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The Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Pacific
 
Kazuyoshi OGAWA
Senior Researcher, Japan Institute for Pacific Studies
 
 Last September,amongst many outstanding points of conflict, the MHLC Convention on the conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean was adopted. For such resource management to be effective, littoral and shipping countries must persistently search for acceptable common ground. Furthermore, Japan needs to follow developments closely and further discussions domestically on the approach to be taken towards any issues.
 
MHLC'S Purpose and the Background to its Adoption
 The "MHLC Convention", or the "Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific" when expressed in full, is at a glimpse slightly difficult to comprehend. However, put in simple terms, its purpose is to form international rules on the means and volume of catch for the Tuna and Bonito that migrate in the Pacific Ocean.
 Different to land, the sea, and in particular the high-seas, were regarded for a long time to be universally owned by all on earth and their resources viewed as open game on a first-come-first-served basis. Countries with large fishing industries would send their fishing fleets out far beyond the horizon, and without any restrictions they would fish and trawl under the noses of other nationalities and islands. However, amongst growing nationalism that began in the early 1970's in regard to marine resources, the 200 nauticalmile international ruling on exclusive economic zones (EEZ) became firmly established, recognizing the rights of littoral countries for at least the fishing resources that surround their islands. Consequently, in order to fulfill their required catch, major fishing countries negotiated with the littoral countries concerned and began paying for the fishing rights to their waters. Through this process, not only were littoral countries presented with economic benefits, but it also provided a means for controlling the fishing takes in their nearby waters, and preventing the depletion of fishing resources.
 On the other hand, however, the establishment of EEZ's didn't resolve the issues that previously existed in terms of how and by whom fish stocks that migrated inside or outside the 200 nautical-mile zones should be managed. Due to the rapid increase in deep-sea fishing by Asian countries during this period, concern for resource depletion grew amongst littoral countries, and in order to establish a sustainable level of utilization, the formation of international arrangements between the related countries became an urgent necessity for coastal nations. To this effect, "The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna" (ICCAT) and "The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission"(IOTC), to both of which Japan is also a member, were established to formulate such resource management frameworks. In the meantime, however, talks on a framework for the Pacific Ocean fell behind, leaving Japan in constantly deep concern over uncontrolled fishing in the Pacific.
 Finally, in 1994 discussions began on the formulation of international regulations for the Pacific. In an effort to generate agreement on a multilateral treaty for the region, a number of talks were undertaken between littoral countries and territories from the Central and Western Pacific and states with fishing operations in the region, with representation at the meetings from 28 countries and territories in total. The result of these deliberations was the "MHLC Convention", which was adopted in Hawaii on September 4th, 2000 at the seventh meeting between the parties.
 However, Japan, which initially advocated the importance of resource management and participated proactively in the treaty discussions, in conjunction with Korea, opposed the adoption of the convention in its final form (20 countries for, 2 against, 3 abstentions), and refused to become a signatory party. This was to say that the talks developed in such a way that Japan's points of view weren't incorporated and so it was unable to accommodate the convention.
 
The Reasons behind Japan's Opposition
 Asahi Newspaper reported Japan's disapproval in the following manner. "Based on regulatory controls such as the tighter setting of fishing quotas and the increased authority of inspectors who board ships, the nature of the convention is very demanding". However, Japan holds strong desires for the suitable management of fishing quotas. The biggest issue for Japan that invites its opposition, is the decision making format of the convention, in conjunction with the waters targeted, the means of dealing with disputes and the tightening of regulatory controls as mentioned above.
 Amongst the participating countries of the convention, it is clearly obvious that littoral countries hold an overwhelming majority in terms of numbers, which means that when it comes to majority decisions, the notions of the littoral countries are more than strongly reflected. However, it is stipulated in the convention that maintaining consistency between management measures for within the EEZ and those outside in open waters is an important priority, so the possibility arises that coastal fishermen, in addition to deep-sea fishermen, will also be affected by regulations that are based on the notions of foreign countries. So as not to follow in the footsteps of the whaling issues, where the "Power of Numbers" is nullifying Japan's "Power of Logic", Japan requires the right of objection to be withheld when a majority decision is made on measures that are unreasonable for fishing countries. However, this was not accepted, and despite many conflicts being left unresolved, the chairman's draft that leans in the favor of littoral countries has ended up being adopted. This process raises many concerns in relation to the continual and complete rejection of fishing country's notions on the presence of the "Power of Numbers", especially during the discussions on measures for storage management, which are closely related to the fishing quota's that will supposedly be decided after the convention has been put into effect.
 From another point of view, there is also a strong sense of uncertainty surrounding some littoral countries that regard their immediate fishing rights as being more important than any resource management. Therefore, if adverse claims are accommodated, there are concerns that regulatory measures for the conservation of resources will effectively be watered down by the objections of fishing countries. In either case, the fact that the adoption of this convention was forced through without enough careful deliberation of the member countries, or the thorough search for acceptable common ground, will no doubt create problems for the future.
 
The Fishing Catches of the Countries/Regions in the Territory Targeted by the MHLC Convention (Unit: Tons)
Country/Region 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Japan 523,963 458,313 445,067 396,221 367,142
Indonesia 196,324 215,951 229,431 256,975 285,300
Taiwan 216,315 219,555 233,089 234,278 216,568
Philippine 106,148 147,739 171,068 171,284 177,439
South Korea 130,496 199,506 177,896 149,831 161,217
U.S.A. 177,376 194,823 156,010 146,403 140,391
Guam 110 123 46 32 41
Solomon Islands 29,813 35,299 55,228 40,804 41,385
Papua New Guinea 8 1,781 15,230 11,077 20,810
Fiji 8,209 8,787 12,467 13,121 12,663
New Zealand 4,593 9,610 8,046 11,033 8,245
Federated States of Micronesia 16,003 22,150 7,692 8,227 8,078
Australia 5,189 4,356 4,300 4,762 7,408
China 5,614 11,143 9,261 5,281 2,953
Kiribati 293 192 482 482 482
Marshall Islands 136 53 35 35 35
New Caledonia 1,237 1,301 1,175 1,117 903
Northern Mariana Islands 40 45 69 92 75
Palau 75 80 80 93 93
Tuvalu 584 272 272 275 275
Vanuatu 490 186 186 665 161
Singapore 0 5 5 5 47
Total 1,423,016 1,531,713 1,527,131 1,452,093 1,451,711
Source: 
"Annual Fishing Catch Statistics, 1997", Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Note: 
The figures in this table are obtained by totaling the catches of the main fish species in the territory (statistics from area fisheries 61, 71, 91 of the FAO)
 
 In order to dispel the concerns of the fishing countries involved, since the adoption of the MHLC Convention Japan has approached each member country about these issues. However, with many of the littoral countries holding a firm stance on their agreement to the convention, regrettably these activities have gone in vain. Furthermore, Japan also chose to overlook participating in a meeting held in April this year to deliberate on the convention's operational regulations. In the event that Japan and other fishing countries were to oppose participation in the convention, the resource management objectives of the agreement would lose all their effectiveness. Surely this emphasizes the need for littoral countries to reconsider the real objectives of the convention and to sit down with the member fishing countries for further talks on the unresolved matters at hand.
 For Japan, the Central and Western Pacific Ocean targeted by the convention contains nearly 80% of Japan's take of Tuna and Bonito. Therefore, in terms of the potential effect on the dining tables of the Japanese people, here hides an issue that by far exceeds any disputes involving international whaling. Sadly, the Japanese media has failed to pick up on the importance of the "MHLC Convention" and so it has no doubt gone unnoticed by most citizens of Japan.
 Judging by the required conditions for validation and the attitudes of each country, the "MHLC Convention" will probably be brought into force sometime between 2003 and 2004. Before this, Japan must maintain persistent pressure on the other member countries to acknowledge its stance and move towards the amendment of the present agreement. Regardless of the result of any such efforts, in 3 years time Japan will be faced with the difficult choice of accepting or rejecting the convention. While airing all related issues to the general public, during this time Japan needs to follow developments closely and further discussions domestically on the approach to be taken.
(Ship & Ocean Newsletter No.19 May 20, 2001)
 
 
Masanobu TERADA
Secretary,Marine Traffic System Forum
 
 The "Ehime-Maru" accident was a tragic incident in which a mistake by the US Navy took the lives of nine people, including several young high school students. For a period after the incident, the Japanese media, in conjunction with many websites, gathered much sympathy for the lost crew and reported extensively on the emotional aspects of the tragedy. However, there were few references made to the different values of Japanese and American people in terms of the political system in America that caused the collision, the rescue effort after the accident and the raising of the sunken "Ehime-Maru".
 
The US Coast Guard's Prompt Search and Rescue
 We can only assume that the nine people tragically lost in the incident were trapped below deck, therefore making it impossible for them to be rescued. If nothing else, at least all the Ehime-Maru crewmembers thrown into the sea by the impact of the collision were saved by the US Coast Guard's prompt rescue effort, and on-going reports on the state of rescue activities were posted on the US Coast Guard's website immediately following the tragedy.
 The prompt and efficient rescue services of the US Coast Guard and the US Navy are highly regarded in their own right. I distinctly remember Satoru Matsuki, yachtsman and Honorary Professor of Kobe University of Mercantile Marine, telling me about the US Coast Guard's immediate reply to his distress call along the coast of America. On expressing his gratitude they replied by saying "It's our obligation to provide such a service to the tax paying public of this country".
 However, there were two hot topics of discussion in relation to the rescue effort of the Ehime-Maru.
 The first was the issue of the crew of the submarine assuming the role of bystanders and not participating in the rescue activities after the accident. It appears that they judged that, rather than making a poor attempt from a submarine without any rescue equipment, that a more efficient and effective effort could be made by waiting for the trusty US Coast Guard, who are specialists in rescue activities. Furthermore, this may also explain why they choose not to interfere in the rescue, and watched as fellow US Navy personnel completed the rescue on their behalf. Maybe it's unavoidable that Japanese people felt that such spectatorship was disgraceful, but it must be accepted that in the heat of the moment such a judgment is likely to have been made. Sure, if the coast guard rescue team were late to respond, naturally you would have expected that the crew of the submarine would have attempted to make the rescue, but in this case it's hard to say that such emotional criticism was advisable.
 The other issue is that of the U.S. Coast Guard wanting to call off the search and rescue activities. One can imagine that after 10 days of rescue activities and no sign of the missing nine people, this was nothing but a rational decision made in relation to the remote possibility of finding anyone by continuing the search. However, the strong pleas of the victims' families and Ehime Marine High School were accepted and the search was continued for some time after. Surely the US Coast Guard and the US Navy must be acknowledged for attempting to understand the feelings of the grieving Japanese and acting in an appropriately respectful manner.
 Consequently, I think it can be said that America's response at the scene of the accident was more than reasonable considering the circumstances. On the other hand, however, I think it was very regrettable that the US media translated the Ehime-Maru not as a "Training Ship" but as a "Fishing Boat", which portrayed an image to the American public that a Japanese ship using youth labor was undertaking trawling operations near Pearl Harbor, of course, when its motives were very much different.
 
An Accident Invited by a Obligatory Service to the Civilian Public(Taxpayers)
 The way in which administration provides obligatory services to the taxpaying public of America is no doubt an outstanding achievement of the American democratic system. However, taken from another view, it was also the incorrect implementation of this obligation to civil society that led to this tragic accident.
 Allowing the passage of civilians aboard a leading nuclear powered submarine that is less than 5 years old, and furthermore to put the passengers through an emergency surfacing experience is something that could only be heard of in America. Even if this was considered to be a way of disclosing information to the civilian public, you would at least think that the most important issue during the experience would be to educate the public about the safety assurance functions of the submarine. This too is the kind of experience that civilians aboard should have demanded, instead of the thrill of the rapid resurfacing maneuver being the "main event" of the journey. Is it not that the US Navy's manual on "Civilian Submarine Tours" is concentrated on displaying performance limits to its audience? I only hope that US Navy officials and the general public understand that, not only is there absolutely no meaning in an experience that caters for desires that are different from the safe everyday navigation of submarines and also the aims of an excellent democratic system, but rather that this process has created a detrimental service that causes accidents. One would imagine that former Commander Scott Waddle, the other crewmembers of the submarine, and indeed the civilians (taxpayers) aboard the submarine, themselves, now ever regret the day that high-ranking navy officials first ordered the guiding of unfamiliar civilians through a cramped submarine. Of course Commander Waddle is no doubt even more remorseful that, amongst the disorder, the all important safety check was verified by just one quick account of the activities on the surface. No excuse now will ever exempt him from the responsibility for the collision.
 In his apology to the bereaved families, Commander Waddles commented that he would have to burden a large weight on his mind for the rest of his life. This signals that he is certainly aware of this responsibility.
 Even if the requests of civilians (taxpayers) for information disclosure and demonstrations are considered to be worthy, America must reflect on this incident as highlighting the top priority that must be exercised towards safety.
 The Ehime-Maru accident can be viewed overall as a sad incident in which the American system failed miserably.
 
The Raising of the Ehime-Maru
 The issues surrounding the raising of the Ehime-Maru throw much light on the differences in Japanese and American culture.
 For the families, relatives and friends involved in the Ehime-Maru tragedy, confirming the deaths and obtaining the remains of the nine people, presumed to be trapped in the hold of the sunken ship, are the only motives behind their requests. The actual reclamation of the ship itself is of no particular concern. In contrast, in western culture people often receive special dignity for meeting with misfortune at sea, and more often than not their bodies and spirits are left to rest in peace where their lives were taken. Without working through the misconceptions that occur from such cultural differences in thinking, America's views on the feasibility of raising the Ehime-Maru initially focused entirely on the physical aspects of the issue. However, even with the cultural misconceptions, must we not give the United States credit for the positive way they agreed to undertake the salvage of the sunken vessel?
 As I mentioned earlier in this article, this collision was caused by a mistake by the US Navy, and there is no room for explanation or debate in regards to their responsibility in the incident. However, for the prevention of further accidents, the coexistence of both parties in maritime affairs and the mutual respect of different cultural values, I think that examining the background to this tragic accident, in terms of the American political system, the state of search and rescue activities and the large gap created by cultural differences is very important.
(Ship & Ocean Newsletter No.20 June 5, 2001)







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