at the shape of damage hole and damage point.

On 27 February 2004, the 10,192 tons inter-island roll-on, roll-off ferry "Superferry 14", en route to Bacolod, Negros Island from Manila with 899 people on board, had explosion and fire on her aft-deck and many passengers killed and lost. She fell sideways, piled up and disused. At the moment of October when 8 months passed from the incident, confirmed number of dead was 63 and missing counted more than 50. At

the incident occurred, Philippine government denied possibility of terrorist attack on this incident and insisted that this was merest fire. However, on 11 October, the government announced that they concluded this was terrorism committed by Islamic extremist “Abu-Sayyaf”, connected to the international terrorist organization “al-Qaeda”. From the start of this incident, it was confirmed that Abu-Sayyaf member’s names were on passengers list and also Abu-Sayyaf declared that they did this attack.

Around 5 PM, 24 April 2004, maritime suicide terrorism using Arabian traditional wooden transport ships made twice near oil shipment facility off Al-Basrah, southern Iraq. First attack took place at oil terminal. A patrol ship found a ship closing to the Kwahr Abd Allah Oil Terminal(KAAOT) and tried to inspect by boarding, then a ship was exploded. 2 US sailors and 1 CG member were killed. 20 minutes after first explosion, additional 2 ships were found near oil terminal and ordered to stop by patrol ship. Ships were exploded when patrol ship approached. Nobody wounded at this time. During this incident, 4 tankers were waiting for shipping at the oil terminal about 15km south of Umm Qasr. Since Iraq war end, there have been number of attacks to oil pipelines and shore oil factories by bandit or armed groups, however sea-facilities have never been attacked. This was the first attack to the sea facility. Currently, 90% of Iraqi oil exports from southern Iraqi ports like Basrah; digged out in southern oil field. About 1M barrels of oil stopped to export and \$28M loss counted by this attack. And damages increased by generators malfunction following attack. This type of attack affects Iraqi recovery funds, because of foreign currency decrease caused by export reduction and weaken of oil competition power by marine insurance rising up.

Those terrorism revealed that terrorists aim weaken points of enemy nation accurately with clear purpose; using cheapest way to get maximum effect. It is speculated that the international terrorist “al-Qaeda” owns their “al-Qaeda Navy manual” gives following contents to achieve their goal. (Lebanon’s Daily Star Newspaper)

- The best places on the vessel to hit
- How to employ limpet mines
- Fire rockets or rocket-propelled grenades from high speed craft
- Turn liquefied natural gas(LNG) tankers into floating bombs
- How to use fast craft packed with explosives
- The use of trawlers, or ships like that, which can be turned into bombs and detonated beside bigger ships or in ports where there are often petroleum or gas

storage areas that could go up as well

- Using underwater scooters for suicide attacks

It is not easy to restrict terrorist actions prepared with such a high skill of attack. It is required to know their way of action and to establish overseeing system using every possible means. To do this, it is indispensable to prepare potential scenarios of possible terrorist attack and study countermeasures and exercise.

## 2 Potential scenarios of maritime terrorism


Among many scenarios of maritime terrorism, some scenarios would have serious result are picked up here;

### (1) Malacca Straits blocked by Mines

There are two variations of this scenario, both equally alarming. The first is that terrorists mine the Straits and the authorities are alerted to this fact either by a declaration from the perpetrators or because a ship hits a mine. The second is that terrorists merely claim to have mined the Straits and simulate a mine attack on ship to add credibility to their claims. In each scenario, assuming that there is little or no information on the exact area of the Straits that has been mined. The impact would be the same – the Malacca Straits would be closed to shipping traffic, forcing the vessels, particularly those on international voyages, to reroute around the Lombok and Sunda Straits. (Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 7; April 6, 2006)

Mine is the strategic weapon. If only one mine would be placed in the Straits, all passages in the Straits would be stopped because nobody knows number of mine laid or the exact place where mine laid. Also vessels could not pass the Straits until passage route be confirmed safe by test cruise after completion of mine sweeping. It will be needed several months to open Straits; required period for mine sweeping totally depends upon force level of mine sweeper. Ships reroute would cause severe delays to shipping as alternate routes longer. Additionally, shipping costs would increase and finally ships size would become larger for effective shipping and world trade would be affected severely.

Generally, there are three types of mines classified by the laying method; one is “Moored Mine” which maintained constant depth by buoyancy connecting from the sea bottom by wire, second is “Bottom Mine” which laid on the sea bottom and third is “Drifting mine” which is floating on the sea. The depth of placed mine is normally between 10m and 200m.



As for moored mine (left picture), there are two types of triggers; one is contact type which will detonate when ship would touch mines antenna or feeler. Another one is influence type which senses ships magnetism, water pressure or/and ships noise. As for bottom mine, there are influence type and broach type which will raise from the bottom and hit ship when mine senses ships approach. Drifting mine is contact type. Terrorists would acquire any type of mines. However, in case of drifting mine, it would be ineffective because drifting mine will be easily detected in Straits and need to utilize current, though easy to drop. Moored and bottom mine would be possibly dropped from even tug / barge or brought by hanging from ship's bottom into water and placed by cutting rope.

Mine is very attractive weapon for terrorists because it's cheap and bring huge damages. If situation should escalated, the possibility of mine attack by terrorists in Malacca Straits would be high and this affects fatal damages to world economy.

## (2) Attack Ships in Port by Limpet mine

There are possibilities to attack ship anchoring in vital port like Singapore setting limpet mine on the bottom of ship and bring ship to non-operational. By this type of attack, not only ship but also port would become non-operational.



Limpet mine (left picture) is set by diver to ship's bottom or pier and bring damages on ship. Normally it will be set by magnet power and explodes at adjusted time passed, with internal time trigger. Limpet mine would be easily acquired and used by terrorist, so it would be also very attractive weapon for terrorists. Limpet mines are produced in Russia, UK, Italy and US, etc. Italian limpet mine is shown on attached picture.

## (3) Tanker as Floating Bomb to Strike Ports

Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo in a speech given to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on 29 July 2005; "Terrorists could hijack an LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) tanker and blow it up in Singapore, of course, would be devastated. But the impact on global trade would also be severe and incalculable." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore) As this statement implies, the potential threat of terrorists hijacking one of

the many vessels passing through the region, particularly those carrying high-risk cargoes, such as LNG, crude oil or other such inflammable chemical products is of great concern to the Singapore government. Also in visit to Malaysia in 2005, VADM Terry Cross, USCG told the media that the ease with which pirate attacks were taking place in the Malacca Straits could “alert terrorists to the opportunities for seizing oil tankers” and that “these could be used as floating bombs”(The Straits Times, April 18, 2005) In a similar vein, when the 1,289 ton MT “Tri Samudra” was boarded by pirates in the Malacca Straits, the regional manager of the International Maritime Bureau was quoted as saying ;”This is exactly the type of tanker that terrorists would likely use to attack a shore-based port or other facility”(The Business Times Singapore, March 15, 2005) The Tri Samudra is a chemical tanker that was carrying a full cargo of inflammable petrochemical products when it was hijacked.

How LNG tanker dangerous as the target of terrorists?

When natural gas is cooled to –260 degrees F, it condenses into a liquid. In this liquid state, natural gas can be shipped and stored in large quantities via refrigerated tankers. According to the Energy Information Administration, global natural gas consumption is expected to increase 70% from 2002 to 2025. Natural gas is at least 90% methane, which is highly combustible. Though in its liquid state, natural gas is not explosive, spilled LNG will quickly evaporate, forming a highly combustible vapor cloud, which if ignited, can be very dangerous, says James Fay, professor emeritus at the MIT. Describing one scenario, he says that a hole in an LNG tanker could result in liquid leaking out of the storage vessel faster than it would burn off, resulting in an expanding “pool fire”. A 2004 study by the Sandia National Laboratory, a division of the Department of Energy, suggests that such a fire would be hot enough to melt steel at distances of 1,200 feet, and could result in second-degree burns on exposed skin a mile away. “This would be bigger than any industrial fire with which we have experience,” Fay says. “There is no way to put out that kind of fire.” A pool fire will burn until all its fuel is gone, which takes five to eight minutes, but it could ignite a rash of secondary fires on such a large scale that they may cause more damage than the initial blaze.

The only notable LNG accident in the United States occurred in 1944 in Cleveland, Ohio, when a full storage tank burst. The LNG spilled out, quickly evaporated, and ignited, scorching some thirty acres of land and killing 128 people and 225 injured. In 2004, a boiler at an LNG-production plant in Skikda, Algeria exploded, resulting in gas leak and a larger secondary explosion and a fire that left two dozen people dead.

Because of LNG’s raw explosive power, experts say that LNG ships and terminals

would be potential terrorists targets. Rob Knake, senior associate at Good Harbor Consulting, LLC, a homeland-security private consulting firm, says “al-Qaeda, for example, has specifically cited LNG as a desirable target.” Pipelines are not as attractive because the flow of gas can quickly be cut off and an explosion easily contained. Terminals make better targets because an attack could result in a massive fire that could potentially kill scores of people. They are also good targets because “if you take out those terminals, you could have a significant disruption in the US gas supply,” Knake says. Nevertheless, the most attractive targets are the boats: 1,000-foot tankers with double hulls and specially constructed storage tanks that keep the LNG cold. A report, put out by Good Harbor Consulting addressing the risk of a proposed LNG terminal in Providence, Rhode Island, concluded that a successful terrorist attack on a tanker could result in as many as 8,000 deaths and upwards of 20,000 injuries.

The Sandia National Laboratories report assesses four potential ways terrorists may target an LNG tanker:

- **Ramming:** Terrorists may attempt to drive another vessel into an LNG tanker or to divert a tanker into a stationary object. Unless the tanker is struck at a very high speed or the object striking it is very sharp, it is unlikely that a breach of the hull will occur. However, if such a breach did occur, there is a chance LNG would spill out and cause a massive fire.
- **Triggered Explosion:** Explosives, such as mines, may be placed in the path of an LNG tanker or on the tanker itself. If powerful enough, such an explosion could cause the cargo to spill and ignite.
- **External Attack:** There are several ways terrorists may attempt to assault an LNG tanker. The 2000 USS Cole attack, in which terrorists detonated explosives after pulling alongside the warship in a small vessel, is often cited as an example of such an attack. Other possible methods of attack include firing missiles or rocket-propelled grenades at a tanker and/or air strikes. Tankers are particularly vulnerable as they traverse inland waterways en route to their destinations. The impact of an assault would vary depending on the size and location of the attack, the worst-case scenario being a massive explosion.
- **Hijacking:** The most catastrophic scenario involving an LNG tanker involves terrorists taking control of an LNG tanker, sailing it toward a major population area and detonating the cargo. (The New York Times; February 11, 2006)

#### (4) Missile Launched at Aircraft from Vessel



One scenario which has not been widely discussed, is terrorists using a portable surface-to-air missile(SAM), launched from a ship, to bring down a commercial airliner. This would be of concern to Singapore where planes coming into land must make their descent over the busy shipping lane-the Singapore Straits. While arrangement may be in place to reduce the possibility of a SAM being fired from the shore in Singapore, the same cannot be said about ships passing off-shore. Portable SAMs can be purchased on the black market for a starting price of \$10,000 and have a range which puts aircraft that are landing or in a holding pattern waiting to land well within their targeting capability. The missile could be launched from one of the many hundreds of small vessels transiting the Singapore Straits. The impact on Singapore would be massive; not only due to the loss of life, closure of the airport and the immediate effect on the Singaporean economy, but because there would be no way of guaranteeing that a similar attack would not be carried out in the future. Short of inspecting the contents of every ship that passes through the Singapore Straits, the law enforcement agencies can do very little to reduce this particular threat.(Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 7; April 6, 2006)

Besides those scenarios, there are a possible scenario that sinking the ship in the Malacca Straits for blockade. However, this would be unsuccessful scenario. If a ship sunk at narrowest point of the Malacca Straits, it would not block the Straits. Ships could continue to use the waterway by simply navigating around the sunken vessel.

### 3 The Measures to Prevent Maritime Terrorism

There is no single measure to prevent maritime terrorism. To integrate various measures for gaining synergism is only way to reduce maritime terrorism. Also due to difficulties of discriminating between piracy and terrorism, measures for preventing piracy affect to prevent terrorism directly and indirectly. In this situation that maritime terrorism diffused global, single nation is not able to prevent terrorism, but able only in case multi nations cooperation.

Current international coordinated measures of anti-maritime terrorism are listed as follows;

- Revision of SOLAS (take effect in July 2004) and ISPS(International Ship and Port Facility Security) Code (adopted in December 2002)  
Information related to ships security, Regulation for entering port ,etc.
- Revision of SUA (October 2005)

- Investigation, restriction and punishment etc. on international waters with flag nation's agreement
- PSI (proposed in December 2002)
  - Coordinated measure to prevent WMD proliferation
- RMSI (proposed in November 2004)
  - Information sharing, Increased situational awareness, Responsive decision-making architectures, Enhanced maritime interception capacity, Agency, ministerial and international cooperation
- ReCAAP (signed in 2004) and IFN(Information Network System) (signed in April 2006)
  - Anti-piracy multinational cooperation and Establishment of Information Sharing Center
- Defense Summit Joint Statement between Japan and India (May 25,2006)
  - Security challenges against trans-national terrorism, violent extremism, proliferation of WMD and related materials, equipment, technologies and means of delivery; and threat to maritime traffic
- Obligation to install AIS (due to the revision of the SOLAS)
  - Automatic transmit and receive of ships sign, position, course, speed, etc.

A good sample of safety precautions to prevent attacks to LNG tanker are in United States; LNG tankers approaching US waters must provide 96 hours' notice, allowing the Coast Guard to provide a small flotilla to safety escort the boat to its destination. Added security detail includes local police boats, divers, firefighting tugboats, and a helicopter. Bridges along the tanker' route are closed and nearby airports suspend flights. Any private vessels that drift too close are sternly turned away. Tankers are inspected and screened for explosives before they are allowed to approach land, and tanker crews must pass a security check before being allowed to board the vessels. At LNG terminals, there is also a heavy security presence; access to the terminals is controlled, and security personnel perform regular threat-response drills.

It will be minimum requirement to take those strict security measures, however it would be still difficult to prevent maritime terrorism completely.

Recently, security talks related to information sharing and joint/coordinated patrol at sea of Indian Ocean, Malacca Straits and South China Sea have been held actively as follows;

- Thailand, Malaysia to strengthen naval intelligence cooperation on the southern

coastal border (Xinhua; July14, 2006)

- Philippine, Malaysia, Indonesia to launch joint sea patrols by 2007(The Daily Tribune; July 25, 2006)
- The three littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore signed an agreement on April 21 to set up a Joint Coordinating Committee(JCC) with an aim to oversea air and sea patrols (Business Times Singapore; April 22, 2006)
- US, Australia sign a comprehensive anti-terror pact on May 17 (Channel News Asia; May 18 2006)
- India, Japan agree to coordinate in security of the Malacca Straits on May 26 (India eNews.com; May 26, 2006)
- The Philippines, China, Vietnam agree to cooperate in Spratly islands security on May 19 (Channel News Asia; May 19, 2006)
- US Pacific Command Admiral assures it will help to secure the Malacca Strait (The Jakarta Post; February 26, 2006)
- Myanmar, Thailand sign treaty to tackle terror on 17 January (Hindustan Times; January 17, 2006)

Assuming that there might be strength, weakness and speculations among those talks, still this effort will be the proper direction of course for nations to achieve safe and stability in ocean. As the prerequisite condition to achieve goal from this effort, it is required to aware accurate situation on maritime safety by collecting any information related to maritime safety, analyzing, correlating and displaying as information knowledge. US Navy and Coast Guard are executing this by systematic and functional way that called “Maritime Domain Awareness(MDA)”.

MDA is the vital function to proceed anti-terrorism operation at sea. It is so important to secure the safety to access coast from the sea because 75% of world population and 80% of world capital cities are concentrated in coastal area. Also, there are vital choke points like Hormuz, Malacca and Horn of Africa. MDA is to collect, analyze, correlate, summarize information for estimating proper action, then distributes summarize to every sections related to maritime security to contribute to achieve world economy, safety and homeland security preventing piracy and terrorism. To do this, C4ISR(Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance) architecture is mandatory to have. The Information Sharing Center established in Singapore could have similar function as MDA in a narrow sense; it collect information in the all area of the Malacca Straits from coastal countries and aim to aware situation of entire Malacca Straits. Immediate needs is to provide COP(Common Operating Picture) to all departmental in real time by utilizing

reconnaissance satellites/ aircraft/ ship's information and satellite communications. Capability to analyze satellite pictures is also essential. By this measures, detail data about ships cargoes and ships actions, etc. will be acquired. In future, more global information network including the Information Sharing Center, etc. should be organized.

If strong MDA be established by international coordination stressing the area of the Malacca, South China Sea and Horn of Africa, etc. terrorists action would be considerably contained.

### Conclusion

Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, Malacca Straits, South China Sea and East China Sea are vital area for both Japan and India. Oil resources and trades of both nations are covered by maritime traffic through those areas. Both Japan and India which are two largest democratic and maritime nations in Asia should have effort jointly to achieve safety and stability in those areas providing own asset of maritime defense and safeguard.

First proposal in this concept is to organize effective MDA function jointly. For this, it is urgent to realize continuous joint patrol by air/surface asset at vital sea areas and establishing interoperability in communication include Data Link and Display. By this, situations awareness of vital area would be possible and not only Japan and India but also other related nations could take proper actions against maritime terrorism.

The idea of establishment of "Maritime Coalition in Asia" cored by Japan, India and US, proposed from previous dialogues, would be strong power for organizing effective MDA.

Robust maritime cooperation between Japan and India is strongly proposed.

(September 29,2006)

## Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on The Continental Shelf

Prabhakaran Paleri\*

Director General Indian Coast Guard

*India and Japan are two responsible and exceptional countries with many common traits that repeatedly recondition their mutual understanding. Sublime lessons of traditions and history, based on human values and drive towards better living, have pushed the countries closer in their quest for advancement through cooperation. Together they can achieve their national goals with the power of mutual support in a confident geostrategic environment. They are poised for growth globally. They are also time-honoured and proven maritime powers. This paper is prepared for presentation against this conviction and appreciation towards advancement of Indo-Japan relations for mutual benefit in the maritime scenario.*

The perilous nature of the sea has been a universally recognised and accepted condition under which the seafarers stood to gain considerable appreciation from the community since the early days. A seafarer, who by nature has to face the perils of the sea, became to be known as an adventurer. Sea faring, thereby, became a perilous adventure, not just a passage in quest of trade promotion. Those who dared could get across the world in long hauls through a terrain alien to the less resolute with the aura of an adventurer. The world grew and narrowed down towards the oceans, and globalisation became a concept through the sea lines of communication (SLOC). Along with came induced perils beyond the vagaries of the oceans that the adventurers could not discount. As in any human settlement, crime entered the scene vitiating the spirit of adventurism associated with seafaring that would have flowed in harmony with nature supporting human endeavors for better life. Transnational crimes chased the seafarers' from the rear like the following sea and stern wind causing deflections in steerage way. Acts like piracy against seafarers became a global issue as a transgression against human enterprise for societal wellbeing and thereby a crime against humanity. The world became concerned about the atrocities committed by criminal groups at sea. Centuries later, the concern still lingers on without solution amidst fear of escalation in

---

\* Dr. Prabhakaran Paleri is the formal director general of the Indian Coast Guard.

a yet to settle down human system that is becoming more and more dependent on the oceans.

Even after the law of the sea has been accepted at the end of a dialogue prolonged for quarter a century, it took time for the maritime concerns related to criminal acts related to sea to find expression in an international forum. The concern about the safety of passengers and crews of ships against reports of kidnapping and killing of crews and passengers, and hi-jacking and intentional destruction of ships found an outlet in International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in the early '80s. IMO's 14<sup>th</sup> Assembly took up the matter. A proposal by the United States, that measures to prevent such acts should be developed, was supported in the IMO Assembly. The resolution (A. 584) adopted by the Assembly noted with grave concern the danger to passengers and crews resulting from increasing number of incidents involving piracy, armed robbery and other unlawful acts against or on board ships, including small craft, both at anchor and under way. The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of IMO was directed to develop appropriate mechanism on a priority basis to ensure the security of passengers and crews on board ships including small craft, both at anchor and under way. The MSC was advised to take into account the work of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in the development of measures and practices for aviation security. It was also the period when increasing number of aircraft were high jacked by terrorist groups demanding stringent counter measures in aviation security.

The Convention, comprising 22 articles, had also the concern of worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism and urged the State Parties to cooperate in curbing it for international peace and security under the United Nations' General Assembly resolution 40/61 of 9 December 1985. The Convention deals with the subject of unlawful acts against maritime navigation and pronounces the offences in article 3 in 2 paragraphs. The offences are seizure of ships by force, endangering the safety of passengers and crews and placing devices on board a ship that will destroy or damage the ship. Amplified, they are:

- seizes or exercises control over a ship by force, threat or any form of intimidation;
- performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship;
- destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or its cargo that is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship;
- places or causes to be placed on a ship, a device or substance that is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship;

- destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship;
- communicates information knowing to be false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship;
- injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted commission of any of the above offences.
- attempts to commit any of the offences above, or abets their commission perpetrated by any person or is otherwise an accomplice of a person who commits such an offence;
- threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under national law, aimed at compelling a physical or juridical person to do or refrain from doing any act, to commit any of such offences likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship in question.

The Convention deals with the safety of maritime navigation on the high seas—outside the territorial waters of a single State. It also applies when the offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of a State Party other than the single State referred. It is supplemented by a Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against fixed platforms in the continental shelf. The Convention and the Protocol were signed at Rome by intended State Parties on 10 March 1988. The Convention and the Protocol entered into force on 1 March 1992. The Countries acceding to the Convention and the Protocol are to make provisions for giving effect thereto and for matters connected therewith. The underlying principle of the Convention and the Protocol is to assure greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings in conformity with the treaties on mutual assistance that may exist between the State Parties. States are expected to cooperate in establishing procedures to prevent offences within their territories, including exchanging information and coordinating administrative tasks, within the limits of their respective national laws. The Convention does not apply to “*a warship; or a ship owned or operated by a State when being used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes; or a ship which has been withdrawn from navigation or laid up*” or *government ships used for noncommercial purposes*. International Law will continue to apply over matters not addressed by the Convention. 102 countries have joined the Convention as on January 2004.

The Parties acceding to the Convention are to ensure that the offences committed under it are punishable appropriately, establish jurisdiction over the offences when

committed against or on board a ship of the State, in its territory including its territorial waters, or by a national or stateless but habitual resident of that State. Jurisdiction also applies when a national of that State is affected during the commission of the offence, as an act of coercion when the State is made to layoff an act that it was expected to do (abstain). The State parties will notify their action under the Convention, also establish jurisdiction over the offences when the offender is within the State and not extradited to any of the State Parties that have established jurisdiction under the Convention. Article 6.5 specifies that the Convention does not exclude criminal jurisdiction exercised under national law.

India acceded to the convention and the Protocol and enacted The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on Continental Shelf Act, 2002. The Act received the assent of the President on 20 December 2002 and came into force on 1 February 2003.

The area of jurisdiction under the Act will be the whole of India including the maritime zones of India as per section 2 of the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, otherwise known as the Maritime Zone of India (MZI) Act, 1976. The Act applies to any offence as per section 3 that comprises offences described in article 3 of the Convention and its extension to fixed platforms in the continental shelf. The section deals with offences against ship, fixed platform, cargo of a ship, maritime navigational facilities, etc., and punishment to such offences.

The SUA Convention originally covered seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against persons on board ships and placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to damage or destroy it. That was not found sufficient in the emerging scenario. A Protocol in 2005 added a new article (3bis) amplifying the acts that may lead to acts of terror as it is understood today. Similarly a protocol in 2005 adds an article (2bis) to the 1988 SUA Protocol related to the safety of offshore platforms. These additions to SUA Convention and the Protocol are expected to enlarge their provisions to contain terrorist activities at sea against ships and fixed platforms. However, the State Parties may have their own views in accepting the amendments.

Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the IMO Assembly adopted resolution A.924 (22), which called for improved measures to prevent acts of terrorism. At the Assembly's meeting in October, 2003, the Correspondence Working Group led by the United States. introduced several proposals to amend article 3 of the SUA Convention so as to include an expanded number of offenses. In particular, the Working Group presented two alternative options to treat offence for transporting



WMD and non-proliferation offense that the original Convention did not cover.

Alternative One would have article 3 to include:

- offense for transporting WMD in which transporter must have the terrorist motive at the time of transportation,
- offense for transporting WMD where the terrorist motive is with respect to the terrorist act and not the actual transportation, and
- non-proliferation offense:
  - offense for transporting chemical, toxic chemicals or their precursors, munitions and related materials, in situations where the transporter knows that he is transporting prohibited items and that it will be used for or as a weapon/a hostile purpose,
  - offense for transporting any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, with the transporter's knowledge, and
  - offense for transporting fissile material, equipment, dual-use equipment, biological agents, weapons or means of delivery.

Alternative Two is a variation of Alternative One, but deals with similar offenses.

There are objections. The most significant objections regarding offenses for transport of WMD include:

- the possibility of including too rigorous clauses that threaten the principle of freedom of navigation and discourage broad support.
- the IMO is not the appropriate forum to deal with non-proliferation concerns that are already dealt with by other treaties, i.e. IAEA, OPCW, ISPS,
- as proposed, article 3 lacks reference to the terrorist motive,
- terms such as 'precursors', 'hostile purposes', 'toxic materials', 'double-use' need to be better defined,
- specific provisions to exclude from criminalisation of legitimate transportation allowed under other treaty regimes should be included

In spite of these bearings that bring down the application of the Convention and its protocols seriously, the advantages of such international understanding are far reaching. The awareness about the maritime domain is increasing. It is a welcome sign. Terrorism is being recognised universally as a crime against humanity. It has come under the purview of unlawful activity without specific reservations and interpretations. International community is able to appreciate the need for cooperation among parties

under such universal understanding that will reverberate in force jointness under collective approach. Direct warfare may even give way to collective defence approach thereby reducing national cost in most of the cases.

However, it is important to note that the Convention is an old initiative It is of '80s' vintage. How relevant is it under the current scenario when terrorism has grown as the worst menace to humanity? Isn't there a more rigorous and result oriented forum to fight terror at sea or originating from the sea?

Introducing amendments through Protocols is not a healthy situation, unless the Convention is highly futuristic and drafted to incorporate amendments. A Protocol can loosen a Convention by delayed introduction on an old base. It dilutes the objective by strategic scaffolding of the original. The law makers should be aware of it. Finally, it is my view that terrorism cannot be handled by chicken or egg method, leaving doubts. The action has to focus on elimination and eradication of the social evil. If there is a will to handle terror, then action has to be overwhelming and firm. It has to be under globally collective consensus. Action has to precede the incident. SUA is not based on warfighting doctrine, whereas terror demands fighting on war footing—most of the time, beyond the laws of war. The victims will agree.

## Session2 海洋安全保障情報の日印共有

### “Indo-Japan Information Sharing”

---

Session2-① ReCAAP と ISC の概要

Outline of ReCAAP and ISC

Session2-② インド洋のチョークポイントにおける海事活動

Maritime Activities in the Choke Points of the Indian Ocean

Session2-③ 日印海洋安全保障情報の共有

Information Sharing on Maritime Security between India and Japan

Session2-④ 異文化間の情報共有—必然と障害

Inter-Cultural Information Sharing: Imperatives and Impediments



## ReCAAP と ISC の概要 / Outline of ReCAAP and ISC

遠山 純司 / Atushi Tohyama

海上保安庁警備救難部国際刑事課課長補佐 /

International Criminal Investigation Division,  
Guard and Rescuer Department, Japan Coast Guard

### Outline of ReCAAP and ISC

**CDR. ATSUSHI TOHYAMA**  
Deputy Director  
International Criminal Investigation Division  
Japan Coast Guard

### Today's Contents

- Background of establishment of ReCAAP
- Outline of ReCAAP
- Outline and functions of ISC
- Information network of ISC
- Information flows and responses
- Cooperation on capacity building for law enforcement organizations
- Proposal on counter measure against piracy/armed robbery

ReCAAP: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ship in Asia  
ISC: Information Sharing Center

### Background of Establishment of ReCAAP



- Increasing the serious piracy and armed robbery cases against ships around Asian sea.
- Threat against safety of life and maritime transportation.

### Background of Establishment of ReCAAP

All cases happens at the borderless sea.  
International syndicate involves in some cases.  
Lack of the skill and equipment of maritime law enforcement organizations in some countries.



**Regional Cooperation is very important for counter measures against piracy and armed robbery cases around Asian sea.**

### Background of Establishment of ReCAAP

- Apr. 2000: Tokyo Appeal and Model Action Plan
- Nov. 2001: ReCAAP was mooted/launched by the Japanese Prime Minister at the Head of ASEAN + 3 meeting
- Nov. 2004: ReCAAP agreement was realized
- Jun. 2006: India was the 10<sup>th</sup> member country to deposit their instrument of ratification
- Sep. 2006: ReCAAP has come into force

### Outline of ReCAAP

#### 3 Main purpose of the ReCAAP


- Establish the information sharing network through the ISC
- Cooperation for enhance the capacity building of the maritime law enforcement organizations
- Enhance the cooperation among the contracting countries

## Outline and functions of ISC

- ISC is Established in Singapore
- Information network consisting of ReCAAP parties Focal Points to enable information exchange
- Functions of ISC
  - Manage and maintain expeditious flow of information relating to piracy/armed robbery
  - Collect, collate and analyze information
  - Prepare and disseminate statistics and report
  - Facilitate capacity building
  - Sharing of best practices

## Information network of ISC

The information treated by ISC is about the Piracy=Maritime crime. It isn't included any security information.



## Information flows and responses



## Cooperation on Capacity building for law enforcement organizations



## Proposal on counter measures against piracy/armed robbery

- Respect for sovereignty of all countries
- Counter Measure by use law enforcement power
- Establish the cooperation network of law enforcement organizations
- Enhance the law enforcement organization's skill (Capacity building)

Thank you for your attention



## Maritime Activities in The Choke Points of The Indian Ocean

Prabhakaran Paleri\*

Director General Indian Coast Guard

*India and Japan are two responsible and exceptional countries with many common traits that repeatedly recondition their mutual understanding to higher values. Sublime lessons of traditions and history, based on human values and drive towards better living, have pushed the countries closer in their quest for advancement through cooperation. Together they can achieve their national goals with the power of mutual support in a confident geostrategic environment. They are poised for growth globally. They are also time-honoured and proven maritime powers. This paper is prepared against this conviction and appreciation towards advancement of Indo-Japan relations for mutual benefit in the maritime scenario.*

Economic significance of the oceans is increasing in the more or less formally globalised world today. Oceans cover 71 per cent of the earth with their choke points where they narrow down dividing continents into geostrategic maritime segments. Navigation in the narrow straits of these choke points has always been a challenge to seafarers not only by their constricted passageways, but also the strategic problems they can induce in marine passage from one segment to another. In the Indo-Japan maritime convergence, the route often specified is the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and passageway to Japan through Malacca Strait (South China Sea and north of it) —the JIA sea route. The route is significant by its expanse, choke points and strategic dimensions with disputed areas abounding, especially past the South China Sea towards Japan. In analysing the security concerns of such vast area, the difficulty is not the constantly changing paradigms of geostrategic appreciation and political view points, but also the concerns the stateless and non-state actors throw up as challenges. Historically, this terrain has seen dominant external players. The terrain is not conflict free. There are many unresolved disputes. Most of them are expected to persist. The terrain is not exclusive to the rim countries even for military build up. There are external forces. Regulating military build up in the ocean is not an easy task considering the vastness of the ocean, and limitations of territorial waters. Changes have to be seen in global perspective. The turning points towards change in the maritime security scenario are the UNCLOS in 1982 and the end of Cold War in 1991. The perception of global maritime security has changed since then. There are better opportunities for benefiting from the oceans and extending cooperation under geostrategic understanding with external players.

---

\* Dr. Prabhakaran Paleri is the former director general of the Indian Coast Guard.

Analysing the security dimension of maritime Asia should spring up from this perspective. They are often intricate and complex. Undefined and inward looking interests induce ominous apprehensions while analysing suitability of a strategic approach. Individual competence of a strategic analyst alone cannot rein in the variances associated with decision-making. A lot more depend on the chosen approach for analysing the changing security paradigm. The most preferred and sought after approach for analysis is the “worst-case scenario,” since it simplifies the approach model. In such cases, often there is no place for sanguinity in arriving at a solution, since identification of the worst-case scenario is always ingrained in maximum threat perception, and the pessimism associated with it. Every situation is disparate. Analysis of the past can often mislead application in a futuristic scenario. A step away is the dimensional approach, though less preferred, since there is a requirement of serious interaction and real-time analysis. There is a feeling of complexification of parameters in such an approach. In a dimensional approach the decisions have positive and pragmatic lining and is often done in a cooperative and responsive environment. Often, it doesn’t slip beyond imaginary realms, because such scenario cannot be visualised unless the dimensions are identified and the terrain is understood. The scenario built under dimensional analysis will be close to reality. There lies the checkpoint for deviation resulting from alarmingly negative diagnosis.

This paper deals with the dimensional analysis of the activities in the maritime choke points and their implications in the economic security scenario. The area concerned telescopes to the JIA sea route. In any analysis, it is important to understand the terrain, and the aspirations and apprehensions of its people futuristically while analysing the dimensions. In the ocean philosophy, the people who occupy the terrain are those around it, not on the rim alone, and affected by it from the maritime security<sup>1</sup> perspective. Basic idea is to understand the people and the differences in their mindset. The area is densely populated and conflict-ridden, dominated by vastly asymmetrical ideologies and constantly shifting pressure points. The region is highly influenced by players external to it and will continue to be so. All these lead to varied issues and view points within diverse ethnic and cultural heritage, and aggressive and often brutal historic background. Much needed homogeneity in decision-making will be absent. It is where India and Japan is precariously poised at asymmetrical vantage points at the flanks of a terrain that is curved in a catenary of ocean passage. Majority Asia is suspended within this catenary. Therefore, activities therein will impact upon the regions collective and individual security and associated economics.

---

<sup>1</sup> Maritime Security is defined by the author in a research study as “*the all encompassing complementary faction of national security of a maritime nation from an ocean specific terrain assessment applicable to that nation.*”



The choke points of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) of the JIA sea route are vital from strategic point of view, though the centre of gravity of the overall maritime security precept may lie elsewhere. The activities at the choke points will weigh very heavily against the identified centre of gravity that may shift with time. In a dimensional approach, it is the future perspective that is to be arrived at with respect to the present; past may not hold much insight, though could help in appreciating the trend.

Historically, the regions of Asia were maritime savvy though less adventurous than their period counterparts elsewhere for whom the oceans were economic and resource highways. Today, the interests of maritime nations in their waters are need based and security centred. The interests of maritime Asia are to be seen accordingly. This will prompt them for geostrategic alliance within the rim countries. And they are not alone. There are external influences too within the terrain. It is also pragmatic to limit interests within the boundaries for dimensional analysis.

The maritime perspective of the region is linked with the terrain specificity of the influencing oceans. The pressures of geostrategic asymmetry are more visible in the ocean environment, since the terrain cannot be easily limited by rigid boundaries. As mentioned earlier, the area of interest covers the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and beyond, and the seas within and adjacent, if the maritime dimension has to be holistically analysed under ideal conditions of mutual cooperation and understanding. There are many choke points along the SLOC on the JIA sea route: Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait, Balabac Strait, Mondaro Strait and the Torres Strait north of Australia on the side. The strategic ocean area (Figure.1.) will encompass the area within the parallels of latitude 10 degrees South and 46 degrees North, and longitudes 56 degrees East and 144 degrees East. The purpose of the mapping is to include all the choke points mentioned above for strategic convenience.

## The Strategic Ocean Area




Figure.1.

The choke points are not to be visualised as centres of gravity for reasons that the concept of centre of gravity in strategic appreciation is singular and fluctuating, and is not based on limitations in operation. Choke points are probable decision blockade centres, or operationally limited segments in maritime thinking. They need extra care, but need not serve as gravity centres. This is the researched understanding in the current terrain specific analysis. Among the choke points along the JIA sea route, the Strait of Hormuz and Malacca Straits demand special mention (Figure.2.), because the traffic normally flows through them into the main SLOC. While the choice of Strait of Hormuz is on geographical imperative, Strait of Malacca figures in the economics of shipping. Every other route is economically constrained. The Strait of Hormuz at the entrance (exit) of the Persian Gulf is a troublesome area under the current context and is expected to remain unchanged with respect to the activities for years to come as long as the flow oil will decided the destiny of Persian Gulf. Operation in the area has become extremely difficult for small time commercial interests who are now inclined to shift to coasts north of Africa avoiding Iran and Iraq. Operations off the coast of Somalia northeast of Africa offers unregulated freedom, but has lead to a new phenomenon under the prevailing

conditions—protectionist piracy. It is the kind of piracy where the hijackers' interest is in ransom money than the vessel and cargo. Actually it amounts to protection money under an authoritative clan for operating in the area. Defaulters are hijacked till ransom is paid. Clashes between rival clans in otherwise governance-less Somalia have drifted into the sea where everyone is territorially aggressive. Such piracy does not seem to exist anywhere else in the world. It is an offshoot of the current scenario inside the Persian Gulf with the conflict in Iraq, and Iran remaining a defiant adventurist. Indian dhow operators and the South Korean fishers are victims of such piratical attacks. Somali piracy has also seriously affected commercial fishing industry in the area that has abundant stock of yellow fin tuna, a high value species in fisheries economics.

The scenario is different in Malacca Strait. It is a narrow strait and thereby a vital choke point in Asian maritime commerce. It has all the potential to become a troubled area that should worry not only the littorals but also those who are at the extreme ends of passage. Japan and India can obviously be affected. India may face fall out even from incidents in the area other than just transport restrictions since its islands in the Bay are close to the Strait. Currently a lot of attention is paid to this aspect though in the early days it had only experienced the stray winds of the Cold War. Lately the Malacca Strait has gained the attention of the community in a serious note with respect to:

- increased incidence of piracy in and around the area,
- growing Islamic fundamentalism in the neighbourhood,
- incidence of political rakishness that could lead to instability,
- tendencies of insurgency,
- simmering disputes between nations in the neighbourhood that may escalate into military actions,
- proneness to natural disasters that could lead to colossal damages,
- external power politics,
- fear of terror strikes,
- smuggling,
- trafficking.




Figure.2.

There is a danger of Malacca Strait transforming into a lane of traffic (sea lane of traffic—SLOT) for illegal activities of trafficking, and breeding ground for militant activism in the unlikely event of piracy getting graduated into more serious business. Unlikely, because piracy in its original form is for economic reasons. This applies even to Somalian piracy. Likely, because pirates are experts whom probable militant organisations may lure into terrorist activities on a consideration. However the intelligence agencies believe that maritime terrorists will be a class apart from pirates who will be trained by professional naval forces of the world since terror is a political weapon under asymmetrical conditions. There are indications of such training being imparted by professional navies to prospective marine

terrorists. An interesting point here is the case of vanishing tug boats in Malacca Straits. The purpose is considered to be training militants since pirating tugs does not yield much economic consideration. Area around Malacca Strait is also prone to underwater disturbances and tsunamis. The Strait can be incapacitated by any of the natural or human induced activity and choke the economics of maritime transport at any time. The collateral damages will be to the environment and geostrategic imbalances. The littorals—Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the IMS countries—have reasons to worry. They are seemingly aware, but will not be able to handle serious issues. They may expect external support without affecting sovereignty.

An example for an issue-based cooperation is in combating piracy and armed robbery at sea. Expectations of the international community also play a major part in inducing regional cooperation. International Maritime Organisation (IMO) advocates maritime co-operation in many faculties that include combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, maritime search and rescue and marine environmental protection.

While the threat perception of each of the nations within the JIA terrain is different—naval supremacy, boundary disputes, piracy and armed robbery, maritime fraud, militancy and insurgency related activities, other transnational ocean crimes, environmental damages, poaching and overexploitation of fisheries, illegal immigration, and refugee influx among them—the choke points may yield asymmetrical advantage that could be effectively utilised by the perpetrators if efficient policing is absent under multilateral international agreements. Existing confidence building measures are not competent to break completely the disinclination for dialogue and diplomacy. Attitudes are country specific with dotted commonality. Military security is in geostrategic contest. There are flash points and movement of fleets in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The latest issue of “war on terror” has more or less “legitimised” serious naval operations at sea and more in the Indian Ocean. Apparently, naval operations in the strategic area are expected to enlarge.

Threats can be intentional or accidental. Monstrous oil spills at sea can choke the straits and damage economic and environmental facilities vital to the region. These are not wanton thoughts, but realities in a security paradigm that is ever shifting. The peculiar attribute of the oceans is that they bring proximity and isolation together in human interaction. It is applicable to even choke points and narrow straits. It is this factor that defines the threat interface. It needs to be studied and understood in detail.

The most significant point in maritime security assessment of maritime nations is that a good number of them will find the centre of gravity poised outside their maritime geometry.

That is the key point in dimensional analysis of maritime security. It has to be identified and protected. The secret of total maritime security lies within it. This also depends upon the will and capability for interoperation.

The Government of the United States of America organised a meeting (February 2006) in capacity building of the IMS States—Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore—the littorals, in enhancing the safety and security of Malacca Strait including protecting its environment. It was in support of the invitation, of the Jakarta meeting (September 2005), to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to convene a series of follow-on meetings for, *inter alia*, user States to identify possible assistance to respond to the needs of the littoral States. The meeting also identified similar problems that have been already mentioned in this paper, the objectives were reviewed under the aegis of IMO to help determine appropriate burden sharing, interoperability, sustainability and prevention of redundancy; and focus on planning and capacity building, information-sharing, technical assistance, training and exercises, counter-terrorism, and developing partnerships with the private sector, etc. There will be follow on meetings. Basically the meeting amounted to calling upon the states to coordinate user-State assistance by providing a forum for interested States to exchange views on their ability to provide resources, develop a process, framework and way ahead, and review levels of need and implementation timetables prior to subsequent meetings with the littoral States. Its goals were to bring like-minded user states and potential assisting States together to discuss implementation of assistance, with particular emphasis on burden-sharing, inter-operability, sustainability and prevention of redundancy. The commitment of the United States was emphasised in the meeting.

The issues of choke points in maritime passage are common. They can be summarized as:

- protection of marine environment,
- protection against transnational crimes—smuggling contraband and currency; trafficking in arms, drugs and humans, money laundering, piracy and armed robbery, crimes at sea (on board), stowaways and illegal migration, hijacking, piracy and armed robbery, intentional pollution, etc.
- protection against militant activities,
- preservation of the safety of navigation,
- preservation of natural resources.

Pragmatically, both the littorals and the user States of the marine passageway through the choke points have reasons to worry. Therefore, they have to establish a fertile ground to address shared interests. India and Japan are user states of the choke points on the JIA sea

route. Protection of the sea route could best be enhanced by collaborative partnership, particularly for the Straits through which one-third of the world's shipping and half its oil passes. A disruption of shipping through the Straits, regardless of cause, would have an immediate and substantial negative effect on the economy not only locally on the littorals but also globally on those who depend on the oceans. That means every nation in a globalised world.

Any State that is a willing partner in global relationship for a common cause in establishing maritime security in the oceans has to respect the sovereign interests and territorial integrity of the littorals failing which confidence will erode. This is a key factor. Those committing unlawful acts against seafarers in the Straits are devoid of such respect. They exploit national maritime boundaries and remote areas within the territorial seas of nearby nations. They penetrate the seams in the maritime security framework. Therefore, collective security becomes the new buzzword in beyond-border understanding in international relations

Cooperative mechanisms could lead the way to a solution. It has to have the consensus of the littorals. Interagency programmes and activities including training and community interaction could be established at the tactical level. It means the parties involved will have to care for burden-sharing, inter-operability, sustainability and prevention of redundancy, with the agreed priorities and needs of the littoral States. It could be achieved by India and Japan by focusing on planning and capacity building, technical assistance, information sharing, training and exercises under tacit understanding of the littorals. Private industry participation is another area that could follow once the system is in place. Such issues are also discussed at various levels in the governments and in many programmes such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) through the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) agenda and the Asian Institutions Fund, etc. besides IMO.

Recommendations for a startup are information sharing, technical assistance, training assistance including hands on training, joint exercise between symmetrical forces (e.g. coast guard and coast guard; navy and navy) and cross service exercises (e.g. between the coast guards and the navies).

The support the choke point littorals require will be information sharing, training in the conduct of sea boarding, mine countermeasures, explosive ordnance disposal, staff talks, command and communications facilities, fusion, analysis and dissemination of actionable information. There will also be requirement for capability support including navigational facilities, ship handling, ship repair and maintenance, logistics and, in advanced cases, even

in ship building. Other add on areas are:

- interoperable and secure communications
- common incident procedures and defined points of contacts
- common legal and regulatory requirements
- common training and standards, including joint exercises
- joint maintenance, logistics and operations support
- maritime law enforcement agreements.

Regional cross-border arrangements are vital to an effective all hazards response, whether the threats be terrorism, transnational crime, maritime accident or environmental disasters while handling threats at choke points. Effective laws and law enforcement are needed to prevent illicit exploitation of the choke points, eliminate safe havens around it, and alter the permissive environment in remote areas – detect, deter, interdict and defeat criminal elements, including pirates and terrorists. Many of these principles are already embodied in agreements between the littorals. Two examples are:

- *Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures*
- *Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)*

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), it is understood, is happy to work with ReCAAP information sharing centre. It is a welcome move. The IMB believes gathering of primary information from ships attacked should be done by a neutral third party with confidence of shipping industry and governments. The role of the information sharing center should be to coordinate law enforcement actions. Australia has shown intentions to accede to ReCAAP after it enters into force.

The capabilities of nations for power projection and enforcement at sea are at variance. India and Japan have powerful maritime forces whose capabilities can be diverted towards problem solving in maritime Asia in the general interest of the littorals with mutual understanding. The Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) at Kuala Lumpur under the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the Regional Information Sharing Centre (RISC) under the ReCAAP at Singapore can undertake the serious job of piracy monitoring and reporting for assessing insurance fraud and enforcement respectively. The shortfalls that limit regional cooperation and maritime self-reliance also spring out from the remains of external maritime subjugation of the littorals. The object will be to overcome the roadblocks caused by inertia of the past and internal conflicts in the region. The resulting constraints could be obviated



under an open policy statement applicable to the littorals under the Indo-Japan initiative. For this India and Japan need to have a very harmonious information sharing system and will to cooperate beyond differences if any. That, in international relations, means reaching beyond the reach.

## Information Sharing on Maritime Security between India and Japan

Kazumine Akimoto

Senior Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation


As reported at the New Delhi Dialogue in 15<sup>th</sup> December, 2005, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF) had set up a system for information gathering / analysis / evaluation / distribution on maritime security and started publishing “OPRF MARINT Monthly Report”.

This paper is presented to remind the participants of the OPRF Maritime Security Intelligence System (MARSECINT System) and proposes further cooperation between India and Japan in information sharing which was agreed to promote at the First Round Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security.

### 1. OPRF MARSECINT System

#### a . Activities

The system for maritime security information gathering / analysis / evaluation / distribution is shown in figure 1. In this system, team members are concerned with the activities as follows,




Coverage will be given to military affairs, security situations, politics, diplomacy, economy, and, resources and environment which could cause dispute and conflict over utilization of the seas and oceans. For the time being, coverage is focused on security issues such as piracy, armed robbery and terrorism, force build up and operations of navies and coast guards, international disputes, international relations, resources and environment in the JIA sea route.

The OPRF MARSECINT System is composed of Maritime Security Information Spot (MARSECINFOR Spot) and Maritime Security Intelligence Center (MARSECINT Center). In MARSECINFOR Spot, information is collected broadly from the internet, mass-media, theses, magazines and others. Collected information is sent to MARSECINT Center for analysis and evaluation. In the MARSECINT Center, the intelligence team analyze, evaluate, and check the reliability and make an OPRF Maritime Intelligence Monthly report (OPRF MARINT Monthly Report). In the case of immediate distribution is needed, the intelligence team will make a special report in timely manner. In the future, it is considered that the information collected in databank can be accessed by outside.

The Information Evaluation Meeting and the Editorial Meeting are to be held in every month for evaluating the significance, reliability and accuracy of some information. Usually, information is evaluated its significance and reliability through the examination of a drafted monthly report in the Editorial Meeting.

Figure 1. OPRF MARSECINT System



b . Source of information

In detail, the information is gathered broadly and timely from as follows:

a. Internet information

- a-1 Home pages of international and local government officials or public sectors.
- a-2 Internet delivery information of media
- a-3 Internet delivery information of private institutes

- b. Newspapers and TV broadcast
  - c. Theses and publications
  - d. HUMINT
  - e. Information exchange with other institutes
  - f. Open information of government, ministries and agencies
- c . Classification and storage of information

Collected information is classified as shown in figure 2 and stored in the PC or library room as soft-file or hard copy. Filing is done in accordance with the category as “date-source-type”.

Figure 2. Classification

Classification
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Type of information <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a-1 Military</li> <li>a-2 Law and order</li> <li>a-3 Diplomacy and security policy</li> <li>a-4 Economy and resources</li> <li>a-5 International dispute</li> <li>a-6 Sea lane and sea transportation</li> <li>a-7 Development and research of the seas</li> <li>a-8 Fishery</li> <li>a-9 Marine environment</li> </ul> </li> <li>b. Source of information <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>web. : Internet information</li> <li>med.: Media information (newspaper or TV broadcast)</li> <li>pub.: Thesis and publication</li> <li>hum.: HUMINT</li> <li>ins.: Information from other institute</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

d . Publication of OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

OPRF MARINT Monthly Report is written by the team members in MARSECINT Center and published by Chairman of OPRF. Now the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report is distributed as a hard-copy brochure and a bulletin in the internet home-page of OPRF.

We are improving the way of distribution and contents of the report while implementing current system.

Contents of the OPRF MARINT Monthly Report is shown in figure 3.


Figure 3. Contents of OPRF MARINT Monthly Report

Introduction: main point of the report
1 Intelligence bulletin: various information gathered within the month
2 Intelligence assessment: pick up some agenda and analyze
Sources of the information: indicate the sources of the information

## 2. Proposed Information Sharing between India and Japan

As a means for realizing an idea on “Maritime Security Information Network” agreed at the First Round Dialogue, it is proposed to make up an information exchange line between India and Japan. Concretely speaking, we set up an information exchange line using e-mail between the MARSECINFOR Spot of OPRF System and some office or persons in India. MARSECINFOR Spot will send information to both OPRF MARSECINT Center and Indian side simultaneously. It should be useful for Indian side to make some independent information report or to make it reference for security study. If Indian side send some information to the OPRF MARSECINFOR Spot in a daily or weekly or monthly base, it should be very much helpful for the examination at the OPRF MARSECINT Center. We may call it IJ Information Exchange Line or RA Information Exchange Line.

Figure 4 indicates an information exchange line between India and Japan.



In the future, it may be interested if we exchange not only maritime security information but also other information such as politics, economy, shipping industry, results of the studies, request for resources or materials for research and even the family talk.

## Inter-Cultural Information Sharing: Imperatives and Impediments

Sanjay Chaturvedi

Indian Ocean Research Group, Panjab University

### Introduction

The joint statement on 'Ocean Security Cooperation', adopted at Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security in Tokyo, on 26th of November 2004, proposed that "Information Network of Indo-Japan Ocean Security" should be established. It was stated that, "...information activities on ocean security are to cover a wide range of problems such as environment, resources, and search and rescue" (The Institute of Ocean Policy, Ship & Ocean Foundation, 2004: 2). Considerable ground has been covered since, especially through OPRF-MARINT Monthly Reports, under the auspices of the study project named, "Information Gathering/Distribution Program on Maritime Security in East and South Asia, since April 2005.

A number of presentations were also made on various possible schemes of maritime security information network during the last Indo-Japan dialogue in New Delhi on 14-15 December 2005. It was pointed out by Mr. Kazumine Akimoto (2005: 2) in his concise but thoughtful paper that, "coverage will be given to military affairs, security situations, politics, diplomacy, economy, and resources and environment which could cause dispute and conflict over utilization of the seas and the oceans." With regard to information analysis and evaluation, the paper appropriately underlined the importance of significance, reliability and accuracy of information. In my own paper (Chaturvedi 2005), while drawing insights from cultural theory, I had emphasized the need to integrate the perspectives of various solidarities/stakeholders in the entire process of seeking and analyzing 'relevant' information. We might also recall some of the critical issues raised by Dr. Prabhakaran Paleri in his paper on the proposed maritime information centre in India. He pointed out that, "the busy and complex JIA sea route is the core interest area under the agreement that comprises *various stakeholders by virtue of being geostrategically present in the area or being players from outside*" (Paleri, 2005: 2). (emphasis supplied)

Dr. Paleri had also sounded a note of caution, which, in my view, is worth recalling: "the purpose of a dedicated centre is meant to filter such information to derive what is needed for analysis and application. In this manner the centre through networking will limit the problems of information overload –a serious issue in the knowledge world" (2005:3). While underlining the importance of ensuring reliability of information, transparency of exchange, and track II cooperative frameworks, Dr. Paleri was quite emphatic in clarifying that, "the function of the centres or that of the network is not to gather or transfer intelligence by unacceptable means but to acquire information through available open sources for analysis

and application in absolute transparency. Such information is for sharing between both the countries under applicable disclaimers” (Ibid.: 8).

The major objective of this paper is to outline a model for information sharing and analysis against the backdrop of progress made so far by India-Japan ocean security dialogue. Within the theme assigned to me for this particular round of dialogue, I intend to focus more specifically on *continuity* and *change* in Indian Ocean geopolitics. Geopolitics, as pointed out by Simon Dalby (2005:1), “usually refers to the largest scale understanding of the arrangements of world power. Invoking the term suggests both matters of importance and their geographical arrangements which in turn situate and constrain states in their rivalries and struggles for power”. In understanding 'the geopolitical' as a broad socio-cultural phenomena it is important to appreciate both that geopolitics is much more than a specialized knowledge used by practitioners of statecraft and that the different facets of its practices are interconnected in various ways to quotidian constructions of identity, security and danger.

Admiral Kazuya Natsukawa has raised a number of significant issues in his opening insightful address for the II-2 Indo-Japan dialogue on ocean security, including the security of sea lanes of communication, marine ecology, proliferation of WMD and various illegal activities. He has also made a pertinent reference to the conflict of interest issues. With regard to each one of the issues raised by Admiral Natsukawa in his paper, including geopolitics, it is possible to underline the urgency for seeking, sharing and analyzing information by the two nations with rich cultural heritage. In order to make this worthwhile pursuit much more meaningful and policy-relevant, it might be worthwhile to look for various possible theoretical-analytical models with the aid of which the information centres/networks in India and Japan could seek, analyze and share information on comprehensive ocean security.

What this paper intends to do, therefore, is to relocate and revisit some of the issue-areas covered so far by Japan-India maritime dialogue, especially with regard to JIA (Japan-Indian Ocean-Arabian Sea) sea route, within some kind of an integrated systems model embracing the myriad complexities of ocean-space straddling Pacific and Indian Oceans. For such analytical purposes, the “framework for systems simulation of the reciprocal actions of political actors and their environment, embracing the dimensions of structures, time and space”, as proposed by John House (1984), could be extremely useful. I would also argue that applying the ‘Triangle Metaphor’ to geopolitical equations among the great powers with a stake in the security of JIA sea route (where none of the three actors, for example US-China-India or China-US-Japan, could act independently towards either of the other two without taking into consideration the third party), within the framework for systems simulation, might also yield some interesting insights.

Before proceeding further let me clarify that the thrust of this preliminary attempt is exploratory and not normative. It is based on the assumption that the challenge of

information sharing between India and Japan is integral to their commitment to peaceful uses of the world ocean-space and resolution of conflicts through diplomatic means. A major necessity in this regard emanates from the extraordinary complexity of issue-areas placed on the agenda of ongoing maritime dialogue between Japan and India. Human interactions in the JIA sea route, are ever more intense and complex. Whereas a major impediment in the way of realizing the objective of policy-relevant information, in my view, *relates to the absence of a systemic perspective with the help of which an event or a series of events could possibly be calibrated or virtual exercises based on scenarios could be conducted.*

### **Indian Ocean Model for Seeking, Sharing and Analyzing Information**

John House, in his presidential address to the Annual Conference of the Institute of British Geographers, in January 1984, outlined, what he described as “a framework for systems simulation of interactions in the Indian Ocean, at all scale levels and for all political actors, in the interests of tension management” (House, 1984). Writing against the backdrop of the Cold War, he argued that,

A systems framework, can, nevertheless, be postulated and disaggregated to cover relationships between sets of actors within segments of environment. The model framework conditions the mental maps of geostrategic decision-takers. Such mental maps are made up from image plans. These may be both positive and negative sets of presuppositions, political, economic, social, strategic or tactical in character, the visual and logical attributes of the geographical mind. When set within cultural-historical as well as spatial contexts, there is some similarity to Mackinder’s ‘organizer’ concept. Behavioral spaces are the geographical fields within which activity is generated and diffused, the ‘horse-sense’ concept of Mackinder, the sphere of influences to others. The constructive purpose of the model framework is to improve tension management in the national and international communities, to increase adaptive and diminish maladaptive behavior.

According to John House, the key stages of analysis (see Figure 1) are, first, the character and significance of the Indian Ocean as interpreted in the image plan and behavioral spaces of decision-takers; secondly, the objectives and interactions of the superpower(s) [or for that matter major powers] with each other, with client states and, finally the degree of cooperation among littoral states. He located the interrelationships within the context of changing events, and focused on the use of sea power as an instrument of state policy. He also talked about the degree of effectiveness and the extent of positive tension management achieved, by wars, threats of force (including sea power), bases, military or economic aid, treaties or alliances.



His key argument was that an evaluation of system stability, or instability, needs to be assessed within a wider global context. It is to a more detailed account of various stages of analysis that we turn next.




FIGURE 1. A framework for system simulation in the Indian Ocean

### *The System Frame: the Indian Ocean: Continuity and Change*

Since John House was writing during the Cold War period, it is not surprising that he approached the Indian Ocean-space in terms of the then predominant geopolitical-strategic visions of the ocean space. For example, while referring to divergent views on the strategic worth of the Indian Ocean, he pointed out that the external powers, particularly the US and the then USSR, perceive a perhaps illusory Indian Ocean unity. He also highlighted the extensive use of terms and concepts such as “the fulcrum of the power struggle of our times” and a “universal flank”, both to the Asian inland containment concept of Spykman and to Brzezinski’s arc of crisis through the Middle East into Africa. Writing in mid-1980s, John House conceded that “few observers have regarded the littoral states themselves as reflecting any kind of unity” (Ibid.: 10).

Few observers have regarded the littoral states themselves as reflecting any kind of unity. According to Vali, (1976: 3) “the Indian Ocean is not a unit. It consists of countries which have great diversity of race, politics, strengths and opportunities”, a kind of ethnic, religious and cultural chessboard. Whereas Wall (1975: 139) would assert that the Indian Ocean is “neither economically, nor socially coherent, nor are many states in it. Such states are often newly independent, unstable, vulnerable, with lack of connectivity or linkages to others.” According to Peter Lehr (2005: 1), “it may sound odd for a specialist on the Indian Ocean to admit that there is nothing like an Indian Ocean region –at least not in any meaningful sense beyond mere geography –and that the prospects for security cooperation in the Indian Ocean as a whole are also bleak”. Whereas John House (1984: 10) would argue that, “...ironically, it was the threat to peace and security arising from the intrusion and activities of the naval forces of both superpowers that lead in 1971 to the first UN-sponsored Zone of Peace proposals, on behalf of the littoral states. A sense of collective Indian Ocean identity under external threat has developed further, in the meeting of 44 littoral and hinterland states in 1979, and more recent re-iteration of the UN Zone of Peace Proposals in 1982. Yet dissention and diversity have never been set aside.” More recently, Don Berlin (2004: 255) has argued that,

The great base race will have important implications for Asia and beyond. Geographically, the rise of new strategic bases emphasizing forward defense is one of a variety of factors at work that deepening the identity and coherence of the Indian Ocean region. In terms of military space, these facilities are linking states (e.g. India and Malaysia) that in recent history were relatively separate from one another. At the same time, the advent and strategic reach of these installations will blur the boundaries and weaken the salience of some of Asia’s traditional sub-regions; that is Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. In so doing, and obviously in conjunction with forces not addressed here, the Indian Ocean region itself will grow, absorbing once peripheral zones. *As the ocean figuratively overflows its banks, capital cities from Asmara (Eritrea) to Dushanbe (Tajikistan) to Kuala Lumpur will be incorporated in various degrees into this enlarged global subsystem. This process could be driving the region towards a status reminiscent of the large, highly interactive zone that existed in the centuries before the final triumph of the West in these waters beginning in the mid-eighteenth century.* (emphasis supplied)

While there is presently a relatively low level of functional cohesion among regional states, the orientation to the Ocean creates a degree of common interest and forms the basis for a potentially greater degree of functional interaction in the future. Furthermore, apart from the

colonial heritage, one critically important commonality of Indian Ocean states is that the majority are members of the developing world and few states possess high human development indices. Common developmental problems (Kerr, 1981; Appleyard and Ghosh, 1988) and their implications for national and regional security, defined in the broadest sense, can also provide a basis for increased South-South cooperation.

### **The Political Actors/Big Powers on Indian Ocean Stage: Mapping Behavioral Spaces**

It is to state the obvious perhaps that in view of considerable incompatibility and variety of image plans the interaction in behavioral spaces is inevitably complex. The image plans of external powers, including India, China, Japan, European Union, Russia, as well as the one and only superpower, namely the United States of America, are, in each case a unique mix of political, ideological, economic/social and strategic/tactical ingredients. The behavioral spaces of these actors, according to John House (1984:10), “encompass an appreciation of ocean logistics, including access for trade, the search for bases, recruitment and support for client states or allies, and counteraction towards adversarial states, and their external protectors. The projection of such policy plans is directed to maximizing adaptive behavior in the system, to the advantage of the instigator.”

We might note in passing, however, that the formulation (and projection) of such policy plans as mentioned above is cumulative, but not necessarily regular or irreversible. One possible method of illustrating the spatial outcome of outside influences exercised (Figure 3), say by China or the United States, on the JIA route, is to chronicle and date specific evidence (treaties, agreements, including defense agreements). This may be followed by a detailed analysis of unfolding events over a particular period of time. The proportions of the bar-graphs mapped thus illustrate the influence by outside powers on, for example, the countries located on the rim of JIA route/SLOCs –Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, among several others. The ways and means of bringing influence or rather leverage, to bear include trade (see figures 4, 5, 6 and 7), especially that on preferential terms; overseas credits or grants, with an overtly political purpose (see figure 8), arms transfers (see figure 9), on which reliable data/information is hard to find; naval or military diplomacy (see figure 10), particularly the exercise of sea power; and cultural/educational training programmes. The information and analysis on political alignments, trade and arms transfer is likely to reveal the spatial working out and degree of success in strategic policies.

### **The Degree of Cooperation among Littoral and Hinterland States**

It is fairly common for the Western commentators to underestimate the geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean region. There are at least five interrelated reasons why this might be so. First, some observers perceive the region as only comprising the “Third” World,

and thus, by implication, it is of lesser significance. Second, some Western observers simply remain ignorant about the geopolitical orientation of regional states due to the existence of other ocean priorities, such as the Pacific or the Atlantic. Third, those analysts who underestimate the geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean, to some extent, still exhibit a kind of 'colonial' perspective; as if the region had been frozen in time prior to the decolonization of most regional states. Fourth, ignorance can also be as a result of the fact that more needs to be written about the geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean in general and the geopolitical orientation of the Indian Ocean states in particular. The latter is especially problematical from the viewpoint of the limited number of available works on regional states written from an 'inside' perspective ---for example for the "Indian Ocean triangle" states, Australia (Rumley, 1999), India (Panikkar, 1995; Chaturvedi, 1998) and South Africa (Mills, 1998). A fifth point is that few Indian Ocean states provide any explicit public discussion of their Indian Ocean orientations, with the notable exception of 'India's Look East' strategy and Australia's 'Look West' policy. How many of them are actually oriented towards the Indian Ocean it self a debatable issue.


Indian Ocean possesses considerable geopolitical importance, if only because of its operation as a Middle East and East Asia, for example, all rely on uninterrupted access through the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, as Christian Bouchard (2004) points out, the Indian Ocean region comprises a number of sub-systems of varying geopolitical significance. He argues that it is only through the application of multi-scale analysis that the complexity of India Ocean geopolitics can be grasped. The Persian Gulf sub-system, which contains the greatest regional concentration of global oil reserves, also is a region of high internal fragmentation while possessing above average GNP per capita. Social, economic and political stability within these regional states and freedom of access through the Indian Ocean and contiguous seas by large oil consumers in the North is of inestimable importance to global economic stability.

The changing geopolitical significance of the India Ocean can be conveniently envisaged in reference to four principal stages---a pre-colonial phase, a colonial phase, a cold war phase and the present post Cold War phase. Ashley Jackson (2004) discusses the relevance of British colonial interests in the Indian Ocean from the eighteenth century until the twentieth century, focusing on the region's strategic significance. While the Indian Ocean *Pax Britannica*, which was established after the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, was shattered in 1941 by Japan, the region continued to be one of British hegemony until the 1960s, albeit as part of a reconfigured global order underwriting by the United States' power.

To a considerable degree, the geopolitical importance of Indian Ocean states increased considerably during the Cold War phase. Super power rivalry, especially from the late 1960s, propelled the search for regional client states in strategic locations and especially those which were reaching independence and had access to or proximity to important regional resources.

At about the same time that the superpower were 'invading' the British Lake, the British themselves decided to vacate it, and by implication, Western strategic interests were left in the hands of the United States. To some extent, the historical legacy of the structure of Cold War linkages in the Indian Ocean region still inhabits regional cohesion and inter-cultural dialogues (Rumley and Chaturvedi, 2004).

There are yet others who would discount the prospect for a consideration of Indian Ocean geopolitics due to the impacts of the processes of globalization. However, as Jean Houbert (2004) has argued, the global system of states remains as important today as the transnational capitalist economy. Furthermore, he suggests that, as far as the Indian Ocean region is concerned, the configuration of land and sea still remains highly significant geopolitically. With decolonization on land, power at sea actually become more important. In the post-Cold War period, Christian Bouchard (2004) argues that the Indian Ocean region has entered a new geopolitical era; what he refers to as the "Indianoceanic order". The structure and dynamics of this new "order" are seen to be articulated around five principal characteristics---regional heterogeneity, a system of Indian Ocean sub-regional sun-systems, the emergent IOR-ARC, a subordination to large foreign powers, and the geopolitical importance of the Ocean itself. According to Bouchard (Ibid.: 105), "Indian Ocean geopolitics is far more than specific oil issues and the military uses of the sea by the large foreign powers. It is multifaceted in nature and influenced by factors that operate at all scales, from local to global. It is especially rich in conflictual and cooperative dynamics at the sub-regional level. As one of its new features, emergent Indiaoceanic regionalism raises many new issues for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, if there is a clear quest for many cultural, economic, political and even strategic emancipation from the large foreign powers, then, this does not necessarily mean that broad and dynamic regional cooperation will successfully developed."



### Mapping “Rising” China: within the Emerging Strategic Triangle of US-China-India?

What I intend to do in this section, as concisely as possible, is to illustrate how various maps of meaning are being implanted on the phenomenon described as China’s rise to power. I hope the analysis in this section, extremely brief due to limitations of time and space, illustrates to some extent the difficulties and dilemmas involved in ensuring the most effective ways of seeking and sharing information about the behavior of a major ‘external’ power with considerable stake in JIA sea route in some kind of an analytical isolation. For many countries, including USA, Japan and India, the China’s “rise to power” is a matter of concern but what does it actually imply?

It is at this stage that I wish to bring in the metaphor of triangle into analysis, which has been quite popular in historical-analytical studies of big power relations. A triangle views the evolution of relations among three nation-states as an indispensable whole. What it implies is that one of the three actors makes a particular foreign policy decision towards a second actor either as a result of, or for the purpose of managing its relations with, the third actor. During the Cold War era, relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China were considered to form a “Great Triangle”. None of the three actors could act independently toward either of the other two without taking into consideration the geopolitical location, worldview, interests and likely responses of the third party. The metaphor of a triangle draws our attention towards the external sources of a government’s foreign policy and the factors that restrict the autonomy of its execution. Now that the Cold War global geopolitical order has changed there is an increasing interest in viewing relations among the United States,

Japan and China as constituting a triangle. At the same time, according to some analysts a new strategic triangle among USA, China and India is fast emerging from the flux in global geopolitics created by the end of the Cold War. According to John W. Garver (2002: 5),

The new triangle had taken clear form by the time of the South Asian nuclear tests of 1998, and is being consciously and enthusiastically “played” by strategists in all three capitals. Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi more frequently perceive each of their national interests as being adversely affected by an alignment of the other two against it, and thus a minuet of strategic triangular relations has resulted. Extant and emerging issues of concern to the strategic triangle are the India-China border dispute, establishing nuclear deterrents, the war on terrorism, relations with Pakistan, and political and economic influence in the South Asia-Indian Ocean region. The deep geopolitical rivalry between India and China, combined with the expanded influence of the United States, makes U.S. support of one Asian rival against the other an extremely important strategic factor. At the same time, there are leaders in both China and India who resent the U.S. global position and find attractive, if impractical, the possibility of identifying issues on which they might cooperate against the United States. Despite its potential importance, the origins, dynamics, and implications of this strategic triangle are not well understood and have already led to controversies over U.S. policy.

The idea of India-China- USA strategic triangle, even though debatable to some analysts, is quite interesting and even insightful. Having said that, I must hasten to add that what follows is an extremely sketchy account, since the purpose here is to critically reassess the model outlined by John House during the Cold War period. The pre-dominant perspective here is geopolitical and strategic.

### **Image Plans (Political)**

Fei-Ling Wang (2004) has described the motives behind the making of the current status-quo and risk-averse Chinese foreign policy. He pin points a three-P incentive structure that, in his view, is based on the political preservation of the CCP regime, China's economic *prosperity*, and Beijing's pursuit of *power* and *prestige*. These three motives are stable and overlapping, featuring Taiwan and the relationship with the United States as the key issues. Beijing is expected to be motivated by these peculiar motives over the next two decades; but new internal and external developments may greatly change these motives and generate new impetus for China's foreign policy. He argues that although the official line in Beijing is still the mild 'peaceful development', after a fling with the more majestic idea of 'peaceful rise', the

rise of nationalist emotions and demands in the PRC continues.

It has been argued by some analysts (see White, 2005), in reference to Australian government's policy, that those who optimistically expects that China's rise can be easily managed are mistaken. They predict US–China relations will be cooperative, and reject concerns that Australia may encounter hard choices between them. The skeptics would argue that this misplaced optimism seems to be based on the view that as China grows it will become increasingly integrated into a US-led global system. They warn that this amounts to overestimation of America's power, and underestimation of China's ambitions. In this view, the best one can hope for instead is that China and the US will cooperate in a concert of power, but the US will be very reluctant to make the necessary concessions to China for that to happen. So there is a real risk of even worse outcomes: Chinese primacy, sustained US–China hostility, or even war.

China's "rise" in South East Asia and its implications for the United States too has been a theme of extensive debate (see Economy, 2005). China's economic success has enabled it to pursue a greater role in international geopolitical economy. China, increasingly being acknowledged both as a regional and aspiring global power, is pursuing more active diplomacy in South East Asia. This is said to be reflected in growing trade relations, proposals for stronger security ties, and the signing of numerous cooperative agreements on issues as varied as environmental protection, drug trafficking, and public health. It is argued by some observers that "China has invested considerable effort to assuage the fears of its neighbors by adopting a foreign policy approach that is active, non-threatening, and generally aligned with the economic and security interests of the region" (Ibid.: 409). This positive diplomacy, it is argued "has clearly yielded some success, most notably in the trade realm, where China is rapidly emerging as an engine of regional economic growth and integration that may well challenge Japanese and American dominance in the next three to five years" (Ibid.).

### **Strategic (Naval) Doctrine and Practice**

Under this stage of analysis, according to John House (1984: 13), "interpretations must rest on doctrinal pronouncements, naval operations undertaken, identifying *modus operandi*, together with observer and target views. The pattern, frequency and composition of regular naval developments suggests a symbolic trip wire, a modest though deliberately visible presence, inadequate for distant/forward projection".

At sea, China's "oceanic offensive", her drive for a blue water fleet and her application of Mahan have brought her into the Indian Ocean (see Holmes and Toshi 2005: 23-51; Smita 2005). Since 1999 Chinese naval vessels have been making calls at Singapore, Malaysia, Pakistan and South Africa to test its strategic reach. For John House (1984: 13), in this way (including flag-showing and goodwill visits to countries with close ties or those with commercial links) the physical presence of warships is transferred into the psychological



presence in minds of decision-makers of the country at the receiving end. China's so called 'string of pearls' strategy focuses around the establishment of a series of access point in and across the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea, registering its presence in Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC), and general control. According to one study, "many Indians in the strategic community believe that real possibilities of a naval conflict erupting between the Indian and Chinese navies in the Indian Ocean region exist" (MacDonald, Danyluk and Donahue, A. 2005).

Many observers have noted that China's maritime challenge starts with the Malacca Straits. As India has moved forward to project its presence in the area, the PRC has been trying to circumvent this through discussions with Thailand on building a canal across the isthmus of Kra, which would directly link the South China Sea to the Bay of Bengal. As such it would allow ships to bypass the Malacca Strait, and India's forward presence there. China's burgeoning links with Myanmar are well established on land but also at sea (Mohan 2005; Boquerat 2001). During the 1990s Chinese maintenance and birthing facilities were established on the Little Coco Islands, just 18 kms north of the Andamans, with a major maritime and electronic intelligence station on Great Coco Island. Situated in the transit Alexandria Channel, this potentially allows Chinese access both to the Straits of Malacca and into the Bay of Bengal and further on. Other Chinese activities have been discerned along the Myanmar Hainggyi Islands, Kyakkame naval base, Margui Kyunsu naval base, Tannintharyi naval headquarters, Sittute naval base, Zadet Gyi naval base and Ayeyarwady naval headquarters.

China is also developed noticeable military links with energy-resource rich Bangladesh. Beijing concluded a comprehensive *Defense Cooperation Agreement* with Dacca in December 2002 (Kapila 2002, 2003). China's involvement in building a deep water port entry at Chittagong has also raised concerns. Its defense pact with Bangladesh can be invoked to allow use of the harbors at Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar as well as refueling facilities for its aircraft. There have also been Chinese efforts to gain influence in Sri Lanka. China has also made its influence felt in the Maldives islands, a crucial link between China's presence in the Arabian Sea (Pakistan) and in the Bay of Bengal (Myanmar and Bangladesh). China seemingly negotiated a deal with Maldives from 1999 to build a naval base in Marao.

Pakistan has long been the lynchpin of China's presence in South Asia, on land and at sea. In 2005, China also conducted its first joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean with Pakistan, the first outside its territorial waters. The most tangible sign of their maritime cooperation is Gwadar, described by some as "China's pearl in Pakistan's waters". This deep water port was opened in the summer of 2006, situated on Pakistan's far western shores it looks towards the entrance of the Gulf. Gwadar has been very much a China-funded (80% of Phase-1 costs) project by the Chinese state, China's vice premier Wu Bangguo formally laying its foundation in March 2002. According to some observers Chinese "Grand Strategy" is evident at Gwadar

(Niazi 2005).

### **Behavioral Spaces**

The spatial outcome of China's Indian Ocean policies is reflected in the pattern and strength of alignments. China is said to be vying for the same strategic space in Asia as India (Berlin, 2006: 63). According to one observer (Malik, 2005), "there is no sign of China giving up its 'contain India' strategy which takes several forms: an unresolved territorial dispute; arms sale to and military alliances with 'India-wary countries' (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and now Nepal); nuclear and missile proliferation in India's neighborhood (Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia); and opposition to India's membership in global and regional organizations."

How does China perceive and respond to various mappings of its "rise" to power, especially by the United States? Yong Deng's analysis (2001) of Chinese perceptions of and reactions to the U.S. global power status and grand security strategy after the cold war is quite interesting. He argues and illustrates that conflict between the United States and China is structural and has been on the rise. He further argues that there is a real danger of an escalation of balancing and counterbalancing unless a mechanism of peaceful change is devised. According to Deng (Ibid) apprehensions over the United States increasingly leaning toward containing China have also been on the rise after the cold war, particularly since Kosovo. (relevant maps to be shown on power-point)

### **In Conclusion**

The discussion so far is likely to leave behind the impression that it is the geopolitics of domination and conflict (dictated and driven by the images of "containment") which is likely to prevail over the geopolitics of peace and cooperation in and around the JIA area. Such an impression needs some scrutiny. In defense of this note of caution, I would like to cite from the study entitled, "Perspectives on China: A View from India", sponsored by Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense (MacDonald, Danyluk, and Donahue, 2005: 61):

Indians across the ideological spectrum have different perspectives on the potential for future cooperation and competition between India and China. Nor surprisingly, optimists focus on areas in which India and China can cooperate, while hardliners maintain an apprehensive posture toward concessions that could benefit China. Interestingly, some areas such as energy were identified by the same school of thought as issues of simultaneous cooperation and competition. Views on these kinds of dynamics are driven by a variety of factors, including perceptions of China's intentions, relative performance or advantage of each country in a specific area, and definition of national interests.

A finding such as this poses a challenge and an opportunity as we move forward with plans to put into place infrastructures for information sharing. In my view, the overall success of such cooperation will demand and deserve that we aim at covering the entire spectrum of perspectives, including the views of the ‘optimists’ and the ‘hardliners’. The model offered by John House in mid-1980s will have to be considerably revised in such a manner that it has enough space for a remarkable diversity of views, choices and reasoning on matters of mutual concern for Japan and India.

The idea of inter-cultural information sharing between India and Japan need not be approached and analyzed exclusively in terms of bilateral cooperation for collating and sharing factual data on issues of mutual maritime concerns. It is important but not enough in my view. It needs to be emphasized that JIA ocean-space/route between Japan and India is not an empty space between discreet points of production and consumption. Nor is it solely a space of movement or flows. It is a space of both physical and social flows, shared by a number of littoral societies and states, with their respective interests, perceptions and policies with regard to ocean security. This paper has shown that JIA sea route is also embedded in passing through the uncertainties associated with a geopolitical transition; a situation where the old geopolitical order is withering away and the new is struggling to be born.

Japan-India maritime dialogues aimed at information-sharing between the two countries are two sides of the same coin, and in my view, it is vital to ensure that the two go together. Information sharing between India and Japan on maritime issues should continue to be realized within the mode of dialogic reasoning. It is neither feasible, nor desirable perhaps, that perceptions of India and Japan (or for that matter perceptions of various groups within the countries) will converge on each and every issue on the agenda of ‘ocean security’. From their respective geopolitical locations, both the countries will continue to throw new light on issues of common concern and are likely to discover in the process many common grounds.

The increased use of and concern with JIA “ocean-space” has led to a situation where there is likely to be intensified social conflict, political-economic regulation, and, in many cases environmental degradation. As pointed out by Philip Steinberg (1999a: 367), the term ocean-space is “intended to capture both the specificity of the world-ocean and the fluidity between the study of landward and seaward domains, as both are socially and physically constructed through linked dynamics.” This is precisely the reason behind the emphasis placed in this paper on the system simulation model proposed initially by John House (1984). The situation in the Indian Ocean-space today is so complex that any system simulation must remain at best a general framework within which India and Japan might seek and share information, with structural, spatial and temporal inputs and impacts.

As a political geographer, I find the idea of JIA sea route most interesting for several

reasons. It questions, in a subtle but significant manner, the boundary between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. A new geopolitical imagination of an “Area” with India and Japan located on the Western and Eastern tips respectively as well as the emphasis placed on the “momentum of involving countries located inside” (Natsukawa 2006) are worthy of serious attention. They remind us in general of ocean’s utility both as a space of connection and as a space that provides discrete, material sources. This ocean-space or “Area” might become what Philip E. Steinberg (1999b) describes as a stewarded space: “spaces that are stewarded may not be possessed in full as alienable property. Yet individual social actors –or communities of actors—may act in their capacity as stewards to temporarily appropriate, manage and even transform the stewarded space in order to ensure that it continues to serve specific social ends” (Ibid.: 258). Needless to say, such stewarded spaces demand and deserve building blocks of both bilateral and multilateral cooperation among state and non-state actors with a stake in the JIA route. Some scholars have even asserted that the attitude of humanity or the world community towards the ocean must go beyond one of stewarding the sea so that it is available for human use to one in which sea is actively possessed and used by the entirety of the world community so that it may serve global needs and reduce social inequality on land.

There is near consensus among scholars that an understanding of the information-sharing and management process must begin with an untangling of uncertainty. Toward that end, I adopt Brashers’s (2001) definition of uncertainty as existing “when details of the situation are ambiguous, complex, unpredictable, or probabilistic; when information is unavailable or inconsistent; and when people feel insecure in their own state of knowledge or the state of knowledge in general” (p. 478). May be, a framework for systems simulation of the reciprocal actions of political actors and their environment (embracing the dimensions of structures, time and space), along with the triangle metaphor, could be of some help in overcoming such uncertainties.

While retaining the disclaimer I had sought at the beginning, (namely that the essay is exploratory, and not normative, in nature) I may please be allowed to make an exception. Since we are in Japan and talking about “inter-cultural” information sharing between India and Japan, it is both significant and rewarding in my view to appreciate that the Buddhist thought is organized like a **Buddhist Wheel**. As Johan Galtung puts it so succinctly.

[Buddhist thought] is not pyramidal and deductive from first principles. Rather, they [ideas] could be seen as organized around a wheel where all possible lines are drawn between the points as connections to be explored (with the danger that this image would lead to bilateralism, always looking at only two points at the time, rather than three, four, many). One important implication of this is that there is no unbroken core of fundamental and final articles of faith; and that the system as a whole is open to new points, meaning new approaches. As the Buddhist

wheel rolls through time, new points are spun into ever tighter web of thought and action. Ultimately it is the totality of all this that matters, the whole approach being fundamentally wholistic, and dynamic –as opposed to a deductive pyramid trying together atomistic insights or “findings”.

## References

Afifi, W. A. and Weiner, J. L. 2004. “Towards a Theory of Motivated Information Management”, *Communication Theory*, 14(2): 167-190.

Afifi, W. A., & Weiner, J. L. (2002). Introduction: Information-seeking across contexts. *Human Communication Research*, 28, 207–212.

Akimoto, K. 2005. “Information Gathering and Distribution on Maritime Security Along the JIA Route”, Paper proposed for presentation at the Indo-Japan dialogue organized by SIOS at Teen Murthy Bhawan, New Delhi, 14-15 December.

Babrow, A. S. (2001). Guest editor’s introduction to the special issue on uncertainty, evaluation, and communication. *Journal of Communication*, 51, 453–455.

Brashers, D. E., Goldsmith, D. J., & Hsieh, E. (2002). Information seeking and avoiding in health contexts. *Human Communication Research*, 28, 258–272.

Brashers, D. E. (2001). Communication and uncertainty management. *Journal of Communication*, 51, 477–497.

Berlin, D. 2006. “India in the Indian Ocean”, *Naval War College Review*, 59(2): 58-89.

Berlin, D. 2004. “The Great Base Race in the Indian Ocean Littoral: Conflict Prevention or Stimulation?”, *Contemporary South Asia*, 13(3): 239-255.

Bouchard, C. 2004. “Emergence of a New Geopolitical Era in the Indian Ocean: Characteristics, Issues and Limitations of the Indianoceanic Order”, in Dennis Rumley and Sanjay Chaturvedi (ed.) *Geopolitical Orientations, Regionalism and Security in the Indian Ocean*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers.

Boquerat, G. 2001. “India’s Confrontation with Chinese Interests in Myanmar”, in F. Grare

and A. Mattoo (eds.), *India and ASEAN*, New Delhi, Manohar: 61-89.

[http://www.iorgroup.org/images/ios\\_main.gif](http://www.iorgroup.org/images/ios_main.gif)

Chaturvedi, S. 2005. "Towards a Network of networks: Issues, Actors and Strategies", Paper proposed for presentation at the Indo-Japan dialogue organized by SIOS at Teen Murthy Bhawan, New Delhi, 14-15 December.

Chaturvedi, S. 1988. "Common Security? Geopolitics, Development, South Asia and the Indian Ocean", *Third World Quarterly*, 19(4): 701-724.

Dalby, S. 2005. Geopolitics, Grand Strategy and Bush Doctrine, Working Paper No. 90, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technology University, The Republic of Singapore.

Economy, Elizabeth. 2005. "China's Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for the United States", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 14(44): 409-425.

Galtung, J. 1993. Buddhism: A Quest for Unity and Peace, Ratmalana: Sarvodaya Book Publishing House.

Garver, J. W. 2001. "The China-India-US Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era", *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, 13(5): 1-61.

Holmes, J. and Toshi, Y. 2005. "The Influence of Mahan on China's Maritime Strategy, *Comparative Strategy* 24: 23-51.

House, J. 1984. "War, Peace and Conflict Resolution: Towards an Indian Ocean Model", *Transactions for the Institute of British Geographers*, 9(1): 3-21.

Houbert, J. 2004. "The West in the Geopolitics of Indian Ocean and India", in Dennis Rumley and Sanjay Chaturvedi (ed.) *Geopolitical Orientations, Regionalism and Security in the Indian Ocean*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers.

Jackson, A. 2004. "The British Empire in the Indian Ocean", in Dennis Rumley and Sanjay Chaturvedi (ed.) *Geopolitical Orientations, Regionalism and Security in the Indian Ocean*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers.

Kapila, S.]0 2003. 'Bangladesh-China defense cooperation agreement's strategic implications',

SAAG (South Asia Analysis Group) Papers 582, 14 Jan

Malik, M. 2005. "China's Foreign Policy is Still Dominated by the 'Contain India' Theory", *Force: The Complete Newsmagazine of National Security*, 14 April.

MacDonald, J. A., Danyluk, B. N. and Donahue, A. 2005. "Perspectives on China: A View From India" Final Report. Sponsored by the Director, Net Assessment, Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

Mills, G. 1998. "South Africa and Security Building", Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 127, ANU, Australia.

Mohan, C. R. 2005. 'There's a New Game in Asia. India, Indian Ocean and China's 'String of Pearls'', Indian Express 31 May 2005.

Niazi, T. 2005. 'Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean', *China Brief* 5(4): 6-8.

Paleri, P. 2005. 'Maritime Information Centre', Paper proposed for presentation at the Indo-Japan dialogue organized by SIOS at Teen Murthy Bhawan, New Delhi, 14-15 December.

Panikkar, K. M. 1945. *Indian and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History*, London: Allen and Unwin.

Rumley, D. 1999. *The Geopolitics of Australia's Regional Relations*, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Rumley, D. and Chaturvedi, S. 2004. "Changing Geopolitical Orientations, Regional Cooperation and Security Concerns in the Indian Ocean" in Dennis Rumley and Sanjay Chaturvedi (ed.) *Geopolitical Orientations, Regionalism and Security in the Indian Ocean*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers.

Smita, 2005. 'China's "Oceanic Offensive"', *Peace & Conflict* 8(10): 1-2

Steinberg, P. E. 1999a. "Navigating to Multiple horizons: Towards a Geography of Ocean Space", *Professional Geographer*, 51(3): 366-375.

Steinberg, P. E. 1999b. "Lines of Division, Lines of Connection: Stewardship in the World Ocean", *Geographical Review*, 89(2): 254-264.

Vali, F. 1976. *Politics of the Indian Ocean Region*, New York.

Wall, P. 1975. *The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West: Four Studies on Global Strategy*, London.

Wang, Fei-Ling. 2005, "Preservation, Prosperity and Power: what motivates China's foreign policy?" *Journal of Contemporary China*, 14 (45): 669-694(26).

White, H. 2005. "The Limits to Optimism: Australia and the Rise of China", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 59(4): 469-480.


Reinhard, D. 2006. "The Ending of Japan's ODA Loan Programme to China –All's Well that Ends Well", *Asia-Pacific Review*, 13(1): 94-117.

Tsukasa, T. 2005. "A New Dynamism in Sino-Japanese Security Relations: Japan's Strategic Use of Foreign Aid", *The Pacific Review*, 18(4): 439-461.


Terada, T. "Forming an East Asian Community: A Site for Japan-China Power Struggles", *Japanese Studies*, 26(1): 5-17.



Annexure (Figure 2: Indian Ocean States: Dates of Independence, Classified by year and date of occurrence



**Figure 3: Indian Ocean States: Political Alignments**






FIGURE 4. United States trade with Indian Ocean states (1982)

FIGURE 5. U.S.S.R. trade with Indian Ocean states (1982) Source: IMF (1983) *Direction of trade statistics yearbook*




FIGURE 6. Japanese trade with Indian Ocean states (1982)

FIGURE 7. U.K. trade with Indian Ocean states (1982) Source: IMF (1983) *Direction of trade statistics yearbook*




FIGURE 8. Overseas credits and grants by socialist countries (1954-77) Source: CIA (1978) *Communist aid to less developed areas of the Free World* (Washington DC)

FIGURE 9. Arms transfers (1967-76) Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1978) *World military expenditures & arms transfers, 1967-76*, Publ. 98 (Washington DC)

## Session3 日印海洋・海事関連経済協力の促進

### “Indo-Japan Cooperation on Ocean-based Industries”

- Session3-① Globalization の進展と新しい日印経済関係  
Globalization and new Japan-India economic relationship
- Session3-② インドの港湾近代化計画  
India's Programme for Modernising Ports
- Session3-③ インドの造船—現在と将来  
Indian Shipbuilding Present and Future
- Session3-④ 海事産業基盤の構築に向けた日印経済協力  
Indo-Japan Economic Co-operation for Development of  
Maritime Industries & Infra-Structures
- Session3-⑤ インドの港湾・海事セクターに対する日本の  
ODA  
Japan's ODA to Indian Ports Sector and Maritime Sector



## Globalization の進展と新しい日印経済関係

眞野 輝彦  
聖学院大学大学院教授

### 1. はじめに

「Globalization の進展と新しい日印経済関係」という演題でお話できることを嬉しく思っております。この会議を設営された日印双方の事務局に感謝申し上げます。

Globalization が益々進展し、日印二国間のみの経済関係を取り上げることが極めて難しくなっています。各国民経済や地域間の多角的関係が増大し、多面的な把握が必要なのです。また Globalization の下では、政治、外交と経済の関係が不可分となる側面が多く、この点からも経済問題だけを取り出すことも難しくなっています。

時間的制約もありますので、まず日印を取り巻く経済環境の実情を把握し、次に日印関係の課題を、中国と比較しつつ取り上げ、最後に、新しい日印関係の構築に向けての私見を述べたいと思います。

### 2. 日印を取り巻く世界経済の現状

まず参加者が共通の認識を持つために、世界経済の中の両国の位置関係を見てみたいと思います（資料 1-2-3-4-5）。

#### 1) GDP、Per Capita DGP の比較（資料 6）

最近のアジアの発展は目覚しく世界経済に占める比率は 20%を越えました（資料 1）。北米が 30%、EU15 が同じく 30%ですから、この合計で 80%になります。

アジアの中では日本が 11%、インドは 1.7%、中国 4.7%ですが、国内購買力平価で比較すると、日本 6.9%、インド 5.9%、中国 13.2%と大分様子が変わってきます（資料 5）。日本は土地や人件費の高さが実質購買力を低めているのです。更に、一人当たりの GNI（\$）を比較しますと、日本\$36,000、インド\$640、中国\$1,490 となります（資料 6）。

#### 2) 人口の動態比較

Per Capita GDP との関連で日印中三国の人口問題に触れておきたいと思います（資料 7）。インド中国の大きさが際立っています。

日本は少子高齢化が進み、年金問題が論議を呼んでいることはご存知のとおりです。2050 の人口構成が示すように、少ない現役世代が多数の高齢者を支えることになるからです（資料 8）。

インドの人口がやがて中国をこえることが確実視されていますが、資料 9 が示すように、人口構成にはかなり違いがあります。中国はやがて日本のような逆ピラミッド型になりますが、インドは全体の人口が若く、もう少し余裕があります。将来の年金、医療などへの制度を整

備する時間があるといえましょう。

### 3) BRICS の台頭と資源価格高騰 (資料 10~14)

BRICS などの経済急拡大にともない、原料価格が急騰していることは言うまでもありません。原油資源の問題に付いては、昨年のニューデリー会合で、インド側より中国との競争などの説明がありました。ここでは数字の確認だけをおきます。

人口大国の経済成長は、原油ばかりではなく、その他の資源も高騰させています。London Metal Exchange の指標がこのことを如実に示しています(資料 14)。

日本は年間 5.2 億トン (世界全体の 5.0%)、インド 3.8 億トン (3.7%) 中国 13.9 億トン (13.6%) のエネルギー (石油換算) を消費していますが、このことは価格問題だけではなく、次の二つの問題を惹起します。

第一は、CO<sub>2</sub> 排出などの環境問題です。そのためには各国がエネルギー効率を上げることが必要です。資料 13 は一単位の名目 GDP\$1 の生産に要するエネルギー消費量です。インドはロシアや中国に比較すれば良好ですが、未だ改良の余地が有り、このあたりに一つの日印協力のチャンスがあると思われます。

第二は、この資源高騰が、G7 会議などで問題になっている世界の不均衡に拍車をかけているのです。この問題に移りたいと思います。

### 4) 世界の不均衡問題

不均衡の根源は、米国の経常赤字にあることは言うまでもありません(資料 15)。今のところ、赤字に見合う資金流入があるため大きな混乱には繋がっていませんが、米国赤字が毎年拡大する状況ですから、この状態が将来も続くとは限りません。不安材料を三つ指摘いたします。

第一は、資本供給国が従来の日本やアジアから、産油国への依存が高まっていることです。政治的、宗教的など理由から、何時逆流出に転じるかもしれないのです(資料 16-18)。

第二は、ユーロの存在です。外貨準備に占めるユーロのシェアは、徐々に増加しています。中国なども外準増加分をユーロに振り替えているとも伝えられます。

第三は、米国景気の動向と外国との金利差の問題です。景気に陰りが出て、金利低下となると、米ドルの吸引力低下も予想されるのです。

## 3. 日印関係の現状と課題

### 1) 輸出入関連

アジアの成長にも拘わらず、日印貿易は相対的に伸び悩み、輸出入の国別順位は輸出入とも第 10 位にとどまっています。インドと中国やシンガポールなどとの伸びが高く、この結果相対的なウエイトは低下しているのです。日本への輸出はダイヤモンド、鉄鉱石、えびの 3 品目で総額の 40% を占めています。ASEAN や中国貿易と比較し、垂直分業の接点が拡大していないのです。補完関係の可能性の高いサービス産業分野においても、言語の問題もあ



ってか、Outsourcing のビジネスモデルが出来ていないのが現状です(資料 19～23)。

## 2) 日本からの Direct Investment (資料 24～32)

i) 日本の DI は、中国とは対照的に、資料 26 が示すように、かなり波をうっている。

その理由として、次の要因があげられます。

a) 市場開放の時期が 1991 年と中国の 1978 年より 10 年以上遅れたこと。

b) ASEAN や中国と比べ、距離的に遠いこと。

c) 98 年の核実験の影響。

d) 2002 年の印パ関係の緊張。

e) 複雑な税制、州ごとの多様性とインフラ問題。

f) 労働者に有利な労働法、などです

ii) 最近、状況の変化が見られます。その理由は、

a) 中国の反日感情、暴動などから中国リスクが再認識されたこと。

対称的にインドは、選挙による政権交代を経験した民主国家であることです。

b) 中国への投資集中の分散先としての選択。

c) 投資家の認識が好転していること(資料 25)。

d) 自動認可制の拡大や一部小売業への参入の可能性がでてきたこと。

d) 再輸出よりも国内市場の大きさ、2 億人を越える中産階級の存在が、再認識され、自動車産業に偏っていた DI の住宅、化学、薬品関連など裾野が広がり始めていること。

f) ASEAN、中国の賃金上からの見直し(資料 27)。

g) EAS へのインド参加、米国との核問題対話、核保有国として中国との政治的 Balancer 機能への期待などが背景にあります。

## 3) 政府開発援助 (ODA)

i) インドは最大の ODA 供与先です(資料 33)。しかし財政削減は安倍内閣の最大の課題であり、公的金融機関も統廃合されます。金額拡大よりも、供与先やプロジェクトを絞込み、重点的配分が必要になります。

ii) しかしインドの株式市場はアジア第三の規模であり、戦前は綿貿易での円為替の実績があったことも忘れてはなりません(資料 34～37)。

iii) このことを踏まえれば、金利の安い円を利用して、恒常的な電力不足や道路などのインフラ整備に Public Private Partnership を活用 of 大きな可能性がある。

## 4. 日印の世界経済への貢献＝日印協力の舞台

1) 朝鮮半島、台湾海峡、北方領土、更に背景はかなり異なりますがカシミール問題などアジアの戦後問題は終了していません。

アジアの安定は世界の安定に資する。ASEAN+3 の枠組みが先行していますが、民主主

義、自由経済。法治主義などの共通価値観がなければ、真の共同体の形成は不可能です。  
この意味で EAS へのインド参加の日本側の期待は大きいのです。

- 2) ソフトとハードをドッキングさせることが両国の重要課題であり、そのためにも日印 FTA 締結を促進させることが不可欠です。
- 3) 戦後 60 年が経過し、国連、IMF などの発言権と義務との Imbalance が目立っています。国連常任理事国のコスト負担の不均衡は、その好例と言えましょう(資料 38・39)。  
Imbalance は経済問題に限らず、それだけ日印協力の裾野は広いのです。
- 4) 核保有国には、通常の途上国にはない責任と義務があります。途上国の一人あたり所得のみでの格付けを見直す必要があると思います。
- 5) 同時に日本も戦後経済発展を優先し、「大砲を捨て、バターに資源を集中した時代」からの脱却が肝要であり、憲法改正、集団自衛権問題が浮上しているのです。
- 6) 勿論従来にも増して Gulf—インド洋—中国がミャンマー経由南下を目指すベンガル湾—ホルムス海峡での航行安全の日印協力が引き続き必要なことは言うまでもありません。両国協力の舞台はますます拡大しているのです。

ご清聴有難うございました。

## **Globalization and new Japan-India economic relationship**

**Teruhiko Mano**

**Professor, Seigakuin University,**

### **1. Introduction**

It is a great pleasure to be able to make a dialogue presentation under the title "Globalization and new Japan-India economic relationship", here today. I thank the secretariat of both countries for this conference setting.

It becomes increasingly difficult to take up the economic relationship between Japan and India only bilaterally, because each national economy and areas contacts multilaterally.

In addition there are many aspects where the politics, the diplomacy are deeply involved under Globalization. It becomes also difficult to take out only an economic problem. We are now going back from Economics of A. Marshall to the period of Political economy.

Because time is limited, I would like to concentrate to the three points.

First the situation of the global economy which surrounds Japan and India to identify the two country's position in the global economy

Second, How to promote Japan-India business relationship.

Third, Responsibility of the two countries to the World.

### **2. Present situation surrounding Japan and India**

I explain the situation to have common understanding (chart 2-3-4-5-6).

#### **1) The comparison of GDP, Per Capita DGP (chart 7)**

Because of Asia's rapid development, the share of Asia account for more than 20 % of the total world GDP (Chart 2).

EU (15) has 30 %, North America 30 %, three area total becomes 80 % of the World GDP.

By domestic purchasing power parity, the ratio changes dramatically with 6.9 % of Japan, 5.9 % of India, 13.2 % of China (Chart 6).

As for Japan, the high price of land and personnel expense is lowering substantially Yen effective buying power. But when comparing with Per Capita GNI in US\$, it shows \$ 36,000 of Japan, \$ 640 of India, \$ 1,490 of China (Chart 7).

#### **2) The comparison by the population**

Referring to Per Capita GDP, I want to touch the population aspect of the three

countries (Chart 8). The size of India and China is outstanding.

The declining birthrate and a growing proportion of elderly people have been raising medical care and pension problem as it knows (Chart 9).

It looks very likely the population of India passes China, but as Chart 10 shows, we see a difference in the population composition.

China would become a reversed pyramid type like Japan, but the population of India is comparatively young and there is leeway to India to establish social security system.

### 3) BRICS rise and the resource price soaring (Chart 11-15)

It is needless to say that the raw material price skyrockets with sharp economic expansion of BRICS.

As for petroleum, there was a good explanation of the competition with China and so on in New Delhi meeting last year from India side. So here only confirms related charts

The other resources in addition to petroleum, too, are marking bottleneck to the economic growth. The index of London Metal Exchange shows this fact vividly (Chart15).

Japan consume yearly 520million tons energy (converted in crude oil, 5.0 % of the world), India 380million tons (3.7%), China 139million tons (13.6%).

This raises the following 2 problems in addition to the price problem.

The first is the environmental problems of the CO2 emission and so on.

It is necessary that every country raises energy efficiencies. Chart 14 is the necessary energy consumption which the production of the nominal \$1 GDP. India is relatively good in compares to Russia and China, but it seems the room of the improvement still to be and there seems a chance of the Japan India cooperation in this field.

The second is acceleration of the imbalance of the world, a problem taken up in the G7 conference and so on. I wish to move to this imbalance problem.

### 4) The imbalances in the world economy.

There is no doubt that the root of imbalances is the U.S. current account deficit (Chart16). It doesn't lead to the big confusion now, because of fund inflow into USA which counter balance the deficit.

As the American deficit, however, is expanding every year, this balancing situation might not continue in future. I point out three discouraging factors.

The first, the capital-supplier is shifting to the petroleum-producing countries from conventional Japan and Asia. It could happen any time from political, religious reasons, the reverse outflow (Chart 17-19).

The second is the appearance of Euro as a reserve currency.

Euro occupy ratio in the foreign currency reserve is increasing gradually.

It is reported that China is shifting increment of reserve into Euro.

The third is the difference in interest rates between US dollar and other convertible currencies. When US economy would slow down and US \$ interest rate could be lower, the US dollar sucking force of money from overseas would decline.

### 3. Promotion of Japan- India business relation.

#### 1) The Trade.

Despite of rapid increase of trade in Asian countries, Japan-India trade stagnates relatively and the Japan ranking of the import and export from India, is the 10th.

Increase of Indian trade with China and Singapore etc. is very rapid and as a result, the relative weight of Japan has declined.

The three item export to Japan, namely diamond, iron ore, shrimp accounts for 40 % of the total amount. The vertical division of trade between Japan and India is less expanding than ASEAN and the China trade.

In the service industry field, the possibility of the complementary relationship could be very high. But the linguistic bottlenecks and the business model of Outsourcing isn't established yet. (Chart 20 - 24).

#### 2) Direct Investment from Japan (Chart 25-33)

##### i ) As chart 27 shows, DI to India from Japan fluctuates fairly.

The followings are given as the reasons.

- a) The delay of the market opening, China in 1978, India in 1991.
- b) Distance compared with ASEAN and China.
- c) The Japanese negative feeling against the nuclear test in 1998
- d) The tension of the India Pakistan relation in 2002
- e) The complicated taxation system, the variety in each state and the insufficient infrastructure.
- f) The labor law, favorable to the laborer.

##### ii ) Recent changes by the following reasons.

- a) Chinese risk has been re-recognized from the anti-Japanese feeling, riot in China.  
India is the biggest country of democracy which experienced changes of governments by the election.
- b) The choice as the place of reallocation of direct investment in Asia.
- c) The feeling of the investors has been improved (Chart26).
- d) The increase of automatic approval system and partial admission to retail sector.
- e) The recognition of sizable of home market, more than 200 million middle income

- people. Attention to home market rather than re-export and the DI sectors are spreading to housing, chemical industry, medicine in addition to automobile industry.
- f) The shift of wage competitiveness among ASEAN, China (Chart28).
- g) The Indian participation in EAS and expectations as a political Balancer with China and the recent nuclear dialog with the U.S.

### 3) The official development assistance (ODA)

- i ) India is the biggest ODA given country (Chart 34).

However, the budget deficit reduction is at the top of the list of priority of new Abe cabinet and public financial institutions, too, are in the process of scrape and consolidation. Expecting no increase of total amount, how to concentrate the use of money to raise effectiveness is our task.

- ii ) However, the stock market in India is the scale of 3rd of Asia and don't forget that there were results of the yen exchange in cotton trade before the war, too, (Chart 35-38).
- iii) Therefore, using inexpensive yen commercial money, the possibility is high for Public Private Partnership, in the infrastructure building in the constant electricity shortage and road expansion etc.

### 4. Partnership to the contribution to the global economy

- 1) The aftereffects of After WWII have not come to end in Asia. The divided Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, the Northern Territories of Japan. Kashmir problem, though cause is far different from formers. The Asian stability contributes to the stability of the world. What two countries could do together. ASEAN+3 is proceeding but without common senses of values, such as democracy, free economy, it is impossible to form a true community. In this connection, expectations of to Indian participation in EAS are enormous.
- 2) To combine soft and hardware is an important task in of two countries and to make FTA is indispensable for its purpose.

### 3) 60 years has passed after the war II and Imbalance of right and duty in

The United Nations, International Monetary Fund is conspicuous. The disproportion of the cost burden of the UN permanent member of the Security Council is the good example (Chart 39-40 ).

For correction of the Imbalance, in addition to the economy, the field of two country cooperation is wide.

- 4) There are an additional responsibility and a duty of developing countries with nuclear

power. The ranking system of the developing country only by the per capita income must be reconsidered.

- 5) Japan, too, has to reconsider her choice of butter than cannon after war II. The amendment of constitution is also in the policy list of new government.
- 6) Of course, the cooperation of the sea safety from Gulf— Indian Ocean— Bay of Bengal , where China is approaching through Myanmar — Malacca strait —Taiwan Strait is ever increasing.

Confirming that the stage of the two country cooperation is expanding, I end my presentation. Thank you for your attention.

Sources: BTMU, JETRO, JCIF, IMF, UN.

October, 2006

GDP & P.C.GDP (IBRD,2004 )			
国・地域	名目GDP (億ドル)	GDP構成比 (名目、%)	1人当たり 名目GDP(ドル)
アジア	90,509.8	21.9%	-
うち日本	46,227.7	11.2%	36,182
うち中国	19,317.1	4.7%	1,490
うち韓国	6,796.7	1.6%	14,136
うちインド	6,911.6	1.7%	640
米国	117,119.3	28.4%	39,893
カナダ	9,779.7	2.4%	30,586
EU15	122,131.5	29.6%	-
うちドイツ	27,405.5	6.6%	33,212
うちフランス	20,466.5	5.0%	33,896
うちイギリス	21,243.9	5.1%	35,485
うちイタリア	16,778.3	4.1%	29,143
ロシア	5,814.5	1.4%	4,042
中南米	20,220.0	4.9%	-
うちブラジル	6,039.7	1.5%	3,115
その他	47,330.4	11.5%	-
世界	412,904.1	100.0%	6,487

(備考) 1. 出所:World Bank 「World Development Indicators Data Query」より算出  
2. 世界合計はWDIの積み上げ合計(台湾等WDIに掲載されていない国・地域は含まない)。

Chart1




Chart2

World GDP 2005 \$ Trillion	
世界	43.9兆 (100%)
先進国	33.9 (77.2%)
G7	27.1 (61.7%)
米	11.1 (25.3%)
日本	5.4 (12.3%)
ユーロ	6.6 (22.3%)
新興国及び途上国	10.0 (22.8%)
中国	1.9 (4.3%)
インド	0.7 (1.6%)
ブラジル	0.8 (1.8%)
ロシア	0.8 (1.8%)

Chart3




Chart4

GDP share (%)				
	GDP(PPP)	GDP(US\$)	Exp	Population
Japan	6.9	12	6.9	1.2
U.S.A.	20.9	29.1	10.3	4.7
Euro Area	15.3	33.6	6.9	4.9
India	5.9	1.7	1.1	17.1
China	13.2	3.9	5.9	20.7
Russia	2.6	1.5	1.8	2.3

Chart5




Chart6






Chart7




Chart8




Chart9




Chart10




Chart11




Chart12




Chart13




Chart14




Chart15




Chart16




Chart17




Chart18

GDP Growth of India (%OCS)

部門	05(4-6月)	06(4-6月)
農業、林業、漁業	3.4	3.4
鉱業	3.1	3.4
製造業	10.7	11.3
電力・ガス・上水道	7.4	5.4
建設	12.4	9.5
商業・ホテル・運輸・通信	11.7	13.2
金融・不動産・ビジネスサービス	8.8	8.9
コミュニティ・社会・個人サービス	7.3	7.4
GDP	8.5	8.9

Chart19

India Export (Country, \$100Mil,%)

順位	国	輸出量	シェア
第1位	米国	132.7	16.7
第2位	UAE	71.0	9.0
第3位	中国	45.9	5.8
第4位	シンガポール	38.0	4.8
第5位	香港	36.5	4.6
第10位	日本	19.8	2.5
合計	-	792.5	100.0

(注) 期間は04年4月～05年3月

(出所)商工省

Chart20

India Export (Goods, \$100mil,%)

		輸出量	前年比	シェア
第1位	機械製品(電子機器以外)	145.9	38.7	18.4
第2位	宝石類	137.1	29.6	17.3
第3位	化学製品	126.8	27.3	16.0
第4位	繊維製品	120.2	-1.5	15.2
第5位	石油製品	67.9	90.3	8.6
合計		792.5	24.1	100.0

(注) 期間は04年4月～05年3月

(出所)商工省

Chart21

India Import (Country, \$100Mill,%)

輸入上位国ランキング(単位:億ドル,%)

		輸入量	シェア
第1位	中国	67.5	6.3
第2位	米国	62.9	5.9
第3位	スイス	58.2	5.4
第4位	UAE	45.8	4.3
第10位	日本	30.1	2.8
合計		1,070.7	100.0

(注) 期間は04年4月～05年3月

(出所)商工省

Chart22

India Import(Goods, \$100Mil %)


		輸入量	前年比	シェア
第1位	石油・石油製品	298.4	45.1	27.9
第2位	金・銀	108.3	57.9	10.1
第3位	電子機器	97.4	29.8	9.1
第4位	真珠・ダイヤモンドなど	94.2	32.2	8.8
第5位	機械製品(電子機器以外)	65.5	38.1	6.1
合計		1,070.7	37.0	100.0

(注) 期間は04年4月～05年3月

(出所)商工省

Chart23

Direct Investment from Japan(¥100Mil)



(出所)日本財務省

Chart24

### Choice of countries

中期の有望事業展開先国・地域

順位	02年度	03年度	04年度	05年度
1	中国	中国	中国	中国
2	タイ	タイ	タイ	インド
3	米国	米国	インド	タイ
4	インドネシア	ベトナム	ベトナム	ベトナム
5	ベトナム	インド	米国	米国
6	インド	インドネシア	ロシア	ロシア
7	韓国	韓国	インドネシア	韓国
8	台湾	台湾	韓国	インドネシア
9	マレーシア	マレーシア	台湾	ブラジル
10	ロシア	ロシア	マレーシア	台湾

(出所) 国際協力銀行 海外直接投資アンケート (05年11月)

Chart25

### Total DI (sectors, ¥100Mil)




Chart26

### Labour Cost (Monthly, \$)

	中国			インド	タイ
	北京	上海	深セン	デリー	バンコク
ワーカー (一般工)	79~139	109~218	86~335	124~146	179
エンジニア (中堅技術者)	121~266	269~601	179~494	250~408	400
中間管理職 (部長クラス)	314~1,382	567~1,574	408~1,193	845~1,302	579

(出所) JETROセンサー2004年4月号、2005年4月号

Chart27

### Structure of N, GDP

Countries	Currency Unit	Year	Total	Consumption	G. Cons.	T Cap.Exp.	Inventory	Net Exp.
Japan	Bill Yen	2004	496,051	57.4	18	22.9	-0.2	1.9
India	Bill Rupee	2003	27,600	63.9	11.3	22.7	0.3	-1.3
Indonesia	Trl Rupiah	2004	2,303	66.5	8.2	21	0.3	4
Korea	Bill Won	2004	778,445	51.5	13.5	29.5	0.7	4.4
Singapore	Mil S\$	2004	180,554	42.2	10.6	24	-5.7	29.7
Thailand	Bill Baht	2004	6,576	55.7	10.9	25.8	1.3	5.1
China	Bill Yuan	2003	12,151	43.4	12.2	42.2	0.1	2.2
Philippines	Bill P. Peso	2004	4,739	70.6	10.4	16.8	0.6	0.6
Malaysia	Mil. Ringgit	2004	447,547	42.9	13.3	20.5	1.9	21.4
U.S.A	Bill US\$	2004	11,734	70	15.7	19.1	0.5	-3.3

Chart28

### IT Export from India (\$ 100Mil)




Chart29

### Sales of Automobiles (1,000)




Chart30




Chart31




Chart32




Chart33




Chart34




Chart35




Chart36




Chart37




Chart38

Power & responsibility

	Share in the world, %			IMF				U.N.	
	GDP	Exp	Population	Quota SDR	Share	Vote	Share	\$ million	Share
Japan	6.9	6.9	1.2	13,312.80	6.24	133,378	6.13	332.2	19.5
U.S.A.	20.9	10.3	4.7	37,149.30	17.4	271,743	17.08	423.5	22.5
								147.8	8.7 Germany
Euro Area	15.3	6.9	4.9					104.6	6.1 UK
								102.9	6.0 France
India	5.9	1.1	17.0	4,158.20	1.95	41,832	1.92	7.2	0.421
China	13.2	5.9	20.7	6,369.20	2.98	63,942	2.94	35.0	2.1
Russia	2.6	1.8	2.3	5,949.40	2.79	59,704	2.74	18.8	1.1
Sources: IMF, UN									

Chart39

## **India's Programme for Modernising Ports**

**Ranjit B. Rai**

**Vice President, Indian Maritime Foundation**

### **Preamble and Introduction**

India's fast growth rate with greater liberalization of economic policies since 2003, has been driven by increased local demand, industrial production, exports, imports and outsourcing opportunities and Foreign Direct Investment FDI. During this period investments from Japan did not pick up substantially except through Foreign Institutional Investors FII and most predictions have pointed to a healthy 8% growth for the future. As far as the Maritime Sector is concerned this growth rate will call for improved port facilities and efficient inter modal transport and infra structure, if India is to continue to climb in the competitive ladder of trade in the world. The Government is now inclined more to private investments in the maritime sector which is capital intensive, and the rules for both private, and public-partnerships for ports and infrastructure have recently been issued and these are discussed in this paper and presentation. The bureaucratic decision making from New Delhi for the 12 major ports which are central Government controlled are guided by the Indian Port Trust Act 1963. The 180 minor ports in all coastal states are controlled by State Governments who have been more liberal to private investors especially Gujrat Maritime Board which led the way and sanctioned India's first two private ports Adani at Mundra and Pipav with public private partnership. The establishment of more private ports offer opportunities and are set to follow and some examples are listed in this paper, with opportunities. There are now fewer delays in decision making in India. However the democratic structure of India's coalition governance, and use of legal recourses to delay projects, are irritants, but it is stressed the legal system in India is well known to protect investor interests. At present Chinese bids in the maritime sector have not been cleared, due to non issue of security clearances, and this is being addressed but the players who invested in Indian ports and terminals few years ago, have harvested profits and real estate values in India have risen.

Indian shipping and ports are set to develop with the call for six demands: larger ships, deeper draft, faster evacuation, modern equipment and mechanisation in ports with modern practices. Last year the throughput handled in Major Ports reached 423.41 mill tons and along with the other ports, private and minor it was about 520 tons. The future predicted growth in volumes at 20% requires large investments and expertise and this is where Japan can come in. The archaic methods of labour gangs have been given up and the Railway and road transport from the hinterland are being improved with privatization, and the Director

General of Shipping's office at Mumbai has been revamped for faster clearances. The year 2005 was another good year for ports, as world trade and the Baltic Index and Container cargo rates remained buoyant. Cargo volumes in India are rising and the Government is also keen Indian bottom carries a greater share which has declined to 15.1%. A survey of Indian cargo volumes is also attached to this paper and the future prognosis looks encouraging for investors.

The expanding Indian Navy which is a part of India's maritime mosaic, has also made investments in a large green field naval port in Karwar( Project Seabird) South of Goa with 12,000 ton synchro lift to berth and repair large ships. The Navy is also modernizing its dockyards. Indian shipyards is dealt in another paper but the Indian Navy has 30 ships on order and the major inductions include two aircraft carriers 44,500 ton INS Vikramaditya(Gorshkov) from Russia and 37,500 ton Air Defence Ship at Cochin Shipyard Ltd (set up by Mitsubishi), 3 Krivacks from Russia, 3 Delhi class missile destroyers, 3 Type 17A Krivack Indian design frigates, a Fleet oil tanker under order, 4 ASW Project 28 Corvettes and 6 Scorpene submarines alone valued at \$ 4 bill. The Navy's infrastructure will therefore need to expand to cope with increased fleet and there is pressure on the Navy to berth ships away from traditional congested ports of Mumbai and Vishakaptnam. The Navy is investigating a green field port on the East Coast to ease Vishakapatnam, where India's bulk traffic throughput has gone up and also Porbunder where UAV facilities are planned. The berthing of the deep 40 foot drafted INS Vikramaditya in Mumbai is engaging the Navy's attention as at present the dredged facilities alongside are well below that draft, and options are being sought which will involve additional expenditure. The palliative actions of the Navy and the Coast Guard, that provided assistance to India's littoral during Tsunami, stemming piracy and more recently the timely repatriation of over 2000 Indians in OP Sukoon (Rescue) in July-August 2006 from Lebanon to Cyprus by three Naval ships which were on passage near Beirut, was widely acclaimed in the Indian media. This has goaded Indian Leaders to give maritime affairs more attention and the Prime Minister speaking at the Commanders' Conference in New Delhi in October 2005, assured that funds for the Navy's expansion will not be constrained.


USA, India's new strategic partner, is transferring large ships like the 17,500 LPD USS Trenton( \$ 50 mill) with bought out 6 SH3 Sikorsky helicopters by early 2007, and exercising inter operability annually with advanced exercises in the Malabar series with the Indian Navy. The geo politics of the Indian Ocean have gained significance and the need to safeguard the 60,000 ships of 2000 tons and above carrying 60% of world's trade including oil and gas that transit the sea lanes and the choke points of the Straits of Bab El Mandab and Hormuz and Malacca and Sunda, is critical. In May 06 Japan has also agreed to exercise with the




Indian Navy during Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee's visit to Tokyo with Minister Fukushima Nukaga. There is perceptible accent on maritime issues in India.

In pursuance of the Government's overall objectives a National Maritime Development Programme with an investment of **Rs 100, 339 Crores** (\$ 24 bill) over the next 10 years with **15% funding** from the government and **85% from the Private Sector has been drawn up**. This includes Rs 55,084 crores (\$ 14 bill) for 276 projects in ports which envisages capacity enhancement of ports from 740 mill ton to 1500 million tonne per annum, and 111 projects worth Rs 44,535 crores( \$ 12 bill) for shipping and inland waterways. Additional container terminals at Vallarpadam Cochin, JNPT, Ennore and Chennai and feasibility studies for a deep water port on the East coast are included. An Indian Maritime University at Chennai is being set up.

**Growth Potential of Ports.** Worldwide container port throughput increased from 36 million TEUs in 1980 to 266 million TEU in 2002. Depending on economic conditions, world container port demand is forecast to increase by 60 per cent to 495m TEUs in 2010 and by a further 32 per cent 647m TEU in 2015. While the Atlantic Rim is the cradle of containerisation, economically dynamic East Asia has become the world's main container region. The share of Asia in worldwide container port throughput rose from 25 per cent in 1980 to about 46 per cent now, while Europe saw its share drop from 32 per cent to 23 per cent. Total East Asian container port demand is expected to continue expanding at an above-average rate, with 63 per cent growth predicted over 2003-10 to 240m TEU. In other markets sustained growth is also forecast, with the Middle East and Indian subcontinent generating the most rapid expansion. World wide port capacity growth projection, in TEUs is shown below:





**CONTAINER SHIPPING--THE BOX IS KING** Roughly 22 million containers move around the world annually. Marc Levinson, in *"The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the Economy Bigger,"* argues this simple innovation "made globalisation possible." The considerably higher growth rates achieved by the container industry as compared to world GDP and trade growth rates is now being emulated in India's terminals, even though India does not possess a hub port. In India the new port JNPT opposite Mumbai was the first to hand over container terminals in 1990 to a private operator P & O Australia which has made profits and is planning to construct a new 4<sup>th</sup> terminal. Total throughput of all the major ports taken together was more than 400 million tonnes in 2005-06, an increase of almost 20 times since 1950-51, the beginning of the First Five Year Plan. The working conditions of port labour were earlier governed by the Dock Workers (Regulation and Employment) Act of 1948, which were not conducive for productivity. Accordingly, an amendment was passed by the Indian Parliament in 1997 to merge of the Dock Labour Boards with Port Trusts. Subsequently, three DLBs (Cochin, Chennai and Mormugao) have been merged with the respective Port Trusts, while the Mumbai port DLB has been superseded. This has enhanced productivity in Government controlled terminals also, now competing with private container terminals leased out in ports. A separate regulatory Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP) was set up in 1997 with the objective of maintaining certain parity in the port tariff levels between public and private port terminals. TAMP enables an arbitrage process, wherein port users, public and private port operators and providers of various port-related services are able to participate in the process of formulating government's tariff policies and sensitise port pricing with emerging competitive market environment. TAMP at Mumbai is only empowered to fix the higher cap on various port-related dues and charges, and private terminal operators, can charge lower incentives. Interestingly, the combined financial performance of major ports showed an almost four fold increase in operating surplus from Rs. 323.4 crore in 1989-90 to Rs. 1,216.68 crore in 2002-03. The surpluses have increased.

## INDIAN PORTS AND OPPORTUNITIES



From the 19<sup>th</sup> century until the 20<sup>th</sup> century, ports tended to be instruments of state or colonial powers and port access and egress was regarded as a means to control markets. Competition between ports especially in India was minimal and port-related costs were relatively insignificant in comparison to the high cost of ocean and inland transport. The scene is changed and private sector investments have been facilitated in 17 projects worth more than Rs 4,500 crore, involving an additional capacity of 60 million tones, are under different stages of implementation. According to government estimates, private sector investment in major ports may exceed US\$ 2.33 billion in over 42 projects within a decade. A number of private companies have already set up port and ICD facilities in the country. Two ports have been set up through private participation at Pipavav in Gujrat and Adani in Kutch in the East, and are doing well especially in efficiency to turn around ships. The Pipavav port is being dredged to allow deep draught vessels to berth. A number of foreign companies like Peninsular and Oriental (P&O) ports of Australia, PSA-Sical Terminals , International Sea ports (ISPL) and the Shell-Essar consortium have invested in the port sector within India. Currently bids are in for development and operation of more container terminals at Kandla, Cochin and Mumbai, conversion of bulk terminal into container terminal at Jawaharlal Nehru port and for bulk and liquid cargo terminals/Jetties at Ennore port. P&O(Peninsular &Oriental) ports of Australia, being sold to Dubai Ports and Port of Singapore Authority International (PSA International) at Tuticorin and Commonwealth Development Council CDC in Pipava are among the largest investors in the port sector within India. Sea King Infrastructure and International Containers Ltd of USA have also taken positions.

1996 Guidelines on Port Privatisation. India has accepted definition of port privatisation by

UNCTAD: as “...Privatisation is the transfer of ownership of assets from the public to private sector or the application of private capital to fund investments in port facilities, equipment and systems...” The first-ever policy guidelines on private sector participation in the Indian port sector have been promulgated by the Ministry of Surface Transport. The objectives of the new policy guidelines were to attract new technology and investment through joint ventures with overseas and domestic private sector. Private participation was also expected to introduce better managerial practices leading to improvement in efficiency of ports and make India’s trade more competitive in the world market. The Government clearly spelt out the objectives for commercialisation of the ports through the private sector. These were revenue generation and augmentation of financial viability, improvement of efficiency and customer satisfaction and most importantly a new enterprise culture. The guide lines were largely related to leasing out:

- Existing assets and construction of new assets.
- Modern equipment and floating crafts to the private sector.
- 100% captive facilities to port-based industries.

**Gujarat Led From the Front.** Although container terminal privatisation occupied the limelight, privatisation of other terminals in major and minor ports has also been quite extensive. Most of these terminals are captive jetties. Today there are close to 50 captive jetties and SBMs throughout India, handling more than 100 million tonnes of cargo, which represents over 25% of total cargo handled. Gujarat took the lead with a spate of captive port facilities being offered for development and operation to private sector participants in minor and intermediate ports boosting their traffic throughput. This also prompted other maritime States like Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, and later Kerala, Orissa and West Bengal to go for private captive jetties.

**Landlord Model in Major Ports.** In introducing private sector participation, the government decided to adopt the ‘landlord port’ model propagated by the World Bank. Major ports progressively relinquished the responsibility of providing operational port services and their management to private developers through contractual agreements. In India, these agreements have largely been in the form of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) schemes for a specified period. The government, however, retains the right of ownership over port land. The period of lease has been restricted to a maximum of thirty years. The policy guidelines issued in October 1996 stipulated that the assets would be returned to the port at the end of the BOT period ‘free of cost’. This condition has subsequently been relaxed. Salient aspects of some privatised container terminals and the concessions in India are highlighted below:

	NSICT – JN Port	Tuticorin	Chennai	Vizag
Sponsor	P&O Ports, Australia.. Now taken over by DP World	PSA, Singapore (57.5%) and SICAL, India	P&O Ports, Australia and Chettinad Group, India. Now taken over by DP World	JM Baxi Group and Dubai Port International. Now DP World.
SPV	Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal	PSA SICAL Container Terminal	Chennai Container Terminal Limited	Visakha Container Terminal
Commissioning/ ratisation	April 1999	December 1999	November, 2001	July 2003
Concession agreement	30-year BOT	30-year lease	30-year BOT	30-year BOT
Royalty – basis	Rs./TEU Increases over years	Rs./TEU Increases over the years	Fixed %age of revenue (37.12%)	Rs./TEU
Development undertaken by SPV	Terminal, Backup area, Superstructure	Superstructure. Backup area	Superstructure. Backup area	Superstructure. Backup Area
Quay length and Draft (metres)	600 12.0	370 10.7	890 12.0	449 14.9
Terminal Capacity TEUs	1,200,000	200,000	400,000	200,000

**Corporate Ports.** In 2001, the reform process also witnessed the establishment of first-ever corporatised port of Ennore, which has set the benchmark for corporatisation of other major ports in the country to shift from Trust rules. The government had decided to progressively corporatise all the existing major ports and JNPT was slated to be corporatised next, as proposed in the Union Budget for 2001-02. However, though many changes have been brought in, the process is yet to begin in its entirety.

**Greenfield Projects.** A policy of initiating joint public private ventures for development of common user multiple-cargo ports such as Pipavav and Mundra in Gujarat, were greenfield projects. Apart from leveraging private sector investments, particularly the Gujarat Maritime Board formed joint sector ownership and management structures with Gujarat Pipavav Port Limited (GPPL), Gujarat Adani Port Limited, Gujarat Chemical Port Terminal Limited (GCPTL). These sector companies were incorporated with majority ownership by the private sector participant, and minority shareholding by the state Government through Gujarat Maritime Board and Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation. Unlike the case of the major ports, joint sector port development in Mundra and Pipavav and Dahej LNG terminal was comprehensive including marine infrastructure, port infrastructure and port superstructure and even the development of hinterland access infrastructure.

**Financing Reforms.** Salient aspects of port infrastructure financing in India in the post reform period are highlighted below.

(a) **Multilateral Financial Institutions.** Since the 1980s, the involvement of International multilateral organisations especially Asian Development Bank, and to some extent World Bank Group, gathered significant momentum. Some estimates put the total exposure of these institutions in the Indian port sector at around USD 800 million. Loans from these multi-lateral institutions are usually of tenure of 15-25 years, with a moratorium period of around 5 years and floating interest rates. Public infrastructure projects have been generally the preferred targets for funding by multilateral institutions though some have also started looking into possibilities of funding public-private partnership (PPP) projects. For instance the ADB, the most actively involved in India, has financed the following projects:

- Ennore Port project (USD 150.15 million).
- Mechanised coal handling berth at Paradip (USD 134.85 million).
- Deep-water berths in Kakinada (USD 80 million).
- Modernisation at Mumbai (USD 50 million).
- Modernisation of port facilities at Chennai Port (USD 15 million).

(b) **Fourth Container Terminal.** JNPT is also planning an ambitious \$1 billion integrated port project that will combine the fourth container terminal and the marine chemical terminal with building back-up yards and approach road/rails. JNPT expects this offshore terminal, to provide a capacity of 3 million TEUs. The planned integrated terminal will have a quay length of almost 1,700 meters and will have around six berths. The immediate problem that JNPT faces in this context is that developmental work cannot be carried out in that 50% land area of the port that falls under coastal regulated zone (CRZ).

The investment incentives are attractive. They include a 10 year 100 percent tax holiday for enterprises carrying on the business of developing, or developing and maintaining, or developing, maintaining and operating ports, inland waterways or inland ports. This holiday can be claimed in a block of 10 years out of the first 20 years. The earlier condition of having to transfer the facility to the Government to be eligible for availing of the tax holiday/deduction has now been withdrawn. External commercial borrowings (ECBs) are permitted to be used for rupee expenditure for port development projects. Holding companies/promoters have been permitted to raise ECBs upto US\$ 200million (or equivalent) to finance equity investment in a subsidiary company implementing projects for the development of port infrastructure. Port development projects can finance upto 50 percent of their total fund requirements through ECBs. The sector has only recently been liberalized and is poised for growth. The Indian government owned Port Trusts are cash rich but the Chairmen have limited financial powers and major expenditure is still controlled by the Ministry of Shipping. The Minister of Shipping T R Baalu has promised to increase the powers of Chairmen and stated \$ 20 billion have been targeted for modernisation and expansion of ports, rail links, oil,

gas and two more LNG terminals, the Sethusumadram canal and associated facilities for shipping.

## **GENERAL RULES FOR INVESTMENT IN PORTS**

(a) Foreign investors can be considered for private sector projects if they have the necessary Foreign Investment Promotion Board FIPB/ Competent Authority clearance and have been registered as a company under the Indian Companies Act. Out of Rs 16,000 crores(\$ 4 Bill) required for expansion of major ports, a sum of Rs.8000 crore is likely to become available from Public Funds such as Government Budgetary Support (Rs.2000 crores), Internal Resources of Ports (about Rs.5000 crores) and borrowings by the Port Trusts to the extent of about Rs.1000 crores. To cover the shortfall, Ports have been thrown open for Private Sector Participation, with the Guidelines issued on 26.10.1998.

(b) Joint Venture between a Major Port and Foreign Ports is also permitted. Areas of Participation: Construction of new port facilities within the existing port.

1. Improving productivity of an existing port facility by upgrading and/or improving managerial practices (entire terminal meant for a particular commodity could be given for running it as a common user facility), and/or
2. Development of a new port. Any combination of above. The Foreign Port(s) should have proven capability in the identified area(s). (The Foreign Port(s) may implement the Scheme by promoting Indian Company in the form of Special Purpose Vehicle(SPV), without equity contribution from Major Port Trust; or Joint Venture Company(JVC) may be incorporated under the Indian Companies Act with equity participation from Major Port Trust. Port Trusts have cash flows.

### **(c) Form of Contributions by Major Ports Public Private Venture**

- (1) Financial.
- (2) Making available port assets at agreed terms.
- (3) Agreeing to provide services such as experts, water front, pilotage, conservancy, and safety, in lieu of agreed terms and return over the period of collaboration.
- (4) Any combination of (1) to (3) above,

(d) Form and Period of Collaboration: Period will be up to 30 years. Form of collaboration will be on B.O.T. basis- Build Operate and Transfer. Upon expiry of the period, the port related assets will revert back to the Major Port Trust in accordance with conditions of Agreement.

### **(e) Definition of Foreign Port**

For the purpose of the guidelines contained in sub-para 3.1, a Foreign Port means a Public

owned Port located outside India and does not include a Port owned exclusively by a Private Company.

**(f) Other conditions:**

1. The Joint Venture arrangements can be finalised without tender.
2. The Joint Venture will require approval from Central Government.

**GENERAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO GUIDELINES CONTAINED ABOVE**

1. The Port Facility may, wherever necessary, include supporting infrastructure, such as Road, Railways and Civic & Urban facilities required for efficiency of the Port.
2. In the event the scheme does not take off, it will be abandoned at option of any party. The pre-operative expenses will be borne by the parties in equal proportion.
3. The Joint Venture will require approval of the Central Government.
4. The Major Port Trust will carry out an exercise to work out contingent liability imposed on it by a collaboration with a view to appreciate the financial commitment of the Major Port Trust.
5. The Private Sector Guidelines relating to the Port Based Industries shall be honoured by the Joint Venture arrangements.
6. The JV arrangements shall recognise the agreements entered into by the Major Ports and provide for suitable measures for the JV arrangements to honour the agreements.

**Bilateral arrangements with Foreign Governments:**

In case it is considered that certain technology, expertise, managerial practices etc. are necessary to be imported from a particular country, Government to Government arrangements can be concluded without inviting the tenders. The respective Major Port Trust and the Foreign Port (a public owned foreign port or privately owned foreign port) as selected by the Foreign Government will then enter into the arrangements between them. The form of collaboration will be on agreed terms and on B.O.T. basis for a period upto 30 years. For implementation of the guidelines, Indian Ports Act, 1908 and Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 are to be amended suitably.

**PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION: MAJOR PORTS**



1. Berths leased out for 10 years to SAH. And TISCO at Haldia - 1991 for import of coking coal and export of iron & steel material.
2. Berths leased out to "X-Press Container Line UK" and "Shreyas Shipping Ltd". For two years at Mumbai for handling containers.



3. A consortium led by P&O Australia set up a \$200 million Container terminal on BOT basis at Jawaharlal Nehru Port. Trial operation started in April 1999.
4. Agreement signed for construction of a captive Coal Jetty at Mumbai by Tata Electric Ltd.
5. a) Agreement signed at Mormugao Port in April 1999 for re- construction of \$52 million two berths by M/s ABG on BOOT basis for handling Coal.  
b) Provision of equipment, operation and maintenance of container terminal at Tuticorin Port by Singapore Port Authority on BOT basis - \$ 30 million. Operation commenced in 2000.
6. Construction and management of two coal berths at New Mangalore Port (BOT) - \$ 120 Million.
7. TATAs have bid for a port at Gopalpur on the East Coast for their steel plant. Reliance plan to build on Rewas port near Mumbai. There are opportunities in Gangavaran, Krishnapatnam and Kakinada ports on the East Coast and West Bengal's deep water port and in Andamans which policy is still to be announced. The Navy will have additional contracts at Karwar.
8. The new concept also includes special Economic Zones SEZ in ports for which rules have just been promulgated is attractive and is an added incentive.
9. a) Extension of container terminal at Vallarpadam Cochin on BOT basis by Dubai Ports.  
b) LNG Terminal - \$ 150 Million by UNOCAL, USA proposed and others have come up at Dahej with Peronet and partners.
10. At Kandla, a captive jetty for fertilizer raw materials (\$55 million) commissioned. Two oil jetties (\$7 million) under construction by IOC & HP. Provision equipment, operation & maintenance of the container terminal (\$ 100 million) - operator selected. Construction of four multipurpose berths and a CFS - bids invited.
11. Integrated 5 berth chemical terminal with annual throughput of 19 million tonnes at Jawaharlal Nehru Port (\$500 Million) - selection process on. POL Handling Facilities (\$50 Million) awaiting signing of agreement with IOC & BPCL.
12. Development of captive port facilities proposed for petroleum crude, LPG, LNG by Indian and foreign oil companies at Haldia, Paradip, Visakhapatnam, Mangalore, Tuticorin, Cochin.
13. Vizag - NIT issued. One LPG terminal with underground storage at Vizag already commissioned.
14. The feasibility study for the Sethusumadram Channel between India and Sri Lanka is complete, and dredging contracts are being awarded.


**CONCLUSION.** There is a quote from India's holy book the Gita which translated goes as, "All Good Things Are Like Nectar In The End". The seas it is said is uncontrollable, like the

human mind but the human being has tried to control the seas for his livelihood and International trade. He has mastered the wind and waves within limits, constructed jetties and wharfs and breakwaters to protect wharfs and there has been progress in technology in the Western world which India has missed. But India is trying to catch up and this paper invites you to join in this journey. It is also said in the Gita that 'Amrut' the holy nectar which is a reward from the Gods also springs from the seas, and may be that is modern profits for commercial risks taken by foreign investors in India's mercantile arena.





### CARGO TRAFFIC AT MAJOR PORTS (DURING 2004-2005 AND 2003-2004)



### CARGO TRAFFIC AT MAJOR PORTS 2004-2005 AND 2003-2004



(In 000 Tonnes)

Port	Unloaded		Loaded		Transhipment		Total		Percent Variation (-)/(+)
	2004-05	2003-04	2004-05	2003-04	2004-05	2003-04	2004-05	2003-04	
KOLKATA	3408	3102	1736	1077	4801	4514	9945	8693	14.40
HALDIA	25005	22676	11220	9890	37	1	36262	32567	11.35
PARADIP	8438	6705	21666	18606	-	-	30104	25311	18.94
VISAKHAPATNAM	21290	19306	24915	21369	3942	7061	50147	47736	5.05
ENNORE	8960	9277	520	-	-	-	9480	9277	2.19
CHENNAI	24745	20302	19061	16408	-	-	43806	36710	19.33
TUTICORIN	12060	10184	3751	3494	-	-	15811	13678	15.59
COCHIN	11043	11118	3049	2448	3	6	14095	13572	3.85
NEW MANGALORE	15512	13045	18379	13624	-	4	33891	26673	27.06
MORMUGAO	5631	4468	25028	23406	-	-	30659	27874	9.99
MUMBAI	17669	16469	11972	10861	5546	2665	35187	29995	17.31
JNPT	15652	13886	15252	15578	1904	1726	32808	31190	5.19
KANDLA	31387	31080	9545	10308	619	135	41551	41523	0.07
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>200890</b>	<b>181618</b>	<b>166094</b>	<b>147069</b>	<b>16852</b>	<b>16112</b>	<b>383746</b>	<b>344799</b>	<b>11.30</b>

NOTE: UNLOADED AND LOADED TRAFFIC INCLUDE COASTAL MOVEMENT ALSO.

30

## Indian Shipbuilding Present and Future

Milan K. Mukherjee

President, Naval Architecture Association of India

### Shipping playing important role in growing economy.

Indian international trade is growing rapidly and in money terms over 80% of trade is through sea route. Indian shipping is over 8 million GRT but through Indian ships only 15% of national export and import are implemented. Therefore, there is a good case to increase national shipping tonnage.

### Indian Shipyards.

Indian Shipbuilding industry has not been able to meet the needs of shipping purely due to low productivity in the shipyards managed by the Central and State Govt. and do not have a good track record.

### Hindustan Shipyard.

Visakhapatnam is the oldest one, set up by a large private business house and taken over by the Central Govt. in early 50s. The Shipyard has been modernised to build ships upto 40,000 DWT. Because of extra ordinary long delivery schedule, the shipyard has not been able to attract orders.

Cochin Shipyard, was set up in end 60s with Mitshubishi Technical Consultancy. Having gone through teething trouble in the initial period, the shipyard has been building Handimax Class Vessels for North West European owners. Even now their performance is much below the Japanese and Korean productivity.

### Defence Ministry managed Shipyards

There are three shipyards, viz. Mazagon Dock Ltd. Mumbai, Garden Rich Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd. Kolkata and Goa Shipyards Ltd., Goa are loaded with orders for defence vessels. All the three shipyards are also being modernised with Govt. of India assistance

### Private Shipyards.

On the other hand private shipyards were smaller ones, but well managed and are able to compete as well as make profits. Of late these shipyards are also able to pick up overseas orders. One of the common markets for these Shipyards are the Offshore Supply Vessels (OSVs) for Offshore oil platform installations.

Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) has a programme to invest over 1.2 Billion USD in the next five years for replacement of old OSVs as well as add more OSVs to meet the need of the new Offshore Oil and Gas installations. Apart from the OSVs there is a large demand of Bulk, Liquid Cargo (product) carriers and special type of container ships ranging between 18000 to 20000 DWT.

Small Private Shipyards in India as well as new players like one of the most well run Engineering Company of India, Larsen & Toubro Ltd (L&T) have invested capital to build special RORO/LOLO (Roll on Roll off/Load on Load off) type container ships and other type of vessels of length 140m to 150m. L&T are also contemplating expansion of shipbuilding business by setting up a larger shipyard in a new venue on the East coast.

Apart from L&T, there are other Large Business Houses in India like the Adanis and Ruia Group, who are showing interest for setting up Mega shipyards with large investment.

#### **Advantages for New Shipyards in India**

- i) Availability of qualified Engineers and Naval Architects, amenable to be trained to manage a shipyards and can improve the available technology for better productivity.
- ii) Availability of Engineering Diploma background personnel for technical supervision and coordination work in a shipyard.
- iii) Availability of good technical working level personnel with skill.
- iv) Labour wages are moderately lower than that in other developing countries.
- v) Industrial development - creating job opportunity gets Central and State Govt. encouragement.
- vi) Availability of large Sea/ Water fronted land area.
- vii) Good connectivity to the coastal areas by Air, Rail and Roads.
- viii) Well established democratic Governance with sound Labour Laws.
- ix) Stable economy with reasonably low rise of cost index.
- x) Availability of power from National/State Power grids.

#### **Business Opportunities**

International demand of ships is growing. Most of the bulk movement is through Panamax and Aframax Size Ships. The annual growth of demand in these Size of Ships is 80%.

After the closure of European Shipyards, Korean and Chinese Shipyards are over booked and Japanese Shipyards are selective in accepting orders for High Tech ships like LNG and LPG carriers. Korean, Japanese and Chinese Shipyards are reluctant to accept orders for

Panamax and Handimax size Bulk carriers. Therefore, India can eye for such ships and develop new shipyards with state of the art facilities and adapt latest technology to give higher productivity.

As stated in the foregoings, new non-shipbuilding Business Houses in India, contemplating to harness shipbuilding business opportunities and intend setting up new shipyards in India.

#### **Other new allied business Opportunities**

As per latest MARPOL decision all Oil and Product tankers are to have double skin. Ship-owners will opt for cheaper means.

For ships older than 15 years, one may opt for new ships. But for ships which are less than 15 yards old, one would prefer to retain the Engine room and accommodation module in the stern area and also the fore body with the bulbous bow and scrap the 75% to 80% length parallel mid body and replace the length with new double skin mid body.

Such a business may not be attractive for the busy Shipyards of Korea and China and for the Shipyards where steel fabrication labour cost is high, but for the Indian Shipyards, such business will be a great welcome. Of course, the Indian Shipyards have to be designed with ample space for building new double skin ring blocks with general out fittings and heavy mechanical handling facilities like Self Elevated Transporters and Goliath Cranes.

High productivity means are also needed in creating new steel fabrication, ship's block construction and block assembly facilities. For welding work, automatic and semi-automatic welding techniques being used in the shipyards of Japan and Korea have to be introduced in the Indian Shipyards. Such adaptations will need import of equipment, systems as well as the consumables. Many such high productivity devices may have digital controls. Indians have good I.T. adaptability and introduction of such devices in the shipyards would be smooth sailing.

#### **Ship repair as a business opportunity**

India will remain a hub for bulk movement. Ships calling at Indian Ports can be diverted for the needed mandatory Classification Society Survey and repairs. This will need dry docks or equivalent device like Ship Lift with Dry repair berths. Therefore, it may be of better viability for an "Integrated" new Shipyard to have a Ship Lift - both for lowering a newly built ship into water and also for lifting a ship and transferring the ship to a Dry Ship repair berth. Add on infrastructure for ship repair is not so capital intensive. They will mostly

be the Ship's Machinery repair workshops, test facilities and Store houses. Indian Shipping companies have been depending on the Far-Eastern Ship repair yards for the repair of their ships.

Indian Ship repair business would do well to adapt the methods in vogue in the Far-East ship repair yards to improve delivery schedule and be able to attract Indian ships.

#### **Ship Recycling as an integrated business set up with Ship building and Ship repair.**

Ship Lift has been considered for the new Indian Shipyards whereby the utility of an expensive Ship Lift System can be enhanced. Inclusion of Ship Recycling with separate area with Dry berth and mechanical handling facilities will be the additional requirements.

Scraping of Ships is an international problem and for safety of personnel engaged in Ship Recycling as well as for the protection of Environment, Ship Recycling in Dry State will be essential. It is well known that countries like Japan, owning large number of Ships are working to develop modern Ship Recycling methods. However, Ship Recycling will always call for a large steel cutting and rigging labour force. Such labour is available in large number in all-round the Indian Coast and perhaps of wage rate 10% to 15% of that of prevailing Japanese labour wages.

Disposal of the steel scrap is easy as import of steel scrap is a thriving trade in India. Other than steel scrap, reconditioning of ships machinery and auxiliaries are well established practice in India. Large number of captive power plants in different industrial units in India are the reconditioned power generating sets of old ships. The origin of the Gen sets are either Europe or Japan.

#### **Requirement of facilities for the Indian Shipyards.**

New Shipyards in India Will need import of equipment or collaboration of manufacture of such equipments in India. Manufacture in India will be viable only if there is a large requirement.

China has attracted many European manufacturers to allow manufacture of plant equipment and ships Main and Auxiliary machineries in China under licence.

Presently, existing shipyards in India are investing heavily to modernise the shipyard for higher productivity. In such modernisation programme common needs are Goliath cranes ranging in capacities,++ 150t to 350t

New Shipyards being set up will be in need of Goliath Cranes of lifting capacities 400t to 600t with a span of 100m to 200m. This could be an area where collaboration with Indian Engineering companies experienced in Gantry Crane manufacturing, would be a viable proposition. European crane manufacturers are reputed but they are not competitive. One looks to the alternative of Far East origin. There could be many from Japan and Korea. Same is the case for the heavy jib and ELL cranes.

Similarly, Self Elevated Transporter is another common requirement projected by the shipyards in their modernisation programme. Such Transporters with the capability of omnidirectional movement and of load capacity 200t to 500t are being considered for import.

Other needs for the shipyards are the high productivity numerical control plasma plate cutting machines, plate forming machines and as discussed earlier high productivity welding equipment.

#### **Need of Shipbuilding Industry.**

So far the considerations were centred on the shipyards and the shipyard's plant equipment. When one thinks of shipbuilding, the work is that of steel hull fabrication and fitment of systems, machinery and Accommodation module. 75% of the cost of a ship is for the bought out items comprising steel plates and sections, pipes, valves, controls, propulsion and auxiliary machineries, electric cabling, distribution system and installations, Domestic Systems, Deck machineries, Mooring System, Navigational aids, Fire fighting and Life saving appliances. In the present context perhaps 80% of such bought out items would be of overseas origin. This will give a great opportunity for the overseas ships' machinery and equipment manufacturers to compete for entry into Indian market.. The race appears to be again between the Europe and Far East.

Success in entering Indian market will develop further business related to post sales services including life time support for the spares and components. Servicing including major overhaul can be undertaken by trained Indian personnel.

#### **Possibilities of Joint Ventures in Ship building.**

Both the European and Far Eastern manufacturing industries have been doing well in joint ventures in India. There are many cases of direct investments like Koreans and Japanese in Automobile sectors. Koreans are also contemplating setting up a mega steel plants in India. So far no overseas renowned shipbuilding company has either considered direct investment or joint venture in the shipbuilding area.



Japanese shipbuilding companies have invested in China in joint ventures with the aim to compete with Korea and also China. Perhaps India can provide a similar if not a better joint venture scope. China may run short of industrial labour force after 15 to 20 years but India will never have the shortage of industrial work force.

In the Indian context there is a need for continued ventures for shipbuilding jointly with Japan and work share for mutual benefits to accrue speed, economisation in labour cost and production; and technology value for the state-of-the-art practices in shipbuilding. There is also a need to transfer of professional updates and latest know-how and modern practices in shipbuilding technology towards minimising time over-runs.

### Conclusion

In conclusion it is expressed that

- xi) Shipbuilding has moved from Europe to Far East due to high Labour cost.
- xii) Development of technology for better productivity alone will not be able to make ship building competitive.
- xiii) World trade is growing and over 85% of trade will be by the sea route – resulting continued demand of ships.
- xiv) Far Eastern Shipbuilding countries are also facing high Labour cost, will look for means to compete if they intend to remain in business of shipbuilding.
- xv) India has a large coast line with good sites for shipbuilding if not for VLCCs but can meet the needs of Handimax, Panamax and Aframax size ships.
- xvi) Political and economic environment are congenial.
- xvii) There is a good opportunity for Joint Venture in India for shipbuilding.
- xviii) Established Shipbuilding countries have also set up a large manufacturing base for shipyard's plant equipments and Ship's main and auxiliary machineries, can find India as a market for export of their product.
- xix) In the long run India may provide a better field for development of Joint venture integrated shipyard to undertake shipbuilding, shiprepair and ship recycling.

## 海事産業基盤の構築に向けた日印経済協力

小林 健  
三菱商事執行役員

- ・ 日印海洋安全保障を主として民間経済の視点から見る。
  - (a) 経済関係の進展なくしては、安全保障関係の深化は困難。まずは、日印関係の経済関係強化が必要。
  - (b) 海事分野では、シーレーンの安全確保の為に、海運国、造船国としてのインドの成長が望まれる。
  - (c) それには、海洋、港湾、造船、海運、河川交通、海上構造物といった分野での協力関係が必要。

この分野の日印二国間の関係を歴史的に振り返りつつ、今後の望まれるべき方向を探る。

### (1) 海事インフラの基礎である港湾

この分野は、政府間の ODA に負うところ大。

1980 年以降 4 件      ハルディア港近代化  
                                 ヒパバブ港 Scrap Yard  
                                 ツチコリン港浚渫  
                                 港湾浚渫船                      等

1985 年世銀資金でのナバシュバ港建設、日本企業が建設協力

- ・ まだまだ足りない、インドの港は Shallow Draft で大型船入れず、陸上交通とのアクセスが悪い。
- ・ 近年は、資源輸出のみならず、生活資材の輸出入、又、乗用車を輸出する計画出てきて、Car Port の重要性も大。

### (2) 造船業、船舶修理業の育成

- ・ 1970～74 年 日本の ODA でコチン造船所に新造、修繕のドックを各 1 基建設。コチン造船所は後年 1986 年以降インド側自己資金の民間ベースで日本企業による 86,000DWT 型タンカーの図面供与、船用機械 Supply の Package Deal による建造技術指導で 3 隻建造した。
- ・ 造船コストの 7～80% は鉄板と船用機械の材料費。従って、造船業の発展には、船用機械工業が進出し、如何に根付くかが鍵となる。  
中国には多くの船用機械メーカーが進出しつつあり、裾野を広げつつある。  
この分野の協力が大事。その為の税制措置等インセンティブも必要。  
又、海軍が造船技術をリードする側面もある。

### (3) 海運

- ・ 古くは戦後初 1960 年 ODA でインド海運会社向貨物船 2 隻を建造。1970 年には同じく大型 Bulk Carrier 1 隻建造。
  - ・ 又、1970 年代半ばには世銀の借款で造船公社 (SCI) 向タンカー5 隻建造。
  - ・ その後は、民間ベースで多数の新造船、個別又は集中購買。
  - ・ 更に、1970 年代に Offshore 石油掘削 Jack-up Rig や海底油田パイプラインの Supply。
  - ・ 又、1994～5 年日本 ODA により、Navigation Simulator を Nautical College に提供。
- この分野では、G・G よりも民間の活発な活動力で発展。

日印の経済協力は、以前は、インフラ構築が優先されていたが最近は、併行して日本メーカーの製造業（例えば自動車）、化学工業への投資、進出により、自前の海洋インフラを備えようという動きもある。

然しながら、この分野は、依然政府間の経済協力に頼らざるを得ぬ部分大きく、上記民間の活動と併行して、海洋、海事優先のインフラ構築に向けて ODA を傾斜配分する事が必要であろう。

以 上

## **Indo-Japan Economic Cooperation for Development of Maritime Industries and Infrastructure**

**Ken Kobayashi**

**Senior Vice-President**

**Division COO, Ship, Aerospace & Transportation Systems Division**

**MITSUBISHI CORPORATION**

Without development of economic relations in the areas of maritime industries, it would be difficult to advance ocean security collaboration. In the context of ocean security, it is, therefore, a must for Japan and India to strengthen economic cooperation in these particular areas. India is expected to develop its shipping and shipbuilding industries and secure ocean security for protection of sea borne trade in the Indian Ocean. Japan should pursue mutual cooperation with India in the broad areas of maritime industries, such as port development; shipbuilding; shipping; river transport, and offshore structures.

In this presentation, I will look back to the history of relations and cooperation of Japan and India, and then look for the prospect of these specific maritime industrial areas. My presentation will focus on three major maritime sectors: port development; shipbuilding and ship repair industries, and shipping industry.

Now let me start with Indo-Japan cooperation for development of Indian ports. This area highly depended on Government-to-government basis ODA in the past. As you may recall, the 1980 onwards, there were undertaken four big ODA projects for modernization and rehabilitation of Indian ports: modernization of Haldia Port; construction of scrapping yards in Pipavav Port; dredging of Tuticorin Port; and supply of harbor dredgers to deepen the depths of Indian ports. In addition to Japanese ODA, World Bank loans were provided in 1985 to construct container terminals at Nabha Sheba Port (currently named Jawaharlal Nehru port), which are handling nearly half of India's total container activities. The expansion of Vizag Port, now in an engineering stage, is another example of Japanese constructors' cooperation in port construction in India.

After a visit to India in April 2006 of the former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro

Koizumi, it was envisaged in an ODA feasibility study to create new railway systems, in conjunction with port development --- extension of railways between Mumbai-Delhi and Delhi-Kolkata. But much more have yet to be done to advance rehabilitation and modernization of ports themselves in India. According to such feasibility studies, the depth at most of Indian ports is quite shallow, so that they could not accommodate larger ships. For further development of Indian ports as hubs in western part of Asia, it is highly required to expedite ports expansion and the deepening of port depths. And it is also necessary to make land access to ports and harbors smoother.

Nowadays Indian ports are used not only for export of mineral resources but also for export and import of living essentials by using containers. And also there is emerging a new notable move among Japanese and Korean car manufacturers which undertake joint ventures in India --- development of their own car ports in India with their own funds.

And secondly, shipbuilding and ship repair industries. In early 70s, as indicated by Mr. Mukherjee, by means of Japanese ODA, India constructed a new shipbuilding yard and repair yard in Cochin. I think their opening was 1974 when I was just a fresh man in Mitsubishi Corporation, working for the ship department. The construction was technically assisted by Mitsubishi Shipyard.

In late 80s, we introduced in the Cochin shipyard a very fantastic project called a package deal. The project enabled the Cochin shipyard to build three Aframax 86 thousand tonner tankers for the Shipping Corporation of India. The package deal in question contained supply of all construction drawings; supply of marine machineries which were packed up by a Japanese trading house, and technical assistance by a Japanese shipyard. This package of drawings, materials, machineries, and technical assistance was supplied on purely commercial basis without ODA.

The package deal project mentioned above is a precedent for the national maritime development project that India is currently pushing forward with. I understand that India is contemplating to build large shipyards which can build ships of more than three thousand tons --- one each in western and eastern parts of the country. I really hope that this project will help develop Indian

shipbuilding industries.

As some experts indicate, the cost of shipbuilding is accounted for largely by that of materials. In the total cost of a new ship construction, labor cost accounts for some 20% to 30 %, while costs of steel materials, marine machinery, and equipment account for 70% to 80 %. Thus, it is quite natural that the development of shipbuilding industry depends a great deal on marine machinery industries. Whether marine machinery manufacturers come to India and take root there or not, is highly important to shipbuilders. In China, for instance, Japanese and Korean marine machinery manufactures came and made investments, thereby extending their businesses. I really hope that our marine machinery industries go to India likewise; make investments; employ Indian laborers, and produce machineries there. For that purpose, the governments of both countries are asked to introduce a tax incentives, which is a sort of soft treatment for enterprises or industries investing in India.

Then thirdly, shipping and shipping industry. In India shipping has a very long history. Let me look back to ODA for shipping sector. Today it is basically prohibited by the UNCTAD agreement to provide soft loans on commercial basis to merchant shipping. But in older days, soft loans for such purposes were not prohibited and we started soft loans in 1960 after the World War II. The first Japanese ODA to India was provided for shipping sector. Soft loans were extended to construction of two cargo ships for Indian private companies, ships which were built in Japanese shipyards. It was followed by much larger ships in 1970 built also with the Japanese government aids. This large ship, a 120 thousand tonner, which could carry iron and ore, was built in Mitsubishi Hiroshima. The ship was christened Gotama Buddha.

In early 70s, India built five new large tankers for shipping corporations by means of World Bank loans, instead of Japanese ODA. Yet, those ships were built in Japan. After that, a large volume of new construction and repair work was done on private, commercial basis without government aids, although sometimes India's Central Purchasing Scheme was employed to acquire commercial ships.

As for offshore oil drilling, Japanese builders supplied, with government aids,

new jack-up rigs for ONGC, and pipelines for underwater oils. In the field of education of seafarers, navigation simulators were supplied to nautical colleges in India by use of Japanese ODA. Bilateral cooperation in seafarer segment is becoming increasingly important, because many Japanese ships under the flag of convenience are using more and more Indian officers and crew combinations.

Previously priorities of economic cooperation between Japan and India were put on infrastructure development. But in these days a lot of new commercial activities have come to existence; for instance, Japanese car manufacturers or chemical industry which have already invested in India and are now in the process of success, they are starting to prepare their own ports and harbors jointly with Indian companies, under assistance of local governments like tax incentives. This is obviously a new move. However, in the field of maritime infrastructures, there are still numerous requirements for assistance on government-to-government basis. Therefore, in parallel with private and commercial activities, it should be essential to incline Japanese ODA more for maritime activities.

# インドの港湾・海事セクターに対する日本の ODA / Japan's ODA to Indian Ports Sector and Maritime Sector

石津 緒 / Hajime ISHIZU

国土交通省大臣官房審議官 /

Assistant Vice-Minister for International Affairs, Minister's Secretariat Ministry of Land,  
Infrastructure and Transport

Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Japan's ODA (Official Development Assistance) to Indian Ports Sector and Maritime Sector**

**- Contents -**

1. Japan's Country Assistance Program for India  
- Priority Targets, Sectors-, etc.
2. Typical ODA Projects in Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors  
- Outline and effects-, etc.
3. Direction for Expanding Cooperation  
- Candidate Projects-, etc.
4. Conclusion

Hajime ISHIZU  
Assistant Vice Minister  
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Japan (MLIT-J)

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 1

Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Japan's Country Assistance Program for India (May 2006)**

**Priority Target of Japan's ODA to India:**

- Economic Growth
- Poverty & Environment Issues
- Human Resources Development

**ODA tools**

- Yen Loan
- Grant Aid
- Technical Cooperation

**Priority Sector (fields are covered by MLIT-Japan):**

- **Transport** ➡ Urban transportation systems  
\*Ports, railways and major trunk roads
- Urban Development ➡ Sewage Systems
- Tourism ➡ Tourism infrastructure

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 2

Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Sector-wise breakdown of Yen Loan Projects**

- India ➡ the largest recipient of Japan's ODA
- Yen Loan assistance ➡ over 95% of Japan's ODA to India
- Effects ➡ Improvement of Indian logistics activities and urban transport systems

**Breakdown of Yen Loan Projects through 1986 to 2005**

Total amount 1,940 billion JPY

Sub-Sector	Billion JPY
Railway	223.6 ( 11.5% )
Ports & Maritime	21.5 ( 1.1% )
Road	47.6 ( 2.5% )
Sewerage	174.6 ( 9.0% )
Tourism	29.8 ( 1.5% )

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 3

Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Typical ODA Projects in Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors**

- Yen Loan Projects**
  - Haldia Port Modernization
  - Modernization of the Hoogly Dock
  - Tuticorin Port Dredging
  - Visakhapatnam Port Expansion
- Grant Aid Projects**
  - Updating Training Equipments for Seafarers
- Technical Cooperation**
  - Development Study on the Port of Mumbai
  - Dispatching Japanese experts on port/shipbuilding engineering, etc.

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 4

Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Good Practice (1) by ODA to Indian Ports Sector**

**Haldia Port Modernization Project**

- Yen Loan Amount: 3.8 billion JPY
- Main Scope:
  - \*Construction of No. 2 Oil Jetty
  - \*Yen Loan assistance
  - \*Container Handling Equipment
  - \*Indian own budget

**Effects**

- Enhancing the port capacity in the outer harbor of the Kolkata Port
- Attracting investment from refinery and petrochemical industries in the hinterland

Increasing Cargo Volume of Haldia Port

Completion of Project: Dec. 92

92/93 99/00 05/06

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 5

Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Good Practice (2) by ODA to Indian Ports Sector**

**Tuticorin Port Dredging Project**

- Yen Loan Amount: 7.0 billion JPY
- Main Scope:
  - \*Dredging of waterway/basin
  - \*Yen Loan assistance
  - \*Construction of container berths
  - \*Indian own budget

**Effects**

- Calling of larger vessels due to deepened/widened waterway, etc.

Increasing Cargo Volume of Tuticorin Port

Completion of Project: Mar. 2002

2001/02 03/04 05/06

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 6



Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Good Practice by ODA to Indian Maritime Sector**

**Updating Training Equipment Project for Seafarers**

➤ **Grant Aid Amount: 1.9 billion JPY**

➤ **Main Scope:**

- Supply of following Simulators
  - \*Ship Maneuvering Simulator
  - \*Cargo Handling Simulator
  - \*Engine Room Simulator

**Effects**

- **Creation of employment**
- **Reinforcement of maritime industry ground**
- **Training of excellent mariners (JAPAN)**

**The worldwide demand for and supply of seafarers**

Serious shortage of ship's officer in the future  
-2.7 (ten thousand) shortage of ship's officer (at 2015)  
Risk to be not able to meet rapid growing demand (BIMCO / ISF estimates)

Effect of Seafarers training in the merchant service of the developing country

- Appropriate training for Seafarers (STCW Convention etc.)
- Strengthen Maritime Security (SOLAS Convention etc.)
- Promotion of Environmental measures (MARPOL Convention etc.)
- Support autonomy and development of each economy by the promotion of the Maritime Policy

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 7

Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Direction for Expanding Cooperation**

**Direction for Cooperation through ODA**

- On-going **Feasibility Study** on the DFC\* in the railway sector
  - \* **Dedicated multimodal Freight Corridors with computerized train control**
- Continued **assistance to strengthen Indian gateway ports**
  - ex.) **Major ports connecting with DFC\***

Assistance to Indian Policy

**Policies/Programs by the 10th Plan (2002-07), National Development Council, India**

- Development of **Gateway Ports**
- Development of **Hinterland/Port Connectivity**
- **Private Sector Participation**, etc.

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 8

Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Candidate Projects in the Ports Sector**

**Target ports connecting with Eastern and Western DFC**

➤ **Urgency/Necessity** of coping with the **cargo demand** in target ports

**-Eastern Ports-**

- Kolkata
- Diamond Harbour
- Haldia
- Sagar

**-Western Ports-**

- Mundra
- Kandla
- Pipavav
- JN Port
- Mumbai

Source: RITES, India

Port-wise projection of container traffic

2003/04 2005/07 2011/12 2016/17 2021/22

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 9

Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Promoting PPP (Public Private Partnership) through ODA**

**Concept of Role-sharing in the port development**

**Yen Loan** ➤ **\*key infrastructures** with huge investment  
\* **low- or non-profitable facilities** such as berthing facility, basin, waterway, etc.

**Private Fund** ➤ **\*high profitable facilities** such as handling equipment, yard, etc.

**Private Fund Portion**

**Yen Loan Portion**

**Yen Loan/Private**

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 10

Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Further Cooperation Area in the Maritime Sector**

**Maritime Education & Training for Seafarers**

**Ship in Campus** -Technical Support to MERI Mumbai-

- Dispatch the Experts for Maritime Education & Research
- Supply Equipment
  - (1) Engine Control System of Diesel Engine Plant
  - (2) Exhaust Gas Watch & Analytical System
- Operation for practical training (replacement of training ship)
- Initiate environment awareness in the Indian Seafarers education etc.

**Cooperation for the Marine Environment Protection**

- **Technology transfer of oil spill response**, etc.
- \* **Training Program**, \* **Dispatching Experts**
- \* **Partnership between both Coast Guards**

Image of Educational Training Equipments

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 11

Session 3: Japan's ODA to Indian Ports & Maritime Sectors

**Conclusion**

**Needs to further develop the maritime sector (incl. ports)**

- **Contribution to the efficiency of logistics**
- **Solution to bottlenecks of trade and investment**
- **Well-balanced development with other modes (railway, road)**

**Importance of the ODA Project Preparation in the maritime sector (incl. ports)**

- Two (2) principles of Japan's ODA
  - \* **Request Basis Principle**
    - **Giving maritime ODA projects to the highest priority** through Indian domestic procedures -
  - \* **Mutual Preparation Principle**
    - **Promoting the exchange of information/views** -

India: Ministry of Shipping, Coast Guard, Port Trusts, MERI, Related industries

Japan: MLIT incl. Coast Guard, International Aid Bodies (JBIC, JICA), Related industries

Consultation/Coordination regarding ODA requests. Project preparation based on feasibility studies, etc.

Japan-India Dialogue on Ocean Security -Phase II-2- 12 - 13 October 2006, Tokyo Japan MLIT-J 12



## Paper for Reference Purposes

---

日印協力の展望

The Prospect of Japan-India Cooperation



## **The Prospect of Japan-India Cooperation**

**Takako Hirose**

**Professor Faculty of Law, Senshu University**

### **1. The Strength of India**

#### **(1) Economic Aspect**

- i) The irreversible liberalisation policy
- ii) Economic growth:
- iii) IT and other industries

#### **(2) Political Aspect**

- i) democracy: stable
- ii) civilian control established: cf. Pakistan
- iii) freedom of speech: transparency- example= The Standing Committee Reports on Defence (cf. China)

#### **(3) Social Aspect**

- i) manpower: education- mathematics emphasised (cf. USA), middle-class- 200~300 million = high-quality manpower + market
- ii) diversity: strength rather than weakness

#### **(4) Military Power**

- i) Strong Military Forces
- ii) Nuclear weapons with indigenously developed missiles
- iii) Joint exercises with 7 countries in 2005 (cf. Pakistan with 2 countries)
- iv) Increasingly important role in the security of the Sea Lines of Communication

#### **(5) International Dimension**

- i) US: from “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership = NSSP) to global partnership, the nuclear deal, the gap between India and Pakistan increasing
- ii) China:
  - a) The relationship with India is a dependent variable rather than independent from Chinese point of view. It largely depends on India’s relations with US and Japan.
  - b) The border talks are slowly progressing, but the mutual distrust is yet to

overcome.

iii) Neighbouring countries

- a) Pakistan: The relationship has improved tremendously, but some distrust at the top level and in the strategic circles, but amicable atmosphere among peoples. Kashmir conflict will take time.
- b) Bangladesh and Nepal: the relationship is difficult for India because of its size and power.

(6) Human Network: Indian Diasporas

- i) Indian diasporas, especially those in the West are assuming increasing importance.
- ii) NRIs (Non-Resident Indians) and PIO (People of Indian Origin) counting over three million (Indian Government Reports on the Indian Diasporas 2002) enjoy the highest economic status among all the ethnic groups in US. Their average income was \$60,000 as against the national average of \$38,000. 300,000 lived in Silicon Valley (15%), and their average income was US\$200,000 in 2000.
- iii) The entrepreneurs' global network: TiE (Talent, Ideas & Enterprise), established in 1992 in Silicon Valley, has grown into a global network with 45 branches in 10 countries.
- iv) The Indian diasporas in US (and to a lesser degree in UK) influence policy-making of India as well as US, through lobbyists and India Caucus.

2. The negative aspects

(1) Economy

- a) The shadow part of the liberalization policy was shown in the 2004 election. 'India Shining' campaign had a negative impact.
- b) The remarkable growth has been largely confined to service sector, which does not create many jobs.
- c) The disparities have widened between rich states (South & West) and poor states (North-East and East). The "digital divide" has polarized the nation.
- d) Infrastructure and energy are bottlenecks.

(2) Democracy

- e) The performance of the successive governments in terms of achieving an egalitarian society is rather poor.

- f) The social structure largely determines the way in which democracy functions. The “identity politics” prevailed in the 1980s and 90s, but the last election shows a shift from the identity politics to more performance-oriented politics.
- g) Democracy takes time.

(3) Social

- h) Poverty is still visible.
- i) The diversity of society has been exploited by political parties, resulting in ethnic conflicts.
- j) The ethnically divided society gives room for neighbouring countries to interfere.

3. Japan-India Relationship

- (1) The 1940s and 50s were romantic period for Japan-India relationship. Indian culture, philosophy and certain policies were highly appreciated by the Japanese.
- (2) When Japan started recording a miraculous economic growth in the 1960s, South-East Asia replaced India and later Korea and China. Until the 1980s Japanese did not regard India as an important partner.
- (3) In the 1990s, although India’s “Look East policy” targeted Japan, Japan did not respond the way India was expecting.
- (4) When Japanese interests in India were picking up, India conducted nuclear tests, resulting in the relationship deteriorating into the worst in history.
- (5) PM Mori’s visit to India in 2000 was a break through. The relationship has improved. The two factors contributed: the improvement of US-India relationship and Japan’s deteriorating relationship with China.
- (6) The improved relationship between Japan and India has assumed a new dimension. Political and strategic relationship has been strengthened.

4. Japan-India Relationship

- (1) The 1940s and 50s were romantic period for Japan-India relationship. Indian culture, philosophy and certain policies were highly appreciated by the Japanese.
- (2) When Japan started recording a miraculous economic growth in the 1960s, South-East Asia replaced India and later Korea and China. Until the 1980s Japanese did not regard India as an important partner.
- (3) In the 1990s, although India’s “Look East policy” targeted Japan, Japan did not

respond the way India was expecting.

- (4) When Japanese interests in India were picking up, India conducted nuclear tests, resulting in the relationship deteriorating into the worst in history.
- (5) PM Mori's visit to India in 2000 was a break through. The relationship has improved. The two factors contributed: the improvement of US-India relationship and Japan's deteriorating relationship with China.
- (6) The improved relationship between Japan and India has assumed a new dimension. Political and strategic relationship has been strengthened.

## 5. Suggestions

- (1) It is important to deal with China with some caution. China is highly sensitive of and over-reactive to India's relationship with other countries. Japan should not consider India as a counterbalance to China, but try to engage China in more constructive multilateral forums. India also does not want to be used as such.
- (2) The US-India nuclear deal was quite shocking to Japan. Japan has been forced to review its non-proliferation policy. Pressuring India (and Pakistan) did not work. "Hiroshima" and "Nagasaki" alone is not enough. A more comprehensive non-proliferation policy is needed and UK and Japan would make the best partnership in this matter. The deal could affect Japan-US relationship in the long run, but should not affect Japan-India relationship. The nuclear issue is not a bilateral issue between Japan and India, but a global issue which the two countries should tackle together.
- (3) UNSC seats: Japan and India once competed with each other over the non-permanent seat, but have learned a lesson and now are cooperating, the efforts of which should not be given up.
- (4) Due to the increasing demands for energy resources, the sea lanes are assuming ever greater concerns for the Japanese. The closer cooperation with India is desperately needed.
- (5) In the post-Cold War world, threat comes not only from states but more from non-state actors, especially terrorists. In view of India's long experience of fighting against terrorism and Japan's endeavour to understand the root causes of terrorism, the both countries should establish a system whereby cooperation in securing peace can be attained.



**“ Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security ”**

2007年 3 月発行

発行 海洋政策研究財団（財団法人シップ・アンド・オーシャン財団）

〒105-0001 東京都港区虎ノ門 1 - 15 - 16 海洋船舶ビル

TEL : 03( 3502 )1828 FAX : 03( 3502 )2033

本書の無断転載、複写、複製を禁じます

ISBN978-4-88404-185-4



