Nonetheless, growing demands on the river's water, both upstream and downstream, have been the principal factor behind what has now become a perennial shortage. There are a total of 122 projects diverting up to 4000 cu.m./s. from the Huang He in 85 counties and municipalities to irrigate over 8 million hectares of land. These include some very productive cotton, tobacco and rice fields on the north China plain. In addition, water-short cities such as Qingdao on the dry Shandong peninsula have come to rely on diversions from the lower reaches.
Table 3 shows the history of withdrawals from the Huang He. By the 1980s, there was concern that not enough water was being left in the river for environmental purposes, notably to discharge silt into the ocean. A decade later, withdrawals in the upper reaches began to affect the total available downstream as well. The State Council issued a nonbinding allocation of water among the 11 provinces and municipalities using the river, but it was set in absolute, not proportional amounts. In effect this favors upstream users in a time of drought.
Nonetheless, some argue that it is excess withdrawals within Shandong Province, the final and heaviest user, that is a major contributor to the problems of the Huang. In addition, a sort of vicious cycle appears to have developed where localities draw off water and store it in anticipation of cutoffs that their actions help precipitate.
The upstream-downstream conflict in the Huang basin is to some extent one between equity and efficiency. Upstream provinces tend to be very poor, but also to use very high amounts of water at heavily subsidized prices to water low-value grain crops and at the same time aggravate problems of soil salinization. Downstream provinces are principal beneficiaries of the post- reform economic boom, and tend to use water for higher value crops or off-farm purposes. They also pay a higher charge for water, although still not enough to cover full cost.
