Biodiversity is the key to the health of the ocean. Finally, we on earth have started to realize this important fact. In order to protect the ecosystems of the ocean, we need to build an integrated framework that transects all relevant organizations and implement a "precautionary principle" approach to policy decision-making.

　

 Around the world, fisheries catches are being pushed to the limit. In most regions of the world ocean, once-rich fishing grounds are collapsing, as typified by Georges Bank in the western Atlantic Ocean. At the same time, human impacts such as development on land and pollution are degrading coastal marine ecosystems that serve as crucial breeding grounds for marine organisms including many commercially valuable species. Among such habitats are coral reefs, mangrove swamps, seaweed meadows and underwater kelp beds. The decline of populations of larger fish due to overfishing and destruction of spawning/breeding grounds is a critical factor in the deterioration of marine ecosystems and the reduction of biodiversity.

 Unfortunately, policy-makers and the media evidence little concern for the biological impoverishment of marine ecosystems. There are several reasons for this. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that people don't witness the decline of living communities beneath the opaque surface of the sea, and therefore they aren't very interested. To those who might exhibit some curiosity, the problems may not elicit sympathy, or they may be difficult to understand. For instance, many of the changes in marine productivity are related to the large amounts of fish caught, and people want those fish. Also, even major upheavals in fish production and habitats tend to go unnoticed if total catch is relatively unchanged. It must be borne in mind that catch and production are not the same thing. These can differ greatly based on the scale and intensity of fishing efforts and the effectiveness of the equipment used, so catch statistics cannot be taken as reliable indicators of the true state of affairs in the oceans. Furthermore, market information relative to the varieties of fish commercially available is a poor guide to the status of other species. Finally, catch reporting is often inaccurate, sometimes intentionally so. Exaggerated reporting, particularly by China, has been responsible for inflated estimates of the amount of fish in the sea.

 Given the misinformation and the gaps in information, it is not surprising that governments have not developed effective ocean environmental policies and the pubic has not noticed the need for them. One major problem in ocean governance is that the responsibility for ocean policy is fragmented among many organizations and institutions, making comprehensive policymaking difficult. In the United States for example, fishing in the three-mile coastal zone is controlled by each state, while fishing in the 200mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is under the jurisdiction of the National Marine Fisheries Service, a federal agency. Moreover, offshore oil fields are the preserve of the Department of the Interior; the US Navy governs areas of submarine activity and establishes environmental criteria for its own vessels; and responsibility for marine pollution is shared between the Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) and the Coast Guard. The situation in Japan is similar: the management of the fisheries is a complicated affair between the Fisheries Agency, fishing co-operatives and local governments, whereas issues of marine shipping and pollution are variously handled by the Japan Coast Guard and the Ministry of the Environment. The problem here is that the ecosystems and biodiversity do not correspond to the niceties of bureaucratic jurisdiction, and in any case none of these agencies is primarily concerned with the preservation of the biological integrity of marine ecosystems. It is rare indeed that these various institutions meet to coordinate solutions to environmental problems.

　

　

 Another problem is that the general public does not understand that biodiversity includes, not only species, but also ecosystems, habitats, and genetics. Yet, because diversity of species is the easiest concept for the public to grasp, it is widely thought that everything is fine as long as the number of species is conserved, even in populations so small as to make the species ecologically insignificant. Public attention focuses on endangered species, especially larger and more familiar fauna, while ignoring the loss of habitats essential for the propagation and growth of a great many species, including less familiar creatures. The public rarely hears or cares about declines in numbers of organisms that play key roles in food chains (the relationship between predators and prey) and disruptions and imbalances among species critical to each other's survival. It is little understood that these and other complex biological phenomena are equally important factors in the loss of biodiversity.

　

 The regulation of fishing, pollution and other activities that affect marine biological environments has long been based on risk assessment. Obviously the outcome of any assessment depends heavily on the criteria by which risk is judged. Bioassays (measurements of biological reaction to a stimulus), which are often used to assess risk, offer an instructive example. In a bioassay, a test species is selected and exposed to measured amounts of pollutant or other environmental stress. If that stress causes the death of some of the target organisms, percent death is recorded as the result of the bioassay; but more subtle processes that may have been occurring before the organism died, such as abnormal behavior or reproductive loss, are ignored. Moreover, bioassay results for one or two species are hardly adequate to assess the impact of a stress on an entire natural ecosystem, with its complex interactions among multitudes of organisms. Research bias, which reports only those results that are in line with expectations, is another source of error. Errors and gaps in scientific knowledge, along with surprise responses of natural systems to environmental stress, all introduce uncertainty into the assessment of risk. Policy-makers must take full account of this problem in their risk-assessment approaches. Regrettably, this is rarely the case. While some modern risk assessment methodologies allow for the consideration of some types of uncertainty, there is a need for additional approaches that take full account of the potential for environmental harm and consider the full array of alternative actions to avoid the harm.

 Policy decisions regarding human health and the preservation of the environment must be based solidly on a scientific approach. Yet, since even science is prone to uncertainty and errors, final decisions on such questions should be grounded in sound ethical principles as well. The precautionary principle or precautionary approach offers an alternative that is both grounded in science and responsive to ethical considerations. This approach has come to be recognized in numerous international agreements governing the environment, including the Rio Declaration, drawn up at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Although agreements that explicitly recognize this principle include among others, the UN Convention of Biological Diversity, the London Convention (governing the disposal of waste at sea), the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and a variety of regional environmental declarations, the principle has been rarely invoked in law to protect biodiversity.

 The precautionary approach emerged as a topic of discussion among policy-makers and industry leaders in the United States in 1998, when the Science and Environmental Health Network, a non-governmental organization (NGO), convened a meeting in Wingspread, Wisconsin and issued a consensus statement calling for and defining the Precautionary Principle. It states: "When an activity raises threat of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically." In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public bears the burden of proof. The proponent must also involve an examination of the full range of alternatives, including no action. This is not a call for "no action" in most cases, a criticism often leveled at the precautionary approach. Instead it challenges decision makers to identify and assess alternative methods of accomplishing the goals of human activities in the natural world with less likelihood of damaging environment or human health. "No action" is the last resort when such innovative alternatives cannot be found.

 Many NGOs in the United States promote the precautionary principle as an overarching policy. Opponents of this approach, including many government officials, criticize the principle as an anti-scientific notion that impedes technological progress and blocks important international trade (the conflict over genetically modified crops is a good example). Others maintain that the precautionary principle assumes that environmental effects of new technologies are negative, such as pollution and doubt its applicability to innovations such as fishing treaties that set out blueprints for sustainable management of resources. Unquestionably, the precautionary principle may seem to leave countries at a disadvantage if expenses are incurred making production processes or resource exploitation less threatening to the environment and human health. However, that is only a perception, since the cost of harm done in the absence of precaution is ultimately born by the public when natural resources must be restored and health problems abound among the population. In the case of the ocean, the fact remains that human activities are clearly depleting marine ecosystems and reducing biodiversity. Existing fisheries treaties and regulations do little to address the declining fish and fisheries, nor have pollution agreements and regulations ended the degradation of marine habitats. In light of these circumstances, the introduction of a legal framework based on the precautionary approach seems reasonable and justified.

　

 Biodiversity is the key to the health of the natural environment, and today the world is finally waking up to this crucial reality. Nonetheless, policy is still being formulated without regard to preserving the biodiversity of the seas. To protect marine ecosystems, we need to reflect carefully on the mistakes of the past and form a comprehensive framework for full and open communication among all related organizations, institutions, and concerned citizens. Where commercial activity poses a threat to marine environments, policy must be determined with due consideration for the functioning of ecosystems and the preservation of habitats, species, and genetic diversity (differences within and between populations). The precautionary principle is a vital tool in this strategy.

　

　

 While risk assessment by itself seeks to measure the greatest degree of damage that people or nature can tolerate, the precautionary approach asks how much damage can be prevented, drawing on the best available scientific information and personal and collective experience and using the utmost caution and foresight within the limits of incomplete scientific data. Far from posing an obstacle to the progress of science and technology, the precautionary principle serves as a shock absorber to prevent environmental damage and becomes an impetus to commercial interests to exercise greater safety and find new innovative methods and benign materials in their development of operations and products. We believe that new policies and binding criteria and laws governed by the precautionary principle should be enacted to protect the ecosystems and biodiversity of the world's oceans before they succumb. Hopefully it is not too late to implement a meaningful policy framework to protect marine ecosystems and marine biodiversity. The developed nations can use their technological and economic power to protect themselves from the threat of environmental degradation (at least for awhile), but those who depend most directly on nature for sustenance are the first to suffer and the last to recover from the loss of ecosystems and biodiversity.

　

　

　

　

 On the morning of January 17, 1995, when the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake struck Kansai area, I felt the shock in my hotel room in Osaka. I had arrived the previous day to attend a conference of Japanese and American researchers on urban disaster prevention in Kansai. Our American counterparts had strongly urged us to change the timing of the conference, as the Northridge Earthquake had occurred on this date exactly one year earlier.

 When we selected the date for the conference I reasoned, as chairman of the Regional Safety Council, that January 17 would be a good date, as it was the day after Japan's university professors finished their center tests. Needless to say I could not possibly have foreseen the calamity that would occur on that date, any more than I could have had advance knowledge of the Northridge Earthquake. When I negotiated with the Americans on the date, I was aware that it was more convenient for us than for them, and the number of participants might be reduced by as much as half. Nonetheless some 37 participants arrived from the United States, no doubt because the Northridge Earthquake of a year earlier had provided numerous findings they wanted to announce.

 The earthquake struck at 5:46 AM. It was hard to discern from the morning news what was going on, so I went downstairs for an early breakfast in the restaurant, where the other attendees had already gathered. The room was abuzz with conversation about the disaster unfolding just a few dozen miles away. Some of the younger researchers and people not involved in running the conference, deciding to go immediately to the scene of the quake, hired taxis and headed for the Kobe/Awaji area. If I had not been responsible for running the conference, I would have joined them. As it happened, it was impossible to proceed, as soon as the conference began, TV and newspaper journalists were calling constantly. I was asked to appear on the 11 o'clock news at NHK. While I waited and watched the news feed from Kobe and Awaji, I realized that as many of us as possible should depart for the affected region the next day, so I asked NHK to transport 25 of us to the scene. NHK obliged with three minibuses carrying nine people each, and soon the other media joined in, so we were all able to make the journey. We finally managed to hold a general conference on the third day. As a result of this experience, the bonds of friendship and cooperation among disaster-prevention researchers on both sides of the ocean were strengthened considerably, and many fruitful Japan-US conferences on urban disaster prevention followed.

　

 I visited more sites struck by the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake than I can count, but I only went there by car on January 17 and 18. At all other times, until the shinkansen was running again, I ventured out from Kansai International Airport by boat.

 When major earthquakes occur, access from the sea is of paramount importance. In 1923, when the Great Kanto Earthquake struck the Tokyo area, relief supplies were shipped in from around the world and unloaded on the wharf at Shibaura. Organization is important, however, as the following tale illustrates. According to Mr. Miyoshi who was present at the time, there were not enough dockworkers to handle the workload, so the people of the stricken city moved in to take the supplies themselves. Unsure how to handle the situation, local policemen asked for the opinion of the Superintendent General of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. The Superintendent General suggested that the people be allowed to carry on, with the police allocating tasks so that the work could proceed in an orderly fashion.

 Later a survey was conducted of the port facilities used during the quake disaster. The equipment used at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake was small, suited to offloading of cargo imported from China. Officials recognized that more modern ports used much larger facilities, and highly detailed plans would have to be considered to ensure the port's usefulness in the event of another earthquake.

 In the case of the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, Kobe's port had three berths specially designed to be earthquake-resistant, but none of them could be used because they were all in the same place and the bridge leading to them had collapsed. When the berths were built, it was deemed that putting them all in one location was most cost-effective; in fact, they were made useless. If each berth had been erected in a separate place, it would have been far more likely that at least one berth would be serviceable.

 More trouble arose when the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force brought in drinking water by ship, but not enough water trucks were available to distribute it. As these incidents reveal, facilities cannot be considered in isolation-planners must take into account the interplay of many different factors.

 Passenger ships were pressed into service as refuges and accommodations for relief teams. The dilemma in this case is that, if the ships are not docked, it may be difficult to get on and off the ships after the port is damaged, yet if the ships are docked when the earthquake strikes, they may be damaged along with the port. When an earthquake struck Italy in 1980, ships were used as refuges, but a lack of similar refuge facilities meant that the ships had to be used in this way far longer than intended, disrupting passenger services. For those taking refuge on the ships, however, there was no need to worry about aftershocks, nor was food supply an issue. On the morning of April 18, 1906, my grandfather was on a ship moored at the San Francisco harbor. When the earthquake struck that city, the ship was rocked by a powerful tremor but was left undamaged, in contrast to the devastation in the city center. He told me that he simply disembarked from the ship and walked around San Francisco to survey the wreckage.

 Maritime facilities have an outstanding role to play in disaster prevention, but to make proper use of them in the event of an earthquake systematic planning is needed to ensure that sea and land facilities are well coordinated. The lessons from past earthquake disasters must be carefully studied and scenarios developed on that basis. Clearly, the role of the sea in earthquake relief has not yet been adequately examined.