The 12 October 2000 attack by terrorists in Aden on the U.S. warship USS Cole has recently reminded the U.S., in particular, of the threat of maritime terrorism. This threat first received wide international notice with the Palestinian terrorist hijacking of the Achilles Laura passenger liner in the Mediterranean in 1985, and the murder onboard of an American passenger. Now that over thirty years have passed since the initial late 1960s surge in air highjackings and hostage takings, terrorism is hardly a “new” transnational security phenomenon. Nor is there, unfortunately, any lack of experience with a variety of military roles in countering terrorism--from intelligence, to defensive “force protection,” to hostage rescue, to apprehension of terrorists. Yet the recent complications in foreign relations caused by the Philippine terrorists' capture of tourists from Europe and other regional countries, and their transport form a Malaysian to a Philippine island, shows that maritime terrorism is an international problem that keeps resurfacing in various forms. The most worrisome form, to which the U.S. military is now devoting considerable attention, is if terrorists were to use biological or chemical agents (or nuclear weapons) in an attack. In the U.S. context, after the 1997 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and again after the USS Cole attack, there has been greatly increased emphasis on “force protection” against terrorist attacks--which may in turn complicate other military requirements. Concerns with force protection, and preparations to counter terrorist chemical and biological attack, will likely continue to be central features of the U.S. military's response to terrorism, joining traditional intelligence, hostage rescue, and terrorist apprehension roles. Where state sponsorship is identifiable, retaliatory (or even preemptive) attacks on terrorist facilities, like the 1998 U.S. Tomahawk missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, are also likely key military roles in countering terrorism.

　

　　The 1985 Achille Lauro maritime terrorism led to the IMO 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the Rome Convention). The Rome Convention (and a protocol extending its application to offences on fixed platforms on the continental shelf) extended international legal jurisdiction against terrorist acts beyond the restrictions of territorial waters and required their prosecution or extradition. Other than China, Australia, Japan, Canada, and the U.S., few Asia-Pacific nations have ratified this treaty. Regional states should ensure such ratification, as was again urged by the UN General Assembly Resolution of 18 January 2000.²⁷